11 March, 2025|Special to the AARC
My Summary of the Pepe Letters by Bill Simpich
Preface
Kudos to Paul Bleau for his fine work on the Pepe letters. He is a good writer and tells a difficult story well.
I also want to give a shout-out to Doug Campbell, who also did a thoughtful presentation on the Pepe letters of 1962 and the Pedro Charles letters of 1963 several years ago.
Doug and I tried to put together a follow-up joint presentation on these subjects, but it is a complicated analysis and we put it on the shelf for another day.
Now that Paul has got the ball rolling, I would like to follow up with my thoughts on this fascinating story – I believe it links several different stories together.
Because it is complicated, I thought the best way to tell it would be in several segments. It is still a work-in-progress.
It covers some provocative areas, and I don’t want to raise hopes too high, but I believe that Bill Harvey and his colleagues who worked on double-agent cases such as Richard Tansing may have been the original authors of the Pepe letters and even more troubling operations as well such as the stripping by CI/SIG of Oswald’s 201 file in the days before he was reported to have been seen in Mexico City.
Part 1: The linked 100-300 files, and how they were used to mislead the Mexico City station
RELATED: Doug Campbell: Letters From Cuba – November, 2020
Another problem with source 3-11-48 goes back to a revelation five months earlier in June 1963: The Mexico City station reported that AMCRAB-1/Rolando Santana Reyes, a Uruguayan defector, said that Quintin Pino Machado was the “former leader 26 July organization, had differences (with) other leaders, was forced out of job “Casa Del 26″” and thus might be approachable for defection.” So which is it – was Pino a Castro agent, or a double agent, or a triple agent? Or is the story about Pino being a terrorist just made up?
The FBI wanted direct access to the source of this story – but a JMWAVE office made it clear: “of course not possible.” The FBI described tipster 3-11-14 as T-2 – and went on to say that T-2 was “another government agency that conducts security-type investigations.”
This same story about Cortes, Saavedra and Sanchez was cobbled together by Angleton’s aide Ray Rocca and provided to lead JFK investigator Jack Whitten the day after the assassination, in what I consider a naked attempt to derail the investigation.
Secret Service agent Ernest Aragon – a confidant of Bobby Kennedy – trained several of Bill Harvey’s colleagues in the summer of 1962. The subject of the training was internal Secret Service procedures. See the summary below:Aragon said that he became aware of the deficiencies of the Secret Service in Presidential protection very early in his career. Because of his work on Cuban subjects in Miami he became friendly with some CIA operatives working out of the Miami Station.
He was reluctant to identify them but was persuaded to do so and told the writer that he dealt with Ted Shackley, Bill Finch and Mitch Lawrence. Finch was head of the Miami office and Lawrence succeeded him. Aragon discussed with Chief Rowley the need for more formal liaison with the CIA and as a result, was asked to come to Washington in 1962 to discuss it further. He hitched a ride to Washington from Palm Beach on Air Force One.
Aragon met with Richard Helms, Ghosn Zogby, Victor Wallen and Clark Simmons.
Helms was the head of the Deputy Director of Plans, who supervised CIA’s covert action wing. He worked on the same executive level as Bill Harvey, and the two men frequently worked in tandem.
Zogby was head of Cuban Task Force (WH/4) in 1962. His position was assumed by Bill Harvey in early 1962, who renamed the branch Task Force W (after his first name, William).
Wallen was C-TFW-CI before Swanson. I believe Wallen’s pseudonym was Richard Tansing – who worked with Bill Harvey in the Pepe investigation.
Clark W. Simmons served as C/WH/4/CI (chief of Western Hemisphere counterintelligence, Cuba) in 1961, succeeding David Morales, who he worked with closely. He later became Chief, WH/SAS/IOS (investigations and operational support for the Cuban division SAS). Throughout the early 60s, Simmons was intimately familiar with the duties of the various AMOT teams in Miami, the anti-Castro Cubans that worked with the CIA and waited for the day where Castro was overthrown and they could insert themselves as the new intelligence unit for the Cuban government. [ 33 ]
Aragon said representatives of the FBI were also present at this meeting. He said that arrangements were made for the immediate coordination and dissemination of intelligence information relating to the protection of the President.