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Phil Shenon and I agree on at least a few things. In any resolution of the mysteries surrounding the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, Mexico City will undoubtedly be important. The investigation into what happened there in 1963 was, for some reason, seriously curtailed by the U.S. government. The government has, since then, fought tooth and nail to keep the full story about what happened there secret.

While I have never met Mr. Shenon, I have spoken with him several times by telephone. I first heard from him when he called me around 2011. He introduced himself as a reporter for Newsweek Magazine. He said he was working well in advance on an article for that magazine for the 50th anniversary of JFK’s murder. He wondered whether I would be willing to talk about the HSCA’s investigation in Mexico City. I agreed to speak with him.

Over the course of that first conversation, and several follow-up calls from him over the next couple of years, it became apparent to me that Mr. Shenon was only interested in our work investigating what had happened in Mexico City in 1963 insofar as it might provide some kind of basis for linking Oswald to Castro or the Cubans. I tried to discuss the details of the HSCA investigation into what happened in Mexico City in its anomalous issues, but he was uninterested in those details. While there is an acknowledgment in his book, A Cruel and Shocking Act, stating that Ed Lopez and I were “generous with their time and interviews for this book,” precious little, if any, of what we shared with him made it into the book or any of his subsequent writing on the subject of Mexico City. Not only does Mr. Shenon ignore the post-HSCA materials we tried to bring to his attention, he also ignores the primary thrust of our report written for the HSCA.

I would not take issue with Phil Shenon if I thought what he is claiming is, merely, that the possibility of Cuban assistance to Oswald should be investigated. While I think the evidence of that is very weak at best, I will not deny that any avenue of investigation that remains open should be pursued. What I take issue with Mr. Shenon about is his single-minded concentration on that one issue and the resultant misrepresentation of facts and questions related to, and arising from, Lee Oswald’s activities in Mexico City. It appears to me that Shenon may be carrying water for the proponents of the original conspiracy theory – that Castro did it – rather than offering any objective review of the complete evidentiary base of that underlies the Mexico City visit. Shenon deliberately ignores the indicators and evidence that suggest Oswald’s trip to Mexico was either designed in advance, or spun in the aftermath, to give the appearance of Cuban and Soviet collusion in the Kennedy assassination.

Shenon’s thesis, as most recently explicated in his article in Politico, “What Was Lee Harvey Oswald Doing in Mexico?”, is built on suspicions expressed by some government officials after the assassination and Charles Thomas’s reporting of the Duran twist party – a report based on a story first told by Elena Garro de Paz. Many had initial suspicions after the assassination: Lyndon Johnson alleged a communist conspiracy within twenty minutes of JFK’s death; Bobby Kennedy’s first question to CIA Director John McCone that day was, “Did some of your guys do this?” (The Warren Commission, in Executive Session, was very concerned about Oswald’s intelligence connections, but Allen Dulles told them it was something that couldn’t really be proven, as a good intelligence officer would lie under oath to the Commission.) When Shenon and I talked, I tried to get him to consider evidence and facts that have come to light about Mexico City and the CIA’s handling of various investigations since, including the one I worked on in 1978, in his evaluation of the twist party story that lies at the root of his speculations. My efforts had no effect. Any possible explanation other than Cuban complicity has been ignored by Mr. Shenon who seems hell-bent on promoting the idea that Castro was behind the assassination, refusing to address any other possibility.

I tried, in vain as it turns out, to get Mr. Shenon to consider that what we had learned about Oswald’s activities, and the government’s reaction to those activities, could support a different explanation which also pointed to an additional avenue of investigation that needed to be publicized and followed. In my view, Oswald’s activities are more consistent with his being involved in an intelligence operation being run by U.S. intelligence than with him trying to make contact with Cubans to garner support for an assassination attempt on the sitting leader of this country.

To fully appreciate why I say that, a little background from Washington in 1978, is necessary. In 1978 the CIA resisted the HSCA’s inquiry into Mexico City more than any other area of inquiry. The chief counsel, G. Robert Blakey, told the Committee on August 15, 1978, “[T]he deeper we have gotten into the Agency’s performance in Mexico City, the more difficult they have gotten in dealing with us, the more they have insisted on relevance, the more they have gone back in effect on their agreement to give us access to unsanitized files. For a while we had general and free access to unsanitized files. That is increasingly not true in the Mexico City area….” And we have since learned that they used George Joannides to shut down the investigation into Oswald and Mexico City. In doing so, they lied to us about who he was. He ran propaganda operations in

George Joannides

Miami in 1963-64 and was the case officer for DRE, the anti-Castro group that scored the anti-Fair Play for Cuba Committee coup using Oswald in New Orleans in August of 1963. As G. Robert Blakey has since acknowledged, “The CIA not only lied, it actively subverted the investigation.” I think the CIA expected we would take the superficial approach of considering the “Castro did it” theory, but when we went beyond the initial appearances and began pushing our investigation into the propaganda sources, seeking interviews with the actual penetration and surveillance agents, seeking to find others in Mexico City who may have seen Oswald, then the Agency resistance to our investigation turned to a stonewall. Shouldn’t it be enough to raise serious questions that when a Congressional Committee investigating specific disinformation operations ran by the CIA, the CIA brings one of those involved in the operation being investigated and uses him in an undercover capacity to forestall and subvert the investigation? But that’s not all.

Consider the scenario of U.S. intelligence involvement in Oswald’s activities in Mexico City that we were not able to fully investigate in 1978. Let’s start with some background on David Phillips. David Phillips was one of, if not the, most experienced, ingenious, respected, and qualified disinformation officers in the CIA. In 1963 he was stationed in Mexico City, but, in early October, he was temporarily assigned to duty at Headquarters because he was being promoted from running anti-Castro propaganda operations to overseeing all anti-Castro operations in the

David Atlee Phillips

Western Hemisphere. He was an experienced hand. In the late 1950’s he had been under non-diplomatic cover in Havana, where he worked with student leaders who would eventually form the Directorio Revolucionario Estudantil (“DRE”). During the Bay of Pigs, Phillips was stationed at CIA Headquarters where he had responsibility for the propaganda and psychological warfare aspects of the antiCastro operations. In running those operations he not only oversaw the operations he ran personally from Headquarters, he was also the supervisor of the propaganda operations flowing out of the JMWAVE station in Miami by William Kent (aka Doug Gupton, William Trouchard). When the students who had been recruited by Phillips fled Cuba, they were reorganized under Kent’s tutelage into the DRE based in Miami.

