The Tenth Batch
Stevenson exhibit No. 5053, 21H 562 at p. 570 indicates that a plan to include a DPD squad car in the motorcade behind the Vice President’s car was changed by Lawson at a DPD-SS meeting on the 21st. Lawson was asked why there is no mention of this in his preliminary report of Nov. 19. Lawson stated that “the DPD could have put it in on their own” and that he could “not recall who took it out”. Lawson added “it would have been listed if it had been scheduled”, that he is “not sure it was scheduled to be there”, and that he “doesn’t know who canceled the DPD car because he doesn’t know who decided to include it.” As for the meeting on Nov. 21 he said that “maybe it (the matter of the squad car) came up.”
The Stevenson report also states that Lawson changed a plan to have the JFK motorcycles parallel to the JFK limousine and instead decided to deploy the JFK motorcycles parallel to the rear fender. In this interview Lawson said he had “no recall of changing plans.”
Even the HSCA saw through this. A comparison of CE 767 (Lawson’s Preliminary Report) and CE 768 (Lawson’s Final Report) show “that the intended sequence of vehicles on 11/19 was changed.” In the actual motorcade of 11/22 as described in CE 768 Congressional Car #1 was placed immediately behind the SS Vice-Presidential Follow-Up Car rather than in its original position as the fifth car behind Vice Presidential Follow-Up.
Mr. Lawson was unable to explain the change except to say that he is “not sure that 768 is what it (the vehicle sequence) was.” He is unsure of the accuracy of his own report!!!!!!
Another weird sentence, “As for the on site (Love Field) formation of the motorcade, Mr. Lawson said that he is not sure whether the deployment of the wire service car and press cars was done by the “local press man” in charge of press cars or by Mr. Lawson.” Why is Mr. Lawson referring to himself, in the third person, as Mr. Lawson? Is he hanging out with Bob Dole? Or was someone else’s name supposed to be here?
Lawson was also unable to remember whether the local press man in charge was Felix McKnight, Sam Bloom, or a White House press man.
Mr. Lawson said that during the whole time he was in Dallas he received no information about threats to JFK that were made in other regions. He specifically recalled receiving no such information from Florida or Chicago.
Lawson acknowledged that Lt. Col. George Whitmeyer who was part of the Dallas district U.S. Army Command, whom Lawson said “taught Army Intelligence” and who rode in the pilot car, “wasn’t scheduled” to be in the motorcade. Mr. Lawson denied that the presence of Col. Whitmeyer had anything to do with Lawson’s prior service in the CIC.
Interesting that they asked, isn’t it?
Lawson stated that in 1963 he had nothing to do with the CIC and that he has attended no inactive USAR meetings since March, 1958. Well, did he attend any active meetings?
During the Dallas Advance, Lawson had contact with an Air Force advance team and with Chief Officer Bales of the White House Communications.
Who was in this Air Force advance team and when did Lawson meet with them?
There are some other details of the assassination and the turmoil at Parkland but nothing that seemed too new.
Document # 180-10078-10384 is missing.
Document # 180-10078-10493 is an eight page summary interview with Samuel A. Kinney. I found this to be an amazing document. I will reproduce nearly all of it word for word.
“SA Kinney, who was the driver of the Presidential follow-up car at the time of the assassination. He first entered the field of law enforcement in 1950 when he was appointed to the Metropolitan Police Department (Washington, D.C.) He was assigned to the White House Police force in 1958, and was then appointed to the Secret Service in 1960.
“SA Kinney worked the November 17 Presidential visit to Tampa, Florida, then traveled to San Antonio, Texas, to prepare for the President’s first stop in the visit
to Texas scheduled for November 21-22. After President Kennedy’s departure from San Antonio, Kinney proceeded to Dallas on November 21.
“As follow up car driver, SA Kinney had supervisory responsibility for the follow-up vehicles, two 1956 Cadillacs specially fitted out with running boards and other equipment. He remarked that the same car used in Tampa was used in Dallas, but that he did not know whether that car was also used in Miami for the visit of November 18.”
Kinney stated that there were “many occasions” when problems with the Presidential car required that the follow up cars be used as Presidential vehicles.
The car in which the President was assassinated was ultimately sent back to the factory (Ford Motor Company) for preservation and display as an historical exhibit.
“SA Kinney stated that the SS agent most responsible for security planning was White House Detail Advance Agent Winston G. Lawson. He recalled that Lawson was working with photographs of possible threat subjects, was concerned about a threat poster printed with the slogan “JFK- Wanted Dead or Alive,” and was “working around the clock”.
Kinney thought that he was responsible for whether or not the bubbletop was used. Kinney was, “of the opinion that if he had put it on at Love Field, it would have been taken off during the motorcade.”
Wonder what he meant by that?
“The follow-up car was interconnected by radio to the Presidential limousine. The radio link was manned by SA Emory Roberts in the front row passenger seat. In addition, four agents rode the running boards, two on each side. In Dallas, Presidential Appointments Secretary Ken O’Donnell and Aide Dave Powers would not have been included in the follow-up car if security planning had been solely the responsibility of SA Kinney. However, since O’Donnell and Powers were stationed well in board, neither one of them in any way affected the operation of the follow up car.
“SA Kinney stated that he was in charge of placing the news media vehicles (Ford Convertibles) in sequence behind the follow-up car. SA Kinney volunteered for this duty because it was “unusual for LBJ to be along” and he felt that his assistance might be useful. He was unable to recall any unusual or suspicious events that took place during this process. He recalled that he had no conversation with advance agent Lawson about the selection of specific vehicles for placement in the sequence.
“SA Kinney immediately recognized the first sound as that of gunfire, realizing that it was a “shot from over our right shoulder” which hit the President in the throat. The President, his movement (in Kinney’s opinion) affected by the brace he wore, fell toward Jackie, who, “after catching him, set him back up.” Kinney commented on Mrs. Kennedy’s influence on the position of the President by remarking that the SS preferred not to have persons riding in jumpseats with the President. The writer understood this remark to mean that the President might have had room to be pushed to the floor.
“While Jackie was setting him back up, Connally turns rights, then left, then pow, pow. The second shot” (hit Connally and) “left Connally’s back open.” “The third shot hit the President.” As the third shot landed, SA Kinney was able to see “hair coming up”. At this point he hit the siren on the follow up car.
“Immediately after SA Kinney hit the siren, portside forward running board SA Clinton Hill said “I’m hitting it” (e.g. announced that he would make a break on foot for the presidential limousine). SA Kinney acknowledged this by lining up the left front side of his follow up car so that that side of the follow up car would offer the shortest, most direct path to the Presidential limousine. SA Kinney stated that at no time after Hill left the follow-up car did Kinney himself see Mrs. Kennedy “come out” (i.e. over the back seat onto the rear of the limousine); “if she had come out, I’d have hit her.”
“During the period of time beginning when SA Hill reached the Presidential limousine and ending with the acceleration of the Presidential limousine, forward starboard running board SA John Ready announced to SA Kinney and Mr. Roberts that he was “going to go” i.e., to run for the Presidential limousine. Roberts ordered him to “stay aboard.” Mr. Kinney’s analysis of Robert’s order was that if Roberts had permitted Ready to go, and “if Ready had done what Hill did, I’ve got one of them,” i.e, because of the impossibility of swerving away at an angle wide enough to avoid both of them.
“SA Kinney stated that he “(didn’t) think they (the people in the Presidential limousine) knew what was happening. They had no control.” He also remarked that when Greer (the driver of the Presidential limousine) looked back, his foot must have come off the accelerator.” N.B.: On the question of the rate of movement (if any) of the Presidential limousine during the assassination, SA Kinney observed that at the time of the first shot, the speed of the motorcade was “3 to 5 miles an hour”.
“SA Kinney indicated that at the moment when the Presidential vehicle began to accelerate, “it went up to 80-85 m.p.h.”, even though “I didn’t know Parkland from the man in the moon”. Upon arrival at the hospital, he “pulled in” in such a manner as to “block off” the Presidential limousine. It was his impression at the time that “the news media didn’t see what happened (in Dealey Plaza) and did not get a story.”
“At the hospital, SA Roberts, who was in command of Vice Presidential protection, noticed a “thumbs-down” signal flashed by SA Hill at the arriving Vice Presidential detail. Roberts understood this to mean that President Kennedy was dead, and accordingly he ordered the other agents in the detail to “surround and protect” the Vice-President and to “get him to stay back.”
“Since SA Hill and SA Kinney had not been assigned a post at Parkland, they improvised their roles. SA Kinney “Bailed out and Clint (Hill) went to the left side of the car (presidential), I to the right.” There they found “Jackie huddled over JFK who was slumped over” and whose “feet were locked under the jump seat.” SA Hill and SA Kinney were unable “to get Jackie to let loose of JFK.” The press had not arrived yet. SA Hill then said to Mrs. Kennedy “Jackie, we got to get him out” and he raised her up. When the President first came into view, SA Kinney believed that he observed the President’s “right eye on his chin.”
“The two agents began to wrap SA Hill’s coat around the President. At this point, SA Kinney “lost control” and for a brief moment ceased assisting in caring for the president: “Someone else wrapped him up by the feet.” By this time the press had arrived. “In the vicinity of the Presidential vehicle”. Captain Cecil Stoughton gave orders that there were to be no pictures.
“SA Kinney soon returned to Vice-Presidential duties. “LBJ was in shock when the SS grapped him.” As a driver, Kinney concentrated on the condition of his vehicle and on events taking place near it. He recalled that “someone wanted to wash the (Presidential) car. I said no one touch. A Dallas Police Department Officer and I put the bubble top back on the car and enclosed it by its snaps. Then pictures were taken of the roses, but not of the Presidential limousine. After the buttoning on of the bubble-top, I told Kellerman (SA Roy Kellerman, no. 2 SA in the White house Detail) that I’d take the cars back to Love Field and wait. I asked for two motorcycles escorts. I told Major Nedbal of the Air Force that I was coming and to have the ramp down on the vehicle transport aircraft. We then flew back to D.C.”
“Inside the aircraft during flight, the loading sergeant, who had been in the rear compartment where the cars were stored, entered the forward cabin and said, “I can’t stand to be back there.” SA Kinney gave him his seat and returned to the rear compartment. At this point he discovered in the Presidential limousine a skull fragment under the jump seat where Connally had been seated, and a bullet fragment in the front seat between the driver’s and passenger’s seat. He remarked that the bullet fragment “Looked like it had hit the windshield frame above the windshield.”
