

September 2016

Context for Readers of the Attached CIA Draft Volume

Between 1979 and 1984, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) staff historian Jack Pfeiffer prepared five volumes of the Agency's *Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation*. The titles of the first four volumes were *Air Operations, March 1960-April 1961*; *Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy*; *Evolution of CIA's Anti-Castro Policies, 1951-January 1961*; and *The Taylor Committee Investigation of the Bay of Pigs*. All have been declassified and are available to the public on CIA's website in the electronic reading room. Pfeiffer also wrote a draft fifth volume, *CIA's Internal Investigation of the Bay of Pigs*, being released today, which the CIA Chief Historian rejected as inadequate at the time, instructing Pfeiffer to make substantial revisions. Pfeiffer did not complete those revisions before retiring in 1984.

Unlike his four other histories, this fifth draft volume was not publishable in its present form, in the judgment of CIA Chief Historians as well as other reviewers, because of serious shortcomings in scholarship, its polemical tone, and its failure to add significantly to an understanding of the controversy over the Bay of Pigs operation—much of which has now been discussed in open source histories and memoirs. CIA's Chief Historians have assessed that addressing those deficiencies would have required much more effort than the draft volume's potential value would justify. Consequently, it remains an unfinished and unpublished draft.

In the attached draft volume, Pfeiffer took very strong issue with the findings of the CIA Inspector General, Lyman Kirkpatrick, who blamed the Bay of Pigs debacle on the Agency task force in charge of an operation that Kirkpatrick assessed was misconceived, mismanaged, and bound to fail from the outset. Kirkpatrick's report evoked a fervent defense from CIA's operations directorate (both of those documents have been declassified and are on CIA's website in the electronic reading room), and Pfeiffer in large part accepted the operations directorate's viewpoint. He contended that Kirkpatrick, for a variety of motives, conducted his inquiry from the start with the purpose of laying responsibility for the Bay of Pigs fiasco on the officers who planned and ran the operation and on two Agency leaders, Deputy Director for Plans Richard Bissell and DCI Allen Dulles.

We are releasing this draft volume today because recent 2016 changes in the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requires us to release some drafts that are responsive to FOIA requests if they are more than 25 years old.

David S. Robarge
CIA Chief Historian, 2005 - present

~~TOP SECRET~~

This file contains CIA Historian Jack Pfeiffer's unpublished "Volume V" of his Bay of Pigs history, "CIA's Internal Investigation of the Bay of Pigs."

I have added this cover sheet to indicate that the document must be controlled as TOP SECRET because Appendices B, C, & D are marked TS.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DRAFT

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Access Controlled by
CIA History Staff

OFFICIAL HISTORY
OF THE
BAY OF PIGS OPERATION

DRAFT Volume V

CIA's Internal Investigation of the Bay of Pigs

Jack B. Pfeiffer

Submitted to the
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency

18 April 1984



(b)(3)

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~~SECRET~~

NOTE: The following draft history has three TOP SECRET appendices (B, C, & D) that are handled separately from this SECRET manuscript:

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Volume V

CIA's Internal Investigation of the Bay of Pigs

Chapter 1

Introduction

Even as the search for survivors of the failed invasion at Playa Giron was underway, two investigations of the causes for the failure at the Bay of Pigs were being authorized. One investigation was called for by President Kennedy and was directed by General Maxwell Taylor. The Cuban Study Group (CSG), as Taylor's committee was known, conducted its investigations and presented its findings to the President within a period of roughly two months (20 April-13 June 1961). By the end of 1961, the general tenor of the committee's findings were public knowledge, and, as noted in the preceding volume in this series,* by the early 1980's, the bulk of the Taylor report, including the testimony of witnesses who appeared before the committee had been declassified for public release.**

* Pfeiffer, Jack, B., The Taylor Committee Investigation of the Bay of Pigs (Draft), 22 Nov 83.

** Operation Zapata (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, Inc., 1981).

In contrast to the Taylor Committee Report, the work of the second official investigation of the Bay of Pigs operation--the investigation which DCI Allen Dulles directed CIA's Inspector General, Lyman Kirkpatrick, to conduct--continues to be regarded by CIA as "classified and sensitive." Consequently requests for declassification and/or sanitization of the Inspector General's report consistently have been denied. Information about the report--including an official history of the Inspector General's office by a former member of the IG staff--has been markedly deficient in substance and factually in error.* Paradoxically, however, Kirkpatrick's own overt publications, although obviously self-serving, provide the most useful source of unclassified information available at the present time.**

Although it was initiated about the same time as the Taylor Committee investigation--and despite the fact that it carried a date of October 1961--the Inspector General's "Survey of the Cuban Operation" was not forwarded until 20 November 1961. Based on their interviews with Kirkpatrick himself, the expectation of the key

* Greer, Kenneth E., The Office of the Inspector General, January 1952-December 1971 (October 1973, DCI-7).

** Kirkpatrick, Lyman: The Real CIA (New York: MacMillan, 1968) and "Paramilitary Case Study: The Bay of Pigs," Naval War College Review, Nov-Dec 1972. Kirkpatrick was appointed Inspector General 1 April 1953 and served in that capacity until appointed Executive Director of CIA, 10 April 1962. On 18 Nov 1963 the offices of the Executive Director and Comptroller were combined and Kirkpatrick was appointed Executive Director Comptroller on 26 November 1963. He resigned from CIA 27 September 1965.

personnel involved in the Agency's anti-Castro project* was that the investigation would reveal that the failure was due to the breakdown of communications between the CIA and the DOD on one side and the White House--the President and his cohorts--on the other. The Inspector General's report, however, was a thinly veiled attempt to lay full blame for the failure on the Deputy Director for Plans, Richard M. Bissell, Jr. and, by his association with Bissell, on DCI Allen Dulles.

The internecine struggle which the IG's "Survey" prompted led to a formal response, "An Analysis of the Cuban Operation by the Deputy Director (Plans) Central Intelligence Agency." Completed 18 January 1962, the "Analysis" attempted a point by point refutation of the charges surfaced by the IG. In the end, John A. McCone--Allen Dulles's replacement as DCI and the initial recipient of Kirkpatrick's report (even prior to Mr. Dulles's retirement)--directed that the two TOP SECRET reports and several pertinent memorandums should be bound together so that readers would have both stories available.** McCone, pleading inexperience, refused to make any attempt to have the divergent views reconciled in order to present a single CIA position on the causes of the failure at the Bay of Pigs.

Since their completion, both volumes have been held very closely--even in-house. External requests for access to the reports

* Particularly Richard Bissell (DDP), Jake Esterline (Chief, Wh/4), Col. Jack Hawkins (Chief, WH/4/PM), and Richard Drain (COPS/WH/4).

** Dulles's date of resignation was 29 November 1961 and McCone was appointed and sworn in on that same date. Richard Bissell resigned 17 February 1962.

have caused and continue to cause great consternation at the highest levels in the Agency. After more than twenty years, it appears that fear of exposing the Agency's dirty linen, rather than any significant security information, is what prompts continued denial of requests for release of these records. Although this volume may do nothing to modify that position, hopefully it does put one of the nastiest internal power struggles into proper perspective for the Agency's own record. In the context of a recent CIA sponsored conference on "Ethics in the Profession of Intelligence" this episode could have provided a classic and practical case study.*

* This conference was held in May 1983.

Chapter 2

The Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation

A. Background

A previous volume on the Bay of Pigs operation discussed in detail the investigation which was conducted by General Maxwell Taylor's committee. Even as the first meeting of that committee was under way on 22 April 1961, it was reported that "Mr. Dulles tells us that the history of this operation [the Bay of Pigs] is in the course of preparation now by CIA." ^{1/} The investigation to which the Director of Central Intelligence referred was one which he had proposed on the morning of the meeting in question to CIA's Inspector General, Lyman Kirkpatrick. Kirkpatrick's diary of 22 April 1961 stated:

The DCI called me in to ask my recommendation on what action should be taken to cope with the Cuban disaster. I told him...that we [should] do an inspection of the operation at a later date. He agreed. ^{2/}

In the first commercial volume to be published by a CIA insider, Mr. Kirkpatrick made the following comment about that assignment:

Within the CIA, Allen Dulles directed me, as Inspector General, to do a complete review of the [Bay of Pigs] operation and its implementation. We were to stay out of national policy decisions, but to examine how well the Agency carried out its responsibilities. For the next several months, several of the staff went through every aspect of the operation, talked to nearly all of the Agency participants and reviewed every pertinent file. The report that was produced was a critical one dealing with operational matters and therefore one that should always remain classified. Rather than receiving it in the light in which it was produced, which was to insure that the same mistakes would not be repeated in the future, those that participated in the operation resented it and attacked it bitterly. ^{3/*}

The key phrase in the above quotation concerns "the light in which it was produced." This was the issue which would be raised by the Director of Central Intelligence, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, the Deputy Director for Plans, and the Assistant Deputy Director for Plans for Action in the almost immediate response which the Inspector General's survey generated. Because the IG's report has been held so closely, even within the confines of the Central Intelligence Agency, this chapter is intended to provide the reader with the details concerning the procedures which were followed in preparing the report; the format, findings, and sources which were used in the preparation of the report; an examination of the facts and opinions in the report; and, finally, some discussion regarding the question of intent of the Inspector General's report.

Although Kirkpatrick had indicated at the time of his 22 April meeting with Mr. Dulles that the inspection of the operation should begin "at a later date," this instruction was modified very soon thereafter when Kirkpatrick noted:

Talked with the DCI about the present problem regarding the Cuban operation. He directed that we immediately commence a thorough review of the operation and suggested that possibly we could give a preliminary report to General Maxwell Taylor before the Taylor report is submitted to the President. 4**

* There is nothing in Kirkpatrick's diary--nor is there other evidence--to indicate that he was asked or instructed to "stay out of national policy decisions." This remark would seem to have been made in reaction to bitter criticism of Kirkpatrick's report for its narrow focus.

** The instruction to do a "thorough review" would seem to belie Kirkpatrick's subsequent overt comment that the investigation was to "stay out of national policy decisions."

At this same session on 30 April 1961, the DCI apparently promised the Inspector General that he would have full access to the minutes of the Taylor Group meetings. 5/* On 1 May 1961 Kirkpatrick told his staff to begin their review, and by 4 May 1961, it was apparent, when Mr. Dulles suggested that perhaps Kirkpatrick's inspection should be delayed for a few days, that the Inspector General had the bit in his teeth and was forging rapidly ahead. He noted in his diary:

The DCI called about the Cuban Inspection. He said that he would provide me all the papers from the Taylor Committee. He said he thought that perhaps our inspection of it should be postponed for 10 days because the people were so busy preparing reports for the Taylor group. I told him that we were not bothering those people that were preparing reports but were trying to see the people that would be leaving very shortly. He agreed to this. 6

Kirkpatrick already had conversed with some of the principals of the Cuban Task Force, including Jake Esterline, Chief of the project, Richard Drain, Chief of Operations for the project, and Col. Jack Hawkins, Chief of the Paramilitary Staff. Esterline had asked Dick Drain to be the point of contact with the Kirkpatrick group. 7

* Giving Kirkpatrick access to the minutes of the Taylor committee meetings would appear to have been in contravention of General Taylor's desire to limit accessibility to those minutes to the immediate members of his committee. As noted in another volume, a copy of the daily testimony was to be provided to each of the four committee members for review and then returned to the Executive Secretary of the committee, Colonel Benjamin Tarwater. The Attorney General, Robert Kennedy also was in contravention of General Taylor's instructions for he retained copies of the papers which he received.

In addition to the assurance from the Director that he and his inspection team would have full access to both the minutes and the papers prepared for the Taylor Committee, the IG was given similar access to the records of WH/4, the Cuban Task Force. Dick Drain reported that the guarantee of such access to WH/4 records for the IG team was the quid pro quo he insisted on prior to accepting the job of being the point of contact with Kirkpatrick:

The one post mortem that I got involved in--I wasn't. Although I was standing by all the time, I was never called before Bobby Boy's [Robert Kennedy] little proctological group. But when Kirkpatrick got Dulles's permission to do an instant IG review of this [the Bay of Pigs Operation], Esterline, who was pretty damned well worn out at this point, turned to me and he said, "Well, here is one more service you can perform. You used to be an assistant to the IG, now you take these types on." I said, "Well, Jake, I am only going to take them on with this understanding--that if they're licensed to do this, then they are required to know all the facts. We're not holding anything back are we?" He said, "Hell no. What's done is done; but I ain't got time for them." 8/

The record reflects clearly that the documentary materials promised by both the Director and by the Chief of the Task Force were made available to Kirkpatrick and his inspectors; and, in addition, interviews or discussions were held with 125 individuals involved in the anti-Castro project. 9/* The team which was named by the Inspector General to review the documents and conduct the interviews consisted of three individuals:

William Gibson Dildine had entered on duty with CIA in March, 1952 and was a GS-14 at the time of the Inspector General's survey. He had served overseas from March 1953-July 1955, and as an ex-newspaper man, he was involved

* Between 11 and 13 July 1961, Kirkpatrick was furnished at least 124 of the documents which had been made available to the Taylor Committee.

in political and psychological activities related to the press in foreign areas. He also had served in the Operations School and had joined the Inspector General's Staff officially in August 1960. Subsequent to his tour with the Inspector General, he went overseas, continuing his career as a DDP officer. Prior to serving on the inspection team for the Bay of Pigs operations, Dildine had no experience in the Latin American area.

A second DDP careerist, also a GS-14 on the Inspector General's staff--and also without any Latin American experience or background--was Robert D. Shea. He was a trained lawyer, had served in the OSS, and had been overseas with the Agency [redacted]. Most of Shea's experience had been in liaison affairs.

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The third member of the inspection team was Robert B. Shaffer, a GS-15 and an OTR careerist whose only overseas experience had been one tour as a training officer in [redacted]. Shaffer was a Ph.D. in art history from Harvard University. Except for his stint on the Inspector General's staff, he had no Agency experience other than in the Office of Training.

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The highest praise which the author heard for the members of the Inspector General's team was that they were "poor." A more colorful description of the team members was provided by Dick Drain who had the closest continuing contact with the team members. An exchange of conversation with Drain went as follows:

Drain: Although I had worked for Kirk...a total time of three years and had then, and still have, a very high regard for him, I think Kirk got a little mixed up. I think Kirk was out to prove something as a result of this particular IG survey--which didn't characterize any survey I ever worked on. I don't know, but I think Kirk was trying to point blame at enough DDP people so that there would be different personnel involved later on.

Interviewer: Namely a new DDP named Kirkpatrick?

Drain: Yeh, yeh. That's a dirty thing to say, but I'll tell you what made me think so. He had talent on that IG staff, and he did not send that talent to us. He sent a couple of old farts that went to sleep in the middle of briefings; that didn't know their tails from third base; and they performed as though what they were doing wa a mere drill because, in point of fact, Mr. Kirkpatrick was going to write this report. I don't know, but that's the way it looked to me. I was pretty goddamned emotionally tied up and tired at this point, too. But I tried. I took those two old assholes with me...I forget....

Interviewer: Bob Shaffer and Dildine?

Drain: Yeh...No...not Gib...Gib was a good man....It was Shaffer and a guy even fuzzier than Shaffer.

Interviewer: I have forgotten his name [Bob Shea].

Drain: Hell, I would get from them their agenda--what they wanted for the next day, and I would line guys up in the project who were damned well wrung out at this time; and I would say, "O.K. we're going to get together in the conference room at 2:00 p.m. with these guys. If they want to ask questions about this matter, be prepared." By God, our good soldiers would be in there; and these guys would wander in a half hour late. We would start to brief them--and look over--one would be sound asleep and the other would be picking his nose. It was lousy performance. 11/*

* Comments in Kirkpatrick's diary indicate that Shea and Dildine were not necessarily the most congenial individuals to deal with. Kirkpatrick's relations with both dated back to 1959. 12/

B. The Inspector General's Survey

1. Format, Description, and Sources

The Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operations consists of 219 pages including the Table of Contents and five Annexes with a total of 57 pages. It also includes a two page Index and five Memorandums totalling eight pages. The Table of Contents to the report shows 15 major headings but fails to indicate the plethora of subheadings--many of which are no longer than a sentence or two--which appear in the text.

In a meeting with Jake Esterline, Chief/WH4 (the anti-Castro project) and Dick Drain, COPS/WH4, on 1 May 1961, Inspector General Kirkpatrick discussed the way in which he intended to conduct his survey. It was a most interesting conversation, particularly in view of the final product, and it went as follows:

K. Well, I know you guys have other things to do today, and, Jake, I think what we might do now is to just outline how we progress from here with this, with the minimum of stress and strain and burden on your people. Because I don't want to do what the Taylor Group is doing, because they apparently have a shortage of time and ask for a lot of papers prepared. We'd much rather see the papers that are already prepared. We will use three men on this, in addition to myself. Gib Dildine, I don't know whether you know him or not?

E. I gave him today our log of the Taylor papers with the single copy but I'm going to have those back tomorrow, because we have ten more papers to put in to Taylor.

K. You can get anything back anytime you want, we'll just buck them down. I'll try to break the Director's set away from him as soon as I can. Dildine is a DD/P man, and also has been in OTR for a while. Shaffer is the second one, he is former Deputy Director of Training, and Bob Shea is the third, he is also a DD/P man. The three of them will work with me. How is your space situation down there? Are you still sitting on each other's shoulders?

E. No. We can make room for them.

K. Can you give them a little room with a telephone and a file-cabinet so that we don't have to carry the papers up and down, if they are right down there in the building they will be closer to access. I'll try to come down as much as I can, so that you people won't have to come up here. I think one thing that might be very useful, if you agree, is to get it around that we are doing this, and anybody who wants to talk to us, can talk to us. So that if anybody really wants to unload and cry.

D. That would be very helpful. I, for example, have been bursting a gut to talk to this Taylor Group and it is becoming increasingly apparent to me that that is not going to happen. I don't want to talk to you anymore. I have said my say, but I'll bet there are a lot of people that would like to say something to somebody.

K. Let them say it to us, the odds are pretty good they are not going to get a chance to talk to the Taylor Group. I imagine Taylor will break off the engagement before this week is over. He is going to write his report and hand it to the President by the end of next week.

E. I understand it was due the 15th, but he wants to move it up.

K. Up, which way? Toward the end of June--I mean the beginning...

E. Beginning of May, closer than the 15th.

K. In other words, this week.

E. Yes.

K. Well, I did hear that he was under pressure to get it out. So I doubt if your people are going to have a lot of chance to talk to them, but I think they ought to have a free shot at us, and I particularly think that anybody returning to the military services who wants to talk should have the opportunity to talk to the IG people. Now, Jake, as I told you this morning over the phone, the way we'll handle this is that as we are working we will make the drafts available to you to read and go over. Not only for your help and suggestions and correction of factual errors, but also if you disagree with us, why say so. And when the report is written, according to your [our?] usual practice we'll give a copy to the Director and a copy to Cabell, one to Bissell and one to WH. I don't know yet, I don't know what the

Director's view is, the sensitivities, the political situation, as to whether we go outside this Agency and skirmish with the Department. 13/*

The report drew nine Conclusions and made ten Recommendations on the basis of the work which was done by the inspection team and the Inspector General himself. The manner in which the inspectors performed their task was described by one team member as follows:

He [Robert Shaffer] remembers the survey well because of the controversy it caused, and because it was his last assignment on the Inspection Staff. He recalls that Kirkpatrick did not follow the course of the survey closely and that the team did not function as a team. Each inspector went largely on his own way, with Shea concentrating on FI matters, Shaffer on PM, and Dildine on PP and the chronology of the operation. After the team members began writing their contributions to the report, the team met with Jacob Esterline, who was Chief of the Cuban Task Force, and with others, whose names Shaffer does not now remember, for a roundtable discussion of the operation. Each inspector then completed his portion of the report with little consultation with the other team members. Dildine assembled the contributions into a draft report, which was reviewed by Deputy Inspector General David McLean from the sole standpoint of any minor editing that might be required. It then went to Kirkpatrick, who apparently approved it virtually as submitted. Shaffer recalls that there was no rewriting at all. He also remembers that Kirkpatrick directed the team members to destroy all of their working papers relating to the survey because of the report's sensitivity. 14**

* K-Kirkpatrick, E-Esterline, D-Drain. Writer's emphasis.

** Writer's emphasis. Based on Kirkpatrick's diary, Shaffer's suggestion that the IG team members were going it alone is in error. Specific meetings with Dildine and/or Shea are noted for the following dates: 1 May, 11 July, 26 July, 30 August, and 10 October 1961; and meetings were held with the IG team on 2 May (two meetings), 7 July, and 17 July 1961. Also, there is no evidence to support Shaffer's reference to a "roundtable discussion" with Esterline and other members of WH/4.

