ASSASSINATION ARCHIVES

AND RESEARCH CENTER

Congressman Cohen Asks President Biden to Release Remaining Documents Relating to the Assassination of President Kennedy

March 29, 2022
Press Release
Doing so would restore public trust by promoting transparency

WASHINGTON – Congressman Steve Cohen (TN-09) today led a letter to President Biden asking him to release the remaining records related to the 1963 assassination of President John F. Kennedy. The letter was signed by Representatives Anna Eshoo (CA-18) and James McGovern (MA-03).

The letter reads in part:

“We write to express and reiterate our concern regarding the delayed release of the more than 10,000 remaining partially redacted or entirely withheld documents related to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. We urge you to release all remaining documents related to President Kennedy’s assassination pursuant to and in accordance with the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, also known as the ‘JFK Act.’

“The assassination of President John F. Kennedy was among the greatest tragedies in our nation’s history, however, nearly 60 years after that horrific day, the American people are still waiting for the government to fulfill its promise to release the remaining relevant documents. Congress unanimously enacted the JFK Act in 1992 to establish a presumption for immediate disclosure of documents related to the assassination. The purpose of such a law was to restore the public’s trust in government and prevent the spread of conspiracy theories bolstered by secrecy. Fostering transparency and facilitating public scrutiny of the remaining records relating to President Kennedy’s assassination is crucial…

“Although we commend the Biden Administration for the release of a select number of the remaining documents related to President Kennedy’s assassination, we believe it is imperative that the remaining documents be released as soon as possible. We have previously requested a briefing with the appropriate Executive Branch official with knowledge and relevant information of the decision to postpone the release of the remaining records. We write to reiterate that request, and again urge you to reconsider your decision to delay the release of the remaining documents.

“It is our hope that you take this opportunity to exercise the authority vested in you to restore public trust in our government by promoting transparency. We have waited for well over 50 years for the release of these documents, and time is of the essence.”

See the entire letter here.

The Wheaton Lead: An Exploration

by Larry Hancock and David Boylan, April 2020

Introduction

In support of the JFK Records Act of 1992, an independent agency – the Assassination Records Review Board – was formed, with the charter of locating and bringing into the national archives materials pertinent to the assassination of President John Kennedy. While the Board’s primary focus was on unreleased government documents, it operated under the premise that assassination materials included both public and private materials – regardless of how they were labeled – which described, reported on, or interpreted the activities of persons or events related to the assassination itself as well as to subsequent inquiries.

The Board and its staff began work in October, 1994 and operated for four years. As part of its activities, Board staff held regional meetings to identify new sources of JFK materials, in particular those which might be held outside the primary agencies involved in the initial Warren Commission inquiry. Going beyond documents and written materials, its staff took testimony from individuals felt to hold relevant information – primarily from those with firsthand knowledge of events related to the assassination. Due to media visibility over the JFK Records Act and the Board’s public meetings and work, a number of individuals privately contacted the Board with information they felt to be relevant to the Kennedy assassination. [ i ]

Gene Wheaton

Gene Wheaton

One of those individuals, Gene Wheaton, approached the ARRB with a fax to its chairman John Tunheim on October 20, 1995. Wheaton indicated that he felt he might have information relevant to the Board’s work. As part of that contact Wheaton provided a four page biography of himself, as well as a letter of commendation from President Richard Nixon for Wheaton’s earlier anti-drug work during an assignment in Iran. Wheaton’s career experience was in law enforcement and security operations, initially with police work and then service with both the Air Force Office of Special (criminal) investigations and with the Army Counter Intelligence Division (criminal and narcotics investigations). Following military service he had obtained his Bachelors Degree in law enforcement, and a Masters Degree in Public Administration. After obtaining his Masters he had moved into security consulting in the Middle East, working in Saudi Arabia, in Egypt (security design for the Cairo Airport) and as an advisor on security, police practices and anti-terrorism to the government of Iran. His work on counter-drug activities with Iranian law enforcement resulted in a special commendation from President Richard Nixon.

While in Iran he also worked as Director of Security for Rockwell International on its IBEX program, a project involving both photographic and communications intelligence surveillance and intelligence collections. [ ii ] Following his IBEX assignment, Wheaton did security consulting work with Iran, Egypt, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia; his assignments included working for Bechtel Corporation in the development of the huge Jeddah airport project. Wheaton’s biographical data – which has been confirmed – was impressive, not only in respect to law enforcement, but in terms of his experience in intelligence and security practices.