Phillips was transferred to Mexico City later in 1961 after the Bay of Pigs. Kent was promoted to Headquarters, and George Joannides took over Kent’s position in Miami, including supervision of DRE. While still stationed in Headquarters in the early 60’s, David Phillips had worked with Cord Meyer to develop the first disinformation campaign aimed at discrediting and disrupting a group of Castro sympathizers who had organized themselves into the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC). In the summer of 1963 Lee Harvey Oswald formed a chapter of the FPCC in New Orleans. In August of 1963 Lee Harvey Oswald, still in New Orleans, had an encounter with DRE which led to a lot of publicity linking Oswald to communists, labeling him as pro-Castro, and discrediting the FPCC. In July and August of that year there is strong evidence that Oswald was used to identify and contact pro-Castro students at Tulane University. In early September, Oswald was seen with David Philips in Dallas.

On September 16, 1963, the CIA informed the FBI that it was considering action to counter the activities of the FPCC in foreign countries. To my knowledge, the operational files on this new anti-FPCC operation have never been released by the CIA. In New Orleans, on September 17, 1963, Oswald applied for, and received, a Mexican travel visa immediately after William Gaudet, a known CIA agent, had applied for one. On September 27 Oswald arrived in Mexico City. This activity did not occur suddenly or in a vacuum. Oswald had started establishing his pro-Castro bona fides earlier that summer in New Orleans, including establishing an FPCC chapter there.

There are too many similarities between Oswald’s activities in New Orleans and Mexico City to simply dismiss, without investigation or discussion, the possibility that he was being used in an intelligence operation, either wittingly or unwittingly, in both cities. In addition to his contacts with the Soviet and Cuban diplomatic facilities in Mexico City, which could have been part of an intelligence dangle, an attempt to discredit the FPCC, or both, there is now also evidence of Oswald’s contacts with students at the National Autonomous University of Mexico and his presence at social events with Cuban Consulate

Secret Wars Diary by David Atlee Phillips

employees. David Phillips frequently lied about Oswald and Mexico City, but in a footnote in a little known book he self-published, Secret Wars Diary, he wrote: “I was an observer of Cuban and Soviet reaction when Lee Harvey Oswald contacted their embassies.” [Emphasis added.] One purpose served by an intelligence dangle is to enable the dangling agency to observe the reaction and, from that observation, identify roles of employees, procedures and processes of the enemy.

There can be little doubt that Oswald’s activities, especially the more flagrant, blatant and egregious ones such as those alleged by Shenon to have occurred at the Cuban Consulate, could only have scandalized the Cuban diplomats who heard the threats and bluster – all to the discrediting of the FPCC, just as the publicity about the New Orleans encounter between Oswald and the DRE formed one of the propaganda nails in that organization’s coffin. It is much more likely, in my opinion, that the seasoned Cuban diplomats would be offended than it is that they would support someone exhibiting Oswald’s alleged behavior to attempt an assassination. It is much more likely that the Cuban diplomats would have, as the evidence shows they did, consider Oswald as a U.S. intelligence provocation. The Cubans knew of the surveillance on their facilities. Why would they use someone to do such a job who showed up under surveillance and announced his plans? On the other hand, someone as provocative as Oswald should have generated a cascade of response that, when observed by the watchers, would have revealed an abundance of information. It could also serve to discredit the FPCC with the Cubans. The CIA prevented us, in 1978, from interviewing then surviving penetration and surveillance agents who would have known more about such an operation.

In 1978, we knew not only about the allegations of the twist party, but also about the stories of Oswald’s contact with students. The CIA prevented us from interviewing Oscar Contreras, a student Oswald contacted. But Anthony Summers, and others, have interviewed him since. Contreras acknowledges that Oswald, in late September, 1963, approached him and three other students who were members of a pro-Castro student organization. He asked them for help getting a visa to Cuba from the Consulate. Contreras did have contacts at the Consulate and spoke to the Consul and an intelligence officer. Both warned him to have nothing to do with Oswald as they suspected he was trying to infiltrate proCastro groups. Contreras still wonders how Oswald identified him and his friends as the students, out of the thousands attending the University, as the ones with contacts in the Consulate. Shenon, some way or another, sees this incident as supporting possible Cuban involvement in the assassination. No mention is made to the similarity to what Oswald was doing with Tulane students in New Orleans.

While in New Orleans, Ruth Paine had asked fellow Quaker, Ruth Kloepfer, to check on the Oswalds while they were in New Orleans. Mrs. Kloepfer’s husband was a professor at Tulane University. There is information in the extensive records in this case that Oswald passed out FPCC leaflets near Tulane University and the homes of some of the professors there who were members of a local leftist group. The

Lee Oswald in New Orleans leafleting for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, 9 August, 1963

individuals who helped pass out pamphlets on the last occasion when Oswald passed out his FPCC literature in downtown New Orleans, were introduced by Oswald as students from Tulane. There are, keeping things in parallel, indications in the documentation about the case that Oswald, while in Mexico City, made contact with Quakers studying at the Autonomous University. There are indications that one Quaker student at the University at that time was an active agent of the CIA, although that person has never been identified and it has not been determined that he had any contact with Oswald in Mexico City. The reason that it has not been determined is that it has not been investigated.

It has to be pointed out that June Cobb, a known CIA agent, was very involved in Agency actions aimed at the FPCC in the early 1960’s. She appears again as the first person to report Elena Garro de Paz’s story about the Duran/Oswald twist party. At the time she made that report to the Mexico City CIA station, Cobb, a CIA asset, was renting a room from Elena Garro de Paz, Sylvia Duran’s cousin. And Shenon bases most of

Elena Garro De Paz

what he writes on a supposition that, based on this twist-party story, Duran was at the center of the Cuban recruitment of Oswald. But the fact is that it is still very much in question whether Duran had been recruited as an asset by the CIA. David Phillips, as well as other CIA employees, in 1978, were of the opinion that she may have been targeted for recruitment by the CIA. The CIA, then and since, has gone out of its way to keep details about Duran buried, claiming, among other things, to have destroyed her Mexico City P file.