Kenneth E. Greer, the author who reported on the interview with Shaffer, also made the following comment about the documentary evidence for the IG report:

An IG survey team customarily assembles a considerable volume of paper in the course of a survey consisting of documents and of notes and memorandums of interview[s]. When the report of survey is completed and the response is in and is accepted, the backup material is disposed of. Some of it is destroyed, and some of it is returned to the suppliers. Those documents that are felt should be retained for record purposes are filed in what is commonly referred to as "the green folder" (because it is a green pressboard binder), which is permanently retained with the report of survey. Unfortunately for the historian, Kirkpatrick's practice was to strip the green folder when the file was retired to Records Center. The green folder on the Cuban operation contains two sheets of paper, one listing the names of the team members and of the typists and the other being a brief transmittal memorandum requesting the DDP's comments on the report. A review of Kirkpatrick's diary failed to find any entries relating to this survey between the date the survey began and the date the report was submitted. 15/*

In June 1976, approximately three years after publication of the above quotation, Don Chamberlain, then Inspector General, and Scott Breckenridge of the Inspection Staff were questioned about the possible existence of documentary materials which had been used by the IG team investigating the Bay of Pigs. They, too, contended

* As already noted, Kirkpatrick's diary recorded at least eight entries relating to the survey during the interval between the beginning of the survey and its transmittal to Mr. McCone. As will be obvious to even the most casual user of this report, Mr. Greer's search for documentation concerning Kirkpatrick's investigations defies belief. To say that it was incompetent understates the case and gives one concern about any other inspections in which Greer was involved. One might also reflect on the qualifications of the IG's to whom Greer reported during his tenure on the staff from 1962-1971.

that no such materials existed. 16/ Even as this volume was being drafted, this negative information regarding documents on the Bay of Pigs investigation was restated by then Inspector General, Charles A. Briggs, who informed the author that:

We [the IG's office] have no record of any Kirkpatrick "working papers" on this subject. As far as we can tell, all of the OIG survey team's working papers related to the Bay of Pigs Operation survey were destroyed in accordance with Kirkpatrick's instructions. 17/*

In interesting contrast to the statements which were provided by Mr. Shaffer were Lyman Kirkpatrick's comments in his memorandum of 20 November 1961 transmitting a copy of his report to Mr. John McCone, who had been named to become--but had not yet sworn in as--Director of Central Intelligence. Kirkpatrick wrote: "While the analysis and conclusions presented herewith regarding the operation are those of the Inspector General, the basis for these conclusions are extensively documented in the files." 18/ In that same memorandum, Kirkpatrick also specified that, "My meeting with the top three officers of the Branch reviewing the operation the week after the landing failed is reported in some 70 pages." A similar statement regarding the availability of

* The correspondence between the writer and Inspector General Charles A. Briggs concerning this material is given in Appendix A. It clearly raises questions about the competence and/or reliability of that key office. Quite obviously the working habits or research capabilities of the IG's office had not improved since 1973 when Greer's volume appeared. In the spring of 1981, through inquiry of another source, the author of this volume recovered a nearly complete set of the working papers of the Bay of Pigs inspection team. One might even wonder if the failures of the IGs to locate the papers in question were intentional. The extreme sensitivity concerning Kirkpatrick's reports at this time in the Agency's life can only be interpreted as a rear guarding action rather than any serious concern over security

documentation--including documentation concerning the meeting with the three top officers of the Cuban Task Force--appears in Kirkpatrick's memorandum of 24 November 1961, transmitting a copy of his report to Mr. Dulles. 19/*

Another point of difference with Mr. Shaffer's recollection is that in his memorandum of 24 November 1961 to Mr. Dulles, Kirkpatrick's memorandum seems to indicate that David McLean may have been involved in something more than minor editing of the final report. 20/ In the instance of the letters of transmittal to both the Director of Central Intelligence and the upcoming Director of Central Intelligence, Kirkpatrick made it quite clear that the opinions expressed in the report were his own.

Even though Kirkpatrick in both his 1968 book, The Real CIA, and a 1972 article in the Naval War College Review made public the role that his office played in reviewing the Bay of Pigs Operation, little else has appeared in the public domain about the IG investigation. In fact, very little has appeared about the investigation even in the classified literature. In 1973 two volumes in the CIA Historical Series devoted segments to the Inspector General's report. One of these segments appeared in Volume 3 of Wayne Jackson's history, Allen Welsh Dulles as Director of Central Intelligence, 26 February 1953 - 29 November 1961. The other segment appeared in Kenneth Greer's, The Office of the Inspector General, January 1952 - December 1971.**

* This 70 page document was among those retrieved at the author's request from a non-IG source.

** The Jackson volume was issued in July 1973 and is recorded as DCI-2 in the CIA Historical Series. Greer's volume was published in October 1973 as DCI-7 in the CIA Historical Series.

Unfortunately, neither author had sufficient background knowledge of the Bay of Pigs Operation to make objective judgments about many of the points which were raised in Kirkpatrick's study; and neither author had access to the reports of the Taylor Committee. Even under the best of circumstances, it probably would have been difficult for Mr. Jackson to have rendered an objective judgment about Kirkpatrick's report because of the close association that had been established between Dulles and many of the officers on the Board of National Estimates--of which Jackson was a long term member. The principal emphasis by both authors concerned speculation regarding Kirkpatrick's motives in terms of the thrust of the report and the handling of the transmittal of the final report. Both Greer and Jackson engaged in more discussion of the rebuttal by Deputy Director of Plans to the Kirkpatrick report than they did to the IG's report. Such substantive information as was presented was done in a slipshod manner, as witness Greer's presentation of the nine conclusions of the Inspector General's survey, but with no indication that the conclusions were followed by ten recommendations. Similarly, Jackson also mentioned several of the conclusions of the Inspector General's report but had little or nothing to say with reference to the recommendations.

After studying the background materials that had been generated during the course of the planning and the conduct of the Bay of Pigs Operation and the Taylor committee report which had been requested by President Kennedy, it is apparent, simply from review of the Introduction, that the Inspector General's survey was guaranteed to arouse strenuous objections among those who had been associated closely with the anti-Castro effort. Among other comments, the IG's Introduction stated: 21/

This is the Inspector General's report on the Central Intelligence Agency's ill-fated attempt to implement national policy by overthrowing the Fidel Castro regime in Cuba by means of a covert paramilitary operation:

The purpose of the report is to evaluate selected aspects of the Agency's performance of this task, to describe weaknesses and failures disclosed by the study, and to make recommendations for their correction and avoidance in the future.

The report concentrates on the organization, staffing and planning of the project, and on the conduct of the covert paramilitary phase of the operation, including comments on intelligence support, training, and security. It does not describe or analyze in detail the purely military phase of the effort.

The report includes reference to the roles played by Agency officials in Presidential conferences and interdepartmental meetings at which policy decisions affecting the course of the operation were taken, but it contains no evaluation or judgment on any decision or action taken by any official not employed by the Agency.

The IG's suggestion that the operation was "ill-fated," particularly in view of the controversy which was precipitated by the cancellation of the D-Day strike, automatically would put participants in the operation on the defensive. In addition, to suggest that the Central Intelligence Agency alone should wear the albatross for the failure of the operation would reinforce the belief that the IG and his inspectors were out to "get" the DDP--and even the DCI. To reemphasize that the study was going to focus exclusively on the "weaknesses and failures" rather than to present an objective overview of all actions--successful and unsuccessful--was another guarantee of automatic resentment. The report's reference to the focus on the "paramilitary" phase of the operation as distinct from the purely "military" phase certainly would raise a question concerning the point at which the inspectors

were making this particular break. Was it in November 1960 when the emphasis shifted from the infiltration of guerrilla teams into Cuba to the decision to form a basic infantry unit? Or was it at the point that the Cuban brigade began to move out of Guatemala through Nicaragua for the landing in Cuba? Finally, in terms of the Introduction, the suggestion that decisions or actions taken by the CIA officials who participated in Presidential conferences and interdepartmental meetings could be judged in isolation and apart from the interests of other agencies' representatives in any given meeting was absurd on the face of it.

2. Findings

Following the Introduction, the Inspector General's survey has a 31 page segment on the history of the operation as it developed in CIA. Basically this is a straight-forward and non-controversial exposition of the evolution of the anti-Castro program in the Agency from the end of 1958 through the organization of WH/4. It describes briefly the various initial activities--propaganda, paramilitary training, financing, and organizing the anti-Castro Cuban elements in the United States; and it then turns to the change in concept from guerrilla type infiltration activities to the development of the plan for an air supported amphibious invasion. It also related the participation through the Presidential level of the other agencies of the government which worked with the Agency in support of the anti-Castro effort--an effort which the Inspector General's report clearly understood was the official policy of the United States Government. 22/

The survey then contained a series of segments which were identified as evaluations of such things as the organization and command structure and staffing and planning. 23/ In reviewing these evaluations there are some which were in complete agreement with those of the Maxwell Taylor Committee. There are others which were unique to the Inspector General's study. There were some which were closely related to items which were subject to discussion by the Taylor Committee, but contrary to General Cabell's opinion that "some of these conclusions are in conflict with General Taylor's conclusions," there are no apparent conflicts with the findings of the Taylor Committee Report. 24/*

In the "Summary of Evaluation" of the Bay of Pigs Operation, the Inspector General's report once again introduced the issue of fate as having pre-ordained the failure of the planned overthrow of Castro stating: "In evaluating the Agency's performance, it is essential to avoid grasping immediately, as many persons have done, at the explanation that the President's order cancelling the the D-Day air strikes was the chief cause of failure." The report proceeded to suggest that the whole question might have been avoided through better planning, organization, and leadership; but more importantly:

It is essential to keep in mind the possibility that the invasion was doomed in advance, that an initially successful landing by 1,500 men would eventually have been crushed by Castro's combined military resources strengthened by Soviet Bloc supplied military materiel. 25/

These opinions, of course, were surfaced by various individuals during the Taylor Committee hearings--all after the

* Unfortunately, General Cabell failed to specify such differences as he had in mind.

Brigade collapsed. As with the Taylor Committee report, such presumptions completely ignored the possible disruption of Castro's military which might have resulted if the Brigade's B-26's had controlled the air over Cuba. They also ignored the impact which unopposed B-26 operations might have had in stimulating potential dissidents throughout Cuba to active efforts to overthrow Fidel Castro. The Inspector General's evaluation then struck its cruelest blow of all at the Central Intelligence Agency saying:

The fundamental cause of the disaster was the Agency's failure to give the project, notwithstanding its importance and its immense potentiality for damage to the United States, the top-flight handling which it required--appropriate organization, staffing throughout by highly qualified personnel, and full time direction and control of the highest quality. Insufficiencies in these vital areas resulted in pressures and distortions, which in turn produced numerous serious operational mistakes and omissions, and in lack of awareness of developing dangers, in failure to take action to counter them, and in grave mistakes of judgment. There was failure at high levels to concentrate informed, unwavering scrutiny on the project and to apply experienced, unbiased judgment to the menacing situations that developed.

26/*

In evaluating the organization and command structure, the IG's survey elaborated on the foregoing criticism of the Agency's leadership during the operation. In specifying that although WH/4 under the direction of Jacob D. Esterline was technically in the fourth echelon in the Agency's overall organization, in fact,

* Perhaps because of the presence of Mr. Dulles as a member of the Taylor Committee, any sharp criticism of the Agency's most senior leadership during the course of Taylor Committee investigation seems to have been avoided, intentionally or unintentionally. Based on the sharp questioning by Attorney General Robert Kennedy, in particular, and sometimes by General Taylor, it is possible that those two members of the committee would have found agreement with this strong statement made by Inspector General Kirkpatrick.

Esterline really was further down the ladder than that. Esterline could report directly to the Deputy Director for Plans, Mr. Bissell, but he also had some reporting responsibilities to Col. J.C. King, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division.* In addition, Esterline also had to deal with both General Cabell, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and Col. Stanley Beerli, Acting Chief, Development Projects Division, over questions involving air operations. Mr. Bissell's Assistant Deputy Director of Plans for Action, C. Tracy Barnes, and the Chief of WH/4's Paramilitary Staff, Col. Hawkins, also played key roles in the decisionmaking process for the operation. There was mention in the IG's comment that: "There were too many echelons' the top level had to be briefed by briefers who themselves were not doing the day-to-day work." 27/

No one was more in agreement with that statement than Jake Esterline who, during an interview nearly fifteen years after the event, stated:

I don't think just because a person is a GS-18, or because he has four stars on his shoulder, that he should have gone [to briefings] himself. He should have at least--if he had to go--he should have at least had one of the principal lieutenants charged with the operation--and that would be Hawkins and myself--someone who knew intimately what, how soon, or how easily disaster could come, should have been there. 28/

The Inspector General's survey also raised another point briefly touched on by the Taylor Committee--the relationship during the on-going anti-Castro activity between DDP Richard Bissell and Richard Helms, Chief of Operations, DDP. Mr. Bissell has explained

* As mentioned in the discussion of the Taylor Committee Report, however, Col. King had only a marginal, somewhat honorary, role in the Bay of Pigs chain of command.

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that there was no formal arrangement between himself and Helms over the division of efforts during the Bay of Pigs Operation and that it was more or less tacitly agreed that Helms would concern himself with all other operations activities while Bissell focused most of his attention on the anti-Castro effort. ^{29/} The Inspector General's survey, however, specified that "on at least two occasions COPS [Chief Operations] was given express warnings that the project was being perilously mismanaged, but he declined to involve himself with the project." ^{30/} The isolation of COPS/DDP also was sharply criticized by Dick Drain, COPS/WH/4. Drain not only suggested that perhaps Helms was gun-shy but stated:

I think that was an error. I've been a COPS now, several times; and a COPS, goddamn it, is a COPS. When anything as big as this is going on, some person has got to be in charge of the interrelationship--- real or imagined---of this thing and the other things.
^{31/}

Kirkpatrick's evaluation also found considerable fault with the fact that the Agency's air arm, the Development Projects Division (DPD), remained an independent entity throughout the course of the Bay of Pigs Operation. It was specified that coordination problems between DPD and WH/4 tended to exacerbate relations between the two organizations, but despite strong arguments from Jake Esterline (and Col. Jack Hawkins) that DPD should be integrated for purposes of the anti-Castro operation, Mr. Bissell insisted on maintaining the independence of DPD. ^{32/}

Another of the points made by the IG concerned the staffing of WH/4--another area about which COPS/WH/4, Dick Drain, also had very firm opinions. According to Drain, Allen Dulles had said repeatedly that the anti-Castro operation was the most important project that the Agency had under way and that he wanted "the very best people" even if it required that "people [be] pulled off tours overseas if necessary." Drain went on to say:

Everybody would solemnly nod, and then, much like the case of Vietnam...we would tend to get the people that the area Division Chiefs found "excess"--which normally meant "found insufficient." With many notable exceptions, we did not get the very best people available ^{33/}

According to the Inspector General's survey:

This recognition of the need for high quality personnel is nowhere reflected in the history of the project. The DDP's Deputy for Covert Action advised his subordinates that the Director's words did not mean that the project was to be given carte blanche in personnel procurement but that officers could be adequately secured through negotiation. In actual fact, personnel for the project were secured by the customary routine method of negotiation between the project and the employee's office of current assignment; no recourse was had to directed assignment by the Director of Central Intelligence. ...In many cases, the reasons for assigning a given person to the project was merely that he had just returned from abroad and was still without an assignment. 34/*

The point about the Inspector General's survey with reference to personnel that struck a nerve, however, concerned his evaluation about the marginal character of the qualifications of the people who ended up in WH/4, or as the report said, "It is apparent from these ratings [the relative retention lists of the Clandestine Service] that the other units had not detailed their best people to WH/4, but had in some instances given the project their disposal cases."

35/ Another of the IG's criticisms concerned the severe shortage of Spanish language capability among those who were assigned to the task force. Kirkpatrick's report charged, "This lack occurred in part because of the scarcity of Spanish linguists in the Agency and in part because WH Division did not transfer to the project sufficient numbers of its own Spanish speakers." 36/ Although many of the senior WH/4 personnel who were fluent in Spanish came

Dick Drain, Chief of Operations for WH/4 specified that this had been the rationale for his assignment to the Cuban Task Force. Having returned [redacted] and being without an assignment for two or three months, he was tapped for assignment to WH/4.

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from WHD, there is no question that the project suffered a severe shortage of Spanish speakers throughout its life.

The principal exception to the questionable caliber of personnel in WH/4 was the large number of assignees from the Deputy Director of Support. Col. Lawrence K. White, the Deputy Director for Support (DDS), took Mr. Dulles at his word and did assign his best people to the WH/4 activity. This was particularly noticeable with reference to the senior support officer, William E. Eisemann, and personnel who were assigned to logistics, security, finance, and communications. The Inspector General's report noted specifically that because of the lack of talent among the DDP assignees, there was heavy dependence on DDS personnel to run the various bases that were associated with the WH/4 project. Bill Eisemann, Chief, Support, WH/4, was particularly critical of the DD/P for its failure to abide by its own contingency assignment plans, thus increasing the burden on the more competent support officers. 37/

Despite the fact that the project eventually employed nearly 600 people, the Director of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles, never gave proper attention to the personnel situation as the project was developing:

When the thing [the Bay of Pigs Operation] was all over, Allen Dulles felt that, given the state of morale, he had better pull together in the auditorium, in R&S building, all those that were by this time back in the States and give them a little pep talk....This must have been about April 20th....Now, when he walked in there--and I was at his elbow with Jake--he looked out at the sea of faces in his sweet way, and he said, "My goodness. I had no idea that there were this many people associated with this project!" Well, why not? It was clear. There wasn't any mystery about it. But higher management, Bissell excepted, never did really load into their thinking how very much of a drain on the total manpower this thing was. It never got

clear to the other Division Chiefs, it seems to me, that they really had to make a sacrifice of their own--at this point relatively second priority operations--to staff this thing up. 38/

In that part of the Inspector General's survey that is devoted to an evaluation of the planning which culminated in the invasion at Playa Giron, the report commented on the change in concept from the initial program of guerrilla type activities with infiltration of trained teams to work with dissident groups inside Cuba to the amphibious invasion which took place on 17 April 1961. Despite the statement that the IG's survey would focus exclusively on internal CIA affairs, it was noted that the changes in concept reflected policies that were determined on the basis of both interagency discussions and amendments from the Executive Branch of government. The reference to the switch in the site of the operation from Trinidad to Playa Giron (the Zapata plan) in the Inspector General's report repeated a major error that also had occurred in the course of the Taylor Committee hearings regarding the airfield at Trinidad. The IG report stated: "The airfield requirement obliged the planners to shift the invasion site from Trinidad to Zapata. The former area was close to the Escambray Mountains and therefore offered better guerrilla possibilities, but only the latter had a suitable airfield." 39/* This same critical error also had gone unchallenged during the Taylor Committee

* The basic reason for the shift from Trinidad had nothing to do with the airfield. Trinidad was going to be "too spectacular" and too much like a WWII invasion for the President's taste.

investigation. Not only could the Trinidad airfield have supported B-26 operations, it could have supported them much more easily and adequately than could the airstrip at Playa Giron.*

The Inspector General's report placed great emphasis on the failure of CIA's planners to make a proper assessment of the potential for internal support from anti-Castro dissidents--even had the planned lodgement of the Brigade been successful. The report stated:

It is clear that the invasion operation was based on the hope that the Brigade would be able to maintain itself in Cuba long enough to prevail by attracting insurgents and defectors from the Castro armed services, but without having in advance any assurance of assistance from identified, known, controlled, trained, and organized guerrillas. The Agency hoped the invasion would, like a deus ex machina, produce a "shock", which would cause these defections. In other words, under the final plan the invasion was to take the place of an organized resistance which did not exist and was to generate organized resistance by providing the focus and acting as a catalyst.

The Agency was matching the 1,500 man brigade, after an amphibious landing, against Castro's combined military forces...estimated as follows: the revolutionary Army--32,000 men; the militia--200,000

* Although the story given in the Inspector General's survey of the changing concepts and the evolution of the final plan which required the capture and use of an airstrip on Cuban soil clearly indicates that the shift from Trinidad to Zapata was a result of political rather than military decisions, in a subsequent discussion of the IG survey, Kirkpatrick seems to have been confused about the D-Day plan. In writing for the Naval War College Review in 1972, he stated: "The President was under the impression initially that the H-hour air strike was actually going to be made from the beachhead. But, of course, the airstrip was never secured to that degree, and the concept of eight B-26's bombing from the beachhead was simply not feasible." 40/ It must be assumed that the President was fully aware of the fact that the H-hour air strike was going to be launched from the beachhead--after all, he not only had been involved in the discussions, but he was the one who authorized the plan which required that before air operations could begin on D-Day, at least two B-26's touch down at the airstrip on Cuban soil.

men; employing more than 30-40,000 tons of Bloc furnished arms and heavy materiel of a value of \$30,000,000. The argument has been made that the Agency's theory of an uprising to be set off by a successful invasion and the maintenance of a battalion for a period of a week or so has not been disproved. It was not put to the test, this argument goes, because the cancelled D-Day air strikes were essential to the invasion's success. Such an argument fails in the face of Castro's demonstrated power to arrest tens of thousands of suspected persons immediately after the D-Day-minus-2 air strikes and the effectiveness of the Castro security forces in arresting agents....