Gene Wheaton's follow-up letter to the ARRB

Gene Wheaton’s follow-up letter to the ARRB (click to view)

In response to his initial outreach to the ARRB, Wheaton was sent a standard form letter signed by John Tunheim, the ARRB Chairman, thanking him for his interest and advising a staff member would be in touch with him. A follow-up letter was sent to Wheaton by ARRB staff member Thomas Samoluk in early February 1995, and Wheaton responded in a two-page written fax, accompanied by a CV of the individual whom he wanted to offer as a potential source of information on the assassination. He noted that the individual had worked for him in the mid-1980s, and had been a close personal friend at that time. The individual had an earlier career as a senior CIA paramilitary officer (his wife was also a high level CIA employee). He had worked as an operations officer on the CIA’s Cuba project as well as in follow-on anti-Castro activities – his work had involved infiltrations, sabotage and assassination. While working for Wheaton in air transportation/logistics sales related to the Nicaraguan Contra effort, the individual had introduced Wheaton to Cuban and American veterans of the CIA’s anti-Castro operations.

Wheaton’s two-page fax stated that the conversations he had heard suggested that the former CIA officer and one of his key Cuban operatives had knowledge of a conspiracy against JFK and of individuals involved in the murder of President Kennedy. When Wheaton had first become aware of that information, he offered to work with the two men to arrange for Congressional immunity for their information – they had adamantly rejected that idea. At that point Wheaton was not sharing the identity of the CIA officer with the ARRB, instead he requested a personal meeting to discuss his information.

Continue reading this important article at The Mary Ferrell Foundation

A CIA Tutorial: How to Avoid Providing Files

13 SEPTEMBER, 2017 © 2017 – Bill Simpich

With the October releases coming up, we should keep in mind what the ARRB has already told us we will not find.

For those of us who research the Mexico City story, it has always been very frustrating to find that there is no organized way to find the cables and dispatches between Mexico City and Headquarters, or between these two entities and JMWAVE in Miami, except within carefully circumscribed dates.

What we have run into amounts to a CIA tutorial on how to avoid providing information that is mandated under the law.

Eusebio Azcue Lopez, former Cuban consul Mexico City

As shown below, the listing of files for JMWAVE begins on November 21, and the listing of files for HQ and Mexico City begins on October 1.  Very unhelpful for putting together the Oswald story, as well as the events prior to the assassination in Miami.

But not all of the files are missing.  A number of the files within this timeframe do exist – simply in a less organized format.  Many memos are tucked away in various other files, such as the files on Cuban consul Eusebio Azcue in CIA microfilm, Reel 2.

In fact, it is probable that most or all of these files could have been provided by the CIA if they had simply cross-indexed the files within their own Records Integration Division.

The National Archives has the duty to index the files themselves, and send a demand to the CIA for the missing files.  The Act is in effect until “the Archivist certifies to the President and the Congress that all assassination-related records have been made available to the public in accordance with this Act.”

This is yet another reason we need a new JFK Records Act with stronger enforcement powers.

From the ARRB Final Report in 1999:

The Review Board determined that, while much of the Mexico City Station cable traffic
existed in the JFK Collection, the traffic contained numerous gaps, particularly in com-
munications between Mexico City and the CIA Station in Miami, JMWAVE.

The Review Board deemed these gaps to be significant because both CIA stations played roles in U.S. operations against Cuba.

The cable traffic that the Review Board reviewed in the CIA’s sequestered collection commences on October 1, 1963, and contains the earliest known communication—an October 8, 1963, cable—between the Mexico City Station and CIA Headquarters concerning Lee Harvey  Oswald.

In 1995, the Review Board submitted a formal request for additional information
regarding the above-referenced gaps in CIA cable traffic. CIA did not locate additional
traffic for the specified periods. CIA completed its response to this request in February

1998 explaining that:

In general, cable traffic and dispatches are not available as a chronological collection and thus, for the period 26 through 30 September 1963 it is not possible to provide cables and dispatches in a chronological/package form.

During the periods in question, the Office of Communications (OC) only held cables long enough to ensure that they were successfully transmitted to the named recipient. On occasion. . .cables were sometimes held for longer periods but not with the intention of creating a long-term reference collection.

The Review Board was not able to locate cables or dispatches from the following periods:

Mexico City Station to Headquarters (September 26–30, 1963);
Headquarters to Mexico City Station (September 26–30, 1963);
JMWAVE to Headquarters (September 26–November 21,1963);
Headquarters to JMWAVE (September 26–November 21, 1963);
and all traffic between the Mexico City Station and JMWAVE for the periods September 26–October 20, 1963 and November 22–December 30, 1963.
In addition, CIA informed the Review Board that it did not have a repository for cables

and dispatches from stations in the 1960s.

Although originating offices maintained temporary chronological files, the offices

generally destroyed the temporary records in less than ninety days.

After the assassination, the Office of the Deputy Director of Plans ordered relevant CIA offices to retain cables that they would have otherwise destroyed.  The HSCA used the remaining cable traffic to compile its Mexico City chronology.

Had CIA offices strictly applied the ninety-day rule, there might have been copies of cable traffic commencing as early as August 22, 1963, rather than October 1, 1963, available to CIA on November 22, 1963.