But the point is, the activities in Mexico City in September and October, 1963, are a capsule version of Oswald’s activities in New Orleans in June, July and August of 1963. In the context of the other information we’ve learned about the CIA’s FPCC black propaganda operation, the people involved in those operations and the role of at least one of those people, George Joannides, in subverting the HSCA investigation, how can anyone not seriously consider whether Oswald’s Mexico City activities were part of a CIA anti-FPCC operation? The very first conspiracy theory, that Castro and the communists killed JFK – the one expressed by President Johnson 20 minutes after the assassination, and first seeing print in the DRE’s CIA funded newspaper, Trinchera, on November 23, 1963 – still has followers and proponents, the latest being Phil Shenon. None of the proponents, it seems, have ever really considered whether they may be the victims – or a part – of a very good, deliberate disinformation operation – possibly the best Phillips and Joannides ever ran.

________________________

Dan Hardway, J.D. Attorney in private practice; former investigator, House Select Committee on Assassinations.

Review of New CIA and FBI Documents That Change Cold War History

Bill Simpich is a civil rights attorney in the San Francisco Bay Area. He is on the board of directors of the Mary Ferrell Foundation, an organization focused on the study of documents related to the 1960s assassinations, Watergate, and Iran-Contra.

In the following essay, he offers a look at some of the gems found in the new JFK document releases and how to speed up the discovery of future finds.

More than 50 years after the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, thousands of government documents related to his death are still under classified lock and key.

By law, all of the remaining secret documents were supposed to have been released last year. President Donald Trump approved the release of approximately 35,000 files in 2017. But he delayed the publication of many other documents in full or in part until 2021 — when the winner of the 2020 presidential election will have another chance to review them for possible declassification.

Researchers have been digging through the released documents in search of a “smoking gun” file which neatly explains to skeptics what really happened that dark day in Dallas. While it’s possible such a document exists, it’s unlikely.

The difficult job of understanding why a president was murdered, and unpacking the Cold War path that America was treading, involves working through the minutiae — the “boring” material — so that the little puzzle pieces can fit together to form a coherent bigger picture.

One year ago this week, the National Archives and Records Administration released the first of what were to be seven batches of newly declassified documents. Some of those documents had actually been released in past decades, albeit with extensive redactions. Others had never been seen before.

Analysis of the newly available documents, including those released in the 1990s — most of which still remain undigitized — are already shedding light on the murky background of President Kennedy’s murder.

Among other things, the findings offer a golden opportunity to unpack more of the hidden history of the Cold War, revise our assumptions about that fraught era, and — finally — get the story right.

There will be no new document releases until 2021. That gives us three years to digest what we already have, and to create some stronger tools for analysis.

But the work of researchers and interested citizens is already paying off.

Intriguing Revelations From the New Documents

.

Take the ongoing research on cryptonyms, or crypts — government codewords for people, places, and things that the intelligence community meant to keep hidden.

As someone who has spent a lot of time solving CIA cryptonyms for the Mary Ferrell Foundation (MFF) website, one of the premier online digital archives of JFK documents, let me say a brief word on why decoding the cryptonyms is important. When you know the names of the CIA programs, officers, and agents whose names are hidden, a whole new way of seeing the world opens up to you.

Cryptonyms usually begin with a two-letter prefix that identifies the country of origin (e.g., “AM” for Cuba or “LI” for Mexico), and then the remainder of the word reveals the program (e.g., AMCANOE refers to a project to unify exiles, many of whom had traveled by water from Cuba into the US).

It becomes particularly important when you see memos like this, saying that “we cannot give wholesale approval for their release [cryptonyms], but if the crypts have been previously blown or exposed they can be released.”

The JFK case is a jigsaw puzzle the size of a football field. Photo credit: Adapted by WhoWhatWhy from Jolene Faber / Flickr (CC BY 2.0) and ARCHIVES.GOV.

Many new crypts have been revealed in the new release. Just two of the recent examples:

CONTINUE READING at WhoWhatWhy

Jefferson Morley

July 17 2018, 6:30 a.m.

On a Monday afternoon, on July 9, the D.C. Court of Appeals handed down a 2-1 decision against me and in favor of the CIA in a long-running Freedom of Information Act lawsuit. At 4:20 p.m., Judges Brett Kavanaugh and Gregory Katsas, a Trump appointee, filed a 14-page opinion with the clerk of the court in Washington. They ruled that the CIA had acted “reasonably” in responding to my request for certain ancient files related to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963. Appended to their decision was a 17-page dissent from their colleague Judge Karen LeCraft Henderson who strongly objected to their decision.

That evening, President Donald Trump announced to the world that Kavanaugh was his choice to fill the Supreme Court seat of retiring Justice Anthony Kennedy. In his remarks at the White House event, Kavanaugh touted his “Female Relationship Resume” and declared, “My judicial philosophy is straightforward: A judge must be independent and must interpret the law, not make the law.”

In her tart dissent issued that morning, Henderson, the senior judge in the D.C. Court of Appeals, called that claim into question. She took Kavanaugh to task precisely for a lack of independence and for making law, rather than interpreting it. On the issue of compensation for successful FOIA litigants, Henderson said the prospective Supreme Court justice ignored the letter of the law while siding with a “recalcitrant” CIA over a working journalist — i.e., me — who had uncovered information of genuine public benefit.

Kavanaugh’s ruling in Morley v. CIA was of a piece with his record as an advocate of unbridled executive branch power. His view that at a sitting president cannot be indicted, or even subpoenaed, is well known. Less known is his permissive treatment of the CIA. In my case, as in another key FOIA case from 2014, Kavanaugh ruled that the agency could not be held publicly accountable for its actions — even ones that occurred more than 50 years ago.

Kavanaugh and Katsas Ruling in Morely v CIA14 pages

Henderson not only dismantled Kavanaugh’s arguments, but her dissent also identified some recurring flaws in his jurisprudence. The source was almost as notable as the document itself.

Henderson is no liberal. She was working as lawyer in private practice in Charleston, South Carolina, when President Ronald Reagan appointed her to the federal bench in 1986. In 1990, President George H.W. Bush elevated her to the D.C. Court of Appeals. She is a conservative who chafes at concepts like abortion rights and immigrant rights. Last October, she joined Kavanaugh in ruling that a pregnant, unaccompanied 17-year-old migrant did not have the right to obtain an abortion while in custody of the Department of Homeland Security.