Timely and objective scrutiny of the operation in the months before the invasion...would have demonstrated to Agency officials that the clandestine paramilitary operations had almost totally failed, that there was no controlled and responsive underground movement ready to rally to the invasion force, and that Castro's ability to both fight back and to roll up the internal opposition must be very considerably upgraded....It might also have suggested that the Agency's responsibility in the operation should be drastically revised and would certainly have revealed that there was no real plan for the post invasion period, whether for success or failure. 41/

Both Richard Bissell and Jake Esterline were fully aware of the fact that the 1,500-man brigade was going to have little support from organized internal resistance groups inside Cuba. One authority on Cuba in fact has quoted Bissell as saying, "Our operations were not hampered by the arrest of so many people in Havana after the [D-2] raids...we did not expect the underground to play a large part." 42/*

In addition to denigrating the potential impact on dissident elements had the Brigade Air Force controlled the air, the IG's survey also ignored the effect which might have resulted had the lodgement been maintained long enough for the representatives of

* Kirkpatrick, however, referred to the arrests following the D-2 airstrike as "the first catastrophic blow to the...operation." 43/

the CRC under the leadership of Miro Cardona to have landed and declared themselves to be the Provisional Government of Cuba. They would have appealed immediately for support and recognition from the United States and from the anti-Castro governments of the Latin American area. 44/

In its evaluation of the planning for the Bay of Pigs Operation, the Inspector General's report strongly implied that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were led down the primrose path by the Central Intelligence Agency. The IG report stated that "Agency participants in the project have sought to defend the invasion plan by citing the approval given to the plan by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." The survey reiterated some of the areas which were called into question during the course of the Taylor Committee's interrogation of members of the JCS regarding the role that their respective services had played in the course of the planning for the Bay of Pigs Operation. The suggestion in the IG's report "that the final plan was presented to them [the JCS] only orally" makes it appear that this was a deliberate plot to deny information to the Joint Chiefs. 45/ As noted in an earlier volume in this series, the ongoing changes from the middle of March to the time of the invasion negated the possibility of preparing formal papers. Comments by members of the JCS to the Taylor Committee recognized this as a fact of life.

The IG report also read that "they [the JCS] went on the assumption that full air support would be furnished and control of the air secured" and makes it sound as if the Agency knew all along that at the last hour the D-Day air strike would be cancelled. Similarly, the IG's assertion that the JCS had been assured that if

things got tough at the beach the Brigade could go guerrilla is not an accurate representation of the beliefs which the various members of the Joint Chiefs expressed to the Taylor Committee. ^{46/} The most important point concerning the JCS evaluation of the planned anti-Castro operation was ignored by the Inspector General's report--each one of the individual Chiefs believed that the operation could succeed. In several instances, General Taylor himself asked one or another of the Chiefs: "If you had believed that the operation was going to fail, would you have told the President?" In each instance where one of the service Chiefs was asked this question the answer was unhesitatingly given as "yes."*

In his further critique of the planning for the Bay of Pigs operation, the Inspector General indicated that the finished intelligence produced by the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), the Office of National Estimates (ONE), and the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) provided ample warning for those in charge of the anti-Castro operation to have called for a time-out to restudy the whole plan. There is no question that the publications of these offices had been read by senior personnel involved in planning the operation. ^{47/} Despite the availability of such finished intelligence reports and a plethora of raw intelligence on the internal Cuban situation, the Chief of the anti-Castro task force indicated that he did not believe that the available intelligence on the Cuban internal situation was adequate to the needs of the time. In response to a question on this specific

* The reader also is referred to Pfeiffer, Taylor Committee Investigation of the Bay of Pigs, for the testimony of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

matter, he replied, "No, I think the Harris poll would have been more effective--a Harris or a Gallup poll would have been more effective. I don't think that we had any quantitative or any qualitative measure of just what the degree of infection with Castro was." 48/

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In addition to the embarrassment that might have been caused to senior personnel both within and outside of CIA by the cancellation of the anti-Castro project, the Inspector General's survey added another fillip of a highly personal nature to his critique of the Agency's role in the Bay of Pigs operation. He stated that the atmosphere was not conducive to any re-evaluation:

The Chief of the project and his subordinates had been subjected to such gruelling pressures of haste and overwork for so long that their impetus and drive would have been difficult to curb for such a purpose. The strike preparations, under the powerful influence of the project's paramilitary chief, to which there was no effective counterbalance, had gained such momentum that the operation had surged far ahead of policy. 49/

The implied criticism of Col. Jack Hawkins (USMC) who was Chief of the paramilitary staff for the task force seems completely unwarranted inasmuch as Hawkins's basic task was to prepare the strike operations. In fact, Hawkins suggested that it was the CIA's

personnel who were so caught up in the effort that they couldn't bring themselves to cancel the operation.*

In a manner similar to that of the Taylor Committee Report, the Inspector General's survey also noted that by November 1960, the operation had received so much publicity that attempts to maintain deniability should have been abandoned. The survey emphasized that not only were Cuban exiles in the United States loose lipped, but the news media--particularly the Miami and New York papers--also were eager to publicize any information they could get about plans involving the United States in an effort to overthrow Fidel Castro. Kirkpatrick's report, however, went a step further than that of General Taylor's committee in pointing out that the attempt to maintain the fiction of plausible deniability imposed such restrictions on the types of military equipment that could be used and on the use of US training bases and air facilities as to be positively detrimental to plans for mounting a successful effort to oust Castro. Once the covert nature of the operation was blown, it was Kirkpatrick's opinion that the Agency's leaders had a responsibility to call a halt to the operation and go to the President and ask for further guidance. 51**

* Col. Hawkins took more than his share of criticism at the hands of the Taylor Committee; and it seems possible that the IG's survey may have been reflecting the opinions of that study. Those most closely associated with Hawkins in the operation, however, spoke most highly of him. One source stated: "Hawkins, who undoubtedly would have gotten his star as a result of a successful Bay of Pigs Operation...had been hand picked by the Commandant of the [Marine] Corps, General Shoup, to come over and do this job. A very decent, honest, hard working man about whom all the fault finders then [following the collapse of the invasion] began to say, 'Well, I guess Hawkins just wasn't up to it'." 50

**Or to quote Kirkpatrick's retrospective view: "Trying to mount an operation of this magnitude from the United States is about as covert as walking nude across Times Square without attracting attention." 52

Referring to the cancellation of the D-Day air strike by President Kennedy on the evening of 16 April 1961, the Inspector General's survey placed more blame on the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General Cabell, and the Deputy Director of Plans, Mr. Bissell, than on Mr. Kennedy and Secretary Rusk--even suggesting that perhaps the President "may never have been clearly advised of the need for command of the air in an amphibious operation like this one." (This, of course, was the position taken by Robert Kennedy during the hearings.) It was not that the President had not been advised, it was simply a case that he and Rusk apparently did not want to risk international criticism of the US.

During the meeting in Rusk's office on the night of 16 April 1961, General Cabell clearly spelled out that unless the brigade aircraft were permitted the strike on the morning of D-Day--particularly the attack on the three air fields which contained the remaining combat aircraft--the Brigade's shipping probably would be lost, and resupply of the beachhead would be impossible. Similarly, at 0430 hours on the morning of the 17th when Cabell went to Rusk's home and got permission to telephone Kennedy at Glen Ora to ask for naval air cover in lieu of the cancelled air strike, the criticality of control of the air over Cuba should have been obvious even to the slow witted.*

Following the IG's evaluation of the Agency's planning efforts, the official report then grimly detailed the differences of

* In this context, Kirkpatrick repeated his earlier speculation that if Jack Hawkins had been with Cabell and Bissell he could have made a stronger, more effective case than either of the other two. In view of Rusk's intransigence--even in view of the fact that the D-2 air strikes had already blown the cover as far off of plausible deniability as it could be--it is doubtful that Hawkins's presence would have made any difference at that particular moment.

opinion between Headquarters and the Miami Base. Points of focus were on the duplication of various activities and the strong desire of the Base to become a Station--despite the firm opposition of Headquarters. Even though "the inspectors agree that this divided effort represented an ineffective and uneconomical use of time, money, and material, and less than maximum utilization of Agency employees, plus unexploited, delayed, or poorly coordinated use of Cuban agents and assets," this administrative debate had no bearing on the success or failure of the Bay of Pigs operation which supposedly was the principal objective of the Inspector General's study. ^{53/} The best that can be made of the emphasis given this segment in the IG's report is that it was a cheap shot at the managerial abilities of the Deputy Director of Plans--or possibly the COPS/DDP, Richard Helms.

Following the discussion of the Miami base, the IG survey examined Intelligence Support. The thrust of this section, as with the segment on the Miami base, was out of focus, if not out of context. The survey reported that WH/4 not only ran the anti-Castro operation but also had the Headquarters responsibility for intelligence collection and dissemination of intelligence reports on Cuba. The IG survey belabored some of the obvious problems such as the shortage of trained personnel to do intelligence analysis, the lack of proper clearances for some of the personnel who should have been analyzing the materials being collected, and competition between WH/4/FI and what Kirkpatrick identified as "a G-2" unit in WH/4 concerning their respective responsibilities for the interpretation and utilization of the intelligence being collected. ^{54/}

In focusing on the territorial responsibilities of these units, Kirkpatrick's discussion of intelligence support ignored the more obvious failure of WH/4 to make the fullest use of the capabilities of the Agency's Directorate of Intelligence to provide analytical support and finished intelligence for the anti-Castro operation. Certainly Kirkpatrick was aware of this, for in The Real CIA he asked:

Why did the Bay of Pigs fail? How could the Central Intelligence Agency with its information gathering facilities, its highly developed analytical processes, and sophisticated personnel and procedures make such a mistake?

In my opinion it failed not because of the CIA, but despite what was available in the CIA. The policy makers were not adequately informed of the capabilities and limitations of the instrument of foreign policy that they had chosen to use. The men in charge of the project chose to operate outside the organizational structure of both the CIA and the intelligence system and consequently forfeited a considerable amount of the expertise and judgment available in Washington. There was no really detached body of experts giving a critical evaluation as to the chances of success or failure. It was essentially the same group of people processing the intelligence, planning the operation, "selling" the project to the policy makers, and finally directing the final effort. It was a classic example of the correctness of those who maintained that there should be clear separation between those who evaluate intelligence and those who mount operations based on that intelligence. 55/

Kirkpatrick's comment beginning "the men in charge of the project" was both misleading and confusing. It would seem to make sense only if it read "the men in charge of the project failed to make full use of the organizational structure of either the CIA or the intelligence community and consequently forfeited a considerable amount of the expertise and judgment available in Washington." There was never any indication during the course of the Taylor

Committee investigation that Bissell, Esterline, et al took off an any unauthorized tangents during either the Eisenhower or the Kennedy administrations.*

The IG's survey next examined "The Political Front and the Relations of the Cubans to the Project." At the same time that this was one of its most critical attacks on the DDP, it also was highly ambivalent. On the one hand the IG's report seemed to take as gospel all that had been heard about the denigration of the Cuban leaders, particularly of Manuel Ray, Miro Cardona, and Antonio Varona. While criticizing the Agency for not giving the Cubans a greater voice in the efforts to organize the anti-Castro effort, the recitation of the brief history of such attempts clearly indicated that the leaders of the principal exile organizations which the Agency was seeking to combine in a united front in opposition to Castro were basically self-seeking, near ego-maniacs, more concerned with what their positions would be in Cuba once Castro was ousted than they were in working for the common cause.

As a case in point, for example, in November of 1960 when the concept of the operation changed from guerrilla activity to invasion, the Agency made it clear that it was no longer going to focus its attention exclusively on the FRD. In terms of providing support for groups inside or outside of Cuba which sought aid for

* One of the complaints voiced to the author by those he interviewed was that the Agency was too closely confined to the organizational structure. Kirkpatrick's comment also ignores the fact that the military plan had been evaluated by the JCS and its findings went to the Secretary of Defense. The political decisions by the White House at the critical hour cancelled the D-Day air strike and ignored the intelligence estimate that control of the air was essential to success.

paramilitary operations against Castro, decisions would be made on a case by case basis. The survey noted:

This complicated relations between project case officers and the FRD leaders. It also appears to have resulted in some diffusion of effort in the attempts of clandestine infiltration of arms and paramilitary leaders into Cuba. It seriously hampered progress toward FRD unity, sharpened FRD internal antagonisms, and contributed to the decline in strike force recruiting efforts. 56/

Despite its own references to the disputatious nature of the Cuban leadership, the Inspector General's report criticized the project for not giving the FRD leadership freer access and more voice in the military training programs in the camps in Guatemala--objecting in particular to the ban that was placed on visits to the camps by Cuban politicians. The survey suggested:

This was probably a mistake and an unreasonable interference in the Cubans' management of their own affairs. Controlled contact between the FRD and the troops could have done much to improve the morale and motivation of the troops and make the training job easier....This was one example of a high-handed attitude toward Cubans that became more and more evident as the project progressed. Cubans were the basic ingredient for a successful operation and, although the aim of having the exiles direct activities was probably idealistic and unattainable, nevertheless the Agency should have been able to organize them for maximum participation and to handle them properly to get the job done. But with the Americans running the military effort, running Radio Swan, and doing unilateral recruiting, the operation became purely an American one in the exile Cuban mind, and in the public mind as well. In by-passing the Cubans the Agency was weakening its own cover. 57/

The Inspector General's report indicated horror not only that the Agency was going to have control over the choice of leaders who were going to be pushed for positions in the Provisional Government, but:

The crowing incident which publicly demonstrated the insignificant role of Cuban leaders and the contempt

in which they were held occurred at the time of the invasion. Isolated in a Miami safe house, "voluntarily" but under strong persuasion, the Revolutionary Council members awaited the outcome of the military operation which they had not planned and knew little about while Agency-written bulletins were issued to the world in their name.

They had not been puppets in the early days of the project. Some of the Cubans had drawn up detailed operational plans for resistance in areas of Cuba that they knew intimately; other provided cover and support....But when the project began to shift from a clandestine operation to a military operation, Cuban advice and participation no longer seemed necessary....To the [US] military officers on loan to the project, the problem was a military one, and their attitude was "to hell with the Revolutionary Council and the political side." 58/

This segment on the relationship with the Cubans closed with some philosophical mauling about the question of whether any operation could be successful--whether Cuban, Latin American, Black African, or Southeast Asian--when US attitudes toward other people were so unfavorable. Projecting from that, the IG's report read like a UN appeal:

The Agency, and for that matter, the American nation is not likely to win many people away from Communism if the Americans treat other nationals with condescension or contempt, ignore the contributions and knowledge which they can bring to bear, and generally treat them as incompetent children whom the Americans are going to rescue for reasons of their own. 59/

Strangely enough, the IG's recommendations about giving the Cubans a freer hand in directing the planning and training of the brigade runs contrary to everything that the IG's survey subsequently had to say about the security consciousness of the exiles and the expectation--or hope--on the part of most of the brigade trainees that the US military would become directly involved in the attempt to oust Castro. The concern of the Cuban political

leaders with their macho image, their childlike and petty rivalries, and their tendency toward impetuosity are but briefly touched on in the Inspector General's report. Review of the records of WH/4 makes clear the difficulties of dealing with the exile leadership throughout the course of the operation. Former Agency employee, E. Howard Hunt, has provided an excellent account of the difficulties encountered in the Miami area as he and his boss, Gerard Droller, tried to persuade a group of self-centered, factional leaders that the anti-Castro effort would require more than bombast if it were to succeed. In a similar vein, one of the Cuban pilots, who was among the first contingent to be sent to Guatemala for training, highlighted the political frictions among the pilot trainees that at one point led to the resignation of nearly a dozen pilots.*

The threat of disruption of the military training effort apparently was a fact a life for those assigned to the infantry training base in Guatemala. The WH/4 logistics officer at Finca Helvetia from December 1960 until after the invasion told an interviewer that:

Various groups of Cubans were always creating problems, complaining, and talking about revolting. About a month before the invasion (just after Arttime and some other political leaders came down from Miami), the camp was split nearly 50/50 into political

* The volumes in question are E. Howard Hunt's Give Us This Day (New Rochelle, H.Y.: Arlington House, 1973) and Eduardo Ferrer's Operacion Puma (Miami: International Aviation Consultants, 1975). Whatever else may be said about Howard Hunt's subsequent involvement in the Watergate episode, it cannot be disputed that he was a most effective hand-holder for the Cuban leadership in the Miami area during much of the Bay of Pigs operation. Hunt not only was fluent in Spanish, but he also was thoroughly familiar with the Latin American temperament, having served a number of years in various Latin American countries.

camps. The split was so bad that Lt. Col. Frank Egan had to separate the groups, moving one to another location. Egan pleaded with the men to be military and leave politics to the politicians. Brigade Commander San Roman threatened to resign. After three or four days--thanks to the efforts of the deputy commander, a large black man, the two factions agreed to work together again....

[The logistics officer] recalls talking to San Roman a couple of weeks later. He quotes San Roman as saying Cubans did not know how to work as a team, and adding: "Every man here wants to be commander of the brigade." 60/

The next topics examined by the IG were the air and maritime paramilitary operations prior to the invasion of Playa Giron. The bulk of the discussion concerning air operations focused not on the critical issue of planned combat air operations but on the failure of the air drops to provide necessary supplies and equipment to dissident elements in Cuba. The IG blamed the failure in large part on the separation of the Agency's air arm (DPD) from the Cuban task force operation. Sharp criticism was directed at the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General Charles P. Cabell, who was the senior air adviser for the anti-Castro operation. To illustrate Cabell's questionable performance, the IG's survey cited the classic case which earned the General the sobriquet of "Old Rice and Beans." In what apparently was an early cost effectiveness fit, Cabell insisted that on air drop operations aircraft must be fully loaded even if it meant filling the cargo space with sacks of rice and beans. The first such drop which used this formula provided not only the 1,500 pounds of materiel which had been requested by an anti-Castro unit in Cuba, but also loaded them down the 800 pounds of beans, 800 pounds of rice, and 160 pounds of lard! 61/

The Kirkpatrick report criticized the Cuban pilots for lack of discipline in their failure to follow instructions in various of

the air drop operations, but also said that the American trainers should share in the blame. It did soften that criticism somewhat by noting that policy banned US observers from accompanying any of the air drop flights over Cuba. It failed to record that from the initiation of the air training program there had been an almost standing request from the air training base at Retalhuleu that American observers or pilots be assigned to the drop missions. 62/

Interestingly enough, the IG report said not a single word about the training activity or the overall air operation. Considering the handicaps under which they labored once the D-Day cancellation broke the planned air operations cycle and despite the fact that as the invasion was collapsing, few of the pilots proved unwilling or unable to continue to function in their combat role.* The performance of the B-26 pilots, in particular, reflected to the high credit of both the Cuban pilots and the US instructors and pilots who were willing to risk the invasion of the air space over Cuba in B-26's which stood no chance in combat against Castro's T-33's and Sea Furies. As a particular demonstration of skill on the part of the Cuban pilot-trainees was the fact that following the combat operations on D-Day several of the pilots, even though unable to return to the home base at Puerto Cabezas were able to save their aircraft through emergency landings at Grand Cayman Island.

The Inspector General's survey then reviewed maritime operations and came up with further interesting observations. 63/

* The US air commander told the Cuban Study Group that only three Cuban pilots were found wanting during the crisis.

Finding that there was no effective overall plan for using small boats to deliver materiel and to infiltrate or exfiltrate personnel to or from Cuba, the report stated: "One officer remarked that the Cubans were running the operations." In context, the implication of the IG's statement being "Why weren't the Americans doing this?" would seem in some contradiction to the previous complaint that the Cubans were not given enough responsibility in terms of supporting the anti-Castro effort. The section on maritime operations also made the point that Cuban pride was offended easily and the idea that cooperation was a two way street was better understood by the American personnel than by the Cubans to whom the word "cooperation" had little or no meaning--here again a contradiction of the IG's position that the Cubans should have been given more responsibility. In the investigation of maritime operations the IG's survey evidenced much concern over the cost-effectiveness of small boat purchases--a picking at nits and lice which had absolutely no bearing on the success^s or failure of the operation.

64/

More pertinent to the Inspector General's inquiry would have been some attention to the last minute need to acquire aluminum boats for use in the landing operation when the target area was changed from Trinidad to Zapata. This was a subject of some concern to the Taylor Committee investigation, but was a matter which had been left in limbo in the final report.* Considering that the IG

* Pfeiffer, The Taylor Committee Investigation of the Bay of Pigs.

had access to the Taylor report, this would seem to have been a rather strange and inexplicable omission on the part of the Inspector General's investigation, particularly in view of the high rate of failure of these boats at the time of the invasion.

In addition to its criticism of both air and maritime training, the Inspector General's report also reviewed the training of underground leaders who were expected to be placed in Cuba to rally guerrilla support about them. Following the basic training program for a group of some 60 men in Panama in the summer of 1960, the IG noted that in July 1960, 32 trainees were sent to Guatemala, the first of the contingent which would be trained at Finca Helvetia, about 10 miles north of Retalhuleu, and other properties owned by Roberto Alejos, close friend and confidant of President Ydigoras Fuentes of Guatemala.

