The 11th Batch
Document # 180-10076-10062 is a 8 page New Orleans police report on David Ferrie giving his arrest background. It is dated August 18, 1961. It is to Joseph I Giarrusso, Superintendent of Police, from August C. Lang, Lt. Acting Commander, Juvenile Bureau
The subject: Contributing to the delinquency investigation, resulting from the runaway of Alexander Landry Jr, WM Age 15 of 5221 Arts. St. The subject alleged to be contributing is David Ferrie WM adult residing 331 Atherten Drive, in Metaire, La.
Fournier and Jenau are the investigators for this. On August 2, 1961 Alexander ran away from home and 24 hours later was found at the house of David Ferrie. Ferrie is supposedly Landry’s unit commander with the Civil Air Patrol. Lawrence Marsh, age 18 was told of Alexander Landry’s runaway status and suspected whereabouts and said he would return the boy home which he did.
On August 5th Al Landry ran away from home again. As of the 17th he has not returned home. The Landrys believe Capt. Ferrie is assisting the boy in his efforts to stay from his home.
The Landrys expressed “a lack of confidence” in Capt. David Ferrie. They say that ever since their son joined the C.A.P. squadron of Capt. Ferrie that he has never been the same.
It is important to emphasize that this C.A.P. squadron is a creation of Ferrie’s and not an official C.A.P. squadron.
The Landrys have been unable to determine if this C.A.P. squadron is legitimate. C.A.P. HQ in New Orleans is investigating and found no record of Ferrie’s squadron in New Orleans and Air Force HQ in Washington D.C. has no record of Ferrie’s squadron. The Landrys state that all the parents of all the boys are concerned about the validity of the squadron and are worried that their children are not getting the required training. The Landrys notified the FBI about this matter.
The Landrys state that Ferrie has taken their son on flights, and loaned him his car while he (Ferrie) was away on a flight. Mr. Landry stated that he personally saw Ferrie take several of the boys to a bar in New Orleans. He has also seen many of the boys staying at Ferrie’s home.
Mr. Landry furnished the names of several other boys in the squadron. One of whom, Layton Martens, was working in an office of the Balter Building for a Cuban organization helping Cuban refugees in the current Cuban situation, which is headed by Mr. Aracha-Smith. Investigators went there looking for Landry. They showed the secretary, Nancy Walker, a picture of Al Landry. She recognized him and stated that he was in the company of Ferrie on two occasions after August 5th.
It was also learned that Ferrie offered his services to Aracha-Smith after the Cuban situation broke.
On August 17 the boy called his mother from Houston, Texas who would return under the following conditions 1.) that she allow the squadron to reform, 2.) that she contact the Airlines (presumably Eastern Airlines) and explain this matter as Ferrie was about to lose his job, 3.) that she contact the other parents and have them withdraw anything said about Ferrie.
On the afternoon of August 17th Mr. Smith contacted the officers. Ferrie had been in to see him and dropped off a typed statement. The statement told a story of Ferrie driving the boy back to his home the night he ran away but the boy ran away from home again claiming to have seen his father and grandfather hiding in the bushes with a weapon. The young Landry was afraid for his life. Ferrie says in his statement that he advised the boy to return home. However, the officers now have two statements that Ferrie was seen in the company of the boy which tends to discredit this typed statement.
In the typed statement Ferrie describes how he too received a call from Al Landry from Houston. Well, where the hell is Ferrie supposed to be when he receives this call? If Landry is not with him, then who is Landry with in Houston?
The investigators went to the Balter Building to question Layton Martens and were of the impression that he was withholding information.
Investigators found Butch Marsch who found Al Landry on August 2nd and returned him to his parents. Mr. Marsch stated that the only way Al Landry will leave Ferrie is when Ferrie tires of him and finds a new boy.
Mrs. Landry explained that at one time Ferrie tried to rearrange Landry’s school schedule. The school called the parents and this idea was stopped.
Investigators contacted David Ferrie. Ferrie questioned the officers to see what information they had on him. Ferrie wanted to know what would be done to the boy upon the boy’s return. (What a humanitarian!) Ferrie harped on the idea that he was interested in the boy’s welfare and felt that things were too tough for him at home. Ferrie insisted that he did not know where the boy was staying in Houston, but he was flying to Houston tonight to see if he could find him and return him to New Orleans.
Lawrence “Butch” Marsch states that he assisted Mrs. Landry because he knew “that all boys go to Ferrie when they run away from home.”
At about 3:30 p.m. August 18, 1961 Officer Fournier received word via the phone from Mr. Smith that he could get the boy back in exchange for a signed statement from the parents indicating that they would not press charges. Smith requested that the statement be notarized.
Amazingly, this was done. The boy was swapped for the statement. Even more amazing, Al Landry wanted to file suit against his parents for taking him away from Ferrie.
The boy explained that he left home with $52 dollars. He said he hitch hiked to the Mississippi Gulf coast on the night he ran away, August 5, 1961. He returned to New Orleans after about 5 or 6 days and went to see Capt. Ferrie. He said he spent August 14th and 15th with Ferrie and then hitch hiked to Houston, Texas where he stayed for another week. He said that when he was in New Orleans with Capt. Ferrie they visited Mr. Aracha Smith. The dates of this are confusing as Nancy Walker placed this event on Monday and Tuesday August 7th and 8th. He said he lived in cheap rooming houses in Houston. He said he called his parents from the Houston airport and also called Capt. Ferrie thus learning of the investigation. He left Houston on August 17 and hitch hiked back to New Orleans.
Officers observed that he was extremely clean and fresh looking for living the way he described.
Officers questioned the boy as to how he got to Houston. He stated that he crossed the Huey P. Long Bridge, and went to Baton Rouge, La., but did not go through Houma, La. The routing maps to Houston will show that you will not cross the river bridge at New Orleans, if traveling by way of Baton Rouge to Houston. The boy was questioned about this and was unable to give an explanation.
Al Landry did admit that Ferrie did take himself and about 50 other boys and bought them beer at Graci’s lounge on Homedale Ave. The young Landry also admitted that he had been to Cuba on several occasions. He did not elaborate as to how he got there, when he was there, or who he went with.
Asked about his trip to Houston again, he did not remember.
Al was taken to the Youth Study Center. Officers talked with the assistant superintendent of the institution. He recalled a similar incident involving another run away boy. That boy’s name was Albert Cheramie.
There was a record in the Visitor’s Record Book of a Dr. D. Ferrie coming to see Albert Cheramie and written in red pencil was “NOT AN OFFICIAL VISIT”.
On August 4, 1960 Albert Cheramie was handled for running away from home and was found at the home of David Ferrie. Ferrie was then living at 704 Airline Park Blvd. Lt. A. J. Scardina, then Juvenile Officer for Jefferson Parish handled the case.
On August 21, 1961 Officer Jenau asked Ferrie if he has a Doctor’s degree and was he treating any patients. Ferrie said he had a degree in psychology and that he didn’t treat anyone but he did give advice. When asked about his visit to Albert Cheramie at the Youth Center in 1960 Ferrie admitted he did indeed visit Cheramie and realized he made a mistake after going.
Officers acquired the name of Eric Michael Crouchet, another member of Ferrie’s Civil Air Patrol. Subsequently, Crouchet made a typewritten statement that Ferrie, “committed acts of crime against nature on him on two separate occasions.”
Crouchet additionally told investigating officers that Capt. Ferrie masturbated him on 4 or 5 occasions, all of which occurred in Jefferson Parish. Crouchet also told of having been given alcoholic beverages at Ferrie’s house.
Crouchet made a statement involving Albert Cheramie. Crouchet said that when Cheramie ran away from home, Ferrie instructed him (Crouchet) to watch Cheramie’s house to see if Cheramie would come home. Crouchet was instructed by Ferrie to put Cheramie in a cab and send him to Ferrie’s house. According to Crouchet, Ferrie told him (Crouchet) that he was going to send Cheramie to Corpus Christ, Texas.
What is this? White Slavery?
On Tuesday, August 22, 1961 a search warrant was issued for the residence of David Ferrie at 331 Atherton Drive. A Passport was found, No. 2188946 for Eumes Albert Paul Cheramie. The picture in the passport was of Cheramie. The date of issuance was two days prior to Ferrie’s visit to Cheramie at the Youth Center.
Ferrie was questioned about the passport. Ferrie said he had it made because he and several other people were planning to go to Honduras to do some mining.
Mr. Hughes Cheramie, father of Albert, stated that he knew about the passport and was trying to get it back for a long time.
Also discovered was the notarized statement given to Aracha Smith in exchange for Al Landry. A letter was also discovered in an envelope, not postmarked. The envelope was marked “Cuban Revolutionary Democratic Front”.
Ferrie was arrested and booked with crimes against nature and Indecent behavior with a Juvenile.
James J. Landry, age 16, brother of Al, gave a statement that Ferrie performed sex acts on him on several occasions.
Ferrie was in deep trouble.
Document # 180-10076-10102 is a one page interview with Eric Michael Crouchet on January 4th, 1967 by Louis Ivon. Garrison apparently is trying to identify the Cuban who was with Ferrie when Ferrie tried to get Crouchet to drop the charges. Crouchet was shown some pictures but couldn’t identify him.
It is impossible to see what Garrison was up to without the same pictures to look at.
Ivons thought Crouchet to be a hostile witness who didn’t want to be bothered.
Document # 180-10076-10123 is a two page document. It is a background arrest record on David Ferrie. On August 24th, 1961 officers received a phone call from Mr. Alexander Landry that Michael Crouchet had come to his house the night before and told of being contacted by David Ferrie. Ferrie was trying to get Crouchet to drop the charges.
Most of the details of this report are the same as those in Document # 180-10076-10124. One additional point of interest was that Officer Jenau received a call from Chief Warrant Officer C. R. Knowlten from Camp LeRoy Johnson, who stated that to his knowledge the charter held by Ferrie was forged. Knowlten contacted the [CAP] National headquarters in Houston and found that there was no charter issued for the Metarire Falcon Squadron. Investigating officers contacted Major Christian, who is the commander of the Civil Air Patrol in New Orleans, who stated that Ferrie was at one time quietly removed from the New Orleans Cadet Squadron of the C.A.P.
Document # 180-10076-10124 is a two page document from Jim Garrison’s files. It is a two page statement from Eric Michael Crouchet. Mr. Crouchet was a 16 year old white male. The report is one of witness intimidation. At about 2:15 p.m. August 23, 1961 Capt. Ferrie walked up to Crouchet and asked him to sign a paper to the effect that everything he had told the police was false and said in anger about Ferrie. Ferrie told Crouchet that this was a way to get him out of trouble without anyone getting hurt. Crouchet answered, “Yea, me disappear.” and Ferrie stated that that could be arranged. Ferrie introduced a man as the Cuban Crouchet was supposed to go to Miami with. If Crouchet signed the ticket Ferrie would get him anything he wanted and if he didn’t he would have a bunch of Cubans after him. Crouchet signed the paper because he was afraid. Ferrie sees Crouchet again around 5 p.m. in front of Crun’s (sp?) Drug store. Ferrie was in his car with two other people. Ferrie asked what Crouchet wanted from the Cubans. Crouchet asked if a motorcycle wasn’t too much. Ferrie said he would like for Crouchet to meet Aracha Smith on Thursday. Ferrie said he had to pick up some things at the Balter Building and had to rush. When Ferrie wanted Crouchet to sign the papers he said that Crouchet was holding up his M-1’s and Bazookas. Ferrie said that one of the Cubans with him was a paratrooper who jumped in the first invasion of Cuba.
Crouchet was questioned by Officer Fournier and Charles Juneau (sp?)
Document # 180-10076-10155 is a 16 page report. It appears to be an arrest record on Thomas E. Beckham age 19 for the rape of Gloria Mae Borja age 14. Thomas is supposedly a Reverend. This document has nothing whatsoever to do with the JFK assassination.
Document # 180-10087-10362 is a 6 page document, with a charge out card by Marwell of the ARRB, of an interview with Tony Zoppi. He was interviewed on March 13, 1978 at 9:45 A.M. at the Riviera Hotel in Las Vegas. Mr. Zoppi was the Director of Public Relations at the Riviera Hotel. He was interviewed by Joseph Basteri and Albert Maxwell
Zoppi had known Jack Ruby since 1952, meeting him while he was employed at the Dallas Morning News as their entertainment columnist while covering the night clubs scene. Zoppi became a good friend to Ruby, he would frequent the Carousel Club. Zoppi claimed to be the only reporter to interview Jack Ruby and to have sat with Ruby at the defense table during the trial. After the trial, Jack Ruby called Zoppi from his cell and the conversation lasted about 40 minutes.
Zoppi tells his HSCA interviewers that he asked Ruby why he did it, “Ruby immediately began to cry, saying how sorry he was for those two poor children being raised without a father.” Ruby also talked of how he was raised without a father. Zoppi recounts this tale from Ruby about how Ruby would visit this orphanage in Oak Cliff on Christmas to bring gifts to the kids and how concerned he was because he would not be able to do that anymore.
Apparently, Zoppi didn’t know Ruby was Jewish.
The interviewers then try to get back on track asking about Ruby’s associations with organized crime in the Dallas area in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s. Zoppi “was quite certain he [Ruby] had no ties with any racket movement in Dallas.” Zoppi admits to having a close friend “who could be described as having friends in the underworld” and because of this friend he was fairly familiar with the criminal structure of Dallas. “Zoppi was firm in his belief that during that era, Dallas could be described as a very clean town.” Zoppi acknowledged that gambling was prevalent in Dallas. His friend whom he did not identify was now deceased and not of Italian origin was part of this gambling empire but Ruby was not part of this operation. Zoppi’s’ friend told him that the criminal underworld knew Ruby was an informant for the Dallas Police.
Zoppi spoke of Joe Civello who had a minor role in criminal activity because he was not too well liked by the Sheriff’s office.
Doesn’t that speak volumes? Does that mean if he was liked by the Sheriff’s office he would be allowed a major role in criminal activity?
Zoppi stated that because of his position with the Dallas Morning News he would have known if the mob had any strong control of the action in Dallas.
Zoppi then offered his explanation as to why Ruby went to Cuba. Zoppi said that he would frequently go to Las Vegas to review acts that were appearing in the various hotels in order to plug those acts to try and lure Texas oil men to the tables in Vegas.
There are some interesting deletions here on page 4 as Zoppi tries to clear up why Ruby went to Cuba. “Apparently someone in Cuba was aware of my role as a newsman because one day in December__________ Jack Ruby called me and asked me how I would like to go to Cuba and write about the clubs there.”
That’s exactly how it appears.
There is another one in the next sentence, “When I agreed that it would suit me fine, Ruby said he had a friend, Lewis McWillie, who managed the Casino in the Tropicana and he would arrange for McWillie to send us ( ) two tickets.”
Now there is room for a word there, a small word, and it’s absence doesn’t seem to alter the sentence but it is odd. No, there is no parenthesis. I’m just trying to visually represent the clear white space
Zoppi goes on to recount that McWillie got the tickets but that Zoppi could not go because one week prior to leaving he got a call from the Sands Hotel informing him that Frank Sinatra, Sammy Davis Jr., Joey Bishop, Dean Martin and Peter Lawford
were to appear there in what was billed as the summit meeting. Zoppi went to this.