“SA Kinney put on a radio patch to Presidential Physician Admiral Burkley to inform him that he had discovered the skull fragment. Chief Petty Officer Tommy Mills, an aide to Burkley, received the message. SA Kinney then announced that he was going to go directly to the White house non-stop. The Washington field Office learned of this and sent 6 to 7 Park Police to escort SA Kinney to the White House Garage. In the garage they were met by FBI agents.”
On the cancellation of the 11-2-63 Presidential visit to Chicago, “SA Kinney was assigned to drive the Presidential follow-up car for the motorcade. His records show that he went to Chicago, prepared for the trip and was awaiting the President’s arrival. At the last minute, the trip was canceled. SA Kinney’s was informed that the “Cuban missile crisis” necessitated the cancellation.”
What the hell is this? Holy Halderman Batman! The Cuban missile crisis was in October of 1962. So what does this mean?
“SA Kinney finds the view of conspiracy plausible for two reasons.
“First, the view of the Presidential limousine that presented itself from the vantage point of the alleged sniper’s nest is consistent with careful planning. From that vantage point, tracking the target through a scope did not require a side-to-side movement but required the use of vertical movement in order to track for distance. SA Kinney stated that tracking for distance is much easier than tracking from side to side. He also indicated that the sequencing of the shots — one before the sign, once after — suggested that the sniper was familiar with the scene.
“Second, SA Kinney reported that on the day of the assassination, SA Stuart Stout of the four-to-twelve shift was driving into Dallas to man a post at the Trade Mart in time for the President’s arrival at the Mart. Stout was passed by a car leaving Dallas at a speed of 110 m.p.h. Stout remarked that “that car must have robbed a bank.” SA William Duncan, who was on the same shift had given notice that it was five minutes away from the Mart. Duncan’s story places the appearance of the speeding car at approximately 12:30 P.M.”
Document # 180-10080-10131 is missing
Document # 180-10080-10231 is missing.
Document # 180-10080-10497 is a one page outside contact report dated 2/17/78. Robert Goff, the Secret Service’s legal counsel called and indicated that John Marshall ex-SAIC is in serious medical condition. Marshall had a stroke and his mental as well as physical condition is not good.
Document # 180-10082-10452 is a four page summary dated 1/30/78. It is an interview with Glenn Bennett. He lived at 5601 Seminary, Falls Church, Va.
Mr. Bennett worked for a time in the PRS. Bennett stated that there were five agents in PRS at that time. He stated that they would receive intelligence and had liaison with FBI, CIA, ATF, the military, U.S. Customs and local police departments.
Bennet stated that he was detailed from PRS to the White House detail for the Dallas trip. This was because there was a manpower pull for the Dallas trip.
Bennet then gives his impression of the assassination. “He remembers hearing what he hoped was a firecracker. He then heard another noise and saw what appeared to be a nick in the back of President Kennedy’s coat below the shoulder. He thought the President had been hit in the back. Bennett stated that he does not recall any agents reacting before the third shot. He believes Agent Ready started to react but was stopped by Emory Roberts, because the limousine had accelerated and Ready might have been injured.
Bennett helped unload the coffin and place it on the plane. He said he came back to the White House via helicopter.
Bennett remembers that Chett Miller and Walter Pine were in the PRS with him in 1962. He didn’t know Abraham Bolden, but he had heard of him.
The name Conrad Cross was familiar and he remembers the name Vallee, but does not recall why.
Bennett was not on the Florida trip and was not scheduled for the Chicago trip. He stated that he does not recall any talk or information on alleged threats in Miami or Chicago. He doesn’t recall any name of persons to be checked out relative to the Dallas trip, filtering back.
Document # 180-10082-10453 is a 3 page summary dated 02/01/78. It is a summary of an interview with James S. Griffiths. He was living at 1809 Chapel Hill Rd., Silver Spring, MD. at the time of the interview.
Griffiths stated that he started as an agent in August, 1961 in Chicago. At first Griffiths had no recall of a proposed Presidential visit on November 2, 1963. When refreshed about the information of President Kennedy attending a Army-Air Force game at Soldier’s Field, he stated, “Isn’t that the one that was canceled at the last moment?”
He stated that he was assigned to the airport for that proposed trip. The HSCA interviewers informed him that the work sheet showed that he was assigned to the airport and this is where he was when word came of the cancellation of the trip.
Griffiths stated that the name of Thomas Vallee was familiar and remembers a case concerning Vallee, but does not remember any of the details. He stated that he does not remember anything outstanding regarding a threat to the President for that particular visit.
He had no knowledge of any of the information in Edwin Black’s article.
Who’s Edwin Black? What article?
He stated that David Grant was the advance man for the Chicago trip.
Document # 180-10082-10454 is a 6 page summary dated 01/31/78. It is a summary of an interview with William “Tim” McIntyre. Mr. McIntyre lived at 3434 Beverly Drive, Anandale, Virginia.
Mr. McIntyre mentioned that agents are given training in dealing with mentally afflicted people.
I am uncertain if Mr. McIntyre is referring to 1963 or when this interview took place but he stated that “The local police department would help the area agent and advance man in staying aware of possible threatening characters. The working agent assigned to protection would not get involved in anything other than Presidential protection. The shift leaders would be responsible for shift reports. The advance agent would be responsible for the pre-trip report and the post-trip report although all agents present made reports relative to the assassination. He stated that each agent assigned to a trip would read the advance agent’s report covering cities to be visited. This report would also contain PRS information as far
as suspicious persons or organizations.”
Mr. McIntyre was assigned to Presidential protection on the 8-4 shift for the Dallas trip. He stated his function on presidential protection was to be alert for any kind of trouble such as missile or objects being thrown, people running to the President’s car and also ramming incidents.
McIntyre’s assignment was the left rear running board of the Presidential running board of the Presidential limousine, behind Clint Hill.
McIntyre heard the first report, which he described as “very loud”. He said that he had no doubt that it was a shot. There was a pause and then two more shots in succession.
McIntyre remembers an FBI agent over reacting at Parkland Hospital, trying to get into the operating room. McIntyre stated that he has no recall of the Agent’s Commission (ID) books being called in and new ones being issued.
McIntyre remembers as a later date Agent Dick Johnson didn’t say which stretcher but McIntyre got the impression it was from the President’s stretcher.
McIntyre, when asked if any Secret service men had stayed behind in Dealey Plaza, he stated that he had heard that Agent Lem Johns, assigned to the Vice president, had left his car and was left behind, but made his way to Parkland Hospital.
McIntyre had heard of Abraham Bolden but did not know him.
Another reference is made to Conrad Cross. McIntyre said the name was familiar. Who is this?
McIntyre did not know the names Vallee and Moseby.
Document # 180-10083-10419 is a 7 page summary of an interview with Lubert F. deFreese. It is dated February 2, 1978. Mr. deFreese was living at 4101 Chestnut Place, Alexandria, Virginia.
Mr. deFreese was a member of the Secret Service White House Detail for JFK’s November 18, 1963 visit to Miami, Florida. Mr. deFreese was in charge of all security measures for the protection of the President.
The final survey report Mr. deFreese indicated JFK landed at Miami International Airport, took a helicopter from the airport to a heliport near the Americana Hotel, and then rode in a motorcade from the heliport to the Hotel, where he addressed the Inter-American Press Association.
Mr. deFreese stated that because he received (at some point during his advance) information criticizing the originally selected landing site for the helicopter, he speculated that perhaps “someone from the White house office had gone to do a multiple stop survey and come back to brief us.” Hypothetically, if a pre-advance survey had been conducted (and Mr, deFreese is not sure that a survey was performed), its result in Miami was to condemn the original helicopter landing site as too close to the hotel. Its proximity placed it too close for a motorcade and too far to walk.” Consequently, a second landing site was chosen which was “a mile or two miles away.”
Who did this multiple stop survey? Where did there stop? What did they survey?
How did they survey whatever they were surveying?
A number of questions were posed for this witness on the subject of an alleged cancellation of a motorcade that, as originally scheduled, would have transported the President from the airport to the hotel. Mr. deFreese stated that to “the best of his recollection” he does “not recall a plan for a motorcade other than to go from the heliport to the hotel.”
“In his Final Survey Report (FSR) of December 11, 1963, Mr. deFreese, in a section entitled Protective Research (p.7), discusses PRS-related contacts with (1) the chief of the PRS service; (2) a local Miami office agent, Ernest I. Aragon, who was a specialist in local Cuban affairs and whose “report on the Miami Cuban Affairs” is mentioned in the FSR; and (3) a local Miami agent, Talmadge Bailey, who submitted reports on two PRS subjects, one “Rohinski” and one “Derber”.
“Although Mr. deFreese acknowledged in the interview that PRS is responsible for the acquisition and the intra- and inter-regional distribution (the latter in case of “floating” threats) of threat information, and although in the FSR he wrote that PRS Chief Bouck “promised to keep the Miami office advised,” he had no recollection of contact with PRS except to say that in 1963 it was rare for a PRS agent from Washington to accompany an advance agent into the field, and that no PRS agent accompanied deFreese on this trip.”
A threat did surface in connection with the Miami trip, but in describing it Mr. deFreese did not indicate that his source of information about it was from PRS.
Mr. deFreese remembered that Mr. Aragon “briefed” him, but cannot recall anything about the content or manner of Aragon’s briefing except that he admitted that Aragon’s briefing may have concerned the pre-November 18 threat activity described in Aragon’s December 30, 1963 supplement to deFreese’s December 11, 1963 FSR.
More convenient memory loss, and exactly what was the threat?
Mr. deFreese remarked that the names (Rohinski and Derber) of the PRS subjects which he discussed with agent Bailey now “mean nothing” to him; “I have no idea what they did.” He observed that the inclusion of their names in the FSR “did not mean that either subject had made a threat” and added that “in 1963 the SS did not have quarterly check-ups” on subjects as it does today. Then he explained (a) that as to Rohinski, the numerical symbol 601.0 was an all-inclusive designation, not necessarily one representing the assignment of a number to an individual, and (b) that, as to Derber the “#3-11” meant only that a record about Derber had been made by the local Miami office.