Of the facilities obtained from Alejos, the IG survey stated:

A worse training site could hardly have been chosen than the one in Guatemala, it being almost inaccessible, with no training facilities and almost no living facilities. The trainees were put to work building the camp, working during the day, and studying at night....The number of Americans at the camp was held to a bare minimum for security reasons. The camp commander was also the chief of training and the project officer for Guatemala. When he arrived, he had to set up the temporary camp, find an area for a permanent camp, contract for buildings, supplies, and equipment; and he had to find sites for a suitable air base, a maritime base, and a prison and contract for these facilities to be built. 65/

Once again the IG report was severely critical of events which really had no bearing on the ultimate outcome of the anti-Castro operation. There was considerable discussion of the problems and delays which occurred during the course of the training program for those who had expected to be infiltrated into Cuba to

work singly, in pairs, or in small teams with dissident elements inside Cuba. But the criticism of WH/4 for failing to place these individuals and teams in Cuba ignored the fact that Headquarters plans were in flux because of the increasing evidence of improvements in Castro's security measures. In criticizing this one particular element of the training program, the IG survey overlooked the two more important training programs--particularly when the plan for infiltration gave way to invasion--those for the infantry and the air force.

The IG's charge that: "There was no full-time chief of training in the project to oversee requirements, define responsibilities, set up facilities, and provide support" may have applied, at least in part, to the training program for potential underground leaders; but it in no way applied to the infantry or air force training. 66/ The infantry training program was directed by Lt. Col. Frank Egan, USA, and the air training program was run by Major Billy Campbell, USAF. Both of these officers also were responsible to Col. Jack Hawkins, Chief, Paramilitary Staff, WH/4.*

The Inspector General's survey of security practices during the anti-Castro operation was introduced as follows:

The assault on Cuba is generally acknowledged to have been a poorly kept secret. It could hardly have been otherwise, considering the complexity of the operation and the number of people involved, both Cuban and American. 67/

To be precise, the operation was exposed to the world on 15 April 1961 with the D-2 air strike. Perhaps the IG's understatement of

* This was a technical responsibility in the case of Campbell who reported directly to Colonels Gaines or Beerli of DPD.

the situation should be excused because: "The inspection team did not make a detailed study of security aspects of the operation but came across many weaknesses in the protection of information and activities from those who did not 'need to know'."

Having criticized the task force planners for their failure to give the Cubans more authority, the IG report then went into detail to demonstrate that the Cubans had no sense of security or of the need to keep quiet about their involvement in anti-Castro activities. This laxity was obvious throughout the community of Cubans in Miami. Those who would go on infil-exfil operations would come back, and the news would soon become quite public. Many of the trained agents also knew the identities of other agents who had been trained for covert activities inside Cuba; and according to the survey: "Agents who were supposedly well trained disregarded elementary rules of personal security and were arrested because they needlessly gave away their true identities by visiting relatives who were under surveillance or by carrying identifying documents in their pockets." ^{68/} What the discussion of security failed to bring out, however, was that despite the so-called lapses in security there were no Castro troops waiting on the beaches at Playa Giron or Playa Larga for the invading forces when they landed.

In the course of its critique on security practices, the IG's survey once again pointed to the hazards posed by the use of Guatemala as a training site. Belaboring the obvious, the survey pointed out that the brigade could have been trained more securely at some location in the United States--a position with which the planners of the anti-Castro operation were in complete agreement.

The point was, however, that the use of a non-US location was a political decision over which the Agency had no control and the IG's criticism created a straw man.

The final area investigated by the IG's staff concerned the use of Americans in combat and simply reiterated the stories put before the Taylor Committee that Rip Robertson and Gray Lynch had led the landing parties that marked the beaches at Playa Giron and Playa Larga and that US pilots had participated in air strikes against Castro's forces on the afternoon of D+1 and again on D+2. On the morning of D+2, two B-26's with US crews had been lost over Cuba. With reference to these aircraft, the IG survey erred in stating that both were lost to the T-33's. Actually, only one was shot down by a T-33. The other B-26 was lost to ground fire. The IG report also asserted that some of the American pilots who were shot down had been executed by Castro after capture. 69/* It appears, in fact, that the IG survey's greatest concern was not over the loss of four US fliers but over the administrative problems that were going to be presented in trying to keep their Agency affiliation secret. This involved maintenance of the cover stories for the families of the deceased Americans, backstopping the notional companies that had been formed in order to protect the identities of the individuals, and the solution of legal claims which would be involved in settling the estates of the deceased. There was little evidence that the IG's office had any concern for the welfare of the widows and children who were left by the four men

* There is no evidence to support the story that two American pilots were executed after capture.

who had died in an operation conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency in support of US national policy. 70/*

Fortunately, however, affairs concerning the widows and children of the four airmen were handled very competently and capably by the Agency's Office of Personnel and the Office of the General Counsel. It was not until the late 1970's that it was acknowledged that the four flyers had been in the employ of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the fact that they were posthumously awarded the Agency's highest medal for valor, the Distinguished Intelligence Cross, has not yet been revealed publicly.

With reference to the participation of Americans in the combat operation, Kirkpatrick's 1972 article in the Naval War College Review stated: "the post-operation inspection was specifically directed to the question of whether any of the US personnel told the Cubans that US military forces would back them up." In the context of the review article, it appears that this could have been a reference to his own Inspector General's survey, but it probably referred to the Taylor Committee report. Certainly there is nothing in the IG's survey that bears on this question, and Kirkpatrick's comment in the NWCR article was very similar to the testimony of some of the CSG witnesses who said that anyone who had been involved in training the Cuban brigade would have been out of his mind if prior to the departure of the brigade for the invasion

* That the Agency did not take steps immediately to acknowledge the affiliation of the four Alabama Air National Guard flyers who lost their lives certainly did nothing to improve the Agency's image. In fact, had Castro not volunteered the return of the body of Pete Ray that had been kept frozen in a morgue since Ray's death on 19 April 1961, the existence of the body might yet have remained unknown, even though Castro, on 23 April 1961, had made it quite clear that at least two Americans had been killed in the B-26 which was shot down by anti-aircraft fire over Cuba on 19 April 1961. 71/

he had given the slightest hint that the United States would let the invasion go down the tubes. 72/

3. Interviews

Before examining the conclusions and recommendations of the IG survey, an attempt must be made to understand--if not explain--the findings of the survey which have been reviewed above. To do this, the records of the meetings of the IG and his team with personnel affiliated with the BOP operation were examined carefully. Sins of both commission and omission by several key witnesses were similar, if not identical, to their testimony before the Taylor Committee. Based on the records of meetings with the principals in the operation, however, it is difficult to understand how the IG's survey arrived at some of its evaluations--assuming the intent of the survey was objectivity. It appears that the most severe criticisms found in the survey were made on the basis of conversations with individuals who, in almost all instances, were minor--if not marginal--participants in the operation. Some of those whose remarks were given the greatest weight had been involved in the project for the shortest time.

In contrast to the Taylor Committee's records of the testimony of witnesses--in summary rather than in verbatun form--the Inspector General's survey retained verbatim records of the sessions with most witnesses. This was true almost without exception in the case of key personnel. Obviously such records provided an opportunity for more accurate appraisal of the final report than was

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true in the case of the Taylor Committee. Moreover, there is no question of identifying the comments of each individual participant.

As nearly as can be determined, Mr. Kirkpatrick took part in only one joint interview with his inspection team--the second interview with Richard Drain. Kirkpatrick did conduct individual interviews with Richard Bissell, J. C. King, and Tracy Barnes; and he also held a joint session with Colonel Hawkins, Dick Drain, and (for part of the meeting) Jake Esterline. Practically all of the interviews which were conducted by inspection team members also were done on a one-to-one basis. Strangely enough Mr. Dulles and General Cabell, in particular, and Colonels Beerli and Gaines were among the key personnel who were not questioned by either Kirkpatrick or members of his team.

Review of the record of the interviews in which Kirkpatrick was involved are of greatest interest because they were with the personnel most closely involved in the planning and conduct of the anti-Castro effort from its initiation to its conclusion. One of the first such interviews conducted by the IG was a joint session on 1 or 2 May 1961 with Dick Drain, Colonel Jack Hawkins, and Jake Esterline. Dick Drain introduced Colonel Hawkins to the IG, noting that as a non-Agency military assignee, Hawkins was--even more than Drain himself--very conscious of "some of the half-assed ways we do things, some of which have been fairly critical to this operation." The following interesting exchange then took place between Kirkpatrick and Jack Hawkins:

K. I want to take the opportunity this week before you get away and go back to the Marine Corps to get the benefit of as many thoughts [as] you have that will enable us to write a report on inside CIA of [what] went wrong. I think the Taylor Group is probably going to cover some of the higher level aspects. I don't envisage at the moment our getting

into any lengthy discussion with the people in State or the Pentagon or the others unless directed to. But I certainly want to find out what's right for [as] an objective and useful report as we can produce. The Director told me yesterday that he wanted this done. We both hoped that we could get a preliminary report for General Taylor before his report goes before the President. Well, I don't see the slightest possibility of that, but we'll certainly do our best, I'm going to put three men on it plus myself.*

H. Well, I don't think that the major difficulty or the responsibility for the failure of the project rests within the CIA at all. In my opinion I think that the responsibility rests upon our national organization of the Government right here in Washington, the lack of coordination between the agencies concerned and a certain attitude on the part of certain policy makers that always ends up with too little too late...In other words I'll start off by saying that the difficulty about the Cuban Operation was not primarily a difficulty within CIA, it was from beyond and above and about. Although I have seen some things about the CIA organization and procedure which I thought hampered the thing, but not critically. For example, I think there has been over-centralization of the control. They formed the task force to perform certain tasks, and yet the Task Force Commander did not have the authority to issue directives to the field in the form of cables or otherwise. 73/

It should be emphasized that when the IG introduced the idea of investigating only CIA to Hawkins, Hawkins immediately indicated the fallacy of such an approach. The final report, however, ignored this advice and attempted to demonstrate that all faults were internal to CIA. There is no evidence in the Kirkpatrick Diary to indicate that the DCI at any time had suggested that the IG should be limited only to an investigation of in-house failures.

* The report of this interview is undated, but based on the referral to Kirkpatrick's meeting with Dulles "yesterday," the interview probably took place on 1 May 1961. Kirkpatrick's Diary of 30 April indicates that he had a discussion with the DCI on that date and the question of getting a preliminary IG report to the Taylor Committee "before the Taylor Report is submitted to the President" was discussed. The text shown here is from an unedited carbon. The author has a carbon copy showing numerous grammatical corrections--many of which neither improve the grammar nor add to the substance.

Kirkpatrick either was inconsistent on this matter--or devious--for at another point in his meeting with Hawkins and company he made clear that he was well aware that the cancellation of the D-Day air strike was the result of Department of State objections. Additionally he stated: "Well now it seems to me, those [cancellation of the D-Day air strikes]--of any single event--those might have [had] as much an affect on the outcome as any." 74/

When the IG's discussion with Hawkins and Drain introduced the question of the advantages of Trinidad over Zapata, Hawkins emphasized that the change to Zapata was dictated by State's concern that an airfield be seized before any B-26's could go into action on D-Day. (Unfortunately he erred, as he had done when testifying to the Taylor Committee in stating that the airfield at Trinidad was too short for B-26 operations.*)

The response to Kirkpatrick's question concerning the Agency's expectation of strong support from the anti-Castro forces inside Cuba involved Drain, Hawkins, and Esterline; but it was Drain who introduced two important points which were ignored by the Taylor Committee--and excluded from Kirkpatrick's report. With reference to the prospects for "a great uprising," Drain commented:

This business of estimating the likelihood of resistance is one in which Sherman Kent gave us an

* Hawkins was one of several senior personnel who, unbelievably, were in error about the capabilities of the B-26's to use the 4,000 foot strip at Trinidad. During the session with Kirkpatrick after Hawkins commented that the airstrip at Trinidad "was shorter," Dick Drain added, "as far as we could tell." The author wonders if Drain had done some homework after the defeat. There was no evidence that anyone else had expressed reservations about the need to use the Playa Giron strip. 75/ In his response to the writer's inquiries in 1976, Hawkins did specify that one of the attractive features of Trinidad over Zapata was that the B-26s could have used the existing airfield at Trinidad. The Cuban pilots had trained to land and take off the B-26s within 4,000 feet--the length of the runways at both Trinidad and Playa Giron.

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early primer, which conditions all of this resistance business, and that is time is running against the United States and in favor of Castro, that is to say, with every day that went by there was less likelihood that resistance would do anything.

This was something that tended to get lost as you have these protracted negotiations. Everytime you had a negotiation you lost another day. Castro's control went up and the resistance went down. We did not make daily, or weekly, or monthly estimates on the likelihood of resistance; but nobody failed to point out that the resistance potential lessened with every passing day. We didn't even make a new assessment of the likelihood of resistance after the President's 13 [sic] April press conference speech in which he said--and it went all over Cuba and everywhere else--under no conditions whatsoever will the United States of America overtly intervene or in any way aid any action against Castro. I like to say myself that this had some aspect [sic] on the resistance. 76/

Not only did the IG's report ignore the above, but it differed very little from the Taylor Committee Report in emphasizing that the anti-Castro project had failed to make the best use of dissident elements in Cuba. Perhaps if Drain had been called to testify before the Cuban Study Group, his more realistic evaluation of the internal Cuban situation would have been understood, and the Agency not reprimanded for misestimating the internal situation in Cuba.

Kirkpatrick also questioned the continued emphasis on plausible deniability, suggesting that it was a recognized international reality that the only countries in the world that could afford to support third country dissidents were the USSR and the USA. No argument for continued support of deniability was forthcoming from the task force representatives. Esterline, in fact, reported that State had suggested that in lieu of running the operation through Trinidad that it either be launched out of Guantanamo or that a new airstrip be constructed in the hills of

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Oriente Province in Cuba, with the anti-Castro troops being airlifted into the new site. To this Esterline lamented:

This is kind of funny, but I mean at the same time they [State] were shooting us down on what we thought and what were still really perfectly sound ideas and plausibly deniable, we were running into this kind of ridiculous proposals [sic]. 77

The very negative picture which the IG survey painted of DDCI Cabell's management of air drop operations--Cabell had over-all supervisory responsibility for all air ops--is clearly traceable to Kirkpatrick's meeting with Esterline, Drain, and Hawkins. The discussion about the DDCI focused on Cabell's role at the time of the cancellation of the D-Day air strike, and it reflected the very strong feelings of the top three officers in the anti-Castro task force. Their comments to the IG were much more critical of the DDCI than any which were made to the Taylor Committee:*

K. Did any of you ever ask Cabell what he had in mind by his discussion with [General David] Gray, "We have got to get your kind [JCS military support] of help?"

D. We were all sitting there listening. At this point I was in a state of shock. When General Cabell and Mr. Bissell came back from the Secretary's office at 10:30 [p.m.] and said, "Well, now we have a little change in our marching orders we are just going to restrict our air." Well, God damn it, this is what it was, you know, just casual, like you were talking about buying nasturtiums instead of...

E. Why in the hell didn't you go on the stage instead of...

D. "Now we have a little change in our marching orders, and we are not going to strike those airfields; we are going to have close support at the beach, now we better get Stan [Beerli] over here and change the orders." Col. Hawkins hit the table like this, and said, "God damn it, this is criminal negligence." And Jake said, "This is the God damnest

* K - Kirkpatrick; D - Drain; E - Esterline; H - Hawkins.

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thing I have ever heard of." And I said, "Don't you realize that we can't even recall the force now they are in the water." General Cabell said, "I know that some of you have lived very close to this project for a long time and feel very deeply about it, but when you get a change in the marching order you have to react now, and you have to just take your orders and do what you are told." That's literal, verbatim. I don't exaggerate that a God damned bit, do I? We were all three sitting there.

H. Well, I guess I was the one sitting there...

E. This is merely a superfluous statement, but I never have yet figured out why General Cabell just suddenly decided to come down there, on Sunday afternoon about 5:00...

D. Saturday he had told us he was going to be in our office helping us all day Monday, so we fixed Jake's office up to look like a war room to keep him out of the real war room, because we had things that had to be done there. Hung a lot of cables up on the wall, made it look very impressive. He called Sunday morning and said, "Unless there was something on that was very important, he was going to play golf. We all heaved a sigh of relief. He came in about 4:00. We had the photography there, then Beerli was there with the photography, [redacted] was there, I was there, and you two. He came in and sat down and he hardly got his tail in the chair when he began to talk about, "Now we've got to be sure that we are acting in good faith with the Department."

(b)(3)

H. Yeah.

D. And we didn't know what the hell he was talking about. Honest to Christ, I don't think one of the five of us knew what he was talking about.

H. Then he came right out and said, "You are going to have those air strikes on those airfields in the morning?" I said, "Why, of course," said "absolutely". He said, "Now, you sure the State Department will understand about that. Maybe we are not acting in good faith with them." And so this was in his mind at 5:00 that afternoon and I thought no more about it. But, I don't know what had happened, but if...Stevenson and Rusk had been working on it at that hour, if we could just have known for sure, we could have tried to stop that invasion.

D. We could have sent them all to the Vieques. We had the thing set up to divert them to the Vieques, if for some good reason the President said, "no", or

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if intelligence showed that there was a trap they were walking into. 78/*

In addition to the joint meeting in which they participated with Kirkpatrick, the records of the IG survey indicate that Esterline had a separate session with Robert D. Shea; but no date is given and no record of the meeting has been found. Mr. Kirkpatrick's diary recorded that on 8 June 1961, "Dildine asked me if I would like to sit in on a round up session with Drain tomorrow. I told him I would if I didn't go to Princeton." The IG's Diary for 9 June 1961 shows that Kirkpatrick not only "met with the Cuban team for round-up with Drain," but also that he had lunch with Drain.

The Drain-Kirkpatrick relationship apparently was quite close before, during, and after the IG's survey. Drain had been on the IG's staff prior to his assignment , and he was in contact with Kirkpatrick shortly after his reassignment to the Cuban operation. 79/ On 24 April 1961, a week before the session he, Hawkins, and Esterline had with the IG, Drain's personal notes show terse entry which read: "Kirk, 11:00-12:00." Kirkpatrick's Diary

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

* Although it was not admitted to either Kirkpatrick or the Taylor Committee by any of the WH/4 personnel--particularly Esterline or Hawkins--the writer believes that even after Cabell returned to the war room at Quarters Eye (I) on the night of 16 April 1961, a withdrawal of the invading force with minimum losses was a realistic option. Why this point was never raised is difficult to understand. Even after the exploits of Lynch and Robertson in marking the beaches and initiating troop landings it should have been possible to reload the troops and evacuate the area. All that would have been lost then was the materiel and a bit of "face," with a few casualties.

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or that same date is more revealing. It noted that: "Drain came up and briefed me on the Cuban operation." Drain also had at least two luncheon dates with the IG prior to the transmittal of the IG survey to the DCI, but a more interesting meeting was reported on 29 January 1962 as follows:

Drain reported to me on his discussion with Bissell on his [Drain's] fitness report. He said that Bissell had agreed with his [Drain's] version of the way the [BOP] project was handled and planned to check it out with Barnes and then with J.C. King. He said Bissell [sic] then turned to the question of the IG Cuban Report and asked what he knew about the background. Drain told him of the meeting he and Esterline and Hawkins had with me and also that he had read the final draft and made about seven factual corrections. He noted to Bissell that the report specifically stated it was not going to deal with decisions made outside the Agency and that this answered their inquiry as to why it would not take these into account. 80/

It seems that Drain was completely out of character in not vigorously protesting the attempt to isolate the Agency's role, particularly in view of the strong position which had been taken by Colonel Hawkins during the Hawkins-Drain-Esterline meeting when the IG had suggested the possibility of doing such a study.*

The so-called "round-up" session which the IG team of Dildine, Shea, and Shaffer held with Drain on 9 June 1961, saw Kirkpatrick in attendance. The available records of that meeting consist of two items. The first is a two page list of questions (most of them leading questions) which focused on many issues which at best either were obviously marginal to the success or failure of the operation or had been covered previously during the 1 May session which Drain, Hawkins, and Esterline had with Kirkpatrick.