Ruby went to Cuba and Zoppi was to meet him there after the holidays. Zoppi could not join Ruby as this was when Castro came to power. Zoppi dismissed the idea of Ruby meeting Santos Trafficante saying they were not in the same league.
How about the same prison?
Zoppi stated he had a slight acquaintance with McWillie and has seen him only a few times.
Document # 180-10093-10496 is a two page report from the Veteran’s Administration. It is an outside contact report to the HSCA, dated 9/27/78.
“Today at the Veterans Administration Liaison Office in B328 Rayburn Building I reviewed the VA file of John David Hurt.
“The file contained numerous documents and medical reports from Hurt’s entry into the Armed forces in 1942 to the present. It catalogued the history of Hurt’s severe psoriatic arthritis which resulted in 100% disability and amputation of several fingers. It stated also that Hurt was hospitalized in 1955 and 1959 for mental disorders, including alcoholism, schizoid reactions and manic depression.
“By the time of the assassination in 1963, Hurt had lost the use of both hands and the amputations were done in 1964.
“The file contained no information pertinent to the assassination. It contained copies of Hurt’s separation papers which stated that he had served in military intelligence in 1945 as an investigator: `Served in the POTT as an investigator conducting investigation of accidents, sabotage, etc. and supervised activities in which civilian and military personnel or property are involved. Collected and safeguarded evidence.’
“Nothing in the VA file contradicts anything Hurt told us about his background when we interviewed him on April 11, 1978.”
They recommended contacting Aleveeta Treon and attempt to pin down the source of the allegation that Oswald tried to call Hurt on 11/23/63. It is signed by Surell Brady.
Document # 180-10097-10495 is a 4 page document of an interview with Glynn A Young. There is a charge out record by Marwell of the ARRB.
Mr. Young ran a printing company at 424 Gravier St. in New Orleans. In the summer of 1963 Lee Harvey Oswald came to his premise two or three times over a three or four week period, concerning the printing of some 2 x 3 cards. He does not recall the requested information but it was something about Free Cuba or some such rhetoric and requesting donations.
Mr. Young recalls quoting a price of $9.00 a hundred or something and Oswald got upset at the price and appeared to him to have a high temper. He believes that he also had some printing done by a Mailer print located at 225 Magazine St. He does not recall Oswald being sent by anybody.
Young states that there was another printing job that Oswald requested a quote price on for printing on 5 1/2 x 8 1/2 sheet and he quoted him a price of $25.00 a thousand. He believes that this work was done by a Jones Printing Company. He states that the difference in the pricing is due to the fact that he is an offset printer and Jones was a letter set printer which would make it cheaper.
Shortly after the assassination, the FBI came in and showed him a copy which contained basically the same rhetoric as he recalls.
He stated that Oswald would come in somewhere between the hours of 12:00 and 1:30, that he was neatly dressed in a shirt, slacks, and states that at the time of the assassination there was quite a bit of feuding going on between the FBI, Treasury and Secret Service.
The only name that he could possibly recall is-he thinks belongs to the FBI-either Quinn or O’Quinn.
When shown the photo album, he was able to identify # 57 as Lee Harvey Oswald; # 5 as Clay Shaw, not that he personally known Shaw, but because Shaw was a public figure in New Orleans and Mr. Young has been in New Orleans since 1946
Document # 180-10097-10328 is the first part of a massive document on David W. Ferrie vs. Eastern Airlines. It is pages 618-867.
Document # 180-10117-10086 is a 7 page document. It is titled “Supplement to OCR of 4-4-78 on CIA-SS relations in 1963”. Sounds interesting.
Marwell looked at this 9/19/95
I. CIA-SS Relations in the Standard Operational Context of Overseas Presidential Protection.
As indicated in the 4-4-78 OCR, no CIA official who participated in the interview of that date had held an official position in any branch of domestic operations. Consequently, the clearest and most comprehensible information was obtained during discussions of those joint SS-CIA operations with which the officers were most familiar– overseas protection.
SS Agents who were engaged abroad in Presidential protection activity benefited from a variety of supplemental supportive services provided by and coordinated by the CIA field station with jurisdiction over the destination of a Presidential visit.
Initially, the CIA role in effecting coordination with the SS was to respond to institutional guidelines established by the SS which (1) enabled the CIA to select information which the SS considered relevant; (2) informed the CIA about proper SS channels for communication; and (3) acquainted the CIA with special procedures for reporting information to the SS. And example of such procedures would be that of “checking off” to determine whether one agency had already conducted an investigation of a threat subject in sufficient detail to eliminate the need for what would otherwise be a duplicative investigation of the subject.
Presidential protection was considered by the CIA officers to be of maximum importance and to have required close inter-agency cooperation, with secured communications lines being made available for instantaneous contact. “Daily contact” was normal.
The specific services which the CIA field station would provide included (1) “names and information,” (2) “logistical support,” and (3) “communications support,” all of which was “coordinated by the CIA.”
A limiting influence on the scope of CIA coordination was the Agency’s conception of the extent of its obligation to provide information. The officers consistently indicated that the information that would be furnished to the SS was never gathered specifically for or because of an SS request. The CIA’s reservoir of information was acquired for its own purposes, and its selection and processing of any information for the benefit of the SS was undertaken only as a secondary (though seriously taken) function, incidental to the regular course of CIA business.
A second limitation on inter-agency coordination was that the CIA recognized no obligation to provide the SS with analyses of the content of CIA and/or SS information except in those instances where the SS specifically requested analysis. Hence, a typical example of CIA-SS contact would involve a joint name trace and a tap-in on existing CIA information. Only rarely, e.g., in the case of a funeral of a head of state which is attended by other heads of state, would the CIA engage and share fully its analytical resources.
II. Preventive Intelligence and Inter-Agency Liaison Procedures
Despite the fact that none of the CIA officials were assigned in 1963 or at any other time to a domestic operations desk, the senior rank of these officials, and their extensive experience and expertise in various areas of intelligence, suggested to both interviewers that Team 4’s comparative perspectives on the SS could be refined by questioning the officials in general terms about processes and procedures used by the CIA for preventive intelligence purposes. The internal operations of the Protective Research Service of the SS provide specific investigative focal points for comparing the preventive intelligence capacities of the CIA and the SS. However, the PRS per se was not mentioned during this interview.
A slightly narrowed context for this line of questioning was provided by mention of the following topics: (1) anti-Castro Cuban-group activism in America in the early sixties, which, as a matter of general knowledge, involved to some extent both extensive domestic monitoring by the CIA of pro- and anti-Castro operatives, and also CIA anti-Castro assassination efforts (cf. Book V Schweiker report); and (2) the threat against American governmental leaders made by Castro after his discovery of the CIA-sponsored attempts against his life. However, neither one of these topics was pursued in substantively factual terms. In effect, the topics were used as hypothetical problems representing opportunities for the CIA to explain the applications of intelligence procedures.
In topic # (1) above, the responses were predicated on the position that the CIA’s Cuban intelligence effort in the early sixties was directed at the Soviet presence in Cuba, and not at any domestic-focus threat. Information currently available to Team 4 contradicts this position, i.e. CIA intelligence, especially the monitoring of Cuban groups, did not stop at the American border. Hence, the official’s frame of reference in defining (as solely Soviet-oriented) certain intelligence procedures used in the early 60’s Cuban effort tended intrinsically to distort their own picture of the overall scope and focus of their operations. Nevertheless, the official’s information about intelligence procedures used in dealing with large, geographically multi-focal groups, was as follows:
1. Field Experience and Special Training.
Perhaps the fundamental method used in developing Agency intelligence resources was to insure that their analysts had both (1) extensive field experience and (2) special training in the same area in which they subsequently become analysts. The clear implication is that a CIA analyst may literally bring to his position years of first hand contact with evolving social, economic, political and other conditions. No parallel practice has yet been determined to have existed in the SS.
“Incident Files” and “organization files” are classified, stored and retrieved in accordance with “programs.” Nothing stated about criteria involved in either the design or selection of the programs.
There is an automatic “link-up” and “full sharing” of information with all other intelligence agencies.
Apparently the Agency has developed a scheme for separating certain categories of information according to degrees of urgency. The example offered was that of “flagging the files of groups representing direct threats.”
4. Source Development.
If a continuing relationship with a covert source is involved, the source is “asked a specific series of questions.” No information was presented to explain whether the supervising case officer directs the questioning so that the hidden source ultimately becomes a conduit for questions developed jointly or exclusively by the case officer.
5. Data Feeds.
For as long as the SS (or other interested agency) requests a continuing data feed, the CIA will comply.
Issue (2) above, the September 1963 anti-Kennedy threat made by Castro, presented a different question for the CIA operatives to consider. Whereas the observation and monitoring of known groups (e.g. Cuban) requires evaluating the threat capacity of known subjects about whom data is continually being gathered, a threat couched in political rhetoric during a speech made in a foreign country requires a more purely analytical response, even to the extent of using analysis to determine what other indicators should be interpreted in conjunction with such a threat.
One official, in commenting on the Castro threat speech, stated that the selective juxtaposition of varied indicators was common CIA practice. The official addressed the issue of combining indicators in order to develop a systematic, multiple-variable, predictive analysis. To this extent, prevailing thematic statements about the limitations on analysis performed in inter-agency operations was qualified.
Other officials’ responses contrasted with and implicitly rejected this combined-indicator approach. The consensus among the other officials was that the SS does its own analysis; that given the narrow focus (and indeed lack) of CIA analysis, the CIA would accordingly not “speculate” prospectively about hypothetical or unusual combinations of indicators; and that such complex prospective analysis, which one official referred to as “crisis management via predictive systems,” was “not real world” and was “nonsense” which “would not work with sociology.” The Hudson Institute’s efforts in particular were singled out for criticism of this type.
In overview, perhaps it is of special importance to record that the notes on which this OCR-supplement is based were classified by an interviewee as “Secret”.
One permissible inference to be drawn from this classification is that the CIA has other intelligence methodologies and procedures, whether for monitoring of known threat groups or for containment of prospective threats through predictive interpretation of selected relevant indicators, which are classifiable as Top Secret.
Document # 180-10117-10173 is the David Ferrie vs. Eastern Airlines grievance hearing. Pages 1-179.
Document # 180-10117-10174 is more of the David Ferrie vs. Eastern Airlines grievance hearing. Pages 180-368.
Document # 180-10117-10175 is more of the David Ferrie vs. Eastern Airlines grievance hearing. Pages 369-491.
Document # 180-10017-10176 is more of the David Ferrie vs. Eastern Airlines grievance hearing. Pages 492-617.
Document # 180-10017-10179 is more stuff relating to David Ferrie vs. Eastern Airlines. This is 83 pages of letters and exhibits.
Document # 180-10117-10181 is 63 pages from the FAA to John O’Brien. O’Brien was the legal counsel for the Airline Pilots Association which oversaw the, or rather conducted the hearing between Ferrie and Eastern Airlines.
Document # 180-10117-10184 appears to be missing.
Document # 180-10017-10185 also appear to be missing.
Document # 180-10117-10186 is 47 pages from Eastern Airlines about David Ferrie. 3 pages are missing.
Document # 180-10017-10189 are 22 pages from the FAA about David Ferrie and Eastern Airlines.
Document # 180-10117-10190 are 23 pages from the FAA to William Bell, counsel for Eastern Airlines.
The Additional Releases Review
Document # 180-10081-10347 is a 140 page document containing various correspondence collected by Dr. Pierre Finck. Only 7 pages of which are in the ARRB release box. Page 1 is a xerox of a page that says “materials received from Dr. Pierre A. Finck – 3/ 9/78 (autopsy surgeon) Andy Purdy Log in as 1 Look out for receipt.” Page 2 is a cover sheet of Dr. Finck’s design. “I used this material to make copies for the Select Committee on Assassinations. Exception: the draft used for the final text sent with letter of 1 FEB 65 to Brig General Blumberg, was not reproduced*. Found with copy of final text in sealed envelope kept with my personal papers for many years. I opened the envelope after receiving the letter of D.A. Purdy on 25 FEB 78.”
* Cover sheet + 13 P reproduced by Purdy, then what looks like someone’s initials, dated 3/8/78, then Purdy’s initials.
Then we get to the meat of the document. There is a 4 page “Memorandum For Record” , dated Sunday 26 Feb 78. Subject: Transcript from Personal diary. It is from Pierra A Finck, MD, Avenue d’Orbaix 14, 1180 Brussels, Belgium. It is to Purdy, then of course, with the HSCA.
The first paragraph states that Dr. Finck has typed this from his handwritten diary.
Dr. Finck mentions that he has received a phone call 1 Nov 77 in Brussels from a C.S. Petty, P.O. Box 35728, Dallas, TX, 75235, tel 214-638-1131 asking him if he is willing to go to the U.S. to appear before the HSCA. Finck says he is available.
The third paragraph goes on well into the the third page of this four page letter. Finck recounts his attendance 8 DEC 77 at a conference by Loyd Braithwaite, a Criminology Professor from Michigan, on: “Organized Crime and the JFK Assassination” held at the SHAPE High School.
Lansky’s wealth= $ 300 million. Everyone connected with him is a millionaire.
L made money in gambling after prohibition.
WW2: L arranged with OSS to move Luciano (Prostitution) to NYC.
After WW2: Luciano goes to Naples in 1946 (Executive Clemency).
Flamingo Hotel, Las Vegas = from Mafia money (Siegal) S accused to steal [Finck misspells it as “steel”] $5000 a week, sent to Switzerland through his mistress.
Chicago: bug for 6 years in Giancana’s office. Bodyguard Scalzetti = Detective in Chicago Police Dept. fired in 1960. Bug continued.
1959: JFK and RFK investigate organized crime. Chief counsel is RFK. McClellan Committee. At time of 22 Nov 63, RFK very active against organized crime in Las Vegas.
Judy Flexner [Really, Judith Exner] introduced to JFK by Frank Sinatra in Las Vegas in 1960. Mistress of Giancana and Scalzetti. Visited White House in 1961 for 2 and 1/2 years.
Operation Mangos [Mongoose} = CIA covert operation to kill Castro; led by William Harvey. Maheu selected to arrange assassination with Mafia help. 1960: Maheau = right arm of Howard Hughes, 1960: JFK, RFK, Allen Dulles, Director of CIA, did not know association with Mafia to kill Castro. Trafficante jailed and released by Castro; involved in plot to kill Castro.
1962: Scalzetti hired by Cook County Sheriff’s Office. Fired in 1964.
CIA = $100,000; Giancana = $90, for training of Cubans to kill Castro.
JAN 61: JFK learns about plan to kill Castro, not the mafia connection. Bay of Pigs.
JFK becomes suspicious of CIA.
Cubelo = Mr. Amlash = CIA agent in Castro’s entourage. CIA sends poisoned darts to Cuba.
CIA did not inform Warren Commission about mafia role against Castro.