Mr. deFreese acknowledged that there was an active threat against the President of which the Secret Service was aware in November 1963 in the period immediately prior to JFK’s trip to Miami. Mr. deFreese indicated that the threat was made by a group of people who were to some extent members of one family, including a “sister and brother.” Mr. deFreese was unable to recall the original source of his information about the group. His immediate source was local Miami Agent Robert Jamison, who “had touched base with the FBI” and who “briefed me about meetings with other agencies.” However, he did remember that the group included “southerners” and originated not in the Miami area but in a “neighboring state,” “possible Alabama or Georgia.” He termed the group a collection of “rabble rousers.” Beyond that he “cannot remember details.”
When asked if a Joseph Milteer was a member of the group, Mr. deFreese acknowledged that “he might have been one” of them and stated that “if he is the one, then yes.” “The name does ring some vague bells.”
Mr. deFreese had no awareness in November 1963 that Joseph Milteer had come to the attention of the SS because of a tape recording of Molters statements held by the Miami Police Department.
Mr. deFreese was part of the November 21-22 Presidential trip in that he went to Houston on the 21st to assist the Houston advance agent, Mr. Ron Pontius. He was sent home after the President left Houston.
Document # 180-10087-10136 is a seven page report from the Chicago Field Office of the Secret Service on Thomas Mosley and Homer S. Echevarria. Information is supplied by an informant still unknown, the symbol number for this informant is 2-1-266. Investigation was made by SS agents Edward X. Tucker, Joseph E. Noonan, Gary M. McLeod and James S. Griffiths. It covered a period between November 29-December 10, 1963. It was previously numbered as CO-2-34,030. It was previously titled Lee Harvey Oswald Assassination of President Kennedy. It is now numbered CO-2-34, 104. It is now titled Homer S. Echevarria.
The informant told of meetings between Echevarria and Mosley and between Mosley and a man named “Mannie” (last name unknown), who allegedly is a leader of all Cuban groups in Chicago. “Mannie” expressed an interest in obtaining automatic weapons, detonators and explosives. These items were to be paid in cash for an action to take place in 90 days.
Apparently the Secret Service turned this matter over to other agencies seeing no jurisdiction for itself. There is a reference to a report of SA Tucker and Noonan dated December 3, 1963.
The informant advised of a meeting to take place between Mosley and Echevarria on December 1, 1963 at the Chicago Transit Authority station, 4221 West Diversey Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. The meeting was to take place between 2:00 and 5:00 p.m. This concerned the desired items mentioned above and the “hit in 90 days”, what this “hit” meant was not determined.
A check of the Chicago Police Department files on suspect Thomas Mosley revealed a record for Mosley under the alias Art Rickoften where in 1959 he was arrested for possession of fictitious license plates. A search of his car found machine guns. He was turned over to the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division of the Internal Revenue Service.
FBI Special Agent Walter Rogers was informed of the meeting between Mosley and Echevarria on Dec. 1. Rogers was also advised of the possible negotiations for explosives. Rogers recalled that Martin Morua, a member of the Directorio Estudiante Revolucionario, (DRE) had come North from Miami about eight or nine months ago and had been in Chicago. Morua had expressed an interest in obtaining detonators too and had been up in Michigan trying to buy them.
On December 1, 1963 at 4:45 p.m. Mosley was observed sitting in his parking lot behind the above referred to bus station. At 5:03 p. m. Echevarria arrived, got out of his car and into Mosley’s. At 5:10 Echevarria got out of Mosley’s car, dressed in his uniform and went to work at the bus station.
Essentially Mosley wanted to take over Echevarria’s Cuban group, promising financial backing, paying any debts the group had etc.
They ran a credit check with the Chicago Credit bureau on December 3, 1963 on Francisco Blanco, residing at 1838 South May Street, Chicago, Illinois, wife Madalupe, formerly lived on (house number not shown) Culerton Avenue. More on Franciso Blanco in a moment. The Lapin Furniture company did a credit check on him. A search of files with the INS revealed one Francisco Blanco originally from Mexico was of record. It was noted that the description of Blanco was not the same as the subject referred to in the earlier Tucker and Noonan report.
On December 5, 1963 “Mannie” and Mosley are supposed to meet.
SA Thomas E. Manson, U.S. Bureau of Customs, and Special Investigator Thomas R. Brennan, Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division were consulted regarding the dealings with automatic weapons. SA Manson made available files from that Bureau reflecting some Cuban arms activity in the past. From those files the following information was culled:
In August 1961, one John Burkman, residing at 535 baseline Road, Northvile, Michigan, and who is employed as a sales representative for the Richmond Arms Company, Blissfield, Michigan, was approached by one William Newton and a Lt. General (FNU) Osborne. William Newton, allegedly residing at Miami, Oklahoma, was suspected of being a leader of a Cuban movement but was a person who stayed in the background. The Customs file did not reflect information on Lt. General Osborne. Newton and Osborne requested that Burkman attempt to obtain 10,000 M-1 rifles for an anti-Castro revolution.
On August 29, 1961 Newton; a Commander Evelio Duque, allegedly residing at 1228 Northwest sixth Street, Miami, Florida, and apparently the head of the (DRE)
Directorio Estudiante Revolucionario; and one Jose Cardoso, met in Kansas City, Missouri to discuss a meeting that was to be held on September 9, 1961 at Chicago. Also, present was a man named Martinez, allegedly from Kansas City. Reportedly, Cardoso was acting as arms procurement officer for this movement. According to Customs files Cardoso is an American citizen and was residing at 2317 South Trumbal Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.
On September 9, 1961 Burkman met at the LaSalle hotel in Chicago with Cardoso, Duque, and one Dr. Orlando Bosch, representative of the Cuban anti-Communist Army. This meeting was called for the purpose of discussing the sale of such items as M-1 rifles, M-14 rifles, hand grenades, flame throwers, bazookas, and ammunition for the same.
On September 12, 1961 another meeting was held to discuss the price and type of arms.
Some time late in 1961, exact date unknown, one Martin Morua, probably the same person mentioned by FBI Agent Rogers, who according to the Customs files is the National Coordinator of the Directorio Estudiante Revolucionario, obtained 3,000 fuse-type blasting caps from Burkman and two telegraph sending and receiving sets which allegedly were given to Evelio Duque, who supposedly took them to Miami. According to the Customs file, Morua had originally submitted his request for blasting caps to Jose Cardoso.
On October 24, 1962 George Marti, probably Jorge Marti Salazar, residing at 131 Englewood, Bellwood, Illinois, Cuban refugee allegedly working for the DRE, telephoned Burkman and inquired into the possibility of obtaining four or five tons of an explosive known as C-4. At about this same time Burkman allegedly supplied Marti @ Salazar [Marti @ Salazar is how it is written. They are using the “@” symbol as “also known as”.] and Morua with 1,00 blasting caps and Morua and Marti @ Salazar reportedly in Miami. Allegedly, these men had driven to Burkman’s residence and then allegedly drove on to Miami after receiving these materials.
The files of the Bureau of Customs also reflected that in October 1963 three individuals, all allegedly Cubans, who were identified as Jose Cardoso, (FNU) Sierra, and (FNU) Hernandez, had come to the Willow Run, Michigan airport, where they were met by Burkman and then taken to rooms which had been reserved for them at the Mayflower Hotel in Plymouth, Michigan. Allegedly, these Cubans advised Burkman that they wanted to purchase .45 caliber pistols, sub machine guns, Browning automatic weapons, composition C-3 explosives, recoiless rifles, and ammunition for these weapons. They indicated that they had the necessary funds and were impatient to consummate the purchase. Burkman was told that the group needed these items for a guerrilla action which was to precede a real attempt at a revolution in Cuba. It is not known whether delivery of the items was ever made by Burkman. However, the report indicates that Sierra and Hernandez departed Willow Run by plane for Chicago and that Cardoso departed Willow Run alone by automobile.
Regarding the name Sierra, mentioned above, it is noted that the Customs file reflects that the Sierra at Willow Run, Michigan was constantly referred to as “doctor” by the other Cubans. A confidential source at Chicago has advised that there is one Paulino Sierra, an attorney, who has been very active in the Cuban movements in Chicago, who claims to have financial backing, and who allegedly wants to unite all anti-Castro groups. It now appears possible that this Paulino Sierra, the “Doctor” Sierra who appeared at Willow Run, and the “Mannie” who met Mosley at the Terminal lounge on December 5, 1963 may be one and the same person.
Regarding the Evelio Duque mentioned above, it is noted that the local television newspaper guide for the week of December 7 through December 13, 1963 reflected that the local NBC station at Chicago would carry a “White Paper” program on the evening of December 8, 1963, at 9:00 p.m. CST, which would concern itself with the Bay of Pigs invasion of October 1961. It was determined that this program was canceled and another one substituted in its place; however, the brief sketch in the TV guide listed Cuban personalities to be interviewed and one of the names listed was one Evelio Duque, who was described as one of the participants in the Escambray (Cuba) Mountain revolt.
A search of the Chicago office indices failed to make a definite association with any of the names appearing in this report.
On December 5, 1963 informant 2-1-266 advised that Mosley had gone to the meting with the man known as “Mannie” on that date at the Logan Square Terminal Tap. A description of “Mannie” will appear below. “Mannie” allegedly advised Mosley that he wanted to meet Mosley’s superior, and he indicated to Mosley that the backers of his group were very responsible people in high positions who had ample money. “Mannie” also advised that his group is buying ships which are being purchased in the names of different American citizens. Allegedly, nothing of a detrimental nature was said during this conversation regarding the United States.
Relative to the policies to be followed by President Lyndon B. Johnson, “Mannie” indicated that it made little difference one way of the other as to the policies President Johnson followed. “Mannie” allegedly stated that the late President Kennedy helped “sometimes”; however, he “…played both sides of the fence to save face.” “Mannie” also indicated that all of the Cuban groups in Chicago were now united with the exception of one.
According to “Mannie” his movement is headquartered in Miami, and his group wants no credit of any kind extended to it and will make all purchases on a cash basis. “Mannie” indicated that he had been doing a lot of traveling lately –to San Francisco, New York, and other cities. When the subject of New Orleans came up, “Mannie” allegedly avoided any discussion of that city, for unknown reasons.
“Mannie” indicated to Mosley that by the 9th or 10th of December 1963 he would know what his Cuban group’s requirements would be. “Mannie” said he was going to get in touch with Miami and that he definitely wanted to meet the person who Mosley has alleged makes his groups’s decisions in order that “Mannie” can place an initial order for demolition explosives.