* Kirkpatrick also took a strong interest in Drain's reassignment following the close-out of the Bay of Pigs operation. 81/

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The second item is Shaffer's Memorandum for the Record of Drain's debriefing. 82/ The memorandum of the debriefing provides some explanations for Mr. Drain's negative opinion of the qualifications of the IG team. Shaffer first addressed himself to Drain's lack of concern about developing the resistance potential, followed those remarks with a foolish statement that "apparently the marines were to land at some later time," and devoted the rest of his memorandum to expressing his dismay at Drain's apparent lack of empathy for the Cubans. Characteristic of the fog in which Drain believed Shaffer operated was the following comment in the paper:

It was also suggested [by Drain] that they [the anti-Castro] Cubans needed some Greeks to lead them to victory and keep them under control. In my view, we will never win the Cubans or anybody else away from Communism if we treat them like incompetent children whom we are coming in to save. 83/*

In addition to Hawkins, Drain, and Esterline, the Deputy Director for Plans, Richard Bissell, and his Deputy for Action, C. Tracy Barnes, both had one-on-one sessions with Mr. Kirkpatrick. The Bissell interview did not take place until mid-August 1961, although the IG had been urged to talk to Bissell as easily as 25 May 1961. Bissell did not make that meeting, and even though he had agreed to a meeting for 19 July, he also failed to make it at that time. The mid-August meeting, however, did provide a 50-page verbatim transcript of the session; and a member of the IG's investigating team prepared a nine-page memorandum of selected highlights for use of the other team members. 84/

* Apparently Mr. Shaffer did not understand that the Greeks succeeded in their fight against a Communist takeover because their hearts were in the struggle--and because of US assistance.

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The verbatim text reflects a high degree of apparent agreement between Bissell and Kirkpatrick. In contrast to Kirkpatrick's stated intent to focus only on matters exclusive to CIA, the session with Bissell dealt extensively with the impact which decisions by other agencies had on the anti-Castro operation. Problems related to modifications suggested by the White House, State, Defense, and the Special Group were recorded; and the Inspector General clearly was aware that the negative impact of such modifications could not be blamed on the task force. Kirkpatrick also was alert to the "passionate" feelings which were engendered by discussion of the Bay of Pigs operation and he told Bissell:

Consequently we have to be very temperate in our remarks. Now what we're going to try and do is to put together a document which will give as dispassionate as possible an analysis of the project and how it was carried out. And recommendations as to if we ever did it again how it should be done.

85/

In response to Kirkpatrick's questions, there were a number of things which Bissell admitted he would change if the operation were being done over. Among these changes were the following:

Restructuring the chain of command by pulling the task force out of WH Division and putting it under the ADD/P/A, Tracy Barnes.

Placing a segment of DPD under the specific authority of WH/4 for the duration of this particular operation.

Establishing a mini-JCS with Colonel Hawkins, Colonel Beerli, and Captain Scapa working together to provide military expertise in all principal operational activities--land, sea, and air.

Providing retention copies of all important papers, requiring Presidential support or authorization to the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy to insure Presidential approval and understanding.

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Giving greater attention to the development of internal resistance elements inside Cuba and possibly placing a military man in charge of this activity as a co-equal to Colonel Hawkins. Hawkins could devote full time to military planning for the invasion.

Recognizing the limitations to maintaining plausible deniability.

As occurred with his testimony before the Taylor Committee, Bissell also made some comments to Kirkpatrick which, at best, were confusing--and at worst misleading and in error. One of the gravest errors concerned the discussion between the IG and Bissell on the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the necessity of air strikes. Bissell unfortunately gave credence to some hearsay that several members of the JCS thought that air support and control of the air were unimportant to the success of the operation. 86/ In fact, all five members of the JCS told the Taylor Committee that control of the air over Cuba was vital to the success of the operation. The Chief of Staff, USAF, General Thomas D. White, insisted that cancellation of the D-Day strike was "a very key factor" in the defeat of the operation. 87/

In addition to his criticism of the JCS's reputed lack of concern about the need for air support, Bissell specifically faulted General Lemnitzer and the Secretary of Defense for their failure to speak up when military aspects of the operation were questioned during various high level meetings. Bissell said that too frequently he, not the DOD representatives, was looked to for military expertise. He did say that if pushed for a response, McNamara usually supported CIA's position. 88/

Bissell did, however, emphasize that the restrictions that came to be imposed on the use of the Brigade's B-26's was a key factor in the failure of the invasion. With referemce to the

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force at Red Beach (Playa Larga), Bissell stated that the reason only half of the troops debarked from the Houston was:

...because of the lack of B-26's, because the B-26's cover could never be used for ground support to any great extent....If we had B-26's that were able to fly ground support missions I think it might have happened that way [that Castro's forces would have been prevented from using the access roads across the Zapata Swamp to reach the invasion sites]. 89/

The success of the Castro forces was insured when the D-Day air strike was cancelled and the B-26 operations were limited to the "immediate" beach area. As Bissell subsequently would recall, in the original D-Day plan the B-26's were intended specifically for ground support operations once the tactical strikes at the D-Day targets--particularly the airfields--had been completed. 90/ In fact, the original plan called for two B-26's to be on station over Cuba throughout D-Day.

Bissell did tend to confuse the story of air operations when he told the IG:

As you know, I've said in many places that one grave error we made was in not having a good many more B-26 air crews which would have made a very big difference...at the crucial time. 91/

Having more B-26 crews, like having had more B-26's, would have had no bearing on the outcome of the operation after the D-Day strike was cancelled. Once Castro's T-33's and Sea Furies were saved from a D-Day strike, having had additional numbers of B-26's and crews would have been meaningless.*

* The problem of not having planned for more B-26's and crews continued to bother Mr. Bissell for many years. In an interview with this writer in the late fall of 1975, he still faulted himself and others for not having had a larger inventory. 92/

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Kirkpatrick engaged Bissell in a lengthy discussion concerning the poor record of airdrops to dissident elements in Cuba. 93/ There was no denying that the record was extremely bad, but whether the fault was more on the side of the reception teams or the aircrews led to differences between the IG and the DDP. Bissell strongly defended the pilots--his point being that pilot performance had been tested over the months of training by US instructors.* Both he and Kirkpatrick did agree that lack of adequate communications between aircraft and reception parties was a major problem. Belaboring the obvious, Kirkpatrick specified that air drop operations had been dismal and that:

We are going to take all of the 27 scheduled clandestine drops and we're going to trace each one through from who was the ground party, what did they know about clandestine air drops, what had they been told about flare paths, the type of identification markers required, in turn who handled the information they gave out, that [sic] case officer, and find out how long a path it was. 94/

Exactly how such information was to be obtained from inside Cuba was not spelled out, but it seems obvious that the technical problems involved in such a survey would have been well beyond the competence of the IG team even under the best of conditions.

In the course of the interchange with Bissell, the IG consistently faulted the military planning for the operation but without suggesting any realistic alternatives to what Kirkpatrick

* There was serious reason to have doubt about the performance of the Cuban pilots on airdrop ops. One of the problems was that US personnel were prohibited from overflights of Cuba and could not check crews out under actual operating conditions.

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called--in an obvious put-down of Colonel Hawkins--"the dominant force in this case, the amphibious mentality." 95/ He and Bissell did agree, however, that the Agency needed a small, competent staff section in the DDP to be responsible for the development and planning of all paramilitary operations--land, sea, and air. 96/ In terms of the impact of outside pressures--particularly from the Department of State--for modifications of the operational plan, there was no apparent disagreement between the IG and the DDP.

The summary of the meeting between Kirkpatrick and Bissell which was prepared by Robert Shea for use by the other two members of the IG review team--Gib Dildine and Bob Shaffer--was a hatchet job of the first order intended to cut Bissell off at the knees. In the "Summary of Bissell's Comments" the number of absurdities is difficult to believe. Among the more flagrant examples:

1. Hawkins was clearly running the task force. It is interesting to note that Bissell refers to "Hawkins and Esterline", i.e., in that order. 97/

In fact there were only three references where both names were used by Bissell in the "and/or" context, and in two instances Esterline came first. More significant was Bissell's statement that: "What I had hoped ... on the DPD business was that Jake would treat Hawkins and Beerli as his two military commanders." This would indicate clearly that Esterline, not Hawkins, was running the task force. 98/

2. Bissell makes no mention of SI evidence of the roll-up of our agents. 99/

There apparently was no specific set of questions prepared for Kirkpatrick's interview with the DDP and since there was no particular reference to this point, there was no reason why Bissell

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should have introduced it. Moreover there is no evidence that such intelligence would have modified the invasion plan. Both D-2 and D-Day operations caught the Cubans by surprise.

3. Shea strongly faulted Bissell for failing to take some "extraordinary step" to alert the President to the need for air support after he heard that some JCS members believed that air support was unimportant to the operation. 100/

The point was that no such opinions were known to Bissell first hand, and, moreover, McGeorge Bundy, the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs was known to Bissell--and was on record--as a strong proponent of control of the air over Cuba. Bundy even had proposed pre-D-Day air strikes to insure such control prior to the time that the D-2 strike was developed. It is unlikely that Bundy would have failed to inform both the President and Bissell if there were serious differences on this matter between the JCS and the Agency.*

4. With reference to the change in concept from infiltration of small teams to assist and train anti-Castro elements to the invasion supported by aircraft, Shea picked out Bissell's comment that in the early fall of 1960 "two developments, really basically both of them unfavorable began to force our hands" and suggested that this implied that "the Agency was under pressure to deliver the victory." 101/

Shea was completely off-track in claiming that Bissell was suggesting that the Agency was being pressured "to deliver the victory." Bissell's "two developments" concerned the fact that between March and September 1960 the resistance potential in Cuba had not been developed to the point that had been anticipated--not

* As noted earlier in this volume, The Taylor Committee records show that the JCS members unanimously understood the need to control the air.

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only because the Agency's training program had been beset by difficulties (including some attributable to squabbling among the exile leadership over recruitment) but also by increasingly effective security measures being developed by Castro. In addition, as the anti-Castro task force was aware, the Agency estimative staffs--ONE and OCI in particular--were reporting improvement in Castro's armed forces, including the militia, and, also, lessened prospects for successful development of internal anti-Castro elements.

The improvement in Castro's security and armed forces also made it obvious to Esterline, Hawkins, and Bissell that the small-team concept had to be abandoned if the national policy of getting rid of Castro were to succeed. The shift to an air-supported amphibious invasion did not represent a reaction to pressure "to deliver the victory," but was a realistic change in concept designed to meet the changed situation within Cuba. Shea was attempting to read meanings into some of Bissell's phrases, some admittedly ill-chosen, which were not there.

5. Shea's memorandum also distorted Bissell's comments on the quality of the intelligence available during the course of planning. It was stated that, among other things, Bissell indicated: "Our intelligence was weak in certain respects: (1) in the estimate, which really was the JCS estimate, of how soon Castro could actually engage his forces; (2) in the estimate of Castro's will to fight; and (3) in the estimate of the degree of skill with which the Castro attack would be directed and coordinated.... Thus we thought the 1,400 man strike force could do the job." 102/

The IG inspection team member, Mr. Shea, completely ignored Bissell's reference to the JCS estimate of the time it would require for Castro's forces to come into contact with the invaders. Bissell's comment was:

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We were 100% on his weaponry. That is to say what kind of weapons he had and pretty much where he had them. The estimate, which really was a JCS estimate of how soon he could actually engage his forces was just about...[100%] these were the tangible factors.
103/*

In his comments about the will of Castro's forces to fight, the skill with which they were employed, and the belief that the invasion force was adequate, Mr. Bissell faulted himself and the Agency unjustly because Castro's forces were never tested against the operational plan. Most important, cancellation of the D-Day strike assured Castro complete control of the air and full freedom of maneuver without fear of interdiction by the B-26's.

6. As a final item concerning the IG's interview with the DDP, Mr. Shea also noted that: "Hawkins apparently thought Cochinos Bay was approximately as good as Trinidad before the invasion, but after the invasion he shifted his view." 104/

As noted with reference to his earlier testimony before the Taylor Committee, Mr. Bissell sometimes did himself and others more harm than good as a witness. This was a case in point for the transcript of his interview with the IG reports Bissell as saying:

Well, I have a memorandum from Jack Hawkins, and I think he's forgotten this one too, setting forth the advantages of Cochinos Bay; and I think it was Jack's judgment I know when he wrote that...that Cochinos Bay was approximately as good as the other. He slightly preferred Trinidad, but by a very small margin. This is one respect in which Jack's hindsight thinking is a little different and a little clearer than his foresight. 105/

Bissell did Colonel Hawkins a great disservice with the above comment. So strongly did Hawkins (and Esterline) feel when learning that the

* The ellipses in the quotation appear in the original text of the transcript of Bissell's meeting with the IG, and probably should have read [100% correct].

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Trinidad site was not acceptable to the President and the Secretary of State, that both gave serious consideration to resigning. 106/
 At no point after that is there support for the idea that Hawkins ever favored Zapata over Trinidad. Both Hawkins and Esterline--and the JCS--did believe that Zapata could be successful, not that it was ever a better choice than Trinidad.*

One other senior planner of the anti-Castro operation who was interviewed by Mr. Kirkpatrick was C. Tracy Barnes, ADDP/A. The date of the meeting between Kirkpatrick and Barnes may have been as early as 18 July 1961 and it was not later than 8 August.** The session was taped, and there is little question but that Barnes was both out of touch and out of focus on some of the issues raised by Kirkpatrick. It also is apparent from the transcript that the IG led Barnes into several booby traps where Barnes ended up apparently criticising Bissell, Hawkins, or Esterline. Such negative comments were given more credence than Barnes's straightforward praise of each of the three men for their dedication, competence, and efforts. As with other key personnel, the IG interview focused sharp criticism on the fact that political discussions pushed by the

* Interestingly enough when the writer interviewed Mr. Bissell in the fall of 1975, Bissell indicated that during the IG's survey, he had spent relatively little time with the investigators. He appeared reluctant to discuss the investigation, noting that DCI McCone had told him that the IG survey and DDP's response would be bound together. He closed off discussion of the subject by saying, "I don't remember very well Kirk's [IG survey]." 107/

** Kirkpatrick's Diary for 18 July 1961 noted: "Lunch with Mr. Barnes for a general discussion of the Cuban Operation." An Official Routing Slip from R.D. Shea of 8 August 1961 to other members of the IG team and to the IG pertains to the IG's session with Barnes.

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Department of State were responsible for the failure of the operation. As with other interviews he conducted, there was no indication that Kirkpatrick intended to limit his survey to the critique of internal Agency problems.

After reviewing the transcript of the IG's interview with Barnes, Robert Shea of the inspection team sent a memorandum to Kirkpatrick with the following note on the routing slip: "The Barnes memo is incomplete and obscure in many places. We believe it would be worth your time to fill in the gaps." 108/ Kirkpatrick deferred, suggesting that he would first review the transcript of his meeting with Bissell; and if gaps remained, he would review the record of the session with Barnes. Shea was insistent, however, and resubmitted the MR to the IG with the following remark: "Re T. Barnes' remarks: it would be helpful if you could go over my short memorandum, confirm its sufficiency, and add some clarification on the 7 points marked in red crayon." 109/

In focussing on Barnes's negative comments about the operation, the IG and his team failed to pick up on Barnes's reference to an apparent about face by one of President Kennedy's principal advisers, McGeorge Bundy, on the matter of the cancellation of the D-Day air strike. With reference to President Kennedy's decision to cancel the D-Day air strike because he "never understood the operational necessity of the air strike," Barnes reported that on the evening of 16 April 1961, he urged Bissell to "get ahold of Mac Bundy because he's on our side and he'll understand this. And just tell Mac to go to the President and tell him for Christ's sake that this [D-Day cancellation of air strike] is cockeyed." 110/ The point was that at the time of the

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cancellation of the D-Day strike, Barnes apparently was the only one who remembered what a consistently strong advocate Bundy had been for control of the air--even having suggested the launching of numerous pre-D-Day air strikes from Nicaragua in order to guarantee such control.

Barnes's recommendation that Bundy be called on for support presents an interesting problem. In his book on President Kennedy, Arthur Schlesinger wrote:

Rusk after his talks with Stevenson, concluded that a second Nicaraguan strike would put the United States in an untenable position internationally, and that no further strikes should be launched until the planes could fly (or appear to fly) from the beachhead. Bundy agreed, and they called the President at Glen Ora. 111/

If the Schlesinger report was accurate, then Bundy would have been of little help; and according to General Cabell, it appears that this was the case:

At about 9:30 p.m. on 16 April (D-1), I was called in the CIA Headquarters for the Cuban Operation by Special Assistant to the President, Mr. McGeorge Bundy. He notified me that we would not be able to launch air strikes the next morning [D-Day, 17 April] until they could be conducted from a strip within the beachhead. Any further consultation regarding this matter should be with the Secretary of State. 112/*

In a memorandum of 4 May 1961 to General Maxwell Taylor, however, Bundy forwarded for the official record of the Taylor Committee a revised and corrected version of the testimony he had

* General Cabell wrote the memo containing this information and Mr. Bissell signed the copy in concurrence with Cabell. Cabell repeated this information in essence in some personal notes found among his effects after his death. The references to Bundy were even stronger: "He [Bundy] made it quite clear to me that the decision had already been made by the President....Mr. Bundy further made it quite clear that the President had left for Glen Ora and that the Secretary of State would act for him." 113/.

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given on 1 May 1961 at the 7th meeting of the Committee. Included among other items in Bundy's memorandum were the following two comments: 114/

1) It was clearly understood that the air battle should be won.

2) In my meeting with General Taylor and his advisory group, I was asked about the decision not to permit an air strike by the Cuban invasion force early on Monday morning. This is a matter which arises from a conversation with the President and the Secretary of State, and I do not believe I am the right man to comment on it.

Based on Bundy's expressed position favoring pre-D-Day strikes and his understanding that "the air battle should be won," did his failure to respond to the Taylor Committee's question concerning the D-Day cancellation indicate that he, too, had been overridden by Rusk and did not wish to be responsible for creating a brouhaha within the Kennedy administration? There is no question that before he departed Washington on the evening of 16 April to go to New York to meet with Adlai Stevenson, Bundy had been made aware of the Agency's position. Dick Drain is reported to have said that:

McGeorge Bundy called Bissell, who said to him--in Drain's hearing--that there was every operational reason against such cancellation. Bundy, who was just leaving for New York to hold Stevenson's hand, told Bissell to go see Rusk. 115/

Unfortunately, however, the question of Bundy's apparent change of position on the importance of the air strikes was never followed up.

Although he was not officially in the chain of command in WH/4, Colonel J.C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division played an active and responsible role in the Agency's anti-Castro

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operation; and he, too, had a session with Mr. Kirkpatrick.* Despite the many requirements which were placed on him by Bissell and Barnes, Colonel King said that too often he was informed of meetings pertinent to WHD interest only because Jake Esterline kept him informed. King was upset particularly following the change of administration in January 1961 because he, and frequently Esterline and Hawkins, were excluded from high-level meetings on operational and other matters about which he or they were most knowledgeable. As one case in point, King contended that he had been unable to convince the Department of State that a full-scale, air supported amphibious operation supported by the US which ousted Castro would have been welcomed by Latin America. To prove his point, King cited the relatively minor nature of the anti-US protests which had followed the D-2 air strike and the invasion of Cuba.

King told the IG that the caliber of personnel sent to WH/4 generally was quite high, noting particularly personnel assigned from the Deputy Director for Support (DDS); but he agreed with Kirkpatrick that Colonels Egan and Hawkins--both military assignees--had given short shrift to developing the guerrilla potential inside Cuba, concentrating instead on the strike force.

* In his interview with the IG, Tracy Barnes claimed that although he was never in the chain of command that J.C. King "was never really out of the chain of command." ^{116/} Although King was Esterline's superior in LA Division, Esterline was authorized direct contact with DDP Bissell from the inception of the operation. Based on the records, however, it is apparent that Esterline was conscientious about keeping King informed of developments. King's most significant contributions were in the area of political organization among the anti-Castro factions in the US rather than in paramilitary planning. King also had been put in the background during the Guatemalan episode in 1954 which also had been directed by Esterline.

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King also pushed strongly for the use of US contract pilots for air operations in the future and lamented that the DPD element had not been subject to operational command of WH/4. 117/ King's responses to the IG appear to have been designed consciously to be protective of his Latin America Division, even at the expense of the WH/4 task force and particularly Colonels Hawkins and Egan who were responsible for planning the military operations and training the Cuban brigade for the invasion.

Considering that the interviews which Mr. Kirkpatrick and his team had with the most senior personnel in the anti-Castro task force focused in large part on CIA's relations with the White House and State and the disastrous modifications which they imposed on the operational plan, it is necessary to examine the testimony of other witnesses for an explanation of the criticism of the task force which characterized the IG's final report. One of the most severe castigations of the WH/4 leadership came from [redacted] (b)(3) ex-Chief of SI support for the project during an interview with Shea on 4 August 1961. For whatever reasons, [redacted] (b)(3) himself a wounded, decorated, combat veteran of World War II, claimed that Colonel Jack Hawkins was "the strong mind, the dominant one" who led Esterline and company down the road to defeat. [redacted] (b)(3) claimed that none of WH/4's principals were sufficiently trained in clandestine "tradecraft," and that all failed to make proper use of the intelligence coming in through FI/SI channels. He also stated that this information was ignored by WH/4. [redacted] (b)(3) parochial view prevented him from understanding that the same pictures of Castro's improved internal security and military postures were available to WH/4 from the more comprehensive estimates of ONE and

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OCI--estimates which were based on all source intelligence, including SI.