22 Nov 77: John Artime dead at age 47.
McCone, new CIA director, not informed about Cuban Plan
1963: Cubelo becomes double agent. SEP 63: taped press conf of Castro: US leaders should be warned, lives in danger
CIA : Swine Fever in Cuba. Cubans planned to infect Texan cattle with Foot and Mouth disease.
22 NOV 63: CIA gives poisoned pen to Amlash to kill Castro.
Lee Harvey Oswald (LHO) = CIA agent originally operating as Pro Castro Agent. Out of USMC 2 months earlier than foreseen, goes to USSR from 60 to 62. Marina is niece of Secret Police Officer.
Raiken [Spas T.] former German Intelligence Officer = CIA connection, Raiken waited for LHO and Marina when they returned from USSR.
In Haiti, someone offered $70,000 to kill JFK.
Clay Shaw was a CIA agent..
LHO distributed leaflets [note the next two words are “in Cuba”. Finck attempted to obliterate them by retyping over them with an “x”. Keep in mind these are merely the notes taken by Finck from Braithwaite’s presentation. ] On back: address of Cuban Revolutionary Committee= 544 Camp Street.
LHO was an FBI informant for $200/month.
Clay Shaw was member of an anti Castro group. Ferry [Ferrie] principal witness for Garrison, was found dead in hotel room.
22 Nov 63: Cubelo and Artime actually carried out the killing. LHO used as diversion. Actual rifle provided by CIA; admitted in OCT 77. Bought by Clay Shaw.
Similar to rifle found on 6th floor. LHO when arrested had $13 [“on him” retyped over with “x”] Agenda with name, car license no., Tel No of Dallas FBI Chief. Page missing for years, kept by FBI, released in 77. Dallas Police tapes sent to Archives in 76 = missing. Tippit seen with LHO and Ruby. Ballistics evidence related to Tippitt, sent to Archives = missing
Braithwaite does not think LHO was able to kill JFK: poor marksman, rifle in poor shape.
In the whole scheme of organized crime, witnesses are killed. LHO was a witness in the plot to assassinate JFK.
A stripper in Ruby’s night club said during TV or parade: “This is where it’s going to happen”. Asked to testify, car ran over her head.
Earl Warren and LBJ did not want the truth to be known to avoid a war with Cuba and WW3. EW and LBJ were wrong. Conspiracy of anti-Kennedy Force.
1975: Congress starts its investigation.
1963-1966: 17 witnesses who disagreed with Warren Report died of natural or violent death.
The remaining paragraphs of the letter detail how Dr. Finck got to D.C. to testify for the HSCA.
Document #180-10110-10007 is a 99 page deposition of Yuri Nosenko taken on 6/19/78 at CIA headquarters in HSCA executive session. Present were Stokes, Define, Preyer, Fauntroy, Burke, Sawyer, Dodd, Ford, Fithian and Edgar. Also, Blakey, Cornwell, Berning, Smith, Morrison, Klein and Goldsmith.
The sessions was closed because of evidence obtained by the Committee that the testimony may defame, degrade, or incriminate people. Nosenko was sworn in.
This hearing was recorded on tape. However, only under strict conditions. It’s single purpose was in verifying the transcript. The witness feared any permanent tape made of his voice might get into the hands of KGB agents.
Isn’t that where he is from? Wouldn’t they already have a recording of his voice?
Could it be that he doesn’t want his voice recorded so American intelligence could compare it?
Anyway, the CIA strictly controlled the tape. It was kept at CIA headquarters, handled by a Mr. Gmirkin, a CIA employee, after the HSCA stenographer was finished reviewing the transcript Gmerkin supposedly erased the tape and destroyed it.
Nosenko spoke without an interpreter.
A little background, Nosenko was born October 30, 1927, in Nikolayev, Ukraine.
His father was a prominent Soviet shipbuilding engineer. In 1956 when he died he was a Soviet Minister of Shipbuilding in Moscow.
Nosenko attended various naval schools during WWII. At the end of the war he went to the Institute of International law and English. In 1953 he transferred to the KGB Second Chief Directorate where he was assigned as a counterintelligence officer in the American Embassy Section of the American department. His job was to keep track of American correspondents and U.S. Army personnel residing in Moscow.
In 1955 he transferred to the Tourist Section of the Seventh Department of the Second Chief Directorate.
In 1958, he joined the newly created American-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Department.
In January, 1960 he transferred to the American Embassy Section of the American Department.
In 1962 he accompanied the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, Switzerland as a security escort. He remained in Switzerland until June 15, 1962. He then returned to the Soviet Union and resumed his duties in the American-British Commonwealth section in the Seventh Department of the Second Chief Directorate.
In January 1964 he again accompanied the Soviet delegation to Switzerland and at that time defected.
On February 4th he was brought to the United States.
Nosenko was asked what is the function of the Second Chief directorate.
“Prior to 1960 the Second Chief Directorate was responsible for counterintelligence work against all foreigners coming to the Soviet Union, diplomats, tourists, businessmen, delegations, private visitors.
“But in 1960, from January, 1960, the Second Chief Directorate in process of reorganization, took in one fist, put all counterintelligence service which were prior different services in the KGB. Let us say prior to 1960 KGB were involved in counterintelligence work six different outfits. Second Chief directorate working against all foreigners, counterintelligence; Third Chief Directorate counterintelligence work against all Soviet armed forces. Fourth Directorate counterintelligence work against Soviet intelligencia; Fifth directorate counterintelligence work in Soviet industry, economy; Sixth Directorate, counterintelligence work in transport; and Department K counterintelligence worked on all atomic industry enterprises.
There is more information on the breakdown of Soviet intelligence, then on p. 36 we get to Oswald information.
Klein asked if there was an investigation of Oswald once he was named as the alleged assassin of President Kennedy.
“Yes, sir.” This is covered in document # 180-10131-10323. Klein is trying to get from Nosenko what he knew about Oswald and if Nosenko knew that information about Oswald would be important to the United States and thus part of the reason for Nosenko’s defection. Klein goes around in circles with Nosenko, who will not give a straight answer to this, and keeps repeating that he did not know what was important to Americans about Oswald only that KGB was trying to see if they ever approached him in any way. They didn’t but they spied on him to see if he might have some connection to intelligence community in America.
“Honestly speaking, I was thinking that their attitude would be that they understand that he is not stable person, that he is a nut, because all his behavior shows he is a nut, not only trying to commit suicide, but he defected. He was allowed to defect, finally was allowed. How long he was back then he tried again, attempts to go again Soviet Union. He is a tumbleweed, a rolling stone.”
This is the kind of thing the U.S. government wants to hear Nosenko say.
Klein returns to the idea that Nosenko’s knowledge of Oswald might be something Nosenko would use to establish his bona fides. Nosenko finally responds that he didn’t have that thought because the CIA and FBI thought he as a dispatched agent in 1962.
Nosenko admits that his story of a recall telegram wasn’t true. Nosenko demanded to be allowed to defect saying a telegram had been sent for him to return to Moscow immediately. Nosenko had been helping the CIA previously and he invents a “oh no, I’ve been caught you must help me” scheme.
He also admits the question of his rank was not true.
“You see what happened, I was appointed Deputy Chief of Seventh Department in 1962. On analogical cases was appointment of another officer, Deputy Chief in Second Department, Second Chief Directorate. Both had rank of Captain. The position of Deputy Chief of Department, Colonel. In 1963, in September 1963, was made presentation on my next rank; my next rank was to be Major but when it was all confirmed on the level of Department, on the party organization, and all papers were given for signing and further must going in Personnel Directorate, the Chief of Second Chief Directorate General Gribanov decided in my case and in the case of another Deputy Chief of the Second Department also captain himself, must be made presentation on Lieutenant Colonels, what was done in 1963. It was well known fact in Second Chief Directorate, in 1963, December, I was sent on a short trip in Gorki district in search of former KGB officer Cherepanov, who ran away. He tried to contact Americans. He contacted them but it was unsuccessful.
Americans returned the papers, considered him a plant when he was through. He noticed the KGB working against him. He ran away. All over the Soviet Union started the search of Cherepanov. In difference places appeared signals. It was in Gorki district signal. I was sent because I know him personally. I work in same department with him, and search on him in Gorki district, and when I was sent in Gorki district, they put on my travel document “Lieutenant Colonel Nosenko.” This was document with me when I come in January. Surely, of course, human vanity.”
Now Nosenko was held in isolation from 1964 to 1969. In 1967 Nosenko was questioned by a CIA officer named Bruce Solie.
Nosenko became an American citizen in 1974. He has been under the CIA’s care all along and still works for the CIA.
Nosenko is then shown the May 30, 1978 deposition. Nosenko made corrections to the transcript and placed his initials on the lines where corrections occured. (I did not notice them in the copy released.)
Klein was worried that the CIA might have told Nosenko what to say and what not to say. Nosenko says no one told him what to say but, “No, sir. On the contrary, before I met you [Klein] I was told that I must tell everything, whatever questions will be. I even asked if questions will be concerning cases, the names, even these, whatever stuff the Committee would like, “What you know you must answer.” This seems to confirm that Nosenko and CIA did talk about what Nosenko should say to the HSCA.
Nosenko mentions that no one could approach a target without permission from Moscow. There was one exception. “The only one thing for qualification I want to add, that up to September, 1963, none of the KGB’s outfits in Leningrad, in Kieve, in Byelorussia, in any part of the Soviet Union, can make an approachment to any foreigner without permission of Moscow.”
Now in September of 1963, one place had so many tourists and other interesting targets that they changed this procedure and allowed approachment without permission from Moscow, that place was Finland.
“Only in 1963 was making special permission concerning KGB apparatus in Leningrad and only concerning Finnish tourists because a big amount of tourists were coming from Finland and not going to any part of Soviet Union, only Leningrad, and after two, three, four or five days, back to Finland.”
This is interesting as Oswald entered the Soviet Union via Helenski, Finland. Oswald entered in 1959 and the no approach allowed without Moscow’s permission was in effect but it’s an interesting note that Finland was nearly an open door, so much so that the KGB changed their procedures over this area, granted years later.
Nosenko recounts to the HSCA that he saw a cable from the KGB’s Mexico City station about Oswald’s request for a visa.
Bill MacDowall wrote an interesting article on Nosenko on his web site “JFK…The Voice of Reason” entitled, “NOSENKO…THE SPY WHO LIED..AND LIED..AND LIED!”. One of the things Bill wrote that struck me was the Nosenko might be able to destroy the story of Oswald in Mexico City, which might be the real reason he was kept in isolation.
Nosenko points out that because of an American exhibition in Moscow at the time Oswald wanted to defect in `59 there wasn’t anyone from KGB working against him. Nosenko also states that no KGB officer talked to Oswald to check him out before decision to not allow him to stay was made.
Krupnov opens a file on Oswald when they do let him stay. The Chief above him ordered him to open a file on Oswald.
Nosenko mistakenly believes Oswald was drafted into the Marines. Nosenko doesn’t know how he knew or when they knew but stresses over and over again that it was not discussed in relation to whether Oswald could defect or not.
On page 96 Representative Sawyer got upset that Klein was asking questions that Nosenko had already responded to. They apparently adjourned and were to reconvene on Tuesday, June 20, 1978.
Document # 180-10131-10320 is a 21 page deposition of James C. Michael taken 7/27/78. Kenneth Klein took the deposition for the HSCA.
James C. Michael is a registered alias. Mr. Michael is an employee of the CIA. He has been employed there since 1956. In July 1964 he talked with Yuri Nosenko.
Michael was assigned to debrief Nosenko on his KGB career.
“Michael” interrogated Nosenko when Nosenko was in confinement in April or May of 1964. Michael was in the Soveit-Russian Division. The chief of that division was David E. Murphy. Michael had never before debriefed a KGB official.
When asked if he read any files on Oswald prior to debriefing Nosenko, Michael replied no, though he may have read previous debriefings on Nosenko that may have contained information about Oswald.
Nosenko was held in a house in suburban Washington D.C. Michael would visit him two or three times a week, about 3 hours a session. These sessions were taped.
At one point, on p. 10, Klein shows Michael a document, “from CIA folder which states, `H.S.C.A. Requests -25 July 1978′ and in parentheses it has a name which I won’t say on the record. Then it says `Deposition -27/7/78.’ Showing you this report which says `Memorandum for the Record.’ Source AE Donor, Date of Interview 3 July 1964.”
The document is a report of the July 3, 1964 debriefing of Nosenko by Michael.
Klein draws Michael’s attention to p. 63, and there is also the number 18 at the top of the page because this page is part of a newly created file, there is a name, Michael’s true name. Michael is with the Soviet Russian Division, Counterintelligence Group, KGB Branch. Klein then shows Michael another document, “Memorandum for the Record, subject follow up report on the Oswald case, source AE Donor, date of interview 27 July 1964” and with the new numbering system, that is the numbering system of the binder which this report is a part of, it begins on p. 22 and goes through p. 39. On p. 39 is Michael’s true name, typed, not a signature. Both of these reports detail questioning of Nosenko about Oswald. Michael was given a series of questions to ask Nosenko about Oswald.
Nosenko was given a copy of the July 3 report and Nosenko went through it line by line. That seems rather odd to me.
Document # 180-10131-10323 is a 40 p. deposition of Yuri Nosenko. This was taken 5/30/78. So it’s earlier than document # 180-10110-10007. In fact, this one is referred to in document # 180-10110-10007.
Klein is accompanied by a researcher Johanna Smith.
Reference is made to Klein speaking with Nosenko on May 27 and an earlier time in May. The May 27th discussion was in reference to Oswald.
Klein asks Nosenko to tell him everything he saw or heard about Oswald while he (Nosenko) was in Russia.
“It was the fall of 1959. I was working in the 7th Department of the Second Chief Directorate of the KGB, being Deputy Chief of the First Section, which is responsible for American, British and Canadian tourists. To me had come a senior case officer, Major Georgiy Ivanovich Rastrusin. He was responsible for counterintelligence work against Intourists. He had come with a question that an American tourist, Lee Harvey Oswald, made a request to Intourist to stay in the Soviet Union.
“I asked him who is responsible for him and what we know about him and what kind of materials we have, and he answered me that nobody is working against him personally, only him. He found materials, it was several pages only. There was a questionnaire, which every tourist before coming fills out in his country where he applies for a visa, or for the Soviet Embassy through tourist firm.
“There were two checkups but I do not know by what officer, one of the officers of the 7th Department, one to check also the archives center, the archives of the KGB, and the other checkup through the archives of the intelligence service. They have different archives.
“Both these checkups in archives showed no existing materials on Lee Harvey Oswald. He was in the Soviet Union the first time.
“Besides that, there was information received from an interpreter who worked with Oswald, about him. There was a short note made from the Intourist page, what kind of tour Oswald had, how many days he will be in the Soviet Union, and also there was written by hand, by Major Rastrusin, a summary concerning the question which he found out in Intourist concerning the question of his stay, he wished to stay in the Soviet Union.
“Here it is necessary for me to clarify that KGB working against foreign tourists doesn’t have capability to, not everyone, but even 50 percent, in working against tourists, and which orders of the leaders of the KGB — KGB is picking up the interesting targets, who are the interesting targets.