On December 9, 1963 informant 2-1-266 advised that there is a possibility that Echevarria has contacts in Cuba, as he allegedly is going to obtain commemorative Cuban stamps depicting the flights of the Russian cosmonauts.
2-1-266 also advised that the Cuban groups are indicating that they desire to step up the sabotage program; however, it is not known if the groups mean the sabotage program in Cuba or elsewhere. 2-1-266 has also determined that there is a desire on the part of the Cuban groups to have any and/or all of the explosives they purchase in Chicago distributed to various parts of Illinois.
On December 10, 1963 2-1-266 advised that he is positive he can introduce an undercover agent into this group at any time.
“Mannie” is described as a white male, (Cuban); could be Jewish or Greek; 48 to 52 years; 5’9″; dark, short wavy hair (receding); very sharp dresser; suit and tie; speaks fluent English; very neat and clean.
The SS discontinued its investigation and turned copies of this report over to Customs, Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division of the IRS and the FBI.
Document # 180-10087-10137 is a 7 page memorandum from Acting SAIC Maurice Martineau to Deputy Chief Paterni on subject Homer S. Echevarria dated November 27, 1963.
Martineau references an earlier memorandum to Paterni dated November 26, 1963 which related to information received from 2-1-266. This information concerns a group of Chicago Cubans, allegedly anti-Castro, who may have had a connection with the assassination of President Kennedy.
Martineau phoned SAIC Marlin Johnson of the FBI’s Chicago Office and informed him that a confidential informant of this SS office that he had knowledge of a group of Chicago Cubans, who were bitterly opposed to President Kennedy and a member of that group made a remark to the informant, “WE now have plenty of money– our new backers are Jews — as soon as `we’ (or `they’) take care of Kennedy…”.
Martineau told the FBI that this informant had worked with them before on a counterfeiting case and had proved to be reliable.
Martineau told Johnson that the Secret Service’s Washington headquarters told him to provide the information to the FBI and as this group would constitute a threat to President Johnson that they should conduct a joint investigation.
Johnson called back later that day and assigned SA’s Bob Baker and Walt Rogers to the investigation. Martineau then told Johnson that the informant, together with Edward Z. Tucker and Joseph E. Noonan would meet with his agents at 6:30 p.m. on Tuesday, November 26, at the intersection of Marine Drive and Lakeside Place, Chicago, Illinois.
Acting under Martineau’s instruction’s Tucker and Noonan met with the informant early, at 6:00 p.m. to explain that the informant was to keep the SS office advised of any contact he has with any other agency.
At the 6:30 scheduled meeting SA Baker stated that the reason he had agreed to come was because he knew the informant previously in relation to a Brink’s truck robbery in Chicago. Baker felt that the matter now under investigation was a protective matter and best left to the SS.
Okay, Mosley appears to be the informant 2-1-266 because he is instructed to contact Homer Echevarria, who is a co-worker with the informant as a driver of a Chicago Transit Authority city bus. Both the informant and the suspect work out of Keeler Station, 4221 West Diversey Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.
In early September (1963) Echevarria had indicated to the informant an interest in buying machine guns to be used in a Cuban revolution. The informant stated that he would be in a position to provide arms of this type, and Echevarria presumably relayed this information to higher authorities in the Cuban group of which he is a member. He subsequently told the informant that others in the group were interested in purchasing machine guns, but that they would first have to satisfy themselves that the informant was trustworthy and was not a CIA agent.
On Thursday, November 21, 1963, Echevarria told the informants, “We now have plenty of money — our new backers are Jews — as soon as `we’ (or they) take care of Kennedy…” the informant was unable to continue this conversation with the suspect because of the presence of other bus drivers.
Acting under instructions to continue his association with the suspect, Mosley arranged to meet with Echevarria at 12:00 o’clock on Thursday, November 28, 1963, for the purpose of being taken to Echevarria’s associates for discussion as to the purchase of machine guns. On November 27, Martineau interviewed Mosley, at which time Mosley assure Martineau that he had not gone to any other agency with this information.
SA’s Noonan and Tucker were instructed to make a background investigation of Echevarria.
Martineau was interested in finding out how the FBI knew the identity of their informant.
Of note are two newspaper clippings that are attached, from Chicago area newspapers, The Chicago American and the Chicago Daily News . The Chicago American has a clipping from a gossip column called “Daly Diary” by Maggis Daly dated November 26, 1963. She writes, “Rumor Row…The word is that the assassination of President Kennedy was planned at a meeting on Chicago’s west side in the early part of February…That a dissident Cuban group financed Lee Harvey Oswald and that he lived on occasional money from the members and occasional money from his mother. ACTION…The FBI went into action in investigating this group last Friday before the Oswald shooting and we hear that after a 30-day mourning period for President Kennedy will begin an open discussion on the subject. GUN FOR HIRE?…The tip on that Italian 6.5 carbine came from a prominent Chicagoan who recognized the gun and knew that the only place in the country where it was available with the scope and sold as a unit was at Klein’s Sporting Goods. The man phoned the Dallas police to save them the trouble of checking thru massive records of gun stores thruout (sic) the country.
He told us, “It’s a wonder the assassin used such cheap equipment. A good high powered rifle for high powered telescopic work sells in the neighborhood of $175 to $200 without the scope. The scope is usually $50 extra.
“And the pistol that misfired when Oswald shot at the Dallas policeman in the movie theater is no jewel either. It is the type that can be purchased from $4 to $6. A high quality pistol sells for $75. Oswald was a good marksman.”
The Chicago Daily News has a small article “Drab Future for Mrs. Oswald”. This is an article designed to create sympathy for Marina. Quoting Mrs. Ruth Paine, “I understand there are people in the Chicago area who are talking of helping her too.” This was underlined.
Document # 180-10087-10138 is a three page report. This is from the Secret Service. It is numbered CO-2-34.030. It was written by Ernest I Aragon. This was for the period December 10-13, 1963.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in Miami, Florida advised the file of Homero Valdivia Echevarria is not in their local office. They stated their Central Office, Washington, D.C. could advise the location of this file. The Francisco Blanco in subject case is someone other than the Francisco-Blanco mentioned in C)-2-30.156. The Francisco Blanco of interest in this investigation has been tentatively identified as Juan Francisco Blanco-Fernandez, a member of the Student Revolutionary Directorate at Miami, Florida.
Reference is made to a memorandum dated December 3, 1963 by SA Edward Z. Tucker, Chicago requesting further investigation of this case in the Miami area concerning Homero Samuel Valdivia Echevarria and Francisco Blanco.
On 12-10-63 inquiry was made of 3-11-14 relative to Valdivia-Echevarria and he is not of record. On the same date, records of the I & NS, Miami, Florida was in this district. SA Charles Challendes, I & NS advised that Valdivia-Echevarria may have been a transient through Miami and his file would have been forwarded to the office where he was to establish residence. Mr. Challendes stated that if this particular file was not in Chicago that their Central Office in Washington, D.C. would be able to advise the exact location of this file. On Dec, 11, 1963 reporting agent discreetly interviewed Francisco-Blanco mentioned in CO-2-30.156. It was determined due to his age and physical appearance that this is not the Francisco Blanco of interest in the investigation.
On December 12, 1963 a check with the DRE through a confidential source found they had a Francisco-Blanco as a member. This same source had a conversation with Jaun Francisco Blanco Fernandez and found that he had been in Chicago approximately two weeks ago. Fernandez allegedly is the head of the military phase of the DRE in Miami, Florida.
On 12-13-63 the INS file of Juan Francisco Blanco Fernandez under their No. A12496140 was reviewed and it discloses that Fernandez entered at Miami, Florida on 10-13-61 through Cuban Passport No. 46784 valid until 10-11-61. He is described as w/m; Cuban; DOB 5-6-39 at Pinar del Rio, Cuba; 5-9; 170; blue eyes; black straight hair parted on one side. At the time of his entry, he was detained for violation of the immigration laws. He was subsequently given an indefinite parole. His FBI number is 340837E. The file further discloses that Juan Francisco Blanco-Fernandez, along with seventeen other members of the DRE, participated in a raid on the Miramar section of Havana, Cuba, on 8-25-62.
On 11-13-62 Fernandez enlisted into the U.S. Army and he was assigned to UC 50303110, COC 3RD Bn, lrst, Inf. REgte, Ft. Jackson. S. Car. The inclusive dates of his active service in the U.S. Army are not known, nor is the exact date of his discharge. Since his discharge from the U.S. Army, he has been residing in Miami, Florida except for his recent trip to Chicago and he is currently the head of the military section of the DRE.
A photograph of Fernandez was extracted from the INS file and exhibited to the confidential source and he identified him as the subject in question. The photograph has been reproduced and copies are attached hereto for use by the Chicago office.
Of course, it’s not attached.
CONCLUSION: Copies of this report are being forwarded to the Washington F.O. (Field Office) in order that inquiry may be made at the Central Office of INS in an effort to determine whether the INS file of Homero Samuel Valdivia Echevarria
INS number A12236480 is located there. For the information of the Washington F.O. Echevarria is also known as Homer S. Echevarria and is described as w/m
Cuban; 32; born at Jatibonico, Camaguay, Cuba; 5-9 160; black hair; mustache; olive complexion. INS number A12236480.
Photographs of Juan Francisco Blanco-Fernandez are attached for Chicago and unless otherwise directed this investigation is closed in Miami.
Document # 180-10087-10191 is a seven page interview summary with Maurice Martineau.
Martineau retired from the Secret Service in 1972 after 32 years with the Secret Service and has been traveling on tours to Europe and the U.S. He recently received a telephone call from Robert Goff, counsel for the Secret Service advising him of the HSCA’a desire to interview him.
When Martineau left the Service he had been assigned to the Inspection Division as an inspector. He inspected Field Offices and personnel to determine if they were in compliance with Secret Service regulations. He reviewed files in these field offices and determine if they were handled probably. And he would interview agents “to see if they had any beefs to unload”. Visual inspection of the physical plant and equipment issued would also be undertaken. These visits would take 2-3 weeks. Martineau would then return to Headquarters in Washington and write up the report of inspection. Recommendations would then be made by the Inspecting Agent. Martineau agreed that an Inspector for Secret Service was usually a senior agent and had or developed a great knowledge of workings of the Service. He functioned as an Inspector from 1969 until he retired in 1972. In his tenure he covered about one half of the 65 field offices.