[redacted] made much of the so-called "Mexico City message" of 13 April 1961 which purportedly indicated that the Soviets had learned that the invasion was set for 17 April. Although charging that it was ignored by the project's leaders [redacted] himself overlooked the fact that even if Castro had been informed of this date, no Cuban troops were waiting on the beaches in the Bahia de Cochinos for the invading force. In an apparent display of tradecraft paranoia, [redacted] stated that NSA had copies of all the CIA messages and would use the information against the Agency--how and to what end were not specified. Finally [redacted] suggested, for whatever reason is unfathomable, that Agency employees should be told that the operation failed because the Agency screwed up, not because the President cancelled the D-Day air strike. At least three of the charges made by [redacted] found their way into the IG's final report:

That Col. Hawkins was pushing the operation, but had neither the training nor the talent to make it work.

That proper use of FI materials could have helped to avoid planning errors.

That project leaders were guilty of substituting their subjective views of enemy intentions for realistic appraisals of his capabilities. 118/*

* [redacted] boss, William Harvey, Chief, FID also was interviewed by a member of the IG team; and even though he was in no way involved in the operation, Harvey also charged that SI information was being ignored. He claimed that he told Barnes and Bissell that SI showed that there would be no Cuban uprising "unless the invasion was a complete success." This point, of course, was obvious to WH/4. Harvey also included some obscure reference to making his information available to Richard Helms, C/OPS/DDP; and made a particularly stupid remark that "J.C. King, as Chief of Division, should have followed the project closely and continuously." Col. King, of course, followed every move throughout the course of the operation. Some of Harvey's guff about Helms and King also got into the IG's report. 119/

Mr. Shea conducted another interview with a decorated, wounded combat veteran of World War II who was a member of WH/4 and, like [redacted] was particularly disenchanted with Col. Jack Hawkins. Edward Stanulis who was Jake Esterline's deputy, claimed that Hawkins believed the US Marines should have been running the operation. Apparently Stanulis found this idea objectionable and he charged that Hawkins "hated the Agency and had no feeling for anything of a clandestine nature." This charge would seem to have misinterpreted Hawkins's displeasure with various CIA administrative procedures and chain of command confusion with hatred of the Agency. Based on the IG team's interview with Stanulis, it appears that he may have been chagrined that Hawkins--an outsider--was put in charge of paramilitary planning rather than Stanulis himself.

(b)(3)

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Another of the principals from WH/4 who was interviewed by Robert Shea of the IG team was Colonel Frank Egan (USA) who was in charge of the paramilitary ground training activity. Egan's remarks generally paralleled his testimony before the Taylor Committee--he faulted the lack of centralized control, the independence of DPD, interference from State, lack of a joint operation with DOD, and General Cabell's ineptness. Egan supported the operational plan as developed for Trinidad and lamented the series of amendments which led to adoption of the Zapata plan. Egan was particularly critical of the Agency for failing to talk directly to the President and of both General Lemnitzer and Admiral Burke for their failure to protest vigorously the cancellation of the D-Day air strike. 121/

More to the point, Egan might have criticized General Cabell

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specifically for his failure to get in touch with his military counterparts on the JCS immediately upon leaving the meeting with Rusk at the time of the D-Day cancellation.

Mr. Shea also was responsible for conducting an interview with [] a senior PM officer who was assigned to WH/4 for only three months in the very early stage of the program (mid-May to mid-August) in 1960. Strangely enough, the record of the interview with []--which was conducted eleven months after his tour--was one of the most detailed that was prepared for the IG, exclusive of the records of meetings with project principals. Even stranger is the fact that much of what [] had to complain about--his session was truly one of "bitching and moaning"--found its way into the IG's report. [] claimed that he volunteered for the project with grave reservations, and it is apparent that the problems he anticipated became self-fulfilling.

In his three month sojourn, [] determined that there was "complete lack of direction and command in the project; the operational plan was nothing short of ludicrous; ...and...there was poor selection of personnel." ^{122/} Reading the record of the three hour interview makes one wonder whether the IG interviewer or [] was most in need of mental health counseling. All was wrong with the world and only right with [] All of the personnel affiliated with WH/4, with the possible exception of Esterline, who was a marginal case, were incompetent at best. Colonel Egan "snowed" Esterline and the others; Stanulis was "a disposal case, a great talker, 100% hot air;" Colonel King, "a top sergeant, used to playing dictator;" Barnes couldn't take a position "or make concrete

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suggestions," and Chick Barquin (a DPD assignee was was involved in planning the deception phase of the D-2 air strike) "suffers from a personality difficulty."

[] had fixed on some strange version of the initial op plan which had the small teams, which would be infiltrated into Cuba, marching their followers toward Havana and being joined by peasants eager to oust Castro; and he was sharply critical of "some 30 unsuccessful air drops"--none of which were attempted prior to [] departure from WH/4! He also commented that "Esterline and company attempted the impossible in setting arbitrary dates for the invasion. This demonstrated a complete lack of understanding of the problem."

In terms of the final IG report, elements of [] testimony are apparent in the criticisms concerning failure to develop internal resistance elements in Cuba; deficiencies in the chain of command; doubts [] to lead WH/4; analysis of SI; Richard Helms's role; and the caliber of personnel assigned to WH/4. Why such weight was given to Mr.

[] remarks is puzzling. Equally puzzling was the interviewer's comment about []

[] made the foregoing comments in a calm, dispassionate manner. He professes to have no hard feelings against anybody in WH/4. He says that the operation of the project and its failure caused him deep concern, which he still feels strongly although he has been away from the project for a year.... He thinks that it will be years before the bad effects of the Cuban fiasco wear off. I think that his comments and view deserve considerable weight.... He said he would be glad to return for further discussion, if and when necessary. 123/*

* This comment by Shea plus the language of the IG's Survey suggest that Shea was the principal author of the IG's final report. It also suggests that perhaps Mr. Shea's "personal problems" (noted earlier in this chapter) were mental.

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The [] interview was the extreme example of an obviously deliberate attempt by one of the IG survey team to give the worst possible marks to those who ran the Bay of Pigs operation. Unfortunately, however, review of the records of the other interviews reveals that the IG team not only seemed determined to find fault whenever possible, but also seems to have selected some of the most marginal witnesses conceivable in order to get the desired results. Among such cases were the following:

(b)(3)

1. Dildine's session with Al Cox:

One of the Agency's paramilitary specialists, Cox, who had no role in the BOP, was more than willing to talk about matters which were out of his bailiwick, and suggested some political interference with Esterline's work from Vice President Nixon and William D. Pawley.

The insinuation regarding Nixon was groundless and the Pawley connection was a useful channel between the project and the Cuban exile organizations. 124/*

2. The Director of Training's report that there was considerable adverse criticism about the management of the Cuban operation from training officers who had been involved in the project:

One of the training critics was a man who, after spending only four days at a base, extensively criticized the organizational set up of the base. Others were "old hands" who were sent to operational bases or foreign areas and worked under new and different conditions. In two other instances where specialists were misassigned, one individual--a security and logistics type--said that having to provide assistance in ordnance and sabotage training had made him a direct asset to the project; and an air operations trainer who was forced to provide paramilitary training for a continually growing cadre on a crash basis had no complaints, recognizing the immediacy of the need. 125/

* Pfeiffer, Jack B., "President Nixon's Role in the Bay of Pigs Operation" (Draft MSS), Jan 84, refutes the suggestion that Mr. Nixon played any significant role in the Bay of Pigs planning or operation.

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3. More than thirty memorandums of interviews with Miami Base personnel:

Selective extractions critical of the operation--need for more autonomy at Miami, lack of Spanish language capability, and more positive, long-range planning--were included in the final IG report in lieu of the equal number of favorable items--high morale, well qualified personnel, good support from Headquarters--which might have been cited. 126/

As one final note concerning the interviews by the Inspector General and the members of his review team, all of the sessions with the most senior personnel and a majority of the interviews with others emphasized that external factors rather than internal CIA failures led to the collapse of the invasion effort. That the IG report could so cavalierly disregard the external pressures and, at the same time, claim to be providing a meaningful report was ridiculous on the face of it. Just how ridiculous will be discussed in the following section.

4. Conclusions and Recommendations

For all practical purposes the IG's investigating team revealed its basic conclusions as early as 20 August 1961 when it proposed that, among other items, the DCI be asked to comment on the following:

It is the general view of the investigating team that the project was ill-conceived, badly administered, poorly led, and that tradecraft doctrine was violated on a massive scale. Our report will reflect this view in detail, with a great deal of supporting evidence. 127/

Mr. Kirkpatrick, too, had made known his displeasure with the operation even prior to transmitting the survey to Mr. McCone and Mr. Dulles. A note from the diary of the Deputy Director for Support, L.K. White of 11 October 1961, stated:

Dick Bissell raised a question this morning about Project USEFUL. He said that some of the people in the Clandestine Services had become quite excited about remarks attributed to the Inspector General alleging that there had been a failure of intelligence in the Cuban affair. 128/

Officially, however, the first conclusion was that when the scale of operation escalated from the training of guerrilla cadres to work with the dissidents inside Cuba to an air supported invasion, plausible deniability went out the window. The operators failed to recognize that the effort was both beyond CIA's responsibility and its capability, and failed to back off. This conclusion was almost identical to one of the findings of the Taylor Committee.

The second conclusion continued the theme that because of its concentration on the planned invasion the Agency failed: "To appraise the chances of success realistically.... To keep the national policymakers adequately and realistically informed of the conditions considered essential for success, and...[to] press sufficiently for prompt policy decisions in a fast moving situation." This finding, too, was very similar to that of the Taylor Committee and paradoxically, it extended the scope of Kirkpatrick's findings beyond events within control of the Agency.*

The third and fourth conclusions of the IG's survey referred to the Agency's relationships with the Cubans in terms of what the Inspector General regarded as the Agency's failure to take advantage

* Even as the Taylor Committee was beginning its investigation, Kirkpatrick had written a Memorandum for the Record noting that failure to control the air over Cuba was the principal reason for the failure of the operation. 129/ Obviously he fully understood that the Agency could not make national policy and it is difficult to understand how he came to believe that his attempt to study the Agency's role could be segregated from such policy.

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of the "active participation" of the Cuban leadership and also the Agency's failure to develop any strong resistance elements inside Cuba. These issues were touched on, but not stressed to the same degree, in the findings of the Taylor Committee.

The fifth conclusion stated: "The Agency failed to collect adequate information on the strengths of the Castro regime and the extent of the opposition to it; and it failed to evaluate the available information correctly." The findings of the Taylor committee did touch in part on the failure of the Agency to properly evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the Castro regime, but the IG's statement presented an obvious paradox for if there was no collection of "adequate information," then "correct" evaluation of "available information" would have been meaningless. The more significant problem here was not that the Agency failed to collect adequate information, but that the Agency failed to make fuller use of the information and resources which were available within the Intelligence Directorate of the CIA. Use of such resources could have avoided the problem (noted by Kirkpatrick) of the operators doing their own intelligence analysis, but whether greater interaction between DDP and DDI analysts would have led to cancellation of the invasion is questionable because the WH/4 planners did make use of the available NIEs and SNIEs.

The remaining conclusions concerned bad organization, poor quality of staffing, inadequate assets (in personnel and materiel), and lack of clear plans and policies. The IG report hoped that the experience that had been gained in the course of the anti-Castro operation would henceforth be put into practice. The Inspector

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General's report devoted three pages to pointing out how, in past years, the Inspector General had made numerous recommendations on the proper manner of conducting covert operations only to have them completely ignored during the course of the Bay of Pigs operation. Moreover, according to Kirkpatrick's report, many of the suggestions for improvement which had been made applied specifically to activities of the Deputy Directorate for Plans and the Western Hemisphere Division in particular. The IG's report modestly stated that: "The study of the Cuban operation shows that these criticisms and many others discussed in previous Inspector General Surveys are still valid and worthy of review." 130/

The Inspector General's survey then made ten recommendations preceded by a statement which read as follows:

The Inspector General, as a result of his study of the Cuban operations, makes the following recommendations regarding future Agency involvement in covert operations which have major international significance and which may profoundly effect the course of world events. 131/

Mr. Kirkpatrick's recommendations were:

1. Such an operation should be carried out by a carefully selected task force, under the command of a senior official of stature on a full-time basis, and organizationally outside the DDP structure but drawing on all the resources of the Clandestine Services.
2. The Agency should request that such projects should be transferred to the Department of Defense when they show signs of becoming overt or beyond Agency capabilities.

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3. The Agency should establish a procedure under which the Board of National Estimates or other bodies similarly divorced from clandestine operations would be required to evaluate all plans for such major covert operations, drawing on all available intelligence and estimating the chances of success from an intelligence point of view.
4. The Agency should establish a high-level board of senior officers from its operational and support components, plus officers detailed from the Pentagon and the Department of State, to make cold, hard appraisals at recurring intervals of the chances of success of major covert projects from an operational point of view.
5. A mechanism should be established for communicating these intelligence and operational appraisals to the makers of national policy.
6. In return, a mechanism should be established to communicate to the Agency the national policy bearing on such projects, and the Agency should not undertake action until clearly defined policy has been received.
7. The Agency should improve its system for the guided collection of information essential to the planning and clearing out of such projects.
8. The Agency should take immediate steps to eliminate the deficiencies in its clandestine air and maritime operations.
9. The Agency should take steps to improve its employees' competence in foreign languages, knowledge of foreign areas, and capability in dealing with foreign people, when such skills are necessary.
10. The Agency should devise a more orderly system for the assignment of employees within the DDP area than that currently in use. 132/

Even a reviewer unfamiliar with the furor which the Inspector General's report caused at both the DCI and DDP levels probably could detect the personal element in Recommendation No. 1 where the selection of the Inspector General himself as the "senior official of stature" might perfectly have met the requirements set forth. Certainly, too, the Inspector General would be an obvious choice for

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membership on any joint board of review (Recommendation No. 4) called on to evaluate the chances of success of planned covert operations. With no axe to grind and as a member of the senior reviewing board, who would be in a better position to transmit to and receive from national policymakers views about ongoing covert operations impacting on national policy?

C. The Question of Intent

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, upon completion of the survey, the Inspector General forwarded a copy to John A. McCone by a memorandum dated 20 November 1960. Mr. McCone had been named by President Kennedy as the replacement for Director Dulles, but he did not officially assume the office of Director of Central Intelligence until 29 November 1961.* The Inspector General's survey carried a date of October 1961. The final paragraph of Kirkpatrick's memorandum of transmittal to McCone read:

This, in my opinion, is a fair report even though highly critical. Unfortunately, there has been a tendency in the Agency to gloss over CIA's inadequacies and to attempt to fix all of the blame for the failure of the invasion upon other elements of the Government, rather than to recognize the Agency's weaknesses reflected in this report. Consequently I will make no additional distribution of this report until you indicate whom you wish to have copies. In this connection, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board has requested a copy in time for Mr. Coyne to give a brief report on

* According to Kirkpatrick's Diary (20 September 1961): "[J. Patrick] Coyne called and...mentioned that among the names as potential candidates for Director had been: John McCone, Gerry Ford, Max Millican [sic], and Andy Goodpaster."

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it at their December 9 meeting. I will await your wishes in this regard.*

In their contributions to the CIA historical program, both Kenneth Greer and Wayne Jackson have stressed that the delivery of the Inspector General's survey to Mr. McCone rather than to Mr. Dulles, who not only was still Director of Central Intelligence, but who also had directed that the Inspector General's survey be done, was at least unusual; and Jackson reported that Mr. Dulles was unaware of the fact that the IG's survey had been completed until he was so informed by Mr. McCone. 133**

* For a complete copy of the IG's memo to Mr. McCone, see Appendix B. J. Patrick Coyne was the Executive Secretary of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Kirkpatrick's Diary for 25 April 1961 reported that "Coyne came over for a briefing on the Cuban operation." One must wonder why Kirkpatrick was called on for this and why he accepted.

** The Greer and Jackson discussions of the IG survey obviously suffered because neither author had access to the Taylor Committee report which would have provided them with a better basis for comparative judgments. In addition, both had strong antipathy toward Kirkpatrick. Greer's review of the survey, however, is full of inexcusable errors which, at best, reflect sloppy research. Among other demonstrable errors were the following: 134

1. That all the backup papers used in compiling the IG survey were destroyed:

As a former member of the IG staff, it is difficult to understand why Greer was unable to recover the plethora of such material that a persistent, non-IG researcher obtained.

2. That "a review of Kirkpatrick's diary failed to find any entries relating to this survey between the date the survey began [27 April 1961] and the date the report was submitted [20 November 1961]":

There are numerous references in the diary to matters pertaining to the ongoing review.

3. That a comment from an IG inspection team member that "Kirkpatrick did not follow the course of the survey closely" was accepted at face value:

Kirkpatrick's diary shows that he had numerous meetings with the inspectors, raised questions about the review, and offered suggestions.

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The only possible explanation of a non-controversial nature that can be offered for Kirkpatrick's action in sending the first copy of his report to McCone rather than Dulles has been found in the following entry in Kirkpatrick's diary for 30 October 1961:

Earman [John, EO/DCI] called to report that Mr. McCone and General Cabell would move into the new building on 20 November and that Mr. Dulles would stay here [2430 E Street, NW] and that he thought this would be the takeover date.

Perhaps the IG acted on the basis of this information, and he simply goofed--in which case some sort of apology or explanation would seem to have been in order, but neither was offered.

According to excerpts from Kirkpatrick's diary, he received a call from McCone on 23 November 1961 "to ask that I give immediate distribution of the Cuba report to Dulles, which I said I would do;" and on 24 November 1961, the IG's diary reported that: "Earman called to ask who had prepared the Cuba report and what material we had access to and I sent him a memo on it." Whether a result of the telephone call from Earman or the telephone call from McCone on 24 November, Kirkpatrick prepared a memorandum for Mr. Dulles forwarding him a copy of the Inspector General's survey. In this memorandum, as noted earlier in this chapter, Kirkpatrick described the procedures and the materials used in the preparation of his survey.*

A memorandum for the record of 28 November 1961 from the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence was indicative of the displeasure engendered by the IG's survey. General Cabell wrote:

* See Appendix C for a copy of this memorandum.

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General Cabell called Mr. Kirkpatrick to state that the fact of the IG's report on Cuba should be restricted on a must need-to-know basis. No copies other than those that have been distributed to Mr. McCone, Mr. Dulles, General Cabell, Mr. Bissell, Colonel King, and Mr. Esterline will be distributed without authority of the DCI or the DDCI.

This restriction also specifically applies to the distribution to the President's Board of Intelligence Advisors, and Mr. Kirkpatrick so informed 27 November.

General Cabell has discussed holding this report tightly with Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bissell, and the latter is to pass on the guidance to Colonel King and Mr. Esterline. (Accomplished per report to DDCI 27 November). 135/

By 1 December 1961, it appeared as though Kirkpatrick was aware that he had been caught in the fallout which had been precipitated by the survey. In a memorandum to Mr. McCone he stated:

In our conversation on Friday morning, the 1st of December, you mentioned your concern that the Inspector General's report on the Cuban Operation, taken alone, might give an erroneous impression as to the extent CIA is responsible for the failure of the operation. In my opinion, the failure of the operation should be charged in order to the following factors:

- a. An over-all lack of recognition on the part of the US Government as to the magnitude of the operation required to overthrow the Fidel Castro regime.
- b. The failure on the part of the US government to plan for all contingencies at the time of the Cuban operation, including the necessity for using regular US military forces in the event that the exiled Cubans could not do the job themselves.
- c. The failure on the part of the US government to be willing to commit to the Cuban operation, as planned and executed, those necessary resources required for its success. 136/

From placing the full blame for the failure of the Cuban operation on the CIA as had been done in the IG's survey, Kirkpatrick now shifted his ground and attempted to put the monkey

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on the back of "the US Government." By the fall of 1963, however, he was again suggesting to McCone that CIA was responsible for the failure at the Bay of Pigs; and after he had been retired from the Agency for some years, Kirkpatrick had fully reverted to the position which had been taken in the Inspector General's survey--that the Agency was principally, if not solely, to blame for the failure of the Bay of Pigs operation. 137/

On 15 December 1961, even as there was some indication that Kirkpatrick might have been modifying his views about Agency responsibility, General Cabell, who retained his position as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence during the early part of the McCone administration, fired the following broadside at Kirkpatrick's report in a memorandum to DCI McCone.

To comment on the subject report in detail would result in a paper approaching in length, that of the survey itself. Such a commentary would have to deal in depth with the aim of the survey, its scope, and the method used in compiling it. Such a commentary would, at a large number of pages, be required to note inaccuracies, omissions, distortions, unsupported allegations, and many erroneous conclusions.

A detailed inquiry on the Cuban operation on elements other than clandestine tradecraft, has already been completed by the group headed by General Taylor. General Taylor's report was based on testimony by all the principal officers involved in the Cuban operation. The Inspector General's report is not based on complete testimony; some of its conclusions are in conflict with General Taylor's conclusions.