“Any foreign tourist, let’s say, an American tourist, if he had any connection with the intelligence community, he will be very interesting target. This tourist will be given priority of interest by the KGB. Anyone who is working, any tourist working for the Federal Government of the United States is a very interesting target. Anyone who specializes in any field on the Soviet Union or Russia, in general, I mean teach, a professor, assistant professor, who is specializing on Russia, history, language, law or whatever it will be, it is interesting for the KGB, because KGB considers that they can be connected with the intelligence community in the United States.
“Students, young people who are studying in any field of Russia, Russian language, Russian history, Russian economy, is a very interesting target, because there is a chance that they in the future will be working for the Federal Government or maybe for the intelligence community.
“Further, any tourist who has any Russian roots, his parents, grandparents or the tourist himself was born in the Soviet Union, in Russia, because it gives the possibility to the KGB to check all his relatives who are in Russia and to view their work on this basis, having in mind approachment. This is the category of people on whom KGB is paying attention.
“Further, any tourist who appears in the Soviet Union the second time automatically becomes a suspicious person and becomes an interesting target. This is the category of people against whom in general KGB pays attention.
“Oswald didn’t belong to this category of people. That is why he wasn’t paid attention. Besides that, what I said above, there is also an important thing that in this period of time, in 1959, the summer-fall, there was going on in the Soviet Union, in Moscow, an American exhibition at Sokolniki Park. Why? Because almost 95 percent of all who were on the American side working for this exhibition knew the Russian language and the KGB was covering these American personnel very tight. It means not one department was responsible for the American exhibition but every outfit of the whole counterintelligence of the Second Directorate was working also against the exhibition.
“After I looked at the materials which Major Rastrusin showed me, what the 7th Department First Section had on Oswald, in my eyes he wasn’t an interesting target, targets about whom I was speaking before.
“I went with Rastrusin to the Chief of the Section of the 7th Department to whom we reported this material, and then we went further to the Chief of the 7th Department, who looked and there was nothing interesting.
“The second thing, the KGB is not very fond to deal with defectors. If it will be a defector from the intelligence community, a diplomat, an interesting person, they will be interested, but with a person they don’t see any interest in, then they are not burning with wish to deal with him.
“And it was made decision by the Chief of the Department, in the presence of the Chief of the Section, me and Major Rastrusin, to answer, to give an answer to Intourist to ask Intourist to tell Oswald that in accordance with all rules and regulations Intourist is not dealing with people who want to stay, Intourist is dealing only with tourists, that is Intourist will recommend him that in accordance with Soviet procedure, he must go back home, in the United States, where he must, if he wants to come to live in the Soviet Union, he must visit the Soviet Embassy, go to Consular department, where he will talk with people about his wish, and if he would still persist and wants to go ahead, it will be taken normal procedures.
“It was a soft brush, the way you can call it. After that — this is what I remember — after that, the next day or a day and a half, the same Major Rastrusin reports that trouble took place with Oswald. Oswald cut his wrist and was taken to the hospital. How it happened, I asked, and he told me that an interpreter has come to him, to take him on a tour, after it was announced to him before, about they must go in accordance with Soviet procedures. Next day it was —
“Mr. Klein- After it was announced that he could not stay?
“Mr. Nosenko – He couldn’t stay and Intourist has no dealing with this question.
An interpreter has come and was waiting for him 20 minutes, half an hour, he is not appearing. She asked the hotel personnel, Hotel Berlin, in Moscow, to check did Oswald leave the hotel, again, because in accordance with Soviet procedures in hotel any foreigner when leaving the hotel leaves key on the floor where he is living. It wasn’t on the floor. It means he was in the room. And the interpreter was concerned and asked the manager, the administration of the hotel, to check it out, and went with them. They broke the door and in the room they found Oswald lying with cut wrist.
“He was immediately given a call to ambulance, for ambulance, and he was taken to hospital, Oswald, Botkin Hospital, where he was given transfusion plus stitches on his wrist.
“And there in the hospital Oswald again stated that if they, the Soviets, will not allow me to stay, then I will kill myself.
“Again I immediately went to Chief of Section, to Chief of Department and reported what was going on, what happened, and here the office of Chief of Department decided to check him through psychiatrist from the Botkin Hospital, and to invite another one. This task was given to Major Rastrusin to arrange it. In this way both psychiatrists check him independently and each one will write what they found.”
Their diagnosis? “Both mentioned that Oswald was mentally unstable”. Okay, so a decision is made to report to higher ups in the Soviet government that Oswald might kill himself if he can’t stay. According to Nosenko they were fearful of repercussions and reactions if Oswald did kill himself that the Soviet government or the KGB would be blamed for the death so they let him stay.
“It means it was reported to Khrushchev to allow him to stay on the basis of those clarifications what I told.”
A decision was made that Oswald’s stay would be handled through the Red Cross. He was to live in Minsk and receive $700 rubles from Red Cross for living.
In December 1959 Major Kim Georgievich Krupnov, another senior KGB intelligence officer, was ordered to prepare a paper on Oswald. A file register was created on Oswald in the KGB’s center archives. The paper was to accompany the file. It was sent to the KGB of the Belorussian republic in Minsk. Nosenko says he has seen this file. The file told what kind of work to give Oswald.
Nosenko was told to spy on Oswald at his residence and at work. His mail and telephone conversations were to be monitored. Nosenko refers to this as “to control him”. Oswald was followed around. Why? “Oswald was suspected in connection with American intelligence.” Well, why wasn’t he suspected of this prior to being allowed to stay?
That’s the last Nosenko hears of Oswald until 1963 when Oswald tries to get a visa to go to Russia in Mexico City.
At this time Nosenko is Deputy Chief of 7th Department, Second Chief Directorate. Lt. Col. Vladimir Alekseev, Chief of the 7th Department, visited Deputy Chief of Service No. 2 of the Intelligence Service of the KGB, Col. Turalin. Turalin gave him a cable received from the KGB station in Mexico City about Oswald’s request for a visa.
Nosenko did not know Oswald had left Russia. Anyway, Nosenko and Alekseev go to see Chief of Department 9 supposedly of intelligence service of KGB who did not want anything more to do with Oswald saying they had enough of him in `59.
Nosenko uses the same term “soft brush” in handling Oswald.
Soon afterward Kennedy is assassinated. It’s turmoil in the Second Chief Directorate. The chief of this, General Gribanov told Nosenko to immediately contact the KGB in Minsk and tell them to get all their files on Oswald, bring them to Moscow immediately, use a military plane.
Nosenko was also asked to talk to chiefs and see if anyone contacted Oswald. Col. Gruzdev said he couldn’t do anything, Oswald was sending file. Nobody talked to him because there was no indication of what to do.
The files from Minsk arrive. It’s a big suitcase, maybe two. Nosenko says 7 or 8 volumes. The Chief of 7th department, chief of American section, officer Krupnov, Nosenko, 4 or 5 other officers, and officer from Minsk started to look at the files. They are looking for anything on whether KGB contacted Oswald and were preparing to write a report on that.
They are interrupted. In comes Col. Matveev, a deputy chief of first Department, of the Second Chief Directorate. Gribanov changed his mind. They are going to take all files on Oswald, the First American department will get them and they will produce a report which will go to the leader of the KGB and Soviet government.
A few days later Nosenko is talking with Gribanov. Several officers from Second Chief Directorate went to Minsk. One of these investigating officers is a friend of Nosenko, Vladimir Krivosheev. They talked to Oswald’s co-workers at the plant and his friends in this hunting club. The story of Oswald the poor shot is told, he couldn’t kill a rabbit.
HSCA counselor Klein asks Nosenko a series of questions.
“Did Oswald make a written application for Soviet citizenship?”
“I haven’t seen it. He must, but I haven’t seen it.”
“When Oswald slashed his wrist he was taken to a hospital and psychiatric tests were performed by two doctors at the request of the KGB. Did you read the two reports?
“Yes, I have seen them, and read them.”
“Can you remember anything about them?”
“No. I remember the main point of them both, and they coincided in their opinion Oswald was mentally unstable.”
“Before you received these reports was there any reason to believe that Oswald was crazy or not normal?”
“Before reports, before cutting wrist? No, there wasn’t anything known to KGB.”
Klein asked before Oswald cut his wrist who made the decision that he couldn’t stay. The decision was made by Chief of the 7th Department, Second Directorate.
Apparently, both Nosenko and Rastrusin said there wasn’t anything interesting about him. Yet, once allowed to stay he suddenly is suspected of being connected with American intelligence community.
At the time this decision was made Oswald had not been interviewed by any officer of the KGB.
Klein asked if they knew if Oswald was a Marine. Yes, they knew. How they knew Nosenko doesn’t say. Did they know he was a radio operator? Nosenko doesn’t know. The First Chief Directorate was not consulted about Oswald and rejecting his request to stay. Apparently, the Second Directorate had the authority to make the decision.
Klein asked if a microphone was installed in Oswald’s room. Nosenko didn’t know.
Klein asked if Nosenko read the KGB file on Marina. No, but there was material on her in the files that came from Minsk.
Was the KGB familiar with Marina’s background? Yes. It’s unclear when the KGB was interested in her, prior to Oswald meeting her, while he was dating her, or after they made marriage license application. Anyone who had any contact with Oswald was checked out.
According to Nosenko, when Oswald went to Minsk all files went with him, nothing stayed in Moscow. There will only be an indication that a file exists and that the file is in Minsk.
The file was thick because it included all the surveillance reports.
Interestingly, Klein asks if Oswald sent any letters to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. See “Document Discovery” in “The Third Decade” Vol. 9 #3 p. 40. for an interesting tidbit on Oswald and the Soviet Embassy in Washington D.C.
Klein asked if there was a KGB training school in Minsk. According to Nosenko, in `56-’57 there was a school for young officers but from second part of `57 no. The training educational system of whole KGB was in Moscow, excluding, of course, school of surveillance in Leningrad and excluding military counterintelligence schools, border troops, but for First and Second Directorate, only in Moscow.
Document # 180-10131-10342 is an 87 page deposition from E. Howard Hunt taken November 3, 1978. Present were Robert W. Genzman and Mike Ewing, HSCA counsels and Hunt and his counsel Ellis S. Rubin. Hunt was placed under oath by reporter Shirley B. Dempsey.
Hunt was asked if he ever worked for the CIA. He answered yes and then they immediately went off the record.
JFK Exhibit No. 94 was shown to him, a letter explaining to Hunt that he is under no constraint regarding his prior secrecy oath with the CIA.
He then goes into his story of how after Watergate some people thought he resembled one of the three tramps arrested in Dallas, the story in the tabloid, where he was on November 22, 1963, the Chinese grocery store, first named “Wah Ling”, then “Tuck Cheong”, picked up his kids and stayed at home watching TV. He states he was never in Dallas, Texas until 1971 when Charles Colson asked him to interview General Paul Harkins. He did not meet Sturgis until 1972. He was not in Mexico in 1963. He provided to the Rockefeller Commission 17 different photographs of himself taken between 1961-1964. FBI photoanalysist Lyndall Shaneyfelt compared the photographs and concluded that Hunt and Sturgis are not the tramps.
He sued Alan Weberman and Michael Canfield for their book “Coup d’Etat in America”. The publisher went out of business and returned to Nigeria.
Then “The Spotlight” and “The News Journal” of Wilmington, Delaware printed a story that the HSCA received from the CIA a memorandum from Richard Helms written in 1966 stating that some day it might be necessary to reveal that Howard Hunt was in Dallas on the day of President Kennedy’s assassination.
Hunt demanded that the HSCA confirm or deny that they ever received such a memorandum, and if it does exist to turn it over to Hunt so he could refute it.
The HSCA said they are aware of Hunt’s request and will make every effort to respond to it.
Hunt was asked if he was ever in Texas at any time in 1963.
“Did you at any time in your life receive a letter or any other form of communication from Lee Harvey Oswald or anyone claiming to be him?”
He was asked about the Diem cables he forged to implicate President Kennedy in the assassination of Diem and his brother. He admitted doing that at President Nixon’s request. He was asked if he was involved in any manner in the fabrication of evidence to link any person to any assassination. “No.”
Hunt thinks Oswald killed President Kennedy and that Oswald has some ties to the KGB.
Hunt said he was not involved in any way with the CIA’s investigation of the assassination.
He was asked if he had any relationship with Mr. James Angleton or Ray Rocca or if he ever discussed the assassination with either of them. Hunt said he had no relationship with either man and no, he didn’t discuss the assassination or assassination investigation with either man. He knew who the men were but had no dealings with them.
He was asked if during his work for President Nixon in the so-called “plumbers unit” if he and his colleagues ever investigated information provided by a woman who claimed to have data related to Fidel Castro’s personal reaction to the Kennedy assassination.
“I was in Miami with or without Gordon Liddy late `71 or early 1972. I was in a hotel room, I think in the Dupont Plaza in Miami, and I was meeting with Mr. Bernard Baker and another member of our team, Martinez, Mr. Martinez, and Martinez mentioned that he had available a woman who was a recent arrival in the United States. I did not know at the time that Martinez was a contract agent for CIA.” He goes on to say that he interrogated this woman, note this is not Marita Lorenz, and she told of how a “pall of gloom” had settled over the Fidel household because according to her Kennedy was on the verge of making a secret deal, a detente, with the Castro government. Hunt recorded this on audiotape, transcribed it, in the White House, and sent it to the CIA via the White House CIA pouch. Hunt made a summary report on this for Charles Colson.
Mr. Genzman- “Did you or anyone else ever undertake or consider any other investigation of any information pertaining to the Kennedy assassination during your period of working for Richard Nixon?”
Hunt- “Beyond the incident I have reported, I can’t recall anything, no.”
“Was there ever any interest among the people working in the Nixon administration concerning new information about the Kennedy administration?”
Hunt, “…if it could be shown ex post facto that Mr. Castro and President Kennedy had a working relationship, this might have been of some potential value..”
Hunt was asked if he prepared a summary of the information he gave to Colson on the woman who knew what Castro’s reaction was to the Kennedy assassination to President Nixon or Robert Halderman. Hunt said no. Of course, Colson could have shared the information.
Hunt was asked what happened to the summary and tapes of this interview. Hunt said at one time they were kept in his office in the Executive Office Building. He stated that he thought he sent the actual tape over to the CIA. He then recounts how his safe was violated on June 19th, 1972. But that’s an old story. Colson, Dean, Erlichman and L. Patrick Gray forced the safe open. There was an inventory, some material was destroyed. The safe was opened by the General Service Administration on orders of John Dean, 48 hours after the Watergate break in.
Hunt was asked if this interview could have been discussed on the infamous 18 minute gap. He didn’t think so. He never heard anything further on the matter. He was asked if was discussed on the June 23, 1972 smoking gun tape that forced Nixon to resign? Hunt said no.
Hunt filed a motion for the return of the material taken from his safe which if acted upon would have resulted in a court hearing about the contents, the substance of the contents and the chain of custody.
Colson squashed the motion because it would have been embarrassing to the White House. Hunt sued his lawyer for malpractice for acceding to Colson’s wishes.