In 1954, Matrineau was Special Agent in Charge of the office in Grand Rapids, Michigan. In 1955, he went to Milwaukee, Wisconsin as SAC and remained in that position until 1961 when he was transferred to Kansas City, Missouri.
In February 1963, he was sent to Chicago as Assistant Special Agent in Charge. The head man at that time was James Burke. Burke was shortly thereafter transferred to Detroit and John Handley was sent to Chicago as Special Agent in charge (SAC). After a while, Handley left for Paris, France but Martineau remained as Assistant Special Agent in Charge. After Handley left Mike Torino was sent to Chicago as SAC.
Martineau described the close relationship between the Secret Service and the Chicago Police Department on Presidential protection, particularly the close surveillance. He complained that the Secret Service was always short of agents. He told about a situation earlier in his career when then Vice President Richard Nixon visited a small town in the northern peninsula of Michigan. Martineau and the local police chief were the only “protectors” for Nixon.
Martineau said that he was in Chicago when president John F. Kennedy made a visit prior to November 1963. He could not recall the precise date. “We got a telephone threat. The caller was not identified, that Kennedy was going to be killed when he got to Jackson Street. We adjusted the routine to rely on the Chicago police to cover the area. The threat did not materialize.” he said. Martineau said that if a threat came to SS field offices, even if it came anonymously, it was reported to headquarters in Washington. Protective Research Service (PRS) would be notified. They are now called protective Research Division (PRD). If the threat came by letter it was sent to PRS for fingerprint analysis and phraseology studies.
The HSCA asked about threats to JFK in the Chicago area in November 1963.
Martineau visibly stiffened. “I can recall no threat that was signficant enough to cause me to recollect it at this time” he said. In contrast to the wealth of detail which flooded his earlier recollections, his answers became vague and less responsive.
Martineau explained that just prior to a Presidential visit, there would be a meeting of the office agents and detail assignments would be handed out. In the instance of the President’s intended visit on November 2, 1963 Martineau did not recall any particular surveillance involving Cuban or Latin types, nor did he recall any all-night interrogation of any suspects in the Chicago office.
“All night interrogation”-? What is that about?
Martineau recalled nothing about the Mosley information until HSCA staff read a portion of a Secret Service memo (q.v.) written by SA Ed Tucker (and which Martineau signed as “Approved by”) which outlined the SS 1963 interest in Mosley, whom it appears was an informant. He only recalled that Mosley was a “police buff, a James Bond type who knew where there was a stock of automatic weapons which some Cubans were trying to buy. “They were Chicago bus drivers….I don’t know what happened in connection with the information and at no time do I recall talking to the FBI about it.”
Martineau briefly discussed the SS filing system as he recalled it. Chicago office files were prefaced by 2-1+#. While the prefix “CO” indicated a Chief’s office or Washington file and CO+S meant special.
Washington headquarters would issue the actual # on these. All Presidential threats were CO#’s. S (Special) could appear on office files which meant that copy [was] sent to Washington.
While the interviewers did not ask flat out if he knew about the circumstances which former agent Bolden mentioned Martineau was questioned about the matter of Thomas Arthur Vallee and the alleged Cuban/Latin types which Bolden mentioned. The paucity of documents in this case make it difficult to pin down a witness on details or even recollection of past events which the Service seems to treat as a “non-event”.
Martineau should be reinterviewed as any documents come to light which touch on Presidential threats in Chicago since, during/between, October 25- November 2, 1963.
He did remember SA Tom Kelly calling him from Dallas – 11/22/63 – regarding Oswald’s rifle ordered from Klein’s in Chicago. He said in those days the Secret Service in Chicago was not open on weekends so Kelly called him at home. He then called SA Tom Strong and asked him to check Klein’s Sporting goods for information on the rifle. Strong told him that the FBI had beaten them to Klein’s and got the records.
Martineau was shown a picture of Thomas Arthur Valle, who was arrested in Chicago by CPD on information from Secret Service. He didn’t recognize the picture and had no present recollection of a case like Vallee.
I think Mr. Maurice Martineau is lying about something.
Document # 180-10089-10262 is a 6 page report dated 09/20/63. It is titled “President Kennedy’s attendance Milford, PA and Stewart Air Force Base on September 24, 1963.” This is the start of the Midwest tour! This originates from the Warren Commission. There are two HSCA routing slips here. One is dated 3/14/78. It has handwritten on it “S.S. Report – JFK Attendance at Pinchot Institute for Conversation Studies. Rowley, James JFK – Itinerary for trip.” The second “S.S. Report – JFK trip to Las Vegas Conversation Center Itinerary. JFK – trip to Miami.”
This last one has team #4 encircled.
This survey was conducted by SA Ernest E. Olsson, SAIC Robert Powis, and SA Alfred Wong on September 17-20, 1963.
Security was handled by the Pennsylvania State Police, the U.S. Forest Service, Special Fire Police from Milford, PA and surrounding communities, and Agents of this Service.
At Stewart Air Force Base, N.Y. the U.S. Air Force and Agents of this Service will effect the President’s security. Only authorized personnel with reason to be present will be allowed near the Presidential area.
At the Pinchot Estate, security will be placed in effect at 10:00 A.M. on September 24, 1963.
All personnel having access to immediate Presidential areas will be identified as follows.
Forrest Service Officers not in uniform – green lapel badge imprinted with bearer’s name
Fire equipment personnel – red lapel badge imprinted with bearer’s name.
Pennsylvania State police – plain clothes detail – tan lapel clips.
Agents of this Service will wear their distinctive lapel pins.
Speaker’s platform guests will wear a white lapel badge imprinted with bearer’s name.
SAIC of the Protective Research Service indicated that there were no known subjects in this area at this time.
Inquiry in Milford revealed that one Gifford C. Emery is a member of the Neo-Nazi party of George Lincoln Rockwell; that he has two brothers names Bruce and James. All three are presently employed as laborers by the Forest Service on the Pinchot Estate and during the past week have been working in the immediate vicinity of Grey Towers. The work was suspended for the day and if they entered with the general public they were to be kept under close observation. The above was told to the PRS by telephone on September 19, 1963.
SAIC Behn rode in the Presidential limousine on all movements and will remain in close proximity to the President at all times.
All activities of the press and photographers will be controlled by Mr. Salinger and Mr. Hatcher.
There were 232 people involved in security for the President on this trip, only 12 of whom were Secret Service.
The following people participated in this survey,
Major John J. Pezzent.
Capt. Vincent R. Scolere
Lt. Norman P. McFadden
Sgt. Harold W. Casper
Mr. Frederick Herbst, chief, Milford Fire Police
Mr. Ross Stump, Chief, Branch of Operations, Regional Office, U.S. Forest Service, Upper Darby, Pa.
Col. Lancaster, Base Commander, Stewart Air Force Base.
Lt. Col. S.A. Steere, Director of Operations, Stewart Air Force Base.
Mr. Paul deForrest, Commander, OSI, Stewart Air Force Base.
Gerald Behn approved and signed.
Document # 180-10090-10027 is a one page outside contact report dated 3/13/78. Seymour Weitzman is in the Psychiatric ward of the VA. Hospital in Banham, Texas and has been confined there for sometime. Any contact with this witness should go through the Hospital director before any conversation with the witness.
Document # 180-10090-10123 is a 30 page report. It is dated 08/31/64. It is titled “Plan to meet requirements for expanded protection of the President”. Apparently, this is also known as the Dillon report, so named after Treasury Secretary Dillon. This includes a two page cover letter to Kermit Gordon, Director, Bureau of the Budget.
Advance agents will be increased from one to six. 5 additional agents for 24 hour coverage and operation of the Protective-Security and Research-Countermeasures Units. The PRS system will now be automated.
They also want to use 5 agents as liaison officers with other intelligence agencies. The reasons given were, “The assassination of President Kennedy demonstrated beyond any doubt that the exchange of information among the intelligence community concerning persons potentially dangerous to the President was inadequate.” also “But we are convinced that liaison officers are required. This is so not only because we are doubtful that the present flow of information is complete but also because it is the only way we can hope to get information or follow-up material quickly.” Doubtful the information is complete?
Document # 180-10093-10022 is a two page interview summary of Louis Sims.
Mr. Sims entered the Secret Service in April 1961 and was assigned to the Chicago field office until January 1964. Louis Sims served three years with the U.S. Army Intelligence, Ft. Holabird, Maryland prior to entering the Secret Service. He attended Treasury School and Secret Service School in Washington, D.C. Sims stated he was attending the Secret Service school at the time of the proposed Presidential visit to Chicago on November 2, 1963.
Sims stated that he could not remember the dates but he recalls that it could have been any time up to a year prior to the assassination, he was assigned to conduct a surveillance on a subject that was either Puerto Rican or Cuban. He does not remember any specific details other than it involved gun running and appeared to be a very sensitive investigation. He stated that the names Echevarria and Manuel Rodriquez were familiar; but he couldn’t place them. Sims also stated that there may have been a grocery store involved in the surveillance.
Sims stated that he had no recall of any threat relative to the Presidential visit to Chicago in April 1963.
April? I thought they were interested in November 2, 1963.
Sims stated that he knew Abraham Bolden well. He considered Bolden an average agent. Sims sat at the counsel table at both of Bolden’s trials. Sims stated that the evidence against Bolden was overwhelming and the U.S. Attorney General’s office had been involved in the investigation for a good while.
In describing the check-ups on individuals considered as threats, Sims stated that checks were made at six month intervals. There was a criteria to follow and also the agents used their impressions. They then made their recommendations as to whether the subject was still a threat or not. The agent in charge made the final decision.
Document # 180-10093-10118 is a one page outside contact report dated 04/18/77. A Mr. James Richard Dougherty, Sr. called. He served three years in Lewisberg, Pa. re, conspiracy to defraud Federal government (1966-69). He was under psychiatric care, diagnosed “psychotic”.
Document # 180-10097-10345 is an eleven page report synopsis of David Ferrie’s grievance hearing against Eastern Airlines. There are some interesting items here.
Apparently G. Wray Gil and Guy Bannister were representing Ferrie.
Roland P. Fournier, Seargant, New Orleans Police Force Juvenile Bureau, testified regarding the complaint made by Mr. and Mrs. Alexander Landry of their runaway boy, Alexander, who was apparently discovered at the home of Cpt. Ferrie. It was discovered that several boys who were members of Ferrie’s CAP (Civilain Air Patrol) squadron often stayed at Ferrie’s house and several were sexually molested by Ferrie. Alexander Landry was not returned to his parents until they signed a statement that they would not press charges against Ferrie. The person acting for Ferrie in this regard was Sergio Aracha Smith of the Cuban Revolutionary Front.