It is not clear what purpose the Inspector General's report is intended to serve. If it intended primarily as an evaluation of the Agency's role, it is deficient. Neither Mr. Dulles nor I was consulted in the preparation of the Inspector General's report. As a result, there are many unnecessary inaccuracies.

The report tries to do both too much and too little. On the one hand it attempts to describe the processes

of national security policy-making as though this were a process in logical deduction like working a problem in geometry. According to the Inspector General's account, firm propositions should be laid down in writing and in advance from which correct conclusions as to proper actions must inevitably be drawn. In this respect the report was far beyond the analysis of the Agency's role and it is not accurate. It tries to do too much.

On the other hand the report treats the preparations for the April landings as if these were the only activities directed against Castro and his influence throughout the hemisphere and the world. It chooses to ignore all other facets of the Agency's intelligence collection and covert actions program which preceded, accompanied, and have followed the landings in April 1961. Thus, it does too little.

The report misses objectivity by a wide margin. In unfriendly hands, it can become a weapon unjustifiably to attack the entire mission, organization, and functioning of the Agency. It fails to cite the specific achievements of persons associated with the operation and presents a picture of unmitigated and almost willful bumbling and disaster.

In its present form, this is not a useful report for anyone inside or outside the Agency. If complete analysis beyond that already accomplished by General Taylor and his group is still required, then a new kind of report is called for--a report with clear terms of reference based on complete testimony. Such a report could concentrate on clandestine tradecraft, an asset for which the Agency remains uniquely responsible. 138/*

By early January 1962 Kirkpatrick knew that in addition to the criticism from General Cabell, the DDP was undertaking a critical review of the IG's survey. It also was clear that Mr. McCone had some reservations about the nature of the charges which had been raised by Kirkpatrick. On 4 January 1962, Kirkpatrick's diary reported:

* The original of this memorandum was earmarked for Mr. Earman for the Director of Central Intelligence and another copy was earmarked for Mr. Dulles.

At the Deputies meeting the DCI said that he was under pressure from the Attorney General and the Killian Board for copies of the IG's report on the Cuban operation and that inasmuch as this occurred before he assumed responsibilities, he was going to send the report over with the responses to it bound with it. He noted that he had the DDCI's comment but he did not have the DDP's. Helms said that Bissell, Barnes, King, and Esterline were working on this and that Barnes had advised they would probably have it by the end of this week. 139/

The DDP response was dated 18 January 1962, and was transmitted from Mr. Bissell through General Cabell to Mr. McCone. As General Cabell had predicted, the DDP's response was almost as long as the IG's survey and will be the subject of the next chapter.

Paradoxically, even as the IG was blasting Mr. Bissell and the DDP for "the Bay of Pigs fiasco," Kirkpatrick was directly involved in a covert scheme intended to brighten the Agency's tarnished image. This episode began slightly more than a week after both the Taylor Committee and the IG investigations began. On 8 May 1961, Kirkpatrick's diary noted: "Called Wallace [R.] Deuel and asked if he would get together with Grayson [sic] Lynch to write the true story of the Cuban handling [sic]." The Kirkpatrick diary for 5 July 1961 stated: "Deuell [sic] called and said he had the story of the Cuban invasion finished and would send it up."

The IG's diary contains no further reference to the Deuel report, but a 29 September 1961 Memorandum for the Record from Robert D. Shea--a member of the IG inspection team--read in part as follows:

In June 1961, Deuel, formerly a well-known foreign correspondent for the Chicago Daily News, was requested to write the story of the invasion. He did this in about three weeks, chiefly by debriefing Grayson [sic] Lynch, who is not a "word man." The result was a 52-page article entitled "The Invasion of Cuba: A Battle Report," dated 4 July 1961, of

which we have a copy. The request to do this job, which was transmitted to him by Mr. Kirkpatrick, resulted from a suggestion made by Admiral Burke, or another of the Joint Chiefs, in the presence of General Taylor, the DCI, and J.C. K[ing], that the true story should be written and published in order to counteract the untrue accounts that were circulating. A copy of the article was sent to General Taylor, who forwarded it to State and DOD for clearance. State's reply, under date of 6 September 1961, was that they were against circulating this sort of article and disapproved of the contents. Deuel said that he is glad that the article was thus killed, as he felt that it was somewhat fuzzy, due to the fact that it was not slanted for any particular magazine. 140/*

At best this was an interesting diversion from the IG's assigned responsibility to ascertain the truth about the Bay of Pigs operation. Investigation of this subject revealed that on 28 July and 1 August 1961, Thomas A. Parrott--an Agency employee assigned to the White House and also the Executive Secretary of the Special Group on Cuba--forwarded a copy of "Battle Report" and a memorandum about the report to General Taylor seeking support for discussing publication of the article in Life magazine. 141/ On 18 August 1961, Thomas Schreyer, Deputy Chief, Covert Action, DDP, forwarded copies of the report to Joseph Scott, Department of State, and General Edward Lansdale, Department of Defense with a memorandum suggesting that:

Thought has been given to the desirability of using this story as an outline for an article or series of articles to appear in some American publication. The objective of such publication would be to cast a new, somewhat more favorable light on the Cuban affair. 142/

* Deuel was a CIA staff employee at this time.

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On 11 September 1961, H. Bartlett Wells of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State addressed a memorandum to Schreyer and General Lansdale saying:

The Department of State holds strongly to the view that there should be no further encouragement by official agencies of stories on this subject until there is some change in the situation in Cuba. The Department of State does not approve use of the material contained in the attachment to Mr. Schreyer's memorandum. 143/

The question of publication of "Battle Report" dragged on until the last day of October 1961 when Mr. Parrott returned the DCI's copy of the proposed report to Tom Schreyer and his (Parrott's) memo to Taylor with the note that, "I guess this is dead for all practical purposes so am returning it herewith." Considering the overblown account of the "heroic Cubans" seeking to oust Castro, it is well that this story has remained buried in CIA files.*

Both Greer and Jackson indicated that the IG's survey took the form that it did because Kirkpatrick wanted Bissell's job. This apparently simplistic view probably was basically at the heart of the matter. By focusing exclusively on internal CIA affairs, the failure of the Bay of Pigs operation could be laid on Mr. Bissell. Had the IG's investigation taken cognizance of the changes imposed on the plan by the White House and the Department of State, Bissell would look to be less the villain. At risk of venturing into

* The proposed article was based in large part on the after action reports that Grayston Lynch and Rip Robertson had prepared at the time of the Taylor Committee hearings. Although the writer has found no evidence that Dulles was involved in this episode, it is difficult--in view of his close contact with Kirkpatrick prior to the release of the IG's survey--to believe that the DCI was ignorant of the plan.

psychohistory, a part of the explanation of why Kirkpatrick wanted Bissell's job is that he believed (perhaps correctly) that if he had not become physically handicapped when his career was in its ascendancy, he would have been named DDP before Bissell.*

Simplistic explanations aside, there is evidence in the IG records which clearly indicates that despite the cordial nature of their interview on the Bay of Pigs operation, Kirkpatrick wanted Bissell out as DDP. This was made apparent in one of the entries in the IG's diary shortly after both the Taylor Committee's and the IG's investigations of the Bay of Pigs were initiated. Among other items which he discussed with Mr. Dulles concerning the Cuban operation was the following:

We also talked about some of the problems in the DD/P and I urged that if Bissell stays on, a good professional be his Deputy if it was impossible for him and Helms to work together. I told him that I would be willing to take that job if he wished, or any job, as I had been IG for eight years and thought a change might be appropriate. He told me that they were giving thought of sending Helms to Europe and possibly bringing [redacted] back to be Deputy, although he was skeptical whether [redacted] could handle the job and I told him that the most important thing for the DD/P was to get somebody who could run it. 144/

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Prior to the completion of his survey, Mr. Kirkpatrick apparently was rated quite highly on DCI Dulles's list. In late August 1961, in the course of another visit to his office by Mr. Dulles, the IG reported:

* At the time that he was stricken with polio in mid-1952, Mr. Kirkpatrick was Chief of Operations, DDP. Soon after his return to active duty in early 1953, Mr. Kirkpatrick became Inspector General. It was common knowledge that he retained a strong affinity for operations.

He then talked about Bissell's plans and said that he had a paper from Defense proposing the establishment of an office there to handle advanced projects with Bissell in charge. I told him I had heard that Bissell was inclined to go to the Institute of Defense Analysis. He then started to talk about candidates for the Directorship from within and mentioned that he was pushing Tracy Barnes and asked if I had any views on who else besides myself was qualified. He mentioned that he didn't think Amory was acceptable because of his indiscretions and public advocacy of the recognition of Communist China. 145/*

Unfortunately, the IG did not record his responses concerning either Mr. Barnes or Mr. Amory. Considering the strange interview that Kirkpatrick had with Barnes on the BOP operation, the thought of Barnes as Bissell's successor must have been shocking!

Kirkpatrick's diary continued to make note of Mr. Bissell's status, particularly references to positions outside the Agency where he might be employed. 147/ In early October 1961, when Allen Dulles indicated the possibility that new DCI, John McCone, probably would not make any changes in the Agency hierarchy except for a new DDCI, Kirkpatrick's true feelings about Bissell were revealed. His diary stated:

The DCI raised the question of the new Director and had Walter Elder come in and brief me on the differences that Mr. McCone had with Dr. Killian, a story which had been given to him by Charles Murphy. When Elder left, the DCI said that he thought Mr. McCone was not going to make any changes except that of the DDCI. I then asked him what he thought the appropriate actions of his senior lieutenants should be and said that I was giving consideration to submitting my resignation so that McCone could either

* At the beginning of the Kennedy administration, Bissell was seriously considered for the post of Deputy Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, but he deferred to President Kennedy's wish that, for a while at least, he continue in CIA. 146/

make a change or re-appoint me. The DCI violently disagreed with this and said that he thought it would be a very bad precedent.

I then went on to say that it distressed me to hear that no changes were to be made because the situation in the Clandestine Services was critical. I told him that while I thought Dick Bissell was a brilliant man, that I also felt he had no managerial capacity. I said that we were looking at DPD and found it to be badly organized, badly run, and with rather mediocre personnel. I pointed out that I had just been out to the Watertown Base in which the most important element was security, and that in my humble opinion it had no security. I said we were just completing the Cuban survey and that this indicated extremely poor management in all respects.

The Director then went on to say that he couldn't but agree with me and asked what I thought should be done with Bissell. I said that if he were to continue in the organization that he should be moved back to special assistant to the Director and run such projects as the one he is now working on with Charyk. I told him that if this wasn't done, we might end up without a Clandestine Service and that many of the good officers down there were simply waiting to see what was going to happen and that if no changes were made, they would leave. I told him that I had many calls from Clandestine Service people asking to have lunch and that they all were very concerned about the situation.

The DCI then asked me who the "good, young men" were, and I cited the names of several but mentioned that we were going to lose the good, young men because there was deadwood among the supergrades and that we ought to get rid of them before we could start pushing good, young men along. He then said that he thought maybe he should make some changes before McCone came in and asked what I thought about it. I told him that I was extremely enthusiastic and would be glad to prepare some recommendations for him. He told me to go ahead. 148/

This record of the IG's obvious dislike of Bissell is, perhaps, the best evidence available to explain the strange approach taken by the IG's survey of the Bay of Pigs. It also is interesting that in his first interview with any of the principal officers involved in the operation--Colonel Hawkins, Dick Drain, and Jake Esterline--some of Kirkpatrick's antipathy toward Bissell may have

become apparent. Otherwise it is difficult to explain why, at the end of their session with the IG, both Jake Esterline and Jack Hawkins apparently felt compelled to volunteer the following remarks about Bissell. Esterline said:

I would like to make one comment for the record to be used any way you see fit. I consider that Bissell has been one of the few outstanding people that I have seen operate with courage under all circumstances and I would hate to see the future of this Agency--to see anything happen to him, because if we lose him, in my judgment, we have lost one of the few people who will stand up and make his points where it counts at the appropriate time because we have a lot of what I call cloakroom commandos around here. They sound good, but, boy-oh-boy, when they get up to the Department or [General] Taylor, or storm some of these other places...nobody will say anything.... We take the brunt. These bastards that some months ago that stood...really from the inception...the architects of this failure, run along unchallenged, unsullied in every respect, to go and destroy any kind of productive thinking in any other area of the world and/or in this hemisphere, and I find that this is intolerable. 149/

Jack Hawkins then chimed in saying:

I would like to add my voice there about Mr. Bissell, I have the greatest admiration for him, he has plenty here [head?] and plenty here [heart?], and he was doing everything he could, that's all. I have already stated what I thought of the task force itself. They were fighting their hearts out trying to do something. If there are faults to be found, those are not the places to find them. 150/

How the DDP responded to the charges made in the Inspector General's survey is the subject of the next chapter.

Chapter 3

The Deputy Director for Plans Analysis
of the Cuban Operation, 18 January 1962

A. Description of the Report

The response from the Deputy Director of Plans to the survey that had been conducted by the Inspector General on the Bay of Pigs operation was entitled An Analysis of the Cuban Operation By the Deputy Director (Plans) Central Intelligence Agency (18 January 1962), and like the Inspector General's survey it carried a TOP SECRET classification. The 194-page report included 15 pages of attachments; and it was divided into 9 major sections.

In addition to working directly from the Inspector General's survey, C. Tracy Barnes, ADDP/A who was the principal author, and other members of the DDP review team also had access to the Taylor Committee report, including the four memorandums which make up the Taylor Committee Report, the records of the committee's meetings with witnesses, and numerous memorandums prepared in response to committee requests. 1/*

In contrast to the more than six months which were required for the preparation of the Inspector General's survey, the DDP response was forwarded to the Director of Central Intelligence in less than 60 days following the receipt of the IG Survey by the DDP.

* Despite his detailed interview with Lyman Kirkpatrick at the time, Mr. Bissell claimed only slight recollection of the Inspector General's report during a meeting with the writer in October 1975.
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As noted in the preceding chapter, the DDP's response to the Inspector General's report was undertaken during a period when emotions were running quite high. Mr. Dulles was just nine days short of retirement from the date of transmittal of the IG report to Mr. McCone, and Mr. Bissell's career with the Agency would come to an end shortly after the beginning of 1962. The introduction to the DDP review stated:

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to an understanding of the nature of the reasons for the failure of the Cuban operation and in so doing to suggest what are the correct lessons to be learned therefrom. It is prompted by and is, for the most part, a commentary on the IG Survey. That document gives a black picture of the Agency's role in this operation. 3/

Stating that, among other faults, the Inspector General's Survey had alleged bad organization and execution, errors of judgment, and failure to insure that the decision making process conducted by the Executive Branch was effective, the DDP countered that its paper would show:

That a large majority of the conclusions reached in the [IG] Survey are misleading or wrong; that the Survey is especially weak in judging what are the implications of its own allegations and, therefore, that its utility is greatly impaired by its failure to point out fully or in all cases correctly the lessons to be learned from this experience. 4/

B. Refuting the Inspector General's Charges

In response to the IG's charge that the Bay of Pigs operation had been badly organized and badly executed, the DDP response was a flat out denial of the validity of any of the charges made by the Inspector General and specified that the command and organizational relationships developed by the Agency were correct and that the

intelligence on Castro and on the internal opposition to Castro was accurate. The rebuttal emphasized that if there were difficulties in the internal planning process, these difficulties as well as the difficulty of running successful air operations in support of resistance elements inside Cuba were attributable to external factors beyond the control of the Agency--specifically that the imposition of policy guidelines were beyond control of the Agency. In addition, the DDP report tried an interesting ploy of turning one of the IG comments back on the IG's report. Where the IG had stated "there were some good things in this [the Cuban] project" with specific reference to the logistics and communication activities and to "the unstinting efforts of many of the personnel involved in trying to make the project a success," the DDP report tried to apply this comment to such things as successful small boat operations, relations with the Cuban leadership, the training and placement of the brigade into Cuba, and various other affirmative aspects of the operation which had been severely and sharply criticized by the Inspector General's report. 5/

With reference to its defense of the adequacy of its military plan and to the estimates of the chances for success of the invasion operation, the DDP rebuttal was strangely ambivalent, particularly in contrast to the testimony by the principal DDP officers before the Taylor Committee that cancellation of the D-Day air strike guaranteed the failure of the operation. Claiming that the military plan was never fully tested because of the cancellation of the D-Day air strike, the DDP report stated that perhaps it had been a mistake to have made the whole plan so dependent on the single factor of

elimination of the Cuban Air Force because: "Although the D-Day air strikes were essential to the destruction of the Cuban air, no guarantee of such destruction was possible even had there been authority for the strikes." 6/

Such a concession was in sharp contrast to the very positive assertions made to the members of the Taylor Committee by the CIA principals that the D-Day air strike would have completed the task of grounding Castro's combat aircraft. This, in turn, would have insured that the artillery role could have been assumed as planned by the brigade B-26s to prevent Castro's forces from freely bringing armor and heavy equipment, including artillery, into action against the brigade at Playa Larga and Playa Giron. Shifting gears again, the DDP report pointed out: "If, then, one wishes to learn what actually caused the military operation to fail, rather than what might have done so, the starting point must be an inquiry into why control of the air was lost and never regained." 7/

Following that suggestion, the DDP report proceeded to the question of whether the 17 Cuban air crews would have been adequate to conduct all the operations planned for the B-26s. The report stated: "The chance of success would have been greater (with or without the D-Day strike) if it had been possible to assemble and commit to action more trained Cuban or US air crews." 8/ The availability of more B-26s and more crews to fly on D-Day would have made no difference unless the D-Day air strike had in fact taken place and had put the T-33s and Sea Furies of the Fuerza Aerea Revolucionaria out of operation. Even with the limited numbers of T-33s and Sea Furies, the B-26s could not have controlled the air once Castro's aircraft left the ground. As mentioned in

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the preceding chapter, this subject had been touched on by Bissell during his interview with Kirkpatrick. 9/

The DDP review also argued that even with the failure to gain control of the air over Cuba, the brigade itself had been in action long enough to demonstrate that the IG's survey was in error with its charge that organization and execution in the build-up of the infantry brigade had been responsible for the military defeat. In contradiction to one of the major premises of the Taylor Committee report, the DDP's analysis of the brigade stated:

The brigade fought long enough to prove its determination and tactical skill. It appears to have been well handled by its officers. There were ample supplies at hand to support continued ground action. And Castro himself has admitted that the terrain was well chosen. 10/

The question of course concerns the statement that there were "ample supplies at hand to support continued ground action." The Taylor Committee had emphasized that "the proximate cause of the failure was the lack of ammunition." If, as the DDP analysis stated, there were ample supplies on hand to support continued ground action, then either the Taylor Committee was wrong in its analysis about the lack of ammunition being a major cause of defeat or the DDP had stumbled on its tongue in suggesting that the brigade had proved its determination and tactical skill in surrendering to Castro forces while still having adequate ammunition supplies.*

The DDP made a good case against the charge leveled by the IG survey that there was a serious lack of comprehensive operational

* As noted in the volume on the Taylor Committee investigation, comments and photographs in Cuban publications indicated that large quantities of materiel did fall into the hands of Castro with the collapse of the invasion effort. The testimony of some of the Cubans who had escaped from Playa Giron suggested strongly that the courage of some of their compatriots was in doubt.

plans in writing which had been approved in advance by competent authority. The DDP emphasized that as situations developed which required changes or modifications of US policy to insure deniability, it was the Agency's responsibility as the operating organization to see to the implementation of these policies. This, in turn, made it impossible to prepare such papers as the IG thought were essential to the operation. 11/

The DDP response continued along this same line with reference to the question that had been raised by the IG survey regarding the failure to back-off from the operation in November 1960, at which time the survey claimed that the operation was no longer plausibly deniable. The DDP's contention was that "up to and through the invasion" the operation remained "technically" deniable, citing as proof that the question of funding had never been exposed, that no case officers had been identified by true name, and that no Americans had been captured ("although the bodies of an American B-26 crew were probably recovered after its loss..."). 12/

Technical deniability aside, the DDP analysis noted that the IG was laying the blame in the wrong place:

No one in the Executive Branch was ready at any point--until after the defeat--officially to avow US support. Indeed, this alternative was never seriously considered. Even the most inadequate fig-leaf was considered more respectably [sic] than the absence of any cover whatsoever. Indeed, the final changes in the operational plan made in March [1961], the official announcement in April that the United States would not give support to the rebels, and the cancellation of the D-Day strike were all last minute efforts to shore up the plausible deniability of an enterprise for which Governmental support was bound to be conclusively surmised even if it could not be proved.

These decisions were made by senior policy makers of the Government who were reading the newspapers every day and knew well to what degree the project had in

fact become "overt." These men simply were not willing to state officially either that the United States itself was about to make war on Cuba or that the US Government was openly supporting a group of Cubans--not even recognized as a government in exile--in a military invasion...