Genzman wondered if the decision to withdraw the motion was related in any way to discussion of hush money for Hunt or a possible clemency.
Hunt was asked what was Colson concerned about in the safe. Hunt wasn’t quite sure specifically but, “examination of what was left behind was all highly incriminating leads to other people. So obviously there was a kind of division of the spoils by interested people in the White House to take their names out of the folders and leave my name in. That is what happened.”
Genzman, “John Ehrlichman, in some notes which he made in 1971, made reference to an episode in which Nixon was trying to get Director Helms to provide his aides with a copy of a secret internal CIA report relating to the Bay of Pigs. Helms evidently was refusing to make a copy available. In his notes of September 18, 1971 Ehrlichman wrote that Nixon was going to tell Helms that `the President is to have the full file or else. Nothing withheld.’ ”
“In those same notes Ehrlichman wrote that the President stated that `Liddy and Hunt’ were to help read or analyze the material once it was obtained. Do you recall this episode?”
Hunt, “No, this is the first time I heard of it.”
This refers to the CIA Inspector General’s report, which I think has been released, perhaps not fully. I recall John Newman saying he has it from a variety of sources and each one is redacted differently.
Hunt was asked if any such material was made available to you on the Bay of Pigs or on Cuban matters. Hunt said no.
The Ervin Committee, also known as the Watergate Committee, published a CIA employee’s affidavit that Hunt had “transmitted sealed envelopes” to the CIA during the Watergate period, 1971-2.
“Yes, I sent occasional things over to the CIA.” Hunt quantifies that by saying it was not a direct from him to Helms system but that there was an intermediary step of addressing the envelope to Chief Reports Officer, Western Hemisphere Division and turning that envelope over to the liaison office in the White House which then had its own pouch and courier service out to CIA. They may have put the envelope Hunt addressed inside another envelope and addressed it to someone else.
Hunt states that he never addressed anything to Helms directly. Colson thought that Hunt was some kind of continuing intelligence liaison between himself (Hunt) and Helms.
Genzman quotes an excerpt from an interview with Chuck Colson conducted by Senator Lowell Weicker and Howard Baker wherein Colson refers to a meeting his lawyer, David Shapiro had with Hunt. Hunt was making demands for more money.
Hunt wanted to see Colson and Shapiro wouldn’t let him. Hunt allegedly said, “the White House better get on the stick; that he had things on Ehrlichman, Krogh and Young, and that he had tapes.” This implied Hunt had tapes threatening to the Nixon Administration.
Hunt stated the assertion is false. Hunt said Shapiro wrote many self serving accounts of that meeting.
In a 1977 interview in Boston, Hunt stated that he knew of a reported plan to “eliminate” Omar Torrijos in Panama. The article states, “Hunt was asked, did you know of anything about a project to eliminate Panamanian dictator Torrijos. In response the convicted Watergate conspirator answered, Panama was a drug traffic area where the drug could move easily, the CIA said with mixed blessings of the Panamanian Government. There was mixed concern on the part of drug officials and certainly on the part of some of the Latin American drug informants. I think the feeling was if Torrijos didn’t shape up and cooperate, he was going to be wasted. That never happened. I don’t know any of the people asked to participate other than the people in the Plumbers Unit. They have that as part of their brief”.
Genzman, “Do you recall a discussion where the people in the Plumbers Unit were asked to participate?”
Hunt, “No, not at this point, I don’t. All I recall about that is that there were people within the Special Investigation Unit who did nothing but concern themselves with the drug traffic, and they were in liaison with the CIA. One was a gentleman named Minnick, and another was Lucien Conein. It was more an impression I had than anything else.”
When asked if he knew who else was involved in these discussions Hunt mentioned that Liddy during his time as Special Assistant to the Secretary of Treasury initiated or strongly supported Operation Intercept which reduced the drug flow from Mexico. Genzman tries to get back to finding out more of possible assassination plans, specifically in this case Torrijos. Hunt doesn’t think that that plan ever came to fruition. He said Bud Krogh not only had responsibilities for the Special Investigations Unit but was also very active with the DEA. When asked whether he had any direct knowledge that anyone in the Plumbers Unit were in fact asked to participate in a plan of this sort Hunt said he had no direct knowledge.
“I know that Mr. Liddy and Mr. Minnick at one time or another discussed the sense of frustration not only with regard to Panama, but with regard to the Golden Triangle, and Mr. Minick having traveled at White House expense out there to Burma, Laos, and so forth, and come back with a report that the White House found very disturbing. It was in this context that Mr. Torrijos came in focus.”
Genzman asked if any of the Watergate burglars had any knowledge of these discussions. Hunt said he didn’t know.
Genzman then showed Hunt an excerpt from an interview with Manuel Artime. Artime mentions that Hunt approached him to “take care of Torrijos”. Artime goes onto to suggest that Barker and Sturgis were involved in a plan.
Hunt claims to be familiar with this, referring to the document as the Dardis memorandum and asks Genzman if this document has been authenticated. Genzman replies that it has. Hunt replies with a press release from his attorney Ellis Rubin issued December 16, 1977 in response to a Jack Anderson column published the previous day.
“Anderson’s column recites a so-called 1973 secret memo from Richard Gerstein’s investigator, Martin Dardis, allegedly quoting Manuel Artime, Hunt’s close friend and Godfather to one of his children. This office represents both Hunt and Sturgis now, and we were the attorney for Dr. Artime over the years. I would have known of any so-called plot because Dr. Artime confided in me, and I possess the facts concerning both Hunt and Sturgis and all of their activities.
“Jack Anderson made no detectable effort to contact Howard Hunt to refute the charges. He knows I represent both Hunt and Sturgis, and he could have contacted Mr. Hunt through this office. I now ask why did Mr. Dardis and Anderson wait until after Dr. Artime’s untimely death from cancer to make Artime their sole authority for Hunt’s so-called involvement in the conspiracy? Along those lines, I challenge Mr. Dardis or anyone else to produce any written memorandum, signed by Manuel Artime, or a tape recording of his voice substantiating these outrageous lies.”
Genzman asks Hunt, “On November 14, 1972 you transmitted a confidential memorandum to the Nixon circle which asked for further support payments for you and the other Watergate burglars. In the memo you stated, `The Watergate break-in was only one of a number of other highly illegal conspiracies undertaken at the behest of the White House.’ Have all of these other illegal acts now been publicly disclosed?”
Hunt, “As far as I know, they have.”
Genzman asks Hunt to describe these other illegal acts. Hunt goes only so far as to remember the Ellsberg affair and the forging of the Diem cables. Hunt would not go beyond stating those two items.
Genzman, perhaps sensing that Hunt was referring to something, if not several somethings beyond what he is admitting to, asked what was so highly illegal about the Diem cables. “That perhaps may have been the hyperbole of the moment. It was certainly discreditable, and there was a good deal of public outrage when it was made known.”
Not a great answer, but Genzman goes on.
Genzman asks Hunt if he recalls a covert plan called Operation Diamond from 1971-1972. Hunt knew of Operation Gemstone which was an umbrella project for a lot of sub-projects which Liddy drew up and presented to the Attorney General [and this most be a misprint] Mr. Diem [?] and Mr. Magruder for their approval. Hunt did not recollect what Operation Diamond was supposed to be.
Who is this Mr. Diem?
Genzman told Hunt that, “Bernard Barker stated that Operation Diamond was a plan to take strong action against drug smugglers, and he also stated that you approached him concerning this plan. Does that refresh your recollection?”
“Not particularly. I think I now recall Barker having made that statement, but I don’t subscribe to it.”
Hunt could not recall any of the details of this plan nor what happened to this plan.
Hunt is asked several questions relating to Watergate figures, and Ameritez, which was a dead corporation resurrected by Bernard Barker to provide cover for the Watergate entry. According to Hunt, Miguel Suarez allowed his corporation, Ameritez, to be used as the apparent renter of the suite that was used by the break-in people. Hunt said he never knew Miguel Suarez. He did not know or had contact with Daniel Hofgren, a man who worked under Charles Colson. Hofgren apparently had something to do with the Panama problem. Hunt did not know a Miami man named Edmond H. “Skipper” Hill.
Hunt is asked about his interview with General Harkins. According to Hunt, he flew to Dallas, arriving at about 2:00 A.M. interviewing the General at breakfast and leaving Dallas around mid-morning. The purpose of the interview was that the Nixon administration was interested in Harkins because Colson felt that Harkins, as troop commander, took issue with some of President Johnson’s policies and that Harkins would have interesting information on who had started the war and just who had finally lost it. Hunt describes the interview as not very rewarding.
Genzman asked Hunt if he discussed the Kennedy assassination with anyone in Dallas. Hunt, of course, responded no.
Hunt returned to the “Spotlight” article and again asked for the CIA document referred therein. Hunt also asked the HSCA to subpoena Victor Marchetti, Joe Trento and Miss Jacquie Powers of the Wilmington Sunday News Journal, and the people of the HSCA staff referred to anonymously in the article.
They took a break and returned. The deposition is broken up into two parts. Upon returning Hunt is asked what his contact was with Nixon, if any, during the Bay of Pigs. Hunt said none directly. Hunt referred to previous testimony of his on this, and the two books he has written. Hunt had a meeting at the request of Nixon’s then military aide general who was then Col. Robert Cushman, who had served with Hunt in the CIA. Cushman told Hunt that Nixon was the action officer for the National Security Council for the Cuba project. If any help was necessary get in touch with Cushman. Hunt was given Cushman’s private phone number.
Genzman asked Hunt if Nixon was ever aware of the CIA-mafia assassination conspiracy directed against Castro. Hunt said no, “but that it’s certainly not conclusive.” Hunt had no idea if Nixon knew one way or the other.
Hunt was asked if he knew that Tony Verona was being contacted by a member or members of the mafia. “No.”
“Do you know whether any Mafia figures were involved in the Bay of Pigs planning or actual invasion?”
“No, I never heard of any Mafia presence within the project until I guess the Church committee began bringing it out.”
Hunt was asked if he knew of the CIA’s hiring of Mafia figures in an attempt to assassinate Castro during the Bay of Pigs period or later. Hunt said no. He only learned of it during the Church committee.
Hunt is then asked about James O’Connell.
“The name is unknown to me.”
“Well, I knew Ed Lansdale from the time he was an Air Force Lieutenant Colonel up through his retirement period –met him, interviewed him in the White House.”
“Do you know of any role which he played in the Bay of Pigs invasion or in the CIA-Mafia plots?”
Listen to this! “No, none. I had not seen Ed Lansdale for many years and then about fall, I think, of 1962 Dick Helms called me in and there was General Lansdale working for MacNamara, [It’s spelled like that in the document but this must be Robert McNamara. Just another incompetent transcriber] I guess, in Defense. He said, `Can you just briefly tell Ed about the Bay of Pigs, and tell him in your opinion what went wrong because he is going to do something else that would have relevance to it. (emphasis added)
What was this?
“Sheff was Director of Security. I had no personal contact with him as such.”
Same question about him with Bay of Pigs and CIA-Mafia plots.
“I just never had any contact with him on those subjects.”
“I think I officially met Harvey once after he took over the remnants of the Bay of Pigs project. I had no personal contact with him. I don’t know what he was really involved in until the Church committee began revealing some of these things.”
“I have no knowledge of his involvement in anything except as portrayed in my book “Give Us This Day.” Cabell came into our war room at an unfortunate moment and delayed the take-off of our strike plans. He was then the Acting Director of CIA.”
“Did you have any other contacts or any type of relationship with Cabell?”
“Only when I was on Dulles’s staff. I would see the Deputy director occasionally.”
“Which years were you on Dulles’s staff?”
“I think that was from late summer of `61 until Mr. Dulles’ retirement, which I think was in `62, if I am not mistaken.”
Retirement my ass, President Kennedy fired Dulles and Hunt damn well knows it.
Hunt explains that he worked for the CIA in a continous relationship from October 1949 to May 1, 1970.
“Any employment relationship with the agency or asset relation with the agency since your retirement?”
James McCord?, prior to Watergate.
“None. Never heard of the name.”
Frank Sturgis?, before Watergate.
“I met Frank in late December `71, or January `72, for the first time.”
“Are you sure of that date?”
“I don’t know him.”
Edward K. Moss?
“Do you know if Tony Verona knew Ed Moss?”
“No. Tony and I had kind of an adversary relationship during the Bay of Pigs period and tended to keep things from each other.”
Genzman then switches gears and asks about Mexico.
“When did you serve in Mexico as a CIA employee?”
“Let’s see, from December 1950 until March `53 I then went down to the Cuba project in the summer of 1960 and stayed for several months and then left.”
“Is it your testimony that you were never in Mexico in 1963?”
“Yes, that’s my testimony.”
“Did you have knowledge about the CIA’s maintenance of secret photography and wire-tap surveillance operations at foreign embassies in Mexico City?”
“Would you describe these operations.”
“Well, there was photo surveillance and physical surveillance of the Iron Curtain embassies. Of course in 1953 when I left there it was pretty primitive. In those ten years a great deal of enhancement took place. [10 years?? That would be in 1963.]When I went back in 19 — I have to be careful about this. [Yeah, you sure do.] I went back in 1959. In that 6-year period [Ah, “6 year period”, much better than 10.] a great deal of enhancement has taken place and the physical and photo surveillance of all the target countries, at the station had increased enormously in size, and of course in that period I was on the outside. I was there as a private U.S. citizen, so I don’t really know what they had. But we had sporadic surveillance in the early `50s. I think it was pretty much full time by 1959.”
“Do you have specific knowledge about the surveillance operations in Mexico City?”
“Do you have any knowledge about the CIA’s surveillance of Lee Harvey Oswald when he made his trip to Mexico City in the fall of 1963?”
Hunt gives a very interesting answer, “Only what I have read in such books, for example, as “Night Watch” by David Phillips.”
“Do you know whether the CIA ever obtained a photograph or photographs of Lee Harvey Oswald during his visits to the Soviet-Cuban embassies in Mexico in 1963?”
“I have heard it alleged publicly. I have no knowledge.”
“I would like to show you an excerpt from your book, “Undercover,” your autobiography. This deals with the break-in which you conducted for the CIA in Mexico City at a foreign embassy. In this excerpt you stated that your CIA burglary team flew from Mexico City to Dallas after the job, changed identities in Dallas, and then returned to Washington. Can you tell exactly what this change of identities in Dallas consisted of?”
“No, I can’t. I didn’t, of course, go. I think that was the Guatemala embassy. I think in those days you had to change planes in Dallas. There were no direct flights — or Fort Worth.”
“For the record, I am referring to page 88 of your book “Undercover.”
“Can you tell how this change of identities was accomplished?”
Hunt, “Well, Obviously the team had two sets of identities. They had their own and fictitious identities suppled by the agency.
“Was Dallas used as a particular point for such a change of identity operation?”
“No. It just happened that was the first American port where the plane landed after leaving Mexico, and in order to get through customs and immigration they had to revert to their own identities.”
“Did this change of identities involve any physical changes?”
“I have no idea. It was a Staff D team.”