Isadore Yager, member of the grievance committee of the AMA (American Medical Association) in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana testified regarding complaints received by the office of the AMA regarding Ferrie’s attempts to pose as a medical doctor. Ferrie told Yager that he had several PhD degrees; was on the faculty of the Tulane Medical School and was doing research in the department of physiology of a very sensitive nature — all of which proved to be false when Yager checked it out.
Fournier was recalled and testified about Landry’s run away from home. During a search of Ferrie’s home Fournier found priestly robes and a chalice, pills, medical syringes, blood pressure gages, and a passport for another run away Albert Cheramie. He also found the notarized statement for the release of Landry which had been turned over to the Cuban Revolutionary Front. Fournier referred the connection with the runaway of Al Landry to the District Attorney, Austin Anderson. The case was never prosecuted. It was later learned that Gil had once employed Anderson in his office some time before.
J. R. Espenan testified in regard to Ferrie’s Falcon Squadron. He learned that the Squadron was not officially chartered. He got Ferrie’s charter and had it checked at the main office of the CAP in the Masonic building in New Orleans.
Since the central office did not have any record of the squadron, Espenan withdrew his son’s membership. Espenan also noticed that the signature on the charter appeared to have been traced. (i.e. faked).
Ferrie interjected that the group was not chartered but had been certified in 1961 as a private non-profit organization, to which Eastern Airlines attorneys answered that Ferrie was nonetheless passing the organization off as an official USAF CAP squadron.
Espenan also stated that uniforms were readily available for purchase at Abe’s on Canal Street or in Roland’s Sporting Goods. He said many of Ferrie’s squad members had retained their uniforms from official squadrons when they transferred to Ferrie’s.
Ronald Huber, Souther Research investigator who handles various aspects of the Ferrie investigation, testified regarding the authenticity of the degree awarded by Phoenix University in Bari, Italy. A letter form the Italian and American counsuls
of Naples, Italy, states that the University was not credited and was believed to be giving out bogus degrees. Southern Research Investigators was retained by Tolan Investigators in New York, which was retained by Eastern Airlines.
Ferrie’s doctoral thesis for Phoenix University was “on an aspect of the psychology of vision – the use of hypnotherapy in retinitis.” Don’t you just love that?
And he took and oral exam for the degree! BAW HA HA! He did most of his work through correspondence.
Document # 1870-10099-10491 is an eight page summary report of an interview with SA William Greer.
Greer’s proximity to President’s goes back to 1944 when as navy seaman he was attached to the Presidential yacht U.S.S. Potomac during the third term of F.D.R. When he left the Navy on September 18, 1945 he had planned to enter the Secret Service and did so on October first of that year. He became part of the uniformed force at the White House.
During Wolrd War II Greer said the Secret Service took over the actual driving functions at the White house. Prior to that time the President had his own personal chauffeur. Secret Service handled the presidential protection and back up car but not until the war did they actually drive the President’s vehicle, according to Greer.
A day or two after the attack on Truman, Greer was transferred as an agent to driver.
In 1963 Greer was listed as agent/driver for President Kennedy on three trips in November: Chicago on 11/2; Miami on 11/18 and Dallas on 11/22.
Greer said that the standard procedure was for the [the document says Social Security but this must be an error. I think it is fairly obvious we are talking Secret Service. What would the Social Security have to do with moving Secret Service cars around? So I am corecting it. ] Secret Service to ship the cars out by C-130 cargo plane prior to Air force One. Greer always travelled with the President and took over the driving functions when they arrived at their destination. Greer said that he was only vaguely aware of most of the routes. He followed a pilot car or lead car, usually driven by a local police official which also contained the Advance (Secret Service) Agent and the local SAIC.
Greer had no independent recollection of going to Chicago on November 2, 1963. He claimed his trip book would verify it and he has three books salted away in the attic and it was too much trouble at the time for him to go rooting around in a cold crawl space looking for them. He assured us he would xerox the material we needed and forward it to Washington.
Greer stated that he was never informed by the Secret Service or Gerald Behn, head of White House Detail, about the existence of any threats in any of the cities that they visited. He complained that he was not too well informed about local conditions by the Advance man or SAIC of the local office, except in the case of Dallas, he recalls. In Chicago, he was scheduled to drive President Kennedy. He recalls the trip was cancelled at the last minute but doesn’t recall the particular reason.
The HSCA staff commented, “Like many people we have talked to about the Chicago trip, he confused the reason for JFK’s previous trip cancellation, i.e. the Cuban Missile Crises, with the assassination of President Diem in Viet Nam.”
Greer again requested time to look at this “trip book” for verification of his whereabouts on 11/2/63.
There is then an interesting deletion of a document that is supposed to be open in full, “In regard to the Miami trip of November 18, 1963 Greer says he was in Palm Beach with the President and went to , then to Miami.” That’s exactly how it appears. Whatever was after the word “to” has been whited out. It is a four or five letter word, a name of a place judging by the sentence.
Greer said SS 100 X, the President’s car, was specially designed for the Chief Executive. It had a seat in back which could elevate 8 1/2″x9″.
Greer does not know if it was elevated in Dallas. He was puzzled about the Single Bullet theory. He does not see how one bullet could have caused both Kennedy and Connally such extensive wounds.
On November 22, 1963, Willaim Greer got up around 6:00 a.m. having gotten to bed at midnight on the 21st. He had breakfast and went down to the place where the cars were being guarded. SS 100x was enroute to Dallas by plane so in Ft. Worth he drove a leased Lincoln. There was talk about putting the bubbletop on.
(N.B. We have excellent pictures of the bubbletop, both in sections and on the President’s vehicle which we obtained from former SA Sam Kinney in Palm Springs, Florida.) but it was decided that since the weather was improving, not to do so. Greer says that Kenny O’Donnell made the final decision. He reminded us too that the trip was political and the President loved exposure to crowds.
Greer recalled that he flew from Ft. Worth to Dallas in air force #1 with the President’s party. After the arrival of Dallas’ Love field he readied the car for the motorcade. Agent Roy Kellerman who was Assistant Special Agent in charge of the White House Detail rode in the front seat with Greer. His function was personal protection of the President and manning the short wave radio, which was set on a channel equivalent to Dallas Polcie Channel #2. There was no window seperating the front and back seats of SS 100x, but Greer said because of the crowd and motorcycle noise he could not hear conversation in the back seat between the Kennedy’s and the Connally’s.
He drove at speeds which ranged from ten to thirty miles an hour although when he made the turn into Elm Street from Houston his speed was slowed to about three to five miles per hour. “We were almost stopped,” Greer said. He recalls approaching an overpass on a downhill run. He was attentive to overpasses, especially when people were on them. He vaguely recalls that there were people on this overpass and he was concentrating on them when the first shot came. The first shot sounded to him like a backfire. He did not react to it. After the second shot he turned to his right and saw blood on Governor Connally’s shirt. At the same moment he heard Kellerman say, “We’re hit. Let’s get out of here,” or words to that effect. He said he immediately accelerated and followed the pilot car to Parkland hospital. He was unaware that Clint Hill had jumped from the follow-up car to his vehicle. He says he doesn’t even recall looking in the mirror `til they got to the hospital. Kellerman was talking on the radio to the Squad car and others.
At this point Greer got out and assisted Kellerman and others in removing Governor Connally and President Kennedy to stretchers into Parkland Emergency.[The document says “Agent Eliot Hill”, this must surely be an error of some kind. Surely they are talking of Clint Hill. I will again correct it] Agent Clint Hill had covered the President’s head with his coat so Greer did not see the massive head wound nor the one in the throat. He guarded the door of the emergency room. He recalls embracing Mrs. Kennedy and saying something about wishing he could have been more evasive or avoided the tragedy. She reassured him with some kind words. It was an emotional scene.
Asked if he noticed the Texas School Book Depository, Greer said he watched people, not buildings. He would note, for example, a person on the street with his hand in his pocket. When they got to Houston from Main Street, he felt relieved. He felt that they were in the clear, the crowds were thinning and while he didn’t relax, he did begin to feel relieved just before the shots came. Greer does not recall the third and final shot. He heard nothing from the back of the car; his mind shut it out and he concentrating on driving at a high rate of speed to Parkland Hospital. He had to weave in and out of other freeway traffic on the way.
At Parkland he recalls that his function was to guard the Emergency Room and keep intruders out. Some press were putting on white coats and trying to get in. Greer does not recall the incident about an unidentified FBI agent trying to get into the emergency room. He said this might have occured when he was temporarily releived.
When the doctors pronounced President Kennedy dead Greer was handed the President’s clothing, wallet and watch, which he took back to Washington. He directed agent Rybka at Andrews Air Force Base to put the shopping bag in his locker at the White House. A few days later he returned Kennedy’s watch and wallet to Ken O’Donnell.
Mrs. Kennedy asked Greer and Kellerman if they would drive the ambulance to bethesda Naval hospital for the autopsy.
Greer recalls going into the autopsy with Kellerman. He described the scene for the writers but was not aware of the identies of all of the people there. He did remember Dr. Burkley and General McHugh. He remembers the two FBI agents Sibert and O’Neill and their acquisition of the fragments from President Kennedy’s head.
Greer recalls Kellerman going to a telephone and talking to someone about a bullet found in Dallas. The doctors turned Kennedy over and found the bullet hole in his shoulder. He indicated a point on his right shoulder which approximated the spot. He said one of the doctors inserted a metal probe in Kennedy’s back, which only went in a short way.
Greer says he asked the doctor if the bullet in [the] back could have worked itself out during heart massage. The doctors continued to take X-rays, looking for lead, but they couldn’t find where the bullet went.
Greer said that after the autopsy he and Kellerman drove the body back to the White House.
Greer later talked to Governor Connally, who incidentally thanked him for saving his life. Connally told Greer that he distinctly recalled three shots (Greer says he never heard the third shot) and Connally further stated that he was shot with a seperate bullet from President Kennedy.
Greer went home at 4:00 a.m. on November 23rd. He was asleep at 8:00 a.m. when the White House called. They wanted the St. Christopher medal which was in President Kennedy’s wallet now in Greer’s possession to place in the coffin. He dressed and went to the White House and gave the medal and wallet to Kenny O’Donnell. He attended a brief family service. He returned home to get more rest because he was scheduled to drive President Johnson. He drove Johnson to the Capitol and on the following day to the funeral.