Henderson faulted her colleague Kavanaugh on impeccably conservative grounds. “

In other instances, Henderson has given the benefit of the doubt to U.S. national security agencies. In 2008, she ruled against four Guantánamo detainees seeking to sue Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld for the torture they endured. She dismissed their case with the rather blithe observation that “torture is a foreseeable consequence of the military’s detention of suspected enemy combatants.”

Henderson, however, didn’t give Kavanaugh the benefit of the doubt in Morley v. CIA. Rather, she faulted her colleague on impeccably conservative grounds: his excessive deference to government arguments, which she found unwarranted by facts; his willingness to overlook relevant law, which she found inexplicable; and his willingness to substitute his own opinions for the law, which she found unacceptable. She wrote, “The majority, it appears to me, overlooks the district court’s latest errors in order to ‘bring the case to an end.’”

Henderson’s dissent illuminates Kavanaugh in action: a creative and cavalier judge who is willing to make law — not interpret it —when it comes to ruling in favor of the government.

I had glimpsed Kavanaugh up close several times in the course of my lawsuit, which was filed in 2003. He heard oral arguments from my pro bono attorney Jim Lesar three times, in 2011, 2014, and 2018. In these hearings, he struck me as an engaged jurist with an agile mind. He asked incisive questions. In his subsequent written decisions, I could discern his judgment on how FOIA law applies to issues of journalism, transparency, and national security. He was conservative, but smart and seemingly open to opposing arguments. I had harbored hopes that he might rule in my favor, but his agility was more opportunistic than independent.

A review of the “protracted history” — Henderson’s phrase — of the case shows why. In Morley v. CIA, I sought the records of a deceased undercover CIA officer, George Joannides. Based on extensive interviews with his former Cuban-American associates, I knew Joannides was working undercover out of Miami in 1963 and had some knowledge about events leading up to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. Joannides had also served as the agency’s liaison to congressional investigators who re-opened the JFK investigation in 1978.

JOANNIDES-RECEIVES-CIA-MEDAL-O71581-1531753164

CIA officer George Joannides, left, receives a Career Intelligence Medal in 1981 from deputy CIA director Bobby Ray Inman. (Photo: CIA)

In 2004, the CIA responded by giving me a small batch of documents from Joannides’s personnel file. Beyond that, the agency asked for summary judgment to block any further releases, which was promptly granted by District Court Judge Richard Leon, a George W. Bush appointee. Lesar filed an appeal on my behalf, contending that the CIA had not conducted the searches required by law.In December 2007, a three-judge panel — including Henderson — upheld most of Lesar’s arguments. The judges unanimously agreed that the agency’s actions had failed to follow the Freedom of Information Act on no less than seven different points of law. The court ordered the CIA to reconsider its response and conduct additional file searches. Nine months later, the CIA gave me an additional 500 pages of documents, including photographs of Joannides receiving a Career Intelligence Medal, one of the agency’s highest honors.

I appealed, seeking still more documents. In April 2012, another three-judge panel — this time including Kavanaugh — ruled my arguments were without merit and the case was closed, at least on the issue of what documents would be released.

Yet I had one more argument. The case law around the FOIA holds that when a plaintiff “substantially prevails” over the government, they are entitled to have their court costs paid by the defendant. So I filed a motion for the government to pay my court costs, namely compensation for Lesar.

A veteran FOIA litigator, Lesar often takes difficult cases on a contingency basis for working journalists or public interest causes, gambling that if he wins, the government will pay his fee. His clients have included well-known authors and veteran Washington journalists. In Morley v. CIA, he had merely bested a squadron of CIA and Justice Department lawyers with three-piece suits and six-figure salaries. I thought he should get compensated, and the law indicated the same.

The CIA refused, claiming there was little “public benefit” to the new information generated by the lawsuit. Leon, the district court judge, agreed. I appealed again, thinking my case was strong. By then, the lawsuit had been covered by the New York Times and Fox News. The Associated Press New York office had compiled a long report on still-secret JFK records, including the Joannides files, which ran in 30 news outlets across the country, including the San Diego Union, St. Paul Pioneer Press, and CBS News in Dallas. The Times and at least six other news sites published the photo of Joannides receiving his medal, which the CIA had only coughed up under judicial order. In short, many news editors thought the information I had found would benefit their readers. I expected that would count for something.

From left, U.S. Senate Majority Whip Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., then-D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals nominee Brett Kavanaugh, and Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, R-Tenn., hold a news conference in the Capitol on May 22, 2006. (Photo: Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images)

Kavanaugh served on the three-judge panel that heard oral arguments on the issue in 2014. He and two other judges agreed that Leon had failed to apply a four-factor test of “public benefit,” established in previous FOIA cases. The test balances the value of the information sought or obtained for an informed citizenry, the plaintiff’s commercial interests, and the government’s actions. Leon, they found, had improperly relied on only one factor: His belief that the release of Joannides files had added nothing of substance to the JFK assassination story. The appellate court sent the case back.In March 2017, Leon shuffled his thoughts and once again ruled that there was no “public benefit” from my case. I again appealed, and, a year later, I finally had my day in court. On March 19, 2018, a new three-judge panel consisting of Kavanaugh, Henderson, and the newcomer Katsas heard the latest round of arguments in the federal courthouse in Washington. By that time, Kavanaugh knew that his name was on Trump’s November 2017 short list of candidates to fill the next Supreme Court vacancy.

Kavanaugh was his usual brisk self in the hearing. He gaveled from the center seat while Henderson listened remotely by telephone, and the forlorn Katsas looked on, perhaps bewildered by the complexity of a case infused with the conspiratorial overtones that inevitably shroud any public discussion of the JFK story. Kavanaugh closely questioned Lesar, while Henderson corrected the government attorney Benton Peterson on a point of fact. After 30 minutes of questions, the hearing was over.

Kavanaugh’s decision could not be considered a surprise. He had sided with the CIA before.

The three judges deliberated for three and a half months. They filed a split decision on July 9 that was delivered per curiam — “by the court” in Latin — denoting an unsigned opinion usually reserved for unanimous or collective decisions. It was an odd designation for a decision contested by the senior judge on the Court of Appeals, but the label spared Kavanaugh from having his name on a pro-CIA decision on the same day as a big announcement. Five hours after the opinion was filed, Kavanaugh stood beaming with his wife and daughters in front of the TV cameras as Trump announced his nomination for the Supreme Court.