“Can you explain what you mean by Staff D?”
“Yes. That was the name associated with the National Security Agency.”
“Do you have any other knowledge of the use by the CIA of false identities in operations conducted in Dallas or through Dallas?”
“No. I was not particularly sensitive to the name Dallas. I could just as easily have said Fort Worth or Houston, for all I know.”
Hunt was asked about an FBI memorandum written two days after the Watergate break-in, FBI Director Gray stated that Frank Sturgis was, quote, “involved in organized crime activities the details of which are not available,” end quote. Do you know what these alleged Sturgis activities were?”
“Do you know what Gray was basing his statement on?”
Genzman again asks about whether Hunt knew Sturgis or any of his pseudonyms?
Amazingly, Hunt helps the fool Genzman, “let me help you on this. There came a time during the Bay of Pigs operation when I heard of a man named Frank Fiorini who had powered a plane with Pedro Diaz Lanz dropping leaflets on Havana, and that was the only reference I had heard to Frank Fiorini. Later on when Barker and I were casting about for people to use in connection with GEMSTONE, Barker mentioned the name Sturgis. And I said, “I don’t know anybody named Sturgis.”
“And he said, “Oh, during previous times he was known as Frank Fiorini. You remember he was Pedro Diaz Lanz.” [Now that should say with Pedro Diaz Lanz. Unless something else was going on.]
Now obviously the next question should be, “When did you first meet Frank Fiorini?”, right? But Genzman doesn’t ask it. Idiot!!!!!!!!!
Instead Genzman asks if Hunt was ever associated with organized crime.
“Did you ever know Sergio Arcacha Smith of the New Orleans branch of the Cuban Revolutionary Council?”
“Did you ever receive mail or other communications from him?”
“Did you ever know Guy Bannister in New Orleans?”
I like Hunt’s answer. “No, or anywhere else.”
“What was your relationship during the late `50’s and early 1960’s with David Phillips?”
“I first met Dave when he was a contract agent. He was on the Guatemala project, and at that time we were co-directors on the project. He was the Chief of Propaganda and I was the Chief of Political Action. Later on I saw Dave in Havana, where he was an undercover agent. It was a meeting of chief of stations just before the Castro takeover. I saw Dave again in Mexico City sometime — I can’t remember whether I saw him in 1960 or not, but in any event Dave was a familiar figure in Western Hemisphere operations. The he showed up on the Cuba project and first he worked in Washington and I worked in the Miami [area] and then when I left the Miami [area] at the end of things and came up to Washington I worked with Dave for about a week.
“Where did you work with Dave Phillips for about a week?”
“Did you ever meet Dave Phillips in Dallas?”
“Did you ever use the alias Knight for a cover name?”
“For him, for my book, “Give Us This Day.”
“Did he himself ever use that alias?”
“No. That was assigned officially to Dick Helms — Knight. He was Fletcher L. Knight.”
“Did you ever use the alias of Bishop?”
“I don’t think so.”
“Do you know anyone who did?”
“Do you know anyone by the name of Maurice Bishop?”
“Does the name mean anything to you?”
Hunt refers to a civil matter where he was once asked if he knew an individual by that name except it was given to him as Morris.
Oddly, Genzman does pick up the cue here when he didn’t on Fiorini. “Do you know anyone who ever used the name Morris Bishop?”
“In any of your last contacts with David Phillips, was the name Maurice Bishop mentioned?”
“No; nor at any time.”
“How and when did you first meet Bernard Barker?”
“Barker was assigned to me in Miami, when I went down there to take over the Revolutionary Democratic Front in the fall of 1960, I guess it was. He was identified to me by the man I replaced as a Cuban who had been an asset of the Havana station, and he was going to be my general, de facto.”
“Did he continue in this relationship with you during the period of preparation for the Bay of Pigs invasion?”
“He did. I left the Miami area shortly before the Bay of Pigs invasion, and I think Mr. Barker stayed on. I next heard Mr. Barker had been redeployed, as it were, to Chicago for training and employment by the agency, since he and many other Cubans were surplus to agency needs at that time.”
“Did you know Pedro Diaz Lanz?”
“I met Pedro on one occasion fully described in my book “Give Us This Day”. I knew, as I mentioned, Pedro Diaz Lanz’s name from the Frank Fiorini episode of the leaflets. Getting into the preconvent period of the Bay of Pigs, I heard our Air Force, Cuban exile air force, needed more pilots. Barker mentioned Lanz…former head of the rebel air force, would be a good candidate. I arranged that Pedro be given a stipend by the Revolutionary Democratic Front…and recommended to Dave Phillips, I think it was, that Diaz Lanz run leaflet flights for Dave Phillips particular interests, and I think there was a good deal of resistance to that in Washington.”
“Did your relationship with Diaz Lanz ever involve any B-25 aircraft?”
“Again. I published the whole thing in my book, “Give Us This Day”. He had an aircraft available. It was under a sheriff’s lien. I suggested to Dave Phillips and others that the lien be reduced or eliminated and the aircraft outfitted and used for propaganda overflights.”
“Did you ever arrange for funds for Pedro Diaz Lanz so that he could effectuate the release of any equipment which was held by the U.S. Customs?”
“Customs, no. My impression was there was a sheriff’s lien on the aircraft.”
“Were you aware that the plane was not owned by Pedro Diaz Lanz?”
“I think in subsequent years Frank Sturgis has indicated to me that he was part owner of the aircraft. I didn’t know that at the time.”
“Were you ever involved on behalf of the CIA in an investigation into allegations of CIA assistance to Pedro Diaz Lanz in the release of the B-25 aircraft in 1961?”
“No, I didn’t know it was ever released.”
Apparently Sturgis made this allegation.
“I don’t to this day know either that the aircraft was released, that CIA provided money for it as I recommended, or that Sturgis talked about it at all. I talked about it with Sturgis a little, but I don’t think I ever learned from him that the aircraft had been released or used during the Bay of Pigs operation.”
“Aside from this aircraft incident, was there any other connection between you and Sturgis before you actually knew Sturgis?” Very good Genzman.
“No, I just had knowledge that Mr. Fiorini was the co-pilot of that plane. There was no connection. I had a collateral piece of information on a man named Fiorini, known as a soldier of fortune in the area. Years later, I was to learn, 1971 or 1972 that Frank Fiorini became Frank Sturgis, who was about to be introduced to me by Bernard Barker.”
“What was Operation Forty?”
“I don’t know.”
“Did you ever know of a boat named Cusa?”
“Did you have any knowledge about CIA training operations in New Orleans in 1961?”
“In New Orleans; no. Are you talking about Lake Pontchartrain? That is something else.”
“Lake Pontchartrain, Houma, Louisiana?”
“Yes. Well, part of the exile navy was trained up at that area; that is all I know. and some of the LSTs were maneuvered around the lake, and I think brought down finally.”
“Let me ask you about the locations Belle Chase and Covington.”
“The names don’t mean anything to me.”
“Could you speculate as to why Pedro Diaz Lanz would deny ever having met you?”
“You mean he has denied it? He is one of the few Cubans who has denied it. Most Cubans claim they knew me, knew me intimately, during the Bay of Pigs. It is refreshing.
“No, I don’t, except that I have been in a lot of trouble, and I don’t think Pedro would gain anything from associating himself with me in any way. Too, there is the aspect he is probably a pretty proud individual, and he was first brought to my attention as literally a charity welfare case, although I had ulterior interests in him as a pilot, and I think he realized it, and he doesn’t want to look back on those days when he didn’t have enough food in his house for his wife and child. Again, that is speculation.”
“Did Pedro Diaz Lanz ever work for the CIA?”
“I don’t know.”
“Did Pedro Diaz Lanz ever receive money from the CIA?”
“Well, as I have stated a little earlier, I arranged that money be given to him to settle his immediate needs, and beyond that I have no knowledge of any money that was paid to him. I recommended again that he be taken under the Cuban exile air force at the appropriate rank and be paid the normal stipend paid Cuban exiles.”
“Are you testifying that the money you arranged for him to receive after you had first met him was CIA money?”
“Had to be. Again, I don’t know that it was paid. I assume it was paid.”
“When did the CIA activity at Lake Pontchartrain cease, to your knowledge?”
“I have no idea. It was a maritime operation. I was political; I had nothing to do with the military. I handled the political aspects of it, the government in exile.”
“Were you ever involved in the Frente Revolucionario Democratico?”
“Did you have a role in the formation of this organization?”
“Could you give us details about the formation of this organization?”
“It was covered in great detail in my book, “Give Us This Day”. Briefly, when I was brought into the project, I was told I was to be the political liaison with this government in exile, and we met at the Hotel Ambassador in New York City, and I met the members of the junta at that time, including Manual Artime for the first time, and they and I worked out a rationale, a modus operandi. I approved their articles of incorporation, as it were.”
“What year are you referring to?”
“Summer of 1960. And told them that we would be moving down to Mexico City from there, as indeed we did.”
“Did the CIA sponsor this organization?”
“Oh yes, Through me. I set their budget and exercised a degree of control that one could exercise over the spending of the moneys that we provided.”
“When did CIA sponsorship of this organization end?”
“Well, the new frontier came in and decided that the FRD was too archaic; it wasn’t progressive enough; and it would be supplemented by a new breed of politicians from Cuba, many of whom arrived recently from a close embrace with Castro.
“I was unwilling to bring these elements into the FRD and requested reassignment to Washington, which was granted me. My successors developed the Cuban Revolutionary Committee out of the ashes of the FRD.”
“What was the date of the formation of the Cuban Revolutionary Committee?”
“I would place it about a month before the invasion; I would put it in March sometime, of 1961.”
“Did the CIA sponsor the CRC?”
“To the best of my knowledge.”
“Do you know how long this sponsorship lasted?”
“Very brief. I would say two months or so.”
“What was the relationship between the CRC and its New Orleans branch?”
“I have no idea. I didn’t know they had a New Orleans branch.”
“Did you ever have contact with the Cuban revolutionary delegates?”
“I don’t know who they would be. The name doesn’t mean anything to me.”
“Let me give you some names and have you comment.”
“Sergio Aracha Smith?”
“Never heard of him.”
“Would you repeat how you knew about the Lake Pontchartrain operations?”
“Because I was present at the briefings at headquarters when Mr. Dulles and other high officials of the agency were briefed on the project and status of each aspect of the operation.”
“Who was in charge of the operation?”
“Who was in charge of the paramilitary operation? I have forgotten his name.”
“I would like to ask you about your knowledge of or involvement in some of the following: Alpha 66?”
“Just a name to me. I have heard it; that is all.”
“Did you know Antonio Carlos Veciano Blanch?”
Movimento Revolucionario del Pueblo?”
“Jose Miro Cardona?”
“Could you give us the details of your relationship?”
“Yes. Dr. Miro was a former, I think, Chief Justice of the Cuban Supreme Court, a very distinguished barrister. He had been counselor-ambassador to Spain and had taken refuge in the Argentine Embassy. I had him brought up from Argentina, when I thought the time was right, and inserted in the FDR leadership as the compromise chief.”
“How about Agrupacion Monte Cristi?”
“The Monte Cristi had delegates in the FRD. I can’t remember the name of the representative.”
“Did you know Jorge Nobregas?”
“The next organization is JURE.”
“I have heard of it but the name doesn’t mean anything to me. I think it is an acronym.”
“Did you know Sylvia Odio?”
“Rogelio Cisneros Diaz?”
“Duney Perez Alamo?”
“Luis Bal Cuena?”
“Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil?”
“The DRE. Dave Phillips ran that for us. Albert Muller is still in prison over there. But that is classified, I think. He was the head of it. He went into Cuba and was captured.”
“Movimento Democrata Cristiano.”
“The Christian Democratic Movement. I have heard of it. It had a delegate in the FRD.”
“Laureano Batista Falla?”
“Movimento Revolucionario Trienta de Noviembre?”
“Thirtieth of November. No I never heard of that.”
“Carlos Rodriguez Quesada?”
“No. I know Felix but not Carlos”
“International Anticommunist Brigade/Interpen.”
“I have heard of it. That is all.”
“Gerald Patrick Hemming.”
“Howard Kenneth Davis?”
“Frank Sturgis, as a member of that organization?”
“Of the anticommunist Brigard? No, I didn’t know Sturgis was connected with it.”
“Roy Emery Hargraves?”
“Pedro Diaz Lanz, as a member?”
“Marcos Diaz Lanz, as a member?”
“I met Mike McLaney once at Joe’s Stone Crabs in Miami. He was then dating a girlfriend of a friend of mine. That is all. This was sometime in 1960.”
“Maz Gorman Gonzalez?”
“During the time period 1962 to 1965, where were you stationed specifically?”
“After Allen left, I joined Tracy Barnes’ new Domestic Operations Division, which should have been called the commercial operations division, and I worked for them in Washington until sometime in 1965, when we left for Spain under cover. I think the division had three different locations while I was with them.”
“What were the details of your undercover operation in Spain?”
“Very little. I spoke Spanish. I wanted to get out of Washington. I was looking to Spain as a retirement post. Helms thought it would be a good idea that I get out because my name had become included in the Library of Congress card system. I had written numerous books under pseudonyms and somebody made a mistake and put my true name down. Helms thought this was a bad idea. I thought it was a great idea to get to Spain. My specific purpose for the record — this is classified, isn’t it?”
“Okay — was to develop working relationships to the extent possible with people who would be in a successor government to Franco.”
“Have you ever heard of AMLASH, a cryptonym?”
“Yes, but only when the Church revelations began.”
“Do you have any knowledge of the AMLASH operations, or AMLASH-1?”
“No. Let me interject this, if I may, that at the time I left the Bay of Pigs operation in the wake of the failure of the Bay of Pigs and joined Allen Dulles’ staff, it was principally to help Allen explain some of the things that went on that he hadn’t known before in his exalted position, and it was made abundantly clear to me in a very pleasant way that having been stained with the failure of the Bay of Pigs that I was to have nothing further to do with Cuban operations, and that it would be probably a good many years before I could expect reassignment to Latin America, if ever. [Shouldn’t that be “very unpleasant way”?]
“So my point is, from 1961 on, I had no current knowledge of anything that was going on in Latin America, no personal knowledge.”
“Did you know Rolando Cubela?”
“Did you ever come into contact with AMLASH-1 or other persons connected with the AMLASH operation while you were stationed in Spain?”
“Were you ever stationed in France?”
“Did you ever participate in or have any knowledge of CIA assassination conspiracies against Castro which were directed from Spain during the period 1964 to 1967?”
“Were you in Spain working for the agency during the period 1964 to 1967?”
“I think it was summer of 1965 to summer of 1966, to the best of my recollection.”
“A Senate investigation determined that your close friend, Manuel Artime, was involved in Castro assassination plans in Spain during the period 1964 to 1967. Were you in contact with him in Spain at that time?”
“Did you have any knowledge of these plans?”
“Not at that time; no.”
“When did you first find out about these plans?”
“When the Church Committee began to expose them.”
“Is it your testimony that Artime never talked to you about these plans?”
“That is correct, at any time.”