Greer saw Gerald Behn, head of the White House Detail and submitted a signed copy of a report on his activities in Dallas on 11/22/63 to the White House Detail.
Greer was asked why Behn did not make the trip, he said he didn’t know why. It was never discussed in his pressence.
Belford V. Lawson wrote an addendum, “I distinctly remember reacting with shock and surprise when Mr. Greer stated to both Mr. Kelly and myself that, in the case of the President’s visit to Dallas on November 22, 1963, he had no prior knowledge whatsoever of the path of the motorcade route or of any conditions on and surrounding the route that might affect his driving. He simply entered the Presidential limousine and followed the car in front of him.”
Document # 180-10104-10331 is a six page summary report of an interview with SA Joseph Noonan.
Noonan had participated in Presidential Protection duties in connection with the planned visit of President John F. Kennedy to Chicago on November 2, 1963.
Noonan had no direct involvement with the Vallee case. He was aware of the action taken by Agents Tucker and Strong which resulted in Vallee’s arrest on 11/2/63 by the Chicago Police.
Noonan was involved in the Mosley case. Noonan explained that Mosley came to the attention of the Secret Service about a year or two prior to this incident. He came into the Chicago office and talked to acting SAIC Martineau about a counterfeiting case. Noonan recalls that SA Robert Motto worked undercover and was attempting to make a “buy”. The surveilance led them to an alley on the North side of Chicago where a Mack Sennet scene ensued. Noonan said that unknown to him Mosley had a gun on his person. Several agents and Chicago detectives were covering. Noonan was looking in a side window of the garage where the “buy” was being discussed. One of the Chicago police spotted the gun on Mosley and shouted “look out he’s got a gun.” The polcie officer fired a shot and all hell broke loose. Noonan said he cocked his pistol and was about to fire when his scarf fluttered in the wind and caught between the trigger and the frame causing a misfire. He said he felt like a fool but was happy he didn’t discharge the weapon because he might have shot agent Motto by mistake.
Wait it gets better
At about 2 a.m. in the morning a woman stuck her head out of the window and took their picture with a flash camera. She informed them that she knew who they were and was calling the police.
This incident did not sour Noonan on Mosley’s status as an informant but made him aware of Mosley’s sense of the theatre and he was wary in the subsequent encounter.
At or about the time of the Kennedy Assassination in Dallas on 11/22/63, Mosley again approached Martineau with information about some Cubans in Chicago who were looking to buy automatic weapons for use against Castro’s Cuba. Asked why Secret Service was involved in gun-running, Noonan said that Mosley had informed them that the Cubans had made threats against the safety of the President, “which President?” he was asked. Specifically, President Johnson (which would put it after 11/22/63). Noonan explained that Mosley had told them that the Cubans said they were well financed and that “if Johnson got in their way in an attempt to invade their homeland he would be taken care of like Kennedy was,” or words to that effect.
Again, SA Robert Motto was pressed into service and used undercover primarily to see if he could get the Cubans to articulate threats against the President. If in the process of making a buy he could audit their threats, then Secret Service would be on solid jurisdictional grounds.
Noonan said he and other agents were uneasy that the Cubans might have some ties to the Central Intelligence Agency and they called Assistant Chief Paul Paterni in Washington and asked him to check on this possibility. Paterni assured them shortly thereafter that it was all right to proceed with their investigation.
A little while later they received a call from Headquarters to drop everything on Mosley and Echevarria and to send all memos, files, and their notebooks to Washington and not to discuss the case with anyone. (emphasis added.)
Noonan describes circumstance in connection with the Mosley/Echevarria case which closely parallel circumstances writer Edwin Black described in his error-filled article in the 1975 “Chicago Independent” -(q.v) except that Black used the incidents he describes in an amalgram relating to threats against Kennedy in November 1963.
Noonan was in 1978 in charge of Intelligence operations for the Chicago office.
Document # 180-10104-10481 is a seven page summary of an interview with Gerald Behn.
Mr. Behn entered the Secret Service in September 1939 and retired in January 1967. He did not at any time serve in any branch of the U.S. military forces.
After admission to the service, Mr. Behn was assigned to the Detroit SS office, then to the Washington, D.C. SS office, and then attended Treasury School in New York City. The school consisted of a combination of lectures and on the job training. He was assigned to the White House detail in 1941 and was elevated to the position of SAIC-WHD in September of 1961.
As SAIC of the WHD, he supervised three shifts of seven agents each which together maintained consecutive round-the-clock watch over the White House premises and protectees. The protectees included the President, First Lady, and their children, plus supervision of the official vehicle garage. The WHD ranged in size under Mr. Behn from the basic 21-man shift force to approximately 50 agents.
In January of 1965, Mr. Behn was assigned to the position of SAIC of Special Service, a reservoir of SS agents for use on out of town trips. His final position with the SS was as SAIC of Special Services, a division which investigated “tort claims, violations of the Gold Act, and auto acts.”
In his position as SAIC-WHD in 1963, Mr. Behn held supervisory responsibility for field protective operations for the Chicago (11/2), Miami (11/18) and Dallas (11/22-2) trips in that month.
Mr. Behn was unable to recall anything about the President’s cancellation of his planned appearance on 11/2. He did not remember hearing about either the trip or its political purpose. He did remember that SA Dave Grant was the advance agent from the WHD to Chicago for the 11/1 trip. Yet, he did remember that Maurice Martineau was the acting SAIC of the Chicago office at the time of the trip. (Someone wrote in a question mark after that.)
Mr. Behn was unable to recall that information about an alleged active threat in or near the Miami area had been communicated to the FBI and SS by the Miami Police as a result of a MPD electronic surveillance operation. The name of Joseph Milteer, who was the source of this information, meant nothing to Mr. Behn. Mr. Behn was also unable to recall any discussions of an active threat with SA Lubert deFreese, the WHD advance agent into Miami, or with John Marshall and Robert Jamison, the SAIC and senior agent, espectively, in the Miami office.
Another area in which Mr. Behn’s memory did not serve him was that of Cuban activism. On the 12-11-63 Final Survey Report (FSR) on the Miami trip, which was written by deFreese and approved by Mr. Behn, mention is made of Miami office SA Aragon’s anticipated report on the Miami Cuban situation. That report was submitted by Aragon on 12/30/63. Mr. Behn had no recollection of seeing the Aragon memo or discussing the situation with him.
” Another area in which Mr. Behn’s memory did not serve him…” that’s an interesting bit of commentary by HSCA staff.
Mr. Behn observed, however, on the basis of his reading of the last sentence of the 11/15/63 Preliminary Survey Report (PSR), and on the basis of memory, that a motorcade was to be used in Miami on the 18th only “in the event of inclement weather”. He added that the actual use of the helicopters to transfer the Presidential party from the airport to the American hotel was not a reaction to an alleged active threat but was simply the result of the original plan.
Now that was odd. Use a motorcade only in inclement weather? Are people supposed to be lining the streets in the pouring rain?
Mr. Behn recalled controversy over alternative speech sites arising between (1) Jerry Bruno, the President’s civilian political advance man, (2) Winston Lawson, the WHD advance agent in Dallas, and (3) Ken O’Donnell, White House Appointments Secretary.
Well, as we should all know the conflict was not among these people but these people versus John Connally.
Behn was unable to recall discussing the selection of the speech site during an 11/5 meeting with Bruno. He was able to recall that Bruno had been in Texas for two or three weeks before the trip plans were resolved. Behn’s recollection was not refreshed by the information that Bruno preferred the Women’s Building because it was easier (than the Trade Mart to secure against acts of harrassment directed against the President and because its large size permitted the admission of a diverse democratic Kennedy following for which there was no room at the mart. Note that Bruno has written in his book Advance Man that he had at one time obtained Behn’s assent to the selection of the speech site.
However, Mr. Behn did recall that he discussed speech site selection with Lawson who ventured the opinion that in matters of security there would not be much difference between the Women’s building and the Mart. Mr. Behn said that he reported Lawson’s opinion to Mr. O’Donnell.
According to Mr. Behn, Ken O’Donnell was the person who made the final decision to go to the Mart. This decision came after a long period of uncertainty about whether to make the trip at all, given the political conflicts of Texas between liberal and conservative Democrats. Mr. Behn was unable to recall that the White House sent Bill Moyers to Texas to work on the problem. Behn did recall that O’Donnell announced a decision favoring the Mart. Behn stated that the announcement was made between the 5th and 9th of November. Behn concluded by saying that Lawson went down to Dallas 3 or 4 days after O’Donnell made the announcement. It is not clear as yet whether Lawson was told to go to the mart prior to departing for Dallas.
Protective Research Service, November, 1963.
Mr. Behn’s account of the procedures in PRS at this time discloses the great extent to which the PRS was the central focus of protective operation. Information from the field about active or potential threats to the president were refferred to PRS directly from the local office before they were referred to the Chief of the WHD. The SAIC-WHD would receive reports from the field only from WHD advance agents. He and the SAIC-PRS would then discuss the matter with the overall chief of the SS, Mr. James Rowley.
Mr. Behn does not recall that PRS distributed information to Winston Lawson about the October 1963 heckling and harassment of Adlai Stevenson in Dallas, Texas, nor can he recall that any information was distributed prior to the 11-21/2 Texas trip about Dallas area right wing extremist Edwin Walker.
The reason he cannot recall was because no such information was given to him from PRS.
Mr. Behn specifically stated as to both the Walker and the Stevenson incident, that “no one in PRS passed it on.” When asked if he himself warned any agent about either Walker or the Stevenson incident, he said that he did “not remember any discussion with any agent.”
Mr. Behn was in Washington at the time of the assassination. He described the communication system linking Washington with Dallas as follows:
WHD-HQ was in touch with the ongoing motorcade through the Dallas switchboard of the Signal Corps, whose warrant officers carried the necessary codes. Any message from WHD-HQ to the motorcade per se had to be relayed through the Corps switchboard; however, the motorcade agents were able directly to contact WHD-HQ.
After the shooting, SA Roy Kellerman called from a telephone at Parkland Hospital and stated that “JFK was shot” and that “it didn’t look too good.” The phone connection remained open until after the President left Parkland.