Kavanaugh’s decision could not be considered a surprise. He had sided with the CIA before. In 2014, he ruled against the nonprofit National Security Archive in a prolonged FOIA lawsuit over an internal history of the failed 1961 CIA operation at the Bay of Pigs. Kavanaugh, in a 2-1 ruling, agreed with CIA and Justice Department lawyers that the document was a “draft,” and its release would “expose an agency’s decision-making process in such a way as to discourage candid discussion within the agency and thereby undermine the agency’s ability to perform its functions.”

Kavanaugh was referring to a study that was 50 years old. Congress quickly overturned his decision with legislation mandating that such histories be released after 25 years.

In my case, Kavanaugh ruled for the CIA again.

“This FOIA case has dragged on for a staggering 15 years,” the majority opinion began, a line that seems likely to have been written by Kavanaugh, given Katsas’s recent arrival on the bench. “The litigation over attorney’s fees alone has taken eight years. It is time to bring the case to an end.”

The CIA had acted “reasonably,” he said. The word recurred 15 times in the opinion. The words “reasonable” and “unreasonable” showed up 24 times. The CIA had been reasonable, Kavanaugh wrote, while depicting me as a modestly paid scrounger who was wasting the court’s time over claims of “minimal” interest about the JFK assassination. He said nothing about the JFK Records Act as a unanimous expression of Congress in support of full disclosure or about the mainstream media coverage of the lawsuit as a possible public benefit.

In her tightly argued dissent, Henderson wasted no time in blasting Kavanaugh’s insinuations.

“Over the past 15 years, we have remanded this case four times,” she declared. “During the same period, we have reversed the same district court twice in a nearly identical Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) cases. That makes six opinions from this court. I share the majority’s displeasure at the resulting waste of judicial resources, especially because ‘fee litigation [is] one of the last thing lawyers and judges should be spending their time on,’” she wrote, citing one of her old decisions in a separate case. Henderson added, “Jefferson Morley, however, is not to blame for this ‘staggering’ saga.”

Henderson pointed out that the court’s 2013 remand order found that I had already met the standard of “public benefit” established in case law. She quoted that decision at length and went on to briefly outline some key points in my case, namely, the connections between Joannides, an anti-Batista-turned-anti-Castro Cuban exile group called Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil, and accused JFK assassin Lee Harvey Oswald:

Morley’s request had potential public value. He has proffered — and the CIA has not disputed — that Joannides served as the CIA case officer for a Cuban group, the DRE, with whose officers Oswald was in contact prior to the assassination. “

She noted that the court had also “previously determined that Morley’s request sought information ‘central’ to an intelligence committee’s inquiry into the performance of the CIA and other federal agencies in investigating the assassination. “

“In other words,” the exasperated Henderson wrote, “we held that Morley satisfied the public-benefit factor in this case.”

“To me, the CIA’s multiple flawed legal positions suggests that it was ‘recalcitrant’ in declining to produce any documents before being sued.”

By ignoring this finding, Henderson went on, Kavanaugh ultimately depended on repeated assertions that the CIA responded “reasonably” to my inquiries. Yet, Henderson noted the appellate court’s 2007 decision found the agency’s initial response to my FOIA request was deficient on seven different legal points. Kavanagh had decided in favor of an agency that had flouted the law, she concluded.

“To me, the CIA’s multiple flawed legal positions suggests that it was ‘recalcitrant’ in declining to produce any documents before being sued,” Henderson wrote.

While Kavanaugh had shot me down, I could take Henderson’s closing words as a moral victory. She wrote:

This case does not call for “[d]eference piled on deference.” … It calls for an adherence to … our four earlier Morley opinions. Because I believe the district court ignored our mandate and misapplied our precedent, I would vacate the district court order a fifth time and remand with instructions to award Morley the attorney’s fees to which he is entitled. “

Henderson’s dissent stands as a warning from a civil and conservative colleague about Supreme Court nominee Brett Kavanaugh. She has identified a strain of recklessness in Kavanaugh’s cynical jurisprudence. She wrote that, in his opinion with Katsas, Kavanaugh had “ignored our mandate and misapplied our precedent.”

Top photo: Judge Brett Kavanaugh listens to Sen. Rob Portman, R-Ohio, talk about Kavanaugh’s qualifications before a meeting in the Russell Senate Office Building on July 11, 2018, in Washington, D.C.

VISIT THE INTERCEPT

RELATED: Kavanaugh and Katsas Ruling in Morely v CIA 14 pages

RELATED: Henderson Dissent in Morely v. CIA – The Intercept

Courtesy of Jefferson Morley and JFKFACTS.ORG

10 July, 2018.

The DC Court of Appeals ruled 2-1 on Monday that the CIA does not have to pay my court costs incurred in the long-running FOIA lawsuit Morley v. CIA. The split decision was joined by Judge Brett Kavanaugh, who was nominated by President Trump later that day to serve on the the Supreme Court.

Judge Brett Kavanaugh

About the information I obtained via litigation, the unsigned opinion said, “the public benefit was small.” The decision made no reference to extensive coverage of Morley v . CIA in the New York Times, Fox News, San Diego Union, St. Paul Pioneer Press, CBS News in Dallas, and the New Yorker, among many other news organizations.

The Times and the U.K. Daily Mail, even published a photo, obtained by the lawsuit, of CIA officer George Joannides receiving a medal after he stonewalled JFK investigators. In the majority view, public interest in Morley v CIA is not a measure of its public benefit.

A strong dissent by Judge Karen Henderson takes a much more balanced and independent view of the case, in my view. Appointed by President George H.W. Bush in 1990, Henderson points out that the court had previously found that I had met the standard of “public benefit” established in case law.

In a 2013 decision the court stated.

Morley’s request had potential public value. He has proffered—and the CIA has not disputed— that Joannides served as the CIA case officer for a Cuban group, the DRE, with whose officers Oswald was in contact prior to the assassination. Travel records showing a very close match between Joannides’s and Oswald’s times in New Orleans might, for example, have (marginally) supported one of the hypotheses swirling around the assassination. In addition, this court has previously determined that Morley’s request sought information “central” to an intelligence committee’s inquiry into the performance of the CIA and other federal agencies in investigating the assassination. Under these circumstances, there was at least a modest probability that Morley’s request would generate information relevant to the assassination or later investigations.

Judge Karen Henderson

“In other words,” Henderson writes, “we held that Morley satisfied the public-benefit factor in this case,”

By ignoring this finding, Henderson argues, the majority opinion ultimately depends on the assertion that the CIA responded “reasonably” to my request. Yet, Henderson notes, the ruling also ignores the fact that the DC Court of Appeals had ruled the agency’s initial response to my FOIA request was deficient on seven different legal points.