“Does the name Terrence Crabanan mean anything to you?”
“No, I don’t know him.”
“Who were your superiors during the time you were working for the CIA in Spain?”
“Mr. Thomas Karamessines”
“Did he specifically give you your assignments?”
“Are you aware of the allegation that the CIA conducted a substantial investigation during 1974 and 1975 to determine what you were doing in Spain during that period and reportedly concluded it was not possible to determine your assignment there?”
“No, I wasn’t. All they had to do was ask Tom Karamessines. He was the Deputy Director of Plans. They must have asked the wrong man. Helms certainly knew.”
“Did you know George Robreno, in Spain?”
“Did you know El Loco?”
“Did you know El Mago?”
“No. These are all street names, I gather, sinister people.”
“Do you think the agency would have full records of what your duties in Spain were during this period?”
“It might be in a private file called a bigot file maintained by Karamessines.”
“Why do you think the records might be in that type of file?”
“Because my assignment was a bigot assignment.”
“Why was it a bigot assignment?”
“Because of the high sensitivity. I was going over to deal with people who were to be sucessor to the Franco government. That was a highly sensitive thing.”
“Did your functions include anything besides which you have stated?”
They asked him how he was paid. Hunt replied through a commercial bank in New York. They go into questions of what kind of life insurance policies Hunt had, who he took them out from, meaning what companies, and under what names.
“Do you know whether the AMLASH operation was ever subject to security problems or counterintelligence threats relating to the Spanish intelligence services?”
“I had no knowledge.”
Hunt is asked about a number of individuals again.
“Clare Booth Luce?”
“I met Bill Pawley — he is now dead, by the way — during the early days of the Bay of Pigs operation. I was taken out there by the project chief — his home was on Star Island, to discuss the situation. Apparently Mr. Pawley had an “in” with the division chief and wanted to have people talk with him from time to time about what was going on. I may have covered that in my book.”
“How about Grayson Lynch?”
“Never heard of him until he made the appearance on the CBS documentary, CIA’s Secret Army.”
“Never heard of him.”
“I know he was killed; that is all.”
“Did you ever know him?”
They go back to insurance policy questions, something about a policy Hunt had while in Spain. And have an off the record discussion.
“During the fall of 1960 and the Spring of 1961, did you have any dealings with Antonio Verona?”
“Antonio Verona? Yes. I dealt with Tony right up until the Bay of Pigs on almost a daily basis.”
Document #180-10131-10343 is a 34 page document. It is the deposition of J. Lee Rankin before the HSCA. It was taken on 8/17/78.
Mr. Goldsmith wanted to focus on the relationship between the Warren Commission and the CIA. He wanted to know if the agency’s concern over “sources and methods” effected the information they gave the commission. According to Rankin, no. They assumed that if there was a “sources and methods” concern that they would bring that to their attention and they would try to see if there was a way to overcome it.
Goldsmith asked, “…so long as you were getting the substance of the information involved the Commission was not particularly concerned with the source of the information?”
Rankin, “we would look at the information first and if there was some question about credibility or whether it was something that we could rely on, then we might want some verification but that didn’t occur as I remember. We didn’t ask for verification…we were introduced to some of their specialists in Soviet and Cuban matters and we thought they were giving their best.”
Goldsmith, “Did you ever feel there was a reluctance on the part of the agency to disclose sources and methods to the Commission?”
Rankin, “It never came up. I had always known that that was true with the FBI when I was with the Department of Justice and so I just assumed it, I guess, it never was discussed, and I assumed that it was with the FBI.” Rankin said that information touching upon sources and methods was generally written.
Goldsmith asked Rankin if he thought the agency provided information only in response to a request or would they provide whatever they came up with.
“We were assured that they would cooperate fully and give us everything that would have any bearing on the investigation. Now apparently they didn’t.”
Goldsmith, “So you were not working under the impression then that the agency’s responsibility was simply to respond to questions that were addressed to it by the Commission?”
Rankin, “Not at all and if anybody had told me that I would have insisted that the Commission communicate with the President and get a different arrangement because we might not ask the right questions and then we would not have the information and that would be absurd.”
Goldsmith then got into specific questions about sources and methods, “When if ever, did the agency tell the Commission about the photo surveillance operation that the agency had in effect in the Cuban and Soviet Embassy and Consulate in Mexico City.”
“I don’t recall anything about that.”
“So you don’t recall ever being informed about the surveillance operations in Mexico City, the photo surveillance operations?”
“Not photo surveillance.”
Goldsmith then states for the record that he and Mr. Coleman and other staff members went to Mexico City and did see the take from the photo surveillance project. There is then this sentence that I don’t understand, “That was in April of 1964 and actually I was concerned at this point with whether the Commission had been appraised of that prior to that time.”
What was in April of 1964? Obviously not when HSCA personnel visited Mexico City. Is April of 1964 when the Commission was supposed to have been shown these photographs?
Anyway, Rankin responds, “No, I am not aware of it before that either.”
Goldsmith then refers to the photograph we have all seen of the “mystery man” the CIA said was Lee Harvey Oswald which became CE 237 (Volume 16 p. 638) in the context of it being shown to Marguerite Oswald by the FBI shortly after the assassination and her claim that it showed Jack Ruby. That photograph had been provided to the FBI by the CIA. Goldsmith asked Rankin if they, the Warren Commission had any trouble in obtaining an explanation from the agency as to the source of that photograph.
“Yes, I do. I don’t remember their response but I remember there was some problem about getting it.”
Goldsmith then shows Rankin two CIA documents. These have CIA security numbers 2221 and 2222. The first one is a memo written by Mr. Coleman. As of March 26, 1964 he was not satisfied with the explanation that the agency had provided concerning the photograph. That explanation is stated in CIA document #3259, a memo dated 23 March 1964.
Rankin now stated that this did refresh his memory but did not explain the discrepancy. Goldsmith agreed and pressed on asking if the Commission ever did receive an explanation on how the photograph was obtained and who the individual was.
“I don’t recall that they ever got any adequate explanation of it.
“I always thought this question of these photographs had not been supplied to this agency by November 22, 1963 was suspect.”
Goldsmith, “Did any members of the Warren Commission or its staff have an opportunity to review the cable traffic that was generated from Mexico City station to CIA headquarters and from CIA headquarters to Mexico City station pertaining to the Oswald case?” (A fascinating and still unfolding story, to date best summarized in John M. Newman’s “Oswald and the CIA” and if you don’t have this book, SHAME ON YOU!)
“I don’t recall that. Maybe you can refresh my memory if there is anything on that.”
“I am unable to refresh your memory because the information is not available to me.”
Fortunately, we can see these documents, and aren’t they fascinating?
Rankin comments on CIA document 3295 that he was always disturbed by these changes in names and how that could be noticed to anybody that they were sending that out to and that sticks in my mind now.
I wonder if that is a comment on Lee Harvey Oswald versus Lee Henry Oswald.
Goldsmith then moves onto the subject of CIA No. 177, a cable dated October 9, 1963 from the Mexico City station to CIA headquarters. In paragraph two the source indicated is LIEMPTY which refers to the photographic surveillance. He asks if Rankin has ever seen it before. Rankin responds negatively. Goldsmith asks Rankin if he was aware that the photograph Marguerite was shown that she thought depicted Jack Ruby but does not depict Jack Ruby was the same photograph reported in paragraph two of this cable, in other words, “were you aware that not only had the agency reported a contact by Oswald in Mexico City but that it at least at some time, the agency, had a photograph that it thought pertained to Oswald?”
“No, I was not.”
“Do you think that the agency should have made this information available?”
“Of course, It looks as though they were disturbed about what it might reveal about their knowledge and their failure to do something that might have prevented this.”
“Now this cable makes no reference to Oswald’s contact with the Cuban embassy and consulate in Mexico City.”
“That probably is a different wire tap.”
Again, I refer people to John Newman’s “Oswald and the CIA”. There is a large hole in Oswald’s story and this centers around his Cuban escapades. I would also refer people to the videotape of A.S.K. `94 “Newly Released Information”, John’s presentation on that book, which he called “the smoking file”. He emphasized over and over that the CIA deliberately lied about their knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald being in the Cuban consulate.
We now know for a fact that they have been lying about Lee Harvey Oswald and his activities in the Cuban consulate in Mexico City in the summer of 1963. This can be seen by their deletion of LHO being in the Cuban consulate in their own cables. They said they didn’t know that Oswald was in the Cuban consulate until after the assassination. A position they testified to the Warren Commission about and have held onto for over 30 years.
On page 777 of the Warren Commission Report it states,
“VISIT TO THE RUSSIAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY”
In October 1963, the Passport Office of the State Department received a report from the Central Intelligence Agency that Oswald had visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.290 The report said nothing about Oswald’s having visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, a fact which was not known until after the assassination.
It’s a lie. They knew immediately that Oswald was in the Cuban Consulate. John Newman got none other than Richard Helms to admit that yes the CIA has lied about this. Helms said they lied to protect their “sources and methods”
Helms wrote a memo to the Warren Commission on March 12 1964, where he meets with J. Lee Rankin, Chief Counsel of the Warren Commission, wherein he states that the reason why the information on Lee Harvey Oswald was transmitted to CIA headquarters in the first place “was the combination of visits to both Cuban and Soviet embassies which caused the Mexico City station to report this to headquarters”.
Now we are told, after the assassination, that yes, Lee Harvey Oswald was in the Soviet and Cuban embassies trying to get a visa to go first to Havana, Cuba, then to Moscow. This is suspect from the beginning as Lee had no trouble getting to Moscow in 1959 and had little trouble or none with visas and had no reason to personally visit embassies anywhere. So what’s he really doing there?
We are told not to ask too much about this as the CIA has telephone intercepts and photographic surveillance of Oswald going into the Soviet and Cuban embassies making threats to kill JFK. The Soviet embassy is played up here as Oswald supposedly meets with a KGB agent Kostikov, from “Department 13”, who is supposedly the KGB officer in charge of assassinations in the Western Hemisphere. The Warren Commission is told that if that gets out it’s World War III.
So, since we the CIA think Oswald did the assassination alone, so do you.
Problem, there is no photograph known to exist of Lee Harvey Oswald visiting either compound. In fact, they identified someone who clearly is not Oswald as Oswald. This is CE 287, the “mystery man” unidentified to this day, who Marguerite Oswald thought was Jack Ruby. The CIA said their cameras broke down. It has been established, in the HSCA’s “Lopez report” and Newman’s “Oswald and the CIA” that they had more than one camera position and several opportunities over several days to photograph Oswald, if it was Oswald.
Another problem is the telephone intercept. We have several documents stating that the tape was listened to, after the assassination, by FBI agents Fain and Hosty,
J. Edgar Hoover, and others, all saying it’s not Oswald, then a few days later they say the tape was destroyed prior to the assassination.
The Assassination Records Review Board is looking for a copy of that telephone intercept tape.
Yet, another problem is that the CIA is telling it’s subordinate station in Mexico City, who are requesting information on Lee Harvey Oswald, that as of October 10, 1963 the latest information that CIA headquarters has is a State Department report dated May, 1962.
HUH? WHAT?? Can’t be. Lee Harvey Oswald is still in Russia in May, 1962. Oswald, “the defector”, has come back to the U.S., been in the newspapers, on TV and radio, had a scuffle on the streets of New Orleans handing out pro Castro leaflets, was arrested, demanded and got an interview with an FBI agent while in a New Orleans jail, had a radio debate with Carlos Bringuier, yet the CIA is supposedly ignorant of all of this? Not Hardly.
We now have CIA record and routing sheets, which the HSCA was not allowed to see, that proves that the CIA had lots of documents, most from the FBI detailing information on Oswald after May of 1962. These same routing sheets have the same names as those who signed off on this false story of “latest information…”. The CIA only lied to their own subordinate agency in Mexico City. A similar document sent to the FBI, State Department and the Office of Naval Intelligence does not have this line about “latest information”. Good thing as those agencies would certainly know that the CIA has been reading reports on Oswald later than May of `62 because they have been writing and sharing them with the CIA.
So what’s going on? Well, if you remove these particular 18 months from Oswald’s life you delete all of his Cuban escapades. There is some deception going on with the name Lee Harvey Oswald, the person named Lee Harvey Oswald, files with the name Lee Harvey Oswald, and files with the name Lee Henry Oswald, and a threat to kill the President of the United States in the summer of 1963 in Mexico City.
Whether it really is Lee Harvey Oswald, an impostor, or both, someone is using the name Lee Harvey Oswald.
Lee Harvey Oswald was involved in some kind of deception operation for the CIA months before the assassination of the President.
Goldsmith, asked “assuming that the agency in Mexico City had processed the information that showed that Oswald had been in contact with the Cuban embassy during his stay in Mexico City, do you think that information should have been made available immediately to agency headquarters?”
Rankin, “Yes, and also to the Commission.”
Well the agency did know, immediately, in addition to the above referred to memorandum Helms wrote to Rankin there is a memorandum from George T. Kalaris, Chief of the Counter Intelligence Staff to the Deputy Director for Operations on Sept. 18, 1975 about what the agency knew about Oswald’s 201 file, in that file “There is also a memorandum dated 16 October 1963 from Win Scott COS Mexico City to the United States Ambassador there concerning Oswald’s visit to Mexico City and to the Soviet Embassy there in late September-early October 1963. Subsequently there were several Mexico City cables in October 1963 also concerned with Oswald’s visit to Mexico City, as well as his visits to the Soviet and Cuban embassies.” -document reproduced on p. 462 “Oswald and the CIA”.
There is another document that proves that the CIA knew that Oswald was in the Cuban consulate and that the agency knew it immediately. This is page 268 of Winston Scott’s manuscript, reproduced on p. 514 of “Oswald and the CIA”. “Every piece of information concerning Lee Harvey Oswald was reported immediately after it was received to: U.S. Ambassador Thomas C. Mann, by memorandum; the FBI Chief in Mexico, by memorandum; and to headquarters by cable.” On p. 268-9 of Scott’s manuscript it continues, “and included in every one of these reports was the conversation Oswald had, so far as it was known. These reports were made on all his contacts with both the Cuban consulate and with the Soviets.”
John Newman calls this the dream team, the Station Chief, the head of CounterIntelligence and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency all saying “we knew” right away that Lee Harvey Oswald was in the Cuban consulate.
This was a busy time for the CIA, who were running many anti-Cuban operations, all beginning with the digraph AM/ (something), for example AM/LASH who was Rolando Cuebela, a close associate of Castro recruited by the Agency who was supposed to murder Castro with a poison pen. We now know of at least 115 AM operations all being run out of the Cuban consulate in Mexico City through our agents inside it.
Now look at the Elden Henson information in Chapter 18 of “Oswald and the CIA”. The CIA was very successfully impersonating people down there.
Now look at the transcripts of the telephone intercepts. They’ve been released. I’ve reviewed them in previous ARRB batch reviews.