As for the evidence of the crime which was brought back from Dallas, Mr. Behn stated that he was in the chain of custody of CE 399, the bullet found on what was allegedly the Presidential stretcher, by SA Richard Johnsen. Behn received the bullet from Johnsen, then turned it over to the FBI.
On the evening of 11/22 Mr. Behn went with President Johnson to Spring Valley and then went home to get some sleep, and returning to Spring Valley on 11/23. He did not see Kellerman, Greer, or Hill until far later. Mr. Behn recalled that the film and X-rays of the autopsy were sent over to PRS at the Executive Office Building.
Mr. Behn was not able to recall any disciplinary action taken against any SS agent, nor could he recall that an in-house investigation was undertaken by the SS. He acknowledged that the writing of reports filed by each SS agent about his 11/21-2 activities was not normal procedure, but did not remember whether the agents were prompted to get them to accelerate their completion of the reports. He did not remember that the Dillon Committee resulted in 1964-65 in any changes in SS operations.
Document # 180-10105-10305 is a four page interview summary of Charlotte A. Klapowski, an employee of the Chicago Secret Service Field Office.
She typed the reports of the field agents.
Ms. Klapowski stated that she believes there were about 17 agents and 3 stenos in the Chicago office when she first started. She stated that relative to the Advance reports, she would only be involved in typing the Final Survey Reports. The advance agent would dictate the report andf she would type it.
She had no recall of the proposed Presidential visit on November 2, 1963 or its cancellation. She had no recall of any threats or arrests relative to the proposed November 2nd visit. She had no recall about any threats during her twenty years in the Chicago office. She stated that she was not privy to this information as a clerk.
She had no recall on the name of Thomas Arthur Vallee or of doing any reports relative even though we have them in our possession. (I love that.)
Document # 180-10109-10358 is missing
Document # 180-10112-10218 is a four page document dated 12/14/77. It contains a list of addresses of former and then (in the time of the HSCA) Secret Service personnel, including Bennet, Behn, Berger, Boring, Grant, Greer, Kinney, Keller man, Lawson, Lawton, McIntyre, Ready, Sulliman, Kelly, Aragon, Bailey, Coughlin, Jamison, Marshall, Martineau, Griffiths, Kollar, Sorrels, Howlet and deFreese.
Document # 180-10017-10149 is a two page letter from the lawyers representing Eastern Airlines to Captain V.G. Rowland. This is an effort to persuade Cpt. Rowland to talk to another Eastern Airlines employee, one J. Hall, a co-pilot to get him to identify Alexander H. Landry as a jump seat pass rider with David Ferrie.
Document # 180-10118-10032 is a one page list of CO-2 files requested from the Secret Service from a list of PRS subjects obtained from JFK’s trip files for the years 1963. There are twelve names listed.
1.) Stanley Berman – gate crasher (no import)
2.) Carl Brookman – on record with FBI subversive activities in Nazi Party and possible association with the Communist PArty. Has firearms.
3.) William Robert Bennett – disabled veteran
4.) John Francis Donovan – extrovert with mailgram
5.) Johnnie Mae Hackworth – letter writer, religious fanatic, makes threats against President: arested 1955, 1960, and 1964.
6.) Jozef Mlot Mroz – picketer “Polish Freedom Fighter”
7. Barney Grant Powell – threatened Truman, extreme temper, violvent man with assualt background. Use of firearms.
8.) Peppi Duran Flores – USAR, firearms use. threatened LBJ. Says he is a Communist and pro-Castro.
9.) Wayne L. Gainey – claimed KKK authorized him to kill the President in 1963. Teenager.
*10.) John William Warrington – mental; 5 letters threatening JFK for his association with M.L. King, Jr. says he will by lying in ambush in Florida; 11/18/63.
Later writes threat to RFK. FBI #9-45448.
11.) [First letter missing] arvin Langdon Parker – mental; pretensions of being a JFK staff member.
12.) Joseph Jesse Gilliam – WH visitor; friendly; mental
Only file deemed important potential threat was Warrington’s. Copies of threat letters and S.S. reports were requested and put into system with this synopsis.
Document # 180-10118-10033 is a xerox of 4 pages from a notebook. I believe it is handwritten notes from the Secret Service. I’ll try to reproduce it as best I can
CO-2 Secret Service Files reviewed 4/20/78
Maradiaga, Carlos – CO2-34732 #2 12-13-63
All that exists is a computer abstract “12-13-63 FBI, L.A. furnished info that subj & wife subject #2 were allegedly in country to kill some President. Interviewing
SA on 2-19-65 stated info appeared false.”
Nicaraguan citizen INS #A8452350
Armstrong, Newton CO2-34773 11-23-63
FBI relayed info that Thomas Keinholy [I’m guessing at the last four letters of the last name] reported that Armstrong employed at GD, made a statement that the Pres. should be assassinated. Armstrong was interviewed & denied making any threatening statement against any President.
Source of problem seems to be suicide of son, Jr. Armstrong believes he was murdered by Mayer Robin Goodenough, Max Asslo, & Prof. Stanley Pinceti – communists opposed to him belonging to John Birch Society. Sent telegram to JFK about sending troops to Cuba & to RFK about having FBI invsetigate son’s death.
SS conducted follow up interview up until 4/25/66 to check on mental state. Conclusion mental state was not deterioting Armstrong has made no threats that have been brought to the SS attention & case closed.
BREITNER, THOMAS C. CO2-34099 11-29-63
Came to SS attention due to correspondence he has initiated to several city, county, UNIv. officials, wrote 10 pp. “Criminal Activities of the CIA Within Bounderies of the U.S.”. Also wrote letter re: assassination investigation from info obtained from news article. No further action beyond interviewing him and finding him sane and no threat.
BOWERS, EDWARD BERT CO2-34173 11-27-63
Subject stated to officers, while in custody for breaking an entering, “I think Oswald did right thing & and I would have done the same thing if I had the chance.” Admitted to statement but made in anger. Appeared normal. displayed no interest in LBJ. Said he continue to be criminal. On 11/29/67 it was recommended that quarterly investigations be discont. since he would be confined until 1970, had no interest in presidency & didn’t exhibit hostile tendencies.
KING. GEORGE J. JR. CO2-26104 #6419
He was heard in August 1963 discussing the possibility of killing the Pres. He was arrested same month for illegal sale of machine guns.
King is extreme right wing, hates Jews, was arrested by ATF O’Neil for illegal possession of firearms. Emotionally unstable. Arrested 2-29-68 again. This time for CCU, John Bircher, Christian Def. League, Am Nazi PArty, Christian Defense League.
There were 9 FBI files pulled on him.
MACHADO, QUINTIN PINO CO2-35800 #14090 4-14-61
Last update Referred by FBI [it looks like FBO, but I’ll assume they’re talking about the FBI] 1-3-66 last report 7-21-66. Subj. is generally armed and should be considered dangerous. Subj was described by associate as a fool of questionable intelligence. A SS informant stated that if the Kennedy asassination proved to be a Cuban plot of conspiracy or Castro had anything to do with the assassination that undoubtedly the subj would be used to carry out any action. Subj. was on Cuban Embassy staff in D.C.
*Get copy of whole file
Letter re Kennedy trip 4/61 to Pan Am Union Bldg.
NAGELL, RICHARD CASE @ Joe Cramer @ Robert Nolan
CO2-32030 #878, 950, 1118 assassination file cont.
Nagel wrote to FBI stating he requested to speak to a SS agent 11/22/63 re urgent matter. He says he was never contacted & wants incident matter of record.
He attempted to rob bank 9/20/63 & been in jail since. Said he’d known LHO & wife socially & did not want to be associated with assassination PRS check recommended.
Claims to have been CIA informant. Contacted Jim Garrison during investigation. Was Int officer in Army, wounded 3 times in Korean War, definetley indicating mental instability. Has tried to commit suicide. Marina Oswald was shown his photo – no recognition.
Document # 180-10118-10038 is missing.
Document # 180-10118-10041 is a six page Secret Service report on John William Warrington. It is written by SA Arnold K. Peppers of the Tampa, Florida office. It covers the period of October 18-23, 1963. It’s status is pending.
Synopsis- This file covers investigation of five threatening letters addressed to the President, postmarked Oct. 15, 16 and 17, at Tampa, Florida and as signed, “R. L. Scates”. John William Warrington has been identified as the author of these letters and was arrested October 18, 1963, at Tampa, Fla., for mailing an extortion letter to a local bank president. Subject is currently under $50,000 bond and confined to the Tampa City Jail on the extortion charge. Subject claims a recent on “trial visit” from the VA hospital, Gulfport, Miss., and the Jackson office is requested to review his file for background information.
Mr. Warrington wrote a letter to Postal Inspector C. M. Griffith on October 17, 1963 that stated that the Postmaster was in danger of having a dynamite accident unless he purchased protection against such an accident for $1,000. The letter instructed Griffith to send ten $100 bills to Room No. 5, Albany Hotel, 1104 1/2 Franklin St. Tampa, Florida, and not to notify the FBI. While reviewing that letter another letter arrived dated October 18, 1963 nearly identical to the first.
Handwritten analysis of those two letters with the five sent to the president showed they were of common authorship.
On the evening of October 18, 1963 Secret Service agent Arnold K. Peppers received word from FBI agent Neil Welch, ASAIC, in the Tampa office that Warrington was arrested and in custody for sending yet another extortion letter to the President of the First National Bank of Tampa, Florida. Warrington told the FBI that the money raised in these extortion schemes was to be used to assassinate the President.
All extortion letters and the letters to the President had the same return address Room 5 of the Albany Hotel.
Warrington stated that he wanted to write five extortion letters to five bank presidents, that the money raised would be used to assassinate President Kennedy on his November 1963 Tampa visit. Warrington hated President Kennedy because he went to Harvard and all Harvard men are Communists.
SA Lee Ballinger of the FBI advised that Warrington had papers that indicated that he was recently released from the Veterans Hospital of Gulfport, Mississippi, and that in June of 1961 Warrington was sentenced to 20 years for similar extortion letters in Jacksonville, Florida. It is unkown if he escaped from Gulfport, Missippi.
On October 23, 1963 Warrington was interviewed in the jail. He is described as an American white male, 53 years, 170 pounds, 5 feet 9 1/2 inches, medium build, ruddy complexion, blue eyes, thin greying hair, slightly stooped.
The subject appeared rational. He admitted to being in and out of mental hospitals for the last 15 years. He has been diagnosed as schizophrenic, paranoid type.