Henderson again:

The majority discusses five in its opinion. It acknowledges that the CIA: (1) missed the 20-day statutory deadline to respond, Maj. Op. 7; (2) incorrectly referred Morley to NARA rather than responding to his FOIA request itself, Maj. Op. 7-11; (3) failed to search its operational files, Maj. Op. 11; (4) submitted an incomplete Glomar response, Maj. Op. 11-12; and (5) relied on an interpretation of Exemption 2 that was later overruled, Maj. Op. 12. It addresses these errors of law seriatim and labels them “incorrect legally,” Maj. Op. 9, but not “unreasonable.” To me, the CIA’s multiple flawed legal positions suggests that it was “recalcitrant” in declining to produce any documents before being sued. Davy IV, 550 F.3d at 1162. At the least, the errors collectively undermine the district court’s conclusion that the fourth factor “weighs heavily against Morley.” Morley X, 245 F. Supp. 3d at 78 (emphasis added).

Henderson concludes:

In sum, I believe the district court erred on two levels: it erred in evaluating each of the four factors individually and abused its discretion in weighing them against one another. Accordingly, this case does not call for “[d]eference piled on deference.” Maj. Op. 11. It calls for an adherence to Davy IV and our four earlier Morley opinions. Because I believe the district court ignored our mandate and misapplied our precedent, I would vacate the district court order a fifth time and remand with instructions to award Morley the attorney’s fees to which he is entitled.

Unfortunately, the majority, meaning Kavanaugh and Trump appointee Judge Gregory Katsas, disagreed. I have 45 days to appeal.

Rex Bradford, President, Mary Ferrell Foundation June 18, 2018

SUMMARY

Under the President John F. Kennedy Records Collection Act of 1992 (“JFK Records Act”), the Assassination Records Review Board (“ARRB”) oversaw the declassification of millions of pages of formerly classified records. But a significant number of documents were withheld in full, and many more were withheld with “redactions” (portions withheld from view).

As noted in the ARRB’s Final Report, the JFK Records Act included a provision for full release 25 years after its passage. Specifically, it “mandated that all postponed assassination records be opened to the public no later than the year 2017” unless the President certifies that (1) “continued postponement is made necessary by an identifiable harm to the military, defense, intelligence operations, law enforcement, or conduct of foreign relations” and (2) “the identifiable harm is of such gravity that it outweighs the public interest in disclosure.” (https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=3611#relPageId=33).

Instead of full disclosure, what occurred was a rolling set of partial releases, 7 so far, along with continued withholding. On the positive side, for the first time the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) published the newly released documents online in PDF format, a huge boon to researchers. But this process has been marred by errors and confusion, as documented herein.

Currently according to NARA, 15,834 documents remain withheld in part, along with a smaller set still withheld in full. Both the current state of affairs, and the process by which releases have occurred, are less than satisfactory.

This paper documents the recent history of releases and the numerous problems with the process and the current state of affairs. It does not discuss the question of “what’s in the new records?” – suffice to say that there are important documents being uncovered, related to the assassination investigations and also the context of Kennedy Cold War policies, and that the full “digestion” process will take time.

RELEASE HISTORY

After an early release of records in July of 2017, the 25-year anniversary arrived on October 26. Against a backdrop of lobbying by federal agencies, President Trump
signed an authorization for continued withholding of most of the remaining records, release of some, and an accompanying review process with a 6-month deadline.

In November and December of 2017, 4 additional releases happened. When the 6month review deadline came on April 26, 2018, a seventh release occurred, along with continued withholding and a new review deadline set for 2020.

In all, tens of thousands of documents were released or re-released, though over 15,000 documents remain withheld at least in part.

Continue reading: DOWNLOAD THE ENTIRE ARTICLE

by Tom Jackman June 5 at 5:00 AM

Paul Schrade, who was hit by one of the bullets fired during the assassination of Robert F. Kennedy, holds a news conference in his Los Angeles hospital room five days after the June 1968 shooting. Beginning in 1974, Schrade launched a campaign to reinvestigate the case, which he continues to do at age 93. (AP)

LOS ANGELES — For six years after he was shot and wounded while walking behind Robert F. Kennedy in the Ambassador Hotel in June 1968, Paul Schrade mourned the loss of his friend and stayed out of the public eye. But beginning with a news conference in 1974, Schrade has demanded answers to the question of whether a second gunman — and not Sirhan Sirhan — killed Kennedy.

Soon after Sirhan’s trial ended with his first-degree-murder conviction in April 1969, journalists noted that Kennedy had been shot in the back of the head at point-blank range, but witnesses all said Sirhan was standing in front of Kennedy. Bullet holes found in the doors of the crime scene indicated more shots were fired than could have come from Sirhan’s eight-shot .22-caliber pistol, some witnesses said. Sirhan’s defense team had not challenged any of the physical evidence at trial.

[‘A train to the end of an era’: Reflecting on RFK’s 200-mile funeral procession]

Fifty years after the assassination, Schrade is still pushing for a new investigation.” I’m interested in finding out how the prosecutor convicted Sirhan with no evidence, knowing there was a second gunman,” Schrade said. “The truth is not known yet about who killed Robert Kennedy.” Schrade, now 93, believes Sirhan wounded him and four other people but did not fire the fatal shot into Kennedy.

Schrade has been supported in his calls for a new investigation into the case by Robert F. Kennedy Jr., who met with Sirhan in prison last December and told The Washington Post that “the wrong person might have been convicted of killing my father.” Now Robert Kennedy’s daughter Kathleen Kennedy Townsend has joined Schrade and her brother.

[Who killed Bobby Kennedy? His son RFK Jr. doesn’t believe it was Sirhan Sirhan]

“Bobby makes a compelling case,” the former Maryland lieutenant governor told The Post. “I think it should be reopened.”

Kathleen Kennedy Townsend speaks to members of the media in 2016 at an event in Boston announcing the naming of a Navy ship in honor of her father, Robert F. Kennedy. Townsend says she thinks the investigation into her father’s assassination should be reopened. (Paul Marotta)

Three other Kennedy children — former Congressman Joe Kennedy, activist Kerry Kennedy and filmmaker Rory Kennedy — have said they do not think the case should be reopened. Ethel Kennedy, the senator’s widow and now 90, has not commented.