Oswald wants to go back to Russia. Why? John Newman asks, “Isn’t that odd to you? Through Mexico and Cuba?! The guy made it in real fast the first time through Helsinki ( Finland ). Anyway, he’s down there and he wants a transit visa through Mexico to Cuba. He doesn’t have pictures of himself. So Sylvia Duran, the Cuban consulate secretary tells him where to go get them done. He goes and gets them. He’s back a second time, fills out the forms in duplicate, signs them. Still no visa. Why? He doesn’t have the Soviet visa, get that then he can have the transit visa. He leaves again, goes to the Soviet consulate. Sorry kid you goofed. You should have done that back in the States. It takes four months if you want to do that here. Oswald goes back, for the third time on (Sept. 27, 1963) Friday afternoon, to the Cuban consulate, saying no problem they’ve approved my visa. He’s lying. Sylvia Duran picks up the phone and checks with the Soviet consulate and, of course there’s been no approval.”
The CIA transcribed all of this. We now have it. There are actually two conversations and they are legitimate. Everything matches the transcript. Everything matches Sylvia Duran’s later testimony. The transcriber, who we now learn is not a CIA person at all but a Mexican with the now defunct Mexican secret police, the DFS, defunct because the head of the DFS was involved in the murder of a DEA agent, Ricky Camerana, (did I get that name right?) anyway, he has no problem recognizing Sylvia Duran’s voice. He states, “The person speaking is Sylvia Duran.” Well, he should recognize her, he listens to her everyday.
Duran states Oswald never returned. That was it.
Ah, but the fun is just beginning with the transcripts.
Oswald makes another attempt to get the Soviet visa on Saturday, Sept. 28. But all the consulates are closed on Saturday and the Russians play serious combat volleyball on Saturday. However, three Soviet guys are there and Oswald gets in. Now Oswald places a gun on the table saying this is what I have to do to protect myself against the FBI and repeats his “Sad Sack” tale trying to get a visa. I also recommend Oleg Nechiporenko’s book “Passport to Assassination” that recounts this story. Nechiporenko was a KGB Col. in the Soviet Embassy. They say do you want to fill out the forms or what? No, he says. He’s finished.
They never see him again. It’s 10:00 A.M. Saturday morning but the fun and games continue. Not an hour later, the phone rings, according to a CIA surveillance, it’s Oswald and Duran. He’s changed his mind. Now he does want to fill out the forms.
These transcripts for after 10:00 a.m. Saturday September 28, 1963 are very odd. They begin with “the woman speaking is later identified as Sylvia Duran”, but it’s the same transcriber who had no trouble identifying Duran the day before. What? He loses his mind in a day? And what does this Duran say? “There’s a man here.” Note, not Oswald is here, but “a man”, a man who says he’s been to the Soviet consulate.
This doesn’t work! She knows he’s been to the Soviet consulate! She knows who he is. He was there before her three times yesterday being a real pain in the ass and lying to her! She’s called the Soviet consulate and talked to Kostikov about him just the day before. If you read the transcript it is readily apparent, line by line, that both Duran and Oswald are being impersonated! These impersonators on the outside do not know what has been going on inside the consulates the day before. They did not have access to the Friday transcript until Monday as stated in the Lopez report.
Once you realize that these are impersonators who don’t know what happened the day before and are just then figuring it out while they are impersonating Oswald and Duran and trying to keep the conversation going it becomes obvious what they are doing.
At the Rio conference the Cuban’s reached the same conclusion.
If Oswald and Duran are really impersonating themselves in some kind of intelligence game, then the reaction of everybody else is very strange.
In the videotape of John’s presentation at the COPA `95 conference John then shows a part of a transcript of a conversation between new President Lyndon Johnson and FBI director, J. Edgar Hoover. This can be seen on page 520 of “Oswald and the CIA”. This is the morning after the assassination. LBJ asks, “Have you established any more about the visit to the Soviet embassy in Mexico in September?” John finds it odd that Johnson asks this question this early. Hoover responds, “No, that’s one angle that’s very confusing for this reason. We have up here the tape…”
Another cover story by the CIA is that we erased the tape before the assassination. So, if anyone wants to investigate this they can say sorry we don’t have any tape.
Yet, Hoover says, “We have up here the tape..”. Hoover continued, “…and the photograph of the man that was at the Soviet Embassy, using Oswald’s name. That picture and the tape do not correspond to this man’s voice, nor to his appearance. In other words, it appears that there is a second person who was at the Soviet Embassy down there.”
John then showed an addendum to a footnote to the Lopez Report. John then showed an FBI memorandum from Hoover to the head of the Secret Service the morning after the assassination that special agents of this Bureau who have spoken with Oswald (Hosty and Fain) have listened to the tape. It wasn’t Oswald on the tape.
John then showed another FBI memorandum from Belmont to Tolson. This again is the morning after the assassination. Dallas agents listened to the tape, from the Cuban Embassy to the Soviet Embassy. This conversation is different than the Oct 1 conversation. This taped conversation occurs on Saturday, October 5, 1963 at about 11AM. Now we have two tapes, two different conversations This is not Oswald’s voice either.
The FBI changed its story a few days later to say oops, we never listened to any tape. (Please see my 3rd ARRB batch review for more.)
Goldsmith and Rankin are trying to figure this out in 1978. It is fascinating reading that they suspect they were and are being lied to. Goldsmith states that the record is the CIA did not know that Oswald was in the Cuban consulate until after the assassination. He admits that it is an issue with the HSCA as to when that information had been obtained and processed.
Rankin, noting the discrepency in the two 10 October 1963 cables coments, “He is too tall.”
Goldsmith, “And the age is not the same either.”
“Do you recall whether the agency ever gave a satisfactory explanation regarding this individual?”
“No, I don’t.”
Goldsmith then shows Rankin the October 10, 1963 cable that gives the correct description of Oswald, reproduced on p.512 of “Oswald and the CIA”. Asked if he has ever seen it before Rankin responds. “No, I’m quite sure I have not.” Goldsmith notes to Rankin that in this cable, the one with the correct description of Oswald, they give an incorrect middle name, Lee Henry Oswald. He then shows Rankin the other October 10, 1963 cable, reproduce on p. 513 of “Oswald and the CIA”. This is CIA No. 2140. This one was sent to the intelligence communities. Rankin notes the misdescription of Oswald. Goldsmith points out that the cable to the Mexico City station with the correct description went out earlier than the one to the intelligence communities, a matter of a few hours.
Goldsmith, “Were you ever made aware of these conflicting descriptions of Oswald in the agency’s cable traffic?”
“Not that I can recall.”
“Well, do you think that if you had been made aware of these conflicts that you would remember it?”
“Yes, I would have asked somebody to check on it. I think they are very curious.
It looks like either somebody quite incompetent or deliberate.”
Goldsmith then points out that Oswald visited the Soviet and Cuban embassies several times over a two day period. And that the CIA had photographic surveillance in effect at both locations, isn’t it “unusual that the agency did not obtain a photograph of Oswald?” The agency’s position is that no photograph of Oswald was ever obtained. Goldsmith asked Rankin if that was an issue in 1964. He got a negative response.
Goldsmith then inquires about the telephone taps asking if Rankin knew about them. Rankin, “Not that I recall.”
Goldsmith then points out to Rankin in CIA No. 2007, 2008, a memo dated January 31, 1964 from Coleman to Slawson which summarizes Oswald’s contact with the Soviet embassy that it makes no mention of telephonic surveillance. Goldsmith also points out to Rankin in CIA 1980 and 1981 another memo from Coleman to Slawson dated April 1, 1964 that there is no mention of photographic surveillance. By deleting where the information came from in this protect the sources and methods game it has the effect of implying that someone actually witnessed Oswald making these visits which strengthens the idea that it really is Oswald. “The point I am trying to make here is that by virtue of the agency not informing the Commission about the telephonic surveillance operation, here at least is one example as late as April of 1964 where the Commission staff members may have been under the misimpression that Oswald had at one time been seen at the embassy when actually the contact was a telephonic contact.”
Goldsmith then asks about the tape. “Was the agency ever asked whether it had obtained and had in existence after the assassination a tape recording of Oswald’s voice?”
“I don’t recall.”
Goldsmith then asks Rankin to look at CIA doc 204 and 205, a cable that starts on 204, dated 23 November 1963. The cable references Oswald’s contact with the Soviet embassy on 1 October 1963 as well as to an earlier contact on September 28, 1963. Paragraph 4 is of interest to Goldsmith because the transcriber states that it was Oswald in both conversations. He asks Rankin if he ever saw it or any staff member saw it, the answer is I don’t know.
“Does paragraph 4 suggest to you that at least on November 23 the agency still had in existence a tape recording of Oswald’s voice?”
Rankin responds rather obtusely, “Well, it is clear that someone or this person made a comparison of some kind of a transcription. Now whether they still had it or whether it was, I can’t tell from the document.”
No, its a tape, not a transcription. How do you compare a voice from a transcript? For a voice you need the sound of the voice, you need the tape.
Goldsmith asks, “Let me ask you this question then. Had this cable been shown to the Warren Commission or its staff instead of simply summarizing the information contained in the cable, would the Commission have asked the CIA to make available any existing transcripts of Oswald’s voice?”
Again, that should say tape, not transcript.
Goldsmith then goes into the Louis Calderon conversation that seems to imply Cuban intelligence had advance knowledge of the assassination, CIA No. 1950-54, a document prepared by Raymond Rocca in 1975. This transcript was fiddled with as well to make the whole assassination look like, as Peter Dale Scott states, a “Phase One” story of a Communist conspiracy. The Cubans and the Soviets know because Oswald was in both their embassies. He met with Kostikov in the Soviet Embassy and threatened to kill JFK in the Cuban embassy.
Goldsmith asks if Calderon was ever investigated as being involved in the assassination. A red herring caused by manipulation of the transcript. Calderon seems to joke, “Yes, of course. I knew it almost before Kennedy.” Rankin seems to indicate that this transcript was made available to the Commission on p. 20 then states that it should have been supplied to the Commission on p. 21
Goldsmith moves onto CIA No. 3178 which is a memo dated April 22, 1964 to Slawson. Apparently the Commission staffers were not given full information about the surveillance and were still under a misimpression about the Oswald in Mexico City. This is a point Goldsmith made earlier.
“The point that I would be trying to make here is that the fact that the staff was not fully informed about the nature and extent of the surveillance operations seems to have had an impact upon the staff’s perception of what Oswald did during his Mexico City trip. Would you agree with that statement?”
Rankin, “Yes, I think that is correct.”
Goldsmith asks Rankin if he had any comment on the quality of the information the CIA was giving to the Warren Commission. Rankin responds that they were given what the agency thought the Commission should have. Goldsmith then asks, “In light of what you have seen, are you satisfied with what you were given?”
Goldsmith then refers to a document about Alvarado Ugarte wherein he (Alvarado) mentions receiving money from someone. Goldsmith thought that was worth investigating and Rankin agreed.
Goldsmith asks how did the Commission investigate if Oswald was a an agent of the FBI or the CIA?
“My recollection was that we had a claim made that Oswald was an agent for the FBI and that part of the claim was that his name would not appear in the FBI files but he would have been assigned a number and that it is only by checking out those numbers that we could determine whether or not he had ever been an agent of the FBI as I recall that if they examined each agent that was under the cover of a number that they would be uncovering all of these agents that they had under a number system and it would be revealing it to the Commission and the staff and that it would be very damaging to the security and the work of the FBI and that J. Edgar Hoover would be willing to swear under oath that Oswald had never been an FBI agent and could come before the Commission and do that rather than to have all of these agents uncovered by this action, and so the Commission decided to accept that.”
“What about the CIA?”
“My recollection there is that there was an assurance from them that he was never a CIA agent.
“In retrospect do you think that that was the appropriate and best manner for dealing with this issue?”
“No. It is obvious that in light of what has happened that you could not rely on those assurances. I don’t know about Mr. McCone, whether there is anything in the record that would show that he ever misrepresented anything that is in the record of the Congress’ committees, but certainly it is evident that you could not rely on Mr. Hoover’s word.”
Goldsmith then inquires about Lee Harvey Oswald’s tax records, if there might be a record in there about Oswald having been given money from either the FBI or the CIA. Rankin was unsure of how that was handled but fairly sure nothing of that importance was revealed.
Goldsmith then rattles off the facts that critics of the Warren Commission point to to show that Oswald had a connection with the intelligence community.
1.) No commercial air traffic for Oswald to have traveled from England to Helsinki at the time that he did.
2.) The ease with which Oswald appeared to have received his discharge from the military.
3.) The ease and speed with which he received his visa to enter the Soviet Union. (in 1959 and without anything to do with Mexico or Cuba!)
4.) The relative ease with which U.S. officials in Moscow and in the States permitted Oswald to return to America after his stay in the Soviet Union.
“What weight, if any, should be given to these factors, do you think, in evaluating whether Oswald was an agent, source of information, or employee of any American intelligence agency?”
Rankin tries to take them individually. The record states that Oswald checked into his hotel in downtown Helsinki on October 10th at midnight. Rankin thinks that since there is no record Oswald could have taken a flight on October 9th or earlier and thus eliminating this idea that he took a flight that arrived in Helsinki at 11:33 p.m. and makes it to the hotel to check in at midnight, accomplishing this impossible feat in 27 minutes. There is a CIA document that states that if Oswald arrived at 11:33 p.m. he could not possibly have arrived at the hotel in 27 minutes. Well since it becomes October 10th at midnight, Oswald did take a flight on October 9th, but Rankin thinks Oswald could have taken an earlier flight on October 9th or even a day or more earlier.
Goldsmith then shows Rankin CIA No. 2137 which was addressed to Rankin dated July 1, 1964 which addresses the issue. It was never resolved.
On the second point Rankin thinks there is ample evidence that the Marines were happy to get rid of him.
On the mater of the visa to enter the Soviet Union Rankin doesn’t think that was a problem for defectors. What nonsense! You say hi I’d like to defect and they open the doors? C’mon!
Goldsmith emphasizes that Oswald got his visa within a mater of days, commenting on that being unusual.
“Well, what I thought was that the fact he was a defector and had close ties with Helsinki and the Soviets and he indicated that he had special information for their benefit like he did, that they would treat it differently than the ordinary visa.”
Oswald had close ties with Helsinki? What’s that all about? Did Oswald announce his desire to defect prior to October 31, 1959 when he so stated in the American Embassy in Moscow?
Goldsmith then goes to the issue of Oswald getting a passport in 1963 despite his earlier attempt to defect within 24 hours of applying for one.
“Well, I never could understand why our intelligence agencies didn’t flag more about Oswald but I never found anything that was given to the Commission that indicated that they were trying to favor him in any way.”
Getting a passport within 24 hours? A returned ex-Marine would be defector? Favoritism? Of course, not. Don’t be silly.
The last question was on Oswald’s easy return.
“Well, I never had any adequate explanation of that. It seemed like the information we were able to obtain in the Commission showed that it was not given any real thought by any part of the government despite the record.
Rankin wanted to ask one question. Did the committee find any credible evidence of a conspiracy? Goldsmith doesn’t answer citing HSCA rules and suggests Rankin ask that of Chairman Louis Stokes or Chief Counsel Blakey. Rankin thinks that they don’t have any such evidence because it would have leaked to the media.