Schrade and a host of authors and researchers point to a number of apparent missteps by the Los Angeles police and prosecutors in focusing solely on Sirhan, while suppressing evidence of a second shooter, such as:

• Prosecutors withheld the autopsy report from Sirhan’s defense lawyers until six weeks into the trial, showing that Kennedy had been shot at point-blank range from behind. Five other people in the hotel pantry standing behind Kennedy, including Schrade, were hit by bullets fired from in front of them.

• Police failed to investigate an armed private-security guard who was walking behind Kennedy at precisely the angle where the fatal shots to Kennedy’s head and back were fired. He has consistently denied firing his weapon but has told conflicting stories over the years.

• Police officers and FBI agents identified apparent bullet holes in two door frames of the pantry, indicating more than eight shots were fired. But no evidence of those holes was presented at trial, and the Los Angeles police destroyed the door frames shortly after the trial.

• The lead crime-scene investigator testified at trial that bullets from the wounded victims matched a bullet from Kennedy, but presented no photos or evidence to support that. When two ballistics experts examined the bullets after the trial, they found the bullets didn’t match. Subsequent investigations couldn’t match any of the bullets to Sirhan’s gun. The crime-scene investigator was subsequently criticized even by prosecutors for sloppy work in the case, by a judge for seeming perjury in another high-profile murder, and later suspended by his own police chief.

• Los Angeles police bullied or ignored witnesses whose stories did not match the lone gunman scenario, records show, particularly people who claimed they saw Sirhan with a dark-haired woman in a white polka-dot dress. Then at trial, prosecutors brought in a blonde-haired woman with a green polka-dot dress and claimed she was the mysterious woman in question. Sirhan’s lawyers, focusing on a mental health defense, did not challenge that, either.

Los Angeles District Attorney Evelle Younger, seated in the light jacket, introduces his prosecution team for the murder trial of Sirhan Sirhan in June 1968. In the back row from left, deputy district attorneys Lynn D. Compton, John E. Howard and David N. Fitts tried the case. (George Brich/AP)

The Los Angeles police have heard all this criticism before, did some reinvestigation in the 1970s that confirmed their own work, and now consider the case closed. The Los Angeles district attorney’s office referred inquiries to the California attorney general’s office, which repeatedly defeated Sirhan’s appeals, and which declined to respond beyond court filings. The California and federal courts have consistently held that Sirhan was guilty of murder, even with new discoveries made in the decades after the early morning of June 5, 1968.

“Considering all of the evidence,” U.S. Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Wistrich wrote in 2013, “old and new, incriminatory and exculpatory, admissible and inadmissible, the Court cannot say that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found [Sirhan] guilty of the assassination of Senator Kennedy beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Lisa Pease, author of a forthcoming book on the investigation’s failures, said: “In ignoring the myriad evidence of conspiracy in this case, the LAPD and DA’s office created the seventh pantry victim: the truth. We have a guy in prison, provably by the evidence, for a crime he didn’t commit.”

There are facts that are not in dispute, namely that Sirhan had a .22-caliber pistol in the hotel pantry on June 5, 1968, and that he emptied all eight shots as Kennedy stood in front of him. Two Ambassador Hotel employees, Karl Uecker and Edward Minasian, said repeatedly that Uecker grabbed Sirhan’s wrist after two shots, slammed it to a table, and that Sirhan continued to fire wildly while being held down but never got close to Kennedy.

Sirhan Sirhan, right, being escorted to court by attorney Russell E. Parsons in June 1968 to face charges in the shooting of Sen. Robert F. Kennedy. The defense team did not challenge the police investigation, in part leading to Sirhan’s first-degree-murder conviction. (AP)

“I have told police and testified [to the grand jury],” Uecker said in a 1975 affidavit, “that there was a distance of at least one and one-half feet between the muzzle of Sirhan’s gun and Senator Kennedy’s head. The revolver was directly in front of my nose. … There is no way that the shots described in the autopsy could have come from Sirhan’s gun. … Sirhan never got close enough to a point-blank shot, never.”

But at trial, neither prosecutors nor Sirhan’s defense team focused on the distance between Kennedy and Sirhan. Though Sirhan and prosecutors reached a plea deal in January 1969 for Sirhan to admit guilt and receive a life sentence — a deal the judge rejected — and trial began on Jan. 7, records show prosecutors did not provide coroner Thomas Noguchi’s autopsy report until about Feb. 22. By that time, the defense had already decided to concede that Sirhan had shot Kennedy and was trying simply to avoid the death penalty by claiming he was mentally ill.

Noguchi found that four shots had been fired at Kennedy from at most three inches away. Three shots appeared to be in contact with Kennedy’s back and shoulder, based on powder burns to his jacket, Noguchi said, with one shot passing through the jacket’s shoulder pad and not touching Kennedy. All three were fired sharply upward. The fourth shot was fired into the back of Kennedy’s head from three inches away, Noguchi concluded, by test-firing a similar gun to determine how much gunpowder sprayed at various distances.

“Thus I have never said,” Noguchi wrote in his autobiography, “that Sirhan Sirhan killed Robert Kennedy.” At a conference last month of RFK assassination authors, Pittsburgh coroner Cyril Wecht pressed Noguchi as to whether there was a second gunman, but the 91-year-old pathologist said, “That’s not my duty.” He also told Wecht that defense attorneys never spoke with him before the trial and did not ask him about the muzzle distance at trial.

Los Angeles County Coroner Thomas Noguchi in 1970. His autopsy of Robert F. Kennedy revealed that the senator was shot from the back, but the report was not provided to Sirhan’s lawyers until six weeks into the trial. (George Brich/AP)

Prosecutors and some authors have theorized that Kennedy turned and raised his arm as the shots began, thus enabling Sirhan to hit him in the back. The government notes that the jury heard the evidence, convicted Sirhan and sentenced him to death, which was later commuted to a life term. But there was plenty of evidence the jury never heard. An appeal Sirhan’s current lawyers have pending to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights says Sirhan suffered from ineffective assistance from his legal team.

[‘That stain of bloodshed’: After King’s assassination, RFK calmed an angry crowd with an unforgettable speech]

The defense attorneys also went lightly on Los Angeles police criminalist DeWayne Wolfer, who oversaw the crime-scene investigation. He and Noguchi were both photographed pointing to bullet holes in the pantry, and police removed those door frames. Numerous witnesses, including police officers and FBI agents, said the holes were made by bullets. But between the bullets which hit Kennedy and those which hit Schrade and four others, all the bullets from Sirhan’s gun had been accounted for by Wolfer.

“I’ve inspected quite a few crime scenes in my day,” FBI Special Agent William Bailey told authors William Klaber and Philip Melanson for their book, “Shadow Play: The Unsolved Murder of Robert F. Kennedy.” “These were clearly bullet holes; the wood around them was freshly broken away and I could see the base of a bullet in each one.” Many other people saw these holes, reports show.

In 1992, former LAPD organized crime Detective Mike Rothmiller filed an affidavit saying he had reviewed an internal intelligence report about the assassination which “listed a total of ten different bullets that had been recovered from the scene of the assassination and victims.” Rothmiller knew Sirhan’s gun held eight bullets. The report was never disclosed to Sirhan’s lawyers.

Two police officers inspect an apparent bullet hole discovered in a door frame in the pantry of the Ambassador Hotel in Los Angeles where Sen. Robert F. Kennedy was fatally wounded on June 5, 1968. The photographer’s caption noted, “Bullet is still in the wood.” Police concluded it wasn’t a bullet. (Dick Strobel/AP)

Wolfer concluded that the holes in the pantry had been made previously through hotel wear and tear, not bullets, though Uecker and other employees said the holes were not there before. The issue was not explored at trial, and when an article appeared in the Los Angeles Free Press shortly after the trial ended questioning the four holes, Los Angeles police destroyed the door frames, records show. The police said there was no room to hold the frames and they were not needed after the conviction, though Sirhan’s appeal was pending. Ceiling tiles with apparent bullet holes in them, removed from directly above the shooting area and also not introduced at trial, were destroyed by the police, too.

Crucially, Wolfer testified that a bullet removed from Kennedy’s neck and a bullet removed from a wounded victim had come from Sirhan’s gun. But he did not submit any photos comparing the two bullets or keep any notes documenting his comparison, and the defense accepted his testimony without challenge. In 1970, when ballistics expert William Harper examined the bullets with a newly invented comparison camera, he found the bullets had not been fired from the same gun.

Soon two other ballistics experts also said the two bullets came from different guns. In 1975, a commission of seven experts was empaneled to review the ballistics, including refiring Sirhan’s gun. But Sirhan’s gun had deteriorated, and it couldn’t be determined whether it had fired either the Kennedy bullet or the wounded victim’s bullet. Later, it was determined that the bullet police submitted for the 1975 test as the Kennedy bullet was from another victim, not Kennedy.

If police had followed a trail of bullets from behind Kennedy’s right side, the person who was standing closest to him was an armed private-security guard, Thane Eugene Cesar. Cesar said he fell down as the shooting began, then pulled his .38-caliber gun but didn’t fire because Sirhan had already been captured. A news assistant for a local TV station, Don Schulman, gave a radio interview moments after the shooting and described Cesar firing back at Sirhan.

Sirhan Sirhan, third from left in blue, is prevented from shaking the hand of Paul Schrade, near the camera, at the end of a parole hearing in 2016. Schrade apologized to Sirhan for not coming forward sooner. Sirhan was denied parole for the 15th time. Schrade believes Sirhan shot him and four others but not Sen. Robert F. Kennedy. (AP/Gregory Bull)

But Los Angeles police did not check Cesar’s gun, records show. When he showed them a .22-caliber revolver similar to Sirhan’s, the police didn’t check that gun either. Cesar was never a suspect for the police and always maintained his innocence. Prosecutors never called him as a witness, even though he was one of those standing closest to Kennedy. Journalist Dan Moldea hired a top polygraph examiner to question Cesar in 1994, and Moldea said Cesar was found truthful. He lives today in the Philippines. His .22-caliber revolver has been found but never tested for comparison to the Kennedy bullet.

Another angle the police were disinclined to follow was the “girl in the polka-dot dress.” Numerous people in the pantry spotted her standing with Sirhan, consistently describing her as “shapely” or “proportionate,” in a white dress with black dots. Most notable of these witnesses was Sandra Serrano, who gave an interview to NBC’s Sander Vanocur an hour after the shooting describing the woman, and a man, running out of the hotel saying, “We shot Kennedy.” But records show an aggressive and demeaning polygraph interview given by an LAPD examiner caused Serrano to change her story. [“Nobody told you ‘We have shot Kennedy,'” Lt. Enrique Hernandez told Serrano, recordings show. “Sandy, you know that this is wrong . . . This didn’t happen.”] Serrano later returned to her original story. John Fahey, a man who spoke to police during their investigation, had said he spent the day of the election with a woman in a polka-dot dress who told him, “They’re gonna take care of Kennedy tonight.” But police interrogators told him, “These answers will have to be changed,” and eventually Fahey equivocated and his account was dismissed, according to Shane O’Sullivan’s book “Who Killed Bobby?”.

An older couple told Sgt. Paul Sharaga about the man and the woman in the polka-dot dress and also heard the “We shot Kennedy” remark. Sharaga broadcast a lookout for the pair, only to have it canceled 90 minutes later. Recordings show that an LAPD inspector told Sharaga over the radio that one man was in custody, and police “don’t want them to get anything started on a big conspiracy.”

Twenty years later, when the case records were released, Sharaga said the LAPD report on his action was “phony,” because it said the couple reported the girl saying, “They shot Kennedy” instead of “We shot Kennedy.” Sharaga told author William Klaber: “This is just how things were done. If they couldn’t get you to change your story, they’d ignore you. If they couldn’t ignore you, they’d discredit you, and if they couldn’t do that, they’d just make something up.”

The burial of Sen. Robert F. Kennedy in Arlington National Cemetery on June 8, 1968. (AP)

A CRUEL AND SHOCKING MISINTERPRETATION

Bill Simpich: Analyzing the New JFK Revelations

Review of New CIA and FBI Documents That Change Cold War History

Intriguing Revelations From the New Documents

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Brett Kavanaugh Repeatedly Ruled in Favor of the Security State, Most Recently for the CIA — and Against Me

On JFK secrecy, Brett Kavanaugh sides with the CIA

2017 & 2018 JFK Releases: Progress, Issues, Recommendations

Did L.A. police and prosecutors bungle the Bobby Kennedy assassination probe?