It was not the Agency's decision and, as the above cited actions suggest, the pressure to strengthen deniability in the last few weeks came from outside the Agency and led to decisions which were unwelcome to the Agency. To suggest, as the Survey seems to do, that the Agency was responsible for this clinging to deniability is demonstrably false. 13/

Before turning to the DDP's response to some of the more specific allegations made in the Inspector General's survey, it should be emphasized that the DDP's over-all summary reiterated that none of the alleged weaknesses in organization or execution mentioned by the IG had any bearing on the outcome of the invasion effort. It repeated the point discussed above that had there not been politically motivated restrictions placed on air operations in terms of types of equipment, utilization of US bases, and the use of US air crews, and if there had been more pre-D-Day air strikes, as well as the D-Day strike as originally planned, the estimates of the chances of success of the operation by Agency planners and JCS representatives might well have proved correct. Pointing out that the military plan which had been worked out between the Agency and the Joint Staff was "a product of highly competent, professional military planning," it at the same time suggested that the "possible inadequacy" of the air arm tended to negate the foregoing opinion. If the DDP believed that the original air plan was adequate--as they had so stoutly maintained during the course of the Taylor committee investigation and as they had stated initially in reviewing the IG report--to suddenly suggest a possible inadequacy in the air arm raises the question of whether the obfuscation resulted from poor

editing of the DDP's response or from second thoughts on the part of the DDP. 14/

In terms of the lessons which it learned as a result of the Bay of Pigs Operation the DDP analysis philosophized on several issues which were more responsive to the Taylor Committee's report than to the IG's survey. It stated that if the policy of the US was to use force in a given operation, sufficient force should be applied to make sure that the operation would be successful--including if necessary the overt use of US force. Barring this, the operation should be called off unless "the odds in favor of success within the politically imposed restrictions are very great." In this same context, the DDP analysis suggested that a department or agency charged with running a given operation had to learn to live with political decisions, even though such decisions might be made by unqualified people. In dealing with questions of policy, another aspect of the problem was whether decisions on major issues of a policy nature could be handled by an impartial adviser or whether all such decisions had to be dumped on the President. This last point, of course, was a direct reflection of the findings of the Taylor Committee that in the case of the Bay of Pigs, the absence of any authoritative decision making body led President Kennedy to support policies of questionable wisdom.

Also in the realm of national policy concerning operational involvement, realistic assessment needed to be made of the prospects for keeping a clandestine operation clandestine. Once deniability started to erode the question should have been asked as to the value of any degree of deniability that might remain. In the case of Cuba, for example, the DDP analysis suggested that hindsight indicated there would have been more to gain if the United States

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had said it was backing the Cuban Revolutionary Council and had recognized the provisional government. The DDP's report admitted that the Inspector General's charge that the views of those who were running the operation might have been given too much weight, but it raised the question of where the line should be drawn with regard to getting the opinions of skeptics. 15/ (Particularly if the skeptics were, as characterized by General Lemnitzer, not only inexperienced, but crippled "by arrogance arising from failure to recognize their own limitations.")*

The second major topic covered by the DDP's analysis of the Inspector General's survey is called "The Survey's Statements of the Operational Concept." This four page segment is basically a brief resume of the planning for the invasion and the collapse of that invasion as it appears in the IG survey. Although the DDP analysis stated that the Inspector General's survey said nothing about the planned diversionary landing on D-2 in Oriente Province by Nino Diaz and his 160 men, the Inspector General's survey did make a brief, but specific, mention of this planned diversion. 16/**

The third major segment of the DDP report, "Why a Military-Type Invasion," is another four page segment that added nothing of significance to what had been covered in the DDP's initial summary of the IG report. It was stated that by the fall of

* For Lemnitzer's comment see Pfeiffer, Taylor Committee Investigation of the Bay of Pigs, p. 155.

**Considering the destructive nature of the survey, it was fortunate that the Inspector General not only omitted any detailed discussion of the Diaz operation but also failed to question the judgment of the DDP planners who authorized Iginio ("Nino") Diaz to lead the expedition. Diaz was a certifiable coward who had aborted at least one previous anti-Castro operation inside Cuba and he had been identified as an undesirable and unwanted recruit for infantry training with the Brigade in Guatemala.

1960 intelligence reporting had indicated that improvements in security measures within Cuba and improved training of the militia made it unlikely that the infiltration of small units trained to give instruction in guerrilla warfare would have much success. It had become obvious that an air supported invasion had the most likely chance of achieving success in the planned overthrow of Fidel Castro. ^{17/}

The fourth section of the DDP analysis of the Inspector General's survey is a 20 page segment concerning "The Decision Making Process," a matter about which the DDP contended that the IG's survey was "particularly incomplete in the discussions of decision making and planning." ^{18/} In response to the IG's charge that "the Agency was driving forward without knowing precisely where it was going," the DDP analysis noted the self-contradictory feature of the IG report which, almost immediately following that statement, reported that after briefings by the Agency on the status of the operation both Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy had authorized the Agency to continue its efforts to develop the anti-Castro program. ^{19/} The analysis further emphasized that during the period between early January 1959 and the date of the invasion there had been extensive meetings of the Agency's planners with Special Group advisers to both Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy and with other high level, political appointees close to both administrations. In addition, members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff began to be read into the act even prior to Kennedy's specific instructions on this matter following his inauguration.

That there could be no possibility of confusion or misunderstanding as to the direction which was being taken by the Agency's anti-Castro planning, the DDP report makes specific

reference to the briefings received by Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense MacNamara, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and/or members of the Joint Staff. It rejected the idea that there were any senior officers in either administration who were not familiar with the status of the project as it was evolving; and it stressed the extensive participation by representatives of the Department of Defense with the advent of the Kennedy administration. In particular, the DDP analysis emphasized the role played by the Department of Defense in evaluating the capabilities of the air, land, maritime forces, and in the role played by representatives of the Joint Chiefs during the critical discussions beginning in mid-March regarding the selection of the specific target area and the change from the Trinidad to the Zapata plan. 20/*

Having clearly established that from early February 1961 through the invasion, General Gray and members of the Joint Staff were for all practical purposes full partners with the Agency in planning the anti-Castro operation, the DDP analysis severely chided the Inspector General's vague references suggesting that either the JCS or individual members of the JCS found fault or had strong reservations about the anti-Castro planning. Taking one rather

* The discussion of the briefings contains one error which DDP representatives also had made during the course of their session with the Taylor Committee. The DDP Analysis indicated that Secretary of State designee Rusk was briefed on the planned anti-Castro operation of 17 January 1961--prior to the Kennedy inaugural. Although the Agency had prepared a detailed briefing for the planned meeting at 5:00 p.m. on that day in Mr. Rusk's office, the DCI's calendar for Tuesday, 17 January 1961, had crossed out that particular item. There is no evidence of a briefing on Cuba for Mr. Rusk prior to the session on 22 January 1961 when Rusk and other Kennedy cabinet members were briefed on the anti-Castro operations. 21

lengthy citation which the IG survey said had been made by representatives of the JCS "in the course of another inquiry," the DDP analysis pointed out that:

Neither the "members of the JCS" nor the other "inquiry" are identified [in the IG survey] nor is there any citation supporting the alleged testimony. Being unable, therefore, to locate the full text from which the quotation was taken, it is not possible to analyze or clarify the points made. Presumably the "inquiry" referred to was that conducted by General Taylor although no verbatim minutes were kept. At least no transcript or full report of these hearings is available to the writer. 22/

Considering that the DCI had authorized the Inspector General to have access to the Agency's collection of Taylor Committee papers during the course of his investigation, it seems highly unlikely that the DDP did not have similarly full access to such papers, particularly since they had been put in the custody of Colonel J. C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division. 23/*

Why the DDP analysis attempted to play coy regarding knowledge of and/or accessibility to the Taylor Committee report and related papers is difficult to understand, particularly in view of the ample evidence which the DDP's own report cited to illustrate the coordinated records between the Agency and the Department of Defense. If this were not enough to establish DDP's point of view

* In his history of Allen Dulles as Director of Central Intelligence, Wayne Jackson noted "the writer [Jackson] has found no evidence that a copy [of the Taylor Committee report] was given to the Agency. The DDP rebuttal to the IG report makes it clear that its author had access to the Taylor Report, and Barnes told the writers that he had consulted it in McGeorge Bundy's office." 24/ The writer of this history cannot challenge the statement that Mr. Barnes may have done some of his work on the Taylor Committee report in McGeorge Bundy's office, but based on the preliminary survey of materials available on the Bay of Pigs operation (which he did about the time that Jackson's history was published), he located not only a copy of the four memorandums prepared by the Taylor Committee, but extensive back-up materials which had been provided to the Taylor Committee during the course of its investigations.

in contrast to the position taken by the IG survey, then the 11 page annex to Section IV of the DDP analysis outlining the tasks and time schedules for the Agency, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense in the pre-D-Day, D-Day, and post D-Day phases of the planned anti-Castro operation would seem to have negated the need to play games with hard evidence. 25/

The fifth section of the DDP analysis of the Inspector General's report, the "Assessment of the Adequacy of the Plan," was another of the segments to which the DDP took strong exception. The tone of the DDP position was set by the first few lines of this assessment which stated:

Whatever conclusions or inferences may be drawn from the defeat of the Brigade, no one can deny that, in absence of the planned D-Day dawn air strikes, the operational plan was never tested. Perhaps these air strikes would have had no significant effect, but in view of the essentiality of eliminating Castro's Air Force, it can be asserted that without these air strikes the plan never had a chance. 26/*

The DDP analysis then submitted what amounted to a test of the reasonableness of the view that the D-Day air strikes could have changed the result of the Bay of Pigs operation. To do this they presented:

The basic theory of the operation and what was accomplished, what failed, and what was not tested...The operational theory in outline was:

- a. To destroy the enemy air force. Not tested though partially accomplished.
- b. To land the Brigade on the Zapata beachhead achieving surprise. Accomplished successfully.
- c. To maintain the Brigade on the beachhead perhaps for several weeks. Not tested.

* The reader may recall that this was a much more forceful statement by the DDP than was made on this same subject in summarizing the IG's report. (See pp. 4-6)

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d. To persuade the Cuban populace (both private individuals and governmental, including military) actively to oppose the regime. It was never expected that this would happen until the populace was convinced that an opposition force supporting democratic leadership receiving outside support was able to maintain itself on Cuban soil. How long this would take was unknown. Not tested. 27/

Picking up again from the summary in its analysis of the IG's survey and from positions which had been expressed to the Taylor Committee by Bissell, Esterline, and Hawkins, the DDP proceeded to show the reasonableness of its belief that given the initial air strike as planned for Zapata--particularly the D-Day air strike--control of the air could have been achieved. Having done that, the presence of the brigade on Cuban soil and the visibility of brigade aircraft would have encouraged the needed support from inside Cuba. Additionally, the DDP evaluation made it quite clear that it was aware of, and had utilized, USIB reporting, National Intelligence Estimates, and OCI reporting in making its judgments about the prospects for both the nature of the opposition which would be presented to them by Castro's militia and armed forces and, also, the sort of stimulus it would take to gain the necessary assistance from the Cuban population. 28/

The DDP cited as further evidence of a potential for internal support the number of defections of individuals who had once been close to Castro, including the leaders of some of the principal exile groups operating in the United States.* Reference also was made by the DDP to the requests that had been received from groups within Cuba for materiel support, reports of incidents of sabotage, labor unrest, and economic difficulties which

* Among others were included Jose Mino Cardona, Manuel Ray, Justo Carrillo, and Manuel Artimo

gave credence to the belief that once a viable opposition could be established on Cuban soil there would be ample volunteers for the anti-Castro effort. Prospects along this line also would have been enhanced if the leadership of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) could have been brought into Cuba, particularly if the CRC could have gained recognition as a provisional government by the United States and any of the anti-Castro Latin American nations. 29/

In response to the IG's charge that the Agency's planners had failed to make a proper appraisal of the chances of success, the DDP argued that the events that did transpire tended to support the judgment that there had been a realistic appraisal of the chances of success. The DDP evaluation cited, for example, the success of the surprise landing of the brigade; the success of the brigade vis-a-vis the initial attacks by Castro's forces; and the defection to the brigade of some of Castro's militia during the very early stages of the invasion. It was emphasized that the potential success was eradicated by the presence of Castro's T-33's and Sea Furies--the aircraft which were the intended targets of the denied and cancelled air strikes subsequent to D-2.

The DDP analysis also repeated the point made by both Mr. Dulles and Admiral Burke to the Taylor Committee when they took exception to the opinion which had been expressed in Memorandum No. 1 of the Taylor Committee report suggesting that the beachhead could not have survived long without either direct US assistance or strong internal support from the Cuban population--the Dulles and Burke contentions being, of course, that if the anti-Castro forces had gained control of the air the situation could have been reversed.

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With reference to the Burke-Dulles dissent from the position taken by General Taylor and Attorney General Robert Kennedy, the DDP concluded its section on the assessment of the adequacy of the plan by noting:

Therefore, even in retrospect the Brigade's inability to hold the beachhead for some time was not clear to well informed individuals who had soaked themselves in all the available evidence. A prospective judgment in favor of success prior to the event would, therefore, seem understandable. 30/*

Section VI of the DDP assessment of the Inspector General's survey was on the organization and command relationships and was the longest segment (35 pages) in the report. The DDP analysis examined and rejected the IG's conclusion that the project was badly organized, making the point that some of the Agency's management and organizational problems were related--as the Taylor Committee had pointed out--to the inability of the Executive Branch to handle a major paramilitary operation involving CIA, DOD, and State. Consequently, decision making devolved exclusively on the President. Despite the failure of the IG's survey to examine the Bay of Pigs operation in this light, the DDP report proceeded apace to justify

* The author of the DDP report, Tracy Barnes, was not the best choice to present the DDP's case. In this discussion of possible failure at the beachhead, he suggested that there was more planning for a "worst case" situation--including a break out for the Escambray--than actually was the case. It appears that Barnes was confusing the Zapata Plan with the Trinidad Plan which had considered withdrawal to the Escambray.

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the organization and command relationships--taking time along the way to give the IG some pointers on semantics.*

The DDP analysis defended the roles of the DCI and the DDCI, DDP, ADDP/A, C/WH, C/WH/4. It was stressed that since the ADDP/A, C. Tracy Barnes, spent practically full time working on the anti-Castro operation, problems regarding DDP decisions could be obtained almost immediately.** To the IG's charge that Jake Esterline was too far down in the chain of command and of too low a rank for the task he had been given, the DDP report noted that in the military sense, Esterline would have had the rank of Colonel and that the responsibilities which he carried for the Agency during the

* As one case in point, the following paragraphs from the DDP analysis:

The DCI allegedly "delegated his responsibility for major project decisions to a considerable extent."
 ...The [IG] Survey appears to support this statement on two grounds, first that the DCI relied on the DDCI "for policy matters involving air operations" and for "military advice he relied on the military officers detailed to the project."
 The consequence of this "reliance" according to the Survey was that the DCI was deprived "of completely objective counsel."

"Reliance on," according to normal usage, does not mean the same thing as "delegation of responsibility." Whatever the Survey intends to say in this connection, it is a fact that the DCI never delegated any portion of this responsibility at any moment during the project. Naturally he relied on others for many things (he could hardly run an entire project himself) and he even delegated authority (not responsibility) in some limited respects. 31/

** The ADDP/A was referred to in the analysis as "an extension of the DDP arm." Barnes, as the principal author of the DDP response, may have been somewhat less than impartial in his judgment.

course of the Bay of Pigs operation were comparable to those which would have been carried by a Colonel in the service.* The DDP also stated that the IG's report was incorrect in its contention that Esterline was too far from the top; and to support this claimed that the DCI and the DDP brought Esterline and/or Hawkins "with them to substantially all Presidential meetings on Cuba." 32**

The DDP analysis also took issue with the IG's assessment of the role played by Col. J.C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, during the course of the Bay of Pigs operation. The IG's survey stated "the DDP and his Deputy dealt directly with the project chief, and gradually the Chief of the WH Division began to play only a diminished role." Even though admitting that King was offset from the basic chain of command, the DDP analysis emphasized that Colonel King played a very important role during the course of the Bay of Pigs operation. The DDP's review made this point far more strongly than it had been made during the course of the Taylor Committee investigation where the role of Chief, WHD had been raised almost as an afterthought.

The DDP analysis pointed out that King sat in on practically all of the DDP and DCI meetings on the project which had been attended by any other WH personnel, that he had dealt with numerous problems concerning the Cuban political leaders, and that he had

* It appears that the DDP may have been shortchanging Esterline. As a GS-15, his rank would more closely approximate that of a Brigadier General than a Colonel.

** It also was the opinion of the DDP analysis that Esterline or Hawkins were usually in attendance at all major briefings--not just Presidential briefings--where their expertise was required. As noted in the preceding chapter, both Esterline and Hawkins took a strong contrary view to this contention, saying that too frequently more senior personnel (meaning specifically Bissell, Barnes, or Cabell) were doing briefings that they should have been doing.

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handled special negotiations on problems of economic sanctions with representatives of other US agencies, private businessmen, and legal counsels. The analysis also mentioned King's particular relationship with William Pawley.* Because of his position as Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, and his extensive contacts with Latinos in all walks of life, there was no question but that King contributed significantly to the successful mounting of the invasion of 17 April 1961. 33/**

The DDP assessment also took sharp issue with the Inspector General's survey of the organization and command relationships between the Cuban task force and Chief of Operations, Deputy Director for Plans (C/OPS/DDP), the senior staffs of the DDP (FI and CI in particular), and the PRC (Project Review Committee). With reference to the role of Richard Helms, C/OPS/DDP, the survey made

* William D. Pawley had served as US Ambassador to Peru (1945) and Brazil (1946). He was the owner of the Havana Bus Company and was a strong supporter of extremely conservative anti-Castro Cubans, particularly Rubio Padilla. He was a heavy contributor to the Republican Party and a strong supporter of Vice-President Nixon. Although he refused to support the Frente Revolucionario Democrático (RFD), which was the CIA-based anti-Castro Cuban organization, Pawley retained close contacts with both J.C. King and Jake Esterline throughout the Bay of Pigs operation. Details of the relationships with Pawley are spelled out in Volume III of the series, Evolution of CIA's Anti-Castro Policies, pp. 249-258, 263-264.

** Review of the chronological files of WH/4 provides ample evidence of the strong support role played by Col. King. In all probability, King's own papers would have added even more to this story. Unfortunately, the "J.C. King papers"--initially reported to the author of this study to be the contents of eight safes, then reduced to two safes--have disappeared. Jake Esterline conscientiously kept King informed of meetings, briefings, and other activities related to the task force. It is clear, however, that Bissell's support was fully behind Esterline who, in 1954, also was head of the task force responsible for the ouster of President Arbenz in Guatemala. Details on the relationship of King-Esterline-Bissell are spelled out in Volume III of this series, Evolution of CIA's Anti-Castro Policies, pp. 32-39.

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the same point that Richard Bissell made to the author of this history nearly 20 years later: that because he (Bissell) and his other Deputy, C. Tracy Barnes, were involved almost full time in the Bay of Pigs operation, Helms had to assume most of the responsibility for running operations in the rest of the world. The DDP also focused sharp criticism on the Inspector General's charge that C/OPS/DDP had received specific warnings concerning the mismanagement of the anti-Castro operation but had taken no action on such warnings. The DDP pointed out quite correctly that the IG's survey had provided no specific information about the reputed warnings and consequently it was impossible to determine whether such warnings were frivolous or serious.* Mr. Helms could not remember receiving any such warnings and the DDP assessment pointed out that any project of the magnitude and duration of the anti-Castro effort would be bound to cause disruptions in normal procedures which might well have led to "warnings" of one sort or another. The tone of strong resentment at the Inspector General's allegations was obvious in the DDP's comment that: "Actually, the Survey is unclear as to what it believes COPS should have done though the inference is that he should have used the alleged 'warnings' as a basis for taking the project away from the DDP."

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The DDP assessment quickly disposed of the IG's complaints that the project planners had failed to consult the senior staffs of the DDP and that clearance had not been received from the Agency's

* One such "warning" came from [redacted] a PM assignee to the project who spent only three months with the project during its early stages. Note of [redacted] testimony to the IG team is found on pp. 96-99.

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Project Review Committee. In the instance of the senior staffs, it was noted that representatives from all of the senior staffs had been assigned to the project and that somewhere along the line a limit had to be placed on the extent to which personnel not directly involved with the project should be briefed and rebriefed about ongoing developments. The DDP report noted that the Agency's Project Review Committee was internal to the Central Intelligence Agency and "advisory" to the DCI. It was further emphasized that the anti-Castro project had been authorized by the President on an interdepartmental basis and was well beyond the jurisdiction of the PRC. 35/

The Inspector General's survey was critical of the relationship between the air arm of the Agency, DPD, and the anti-Castro task force; but the criticism about the independent position of DPD was simply a rehash of ground that had been more adequately covered during the course of the Taylor Committee investigation. This issue had been answered in writing by Mr. Bissell in response to appeals which had been made by Chief, WH/4 (Jake Esterline) and Chief, WH/4/PM (Col. Jack Hawkins) in the fall of 1960. 36/

The DDP assessment also rejected the Inspector General's criticism about weaknesses in intelligence collection and evaluation. The DDP was particularly critical of the IG's failure to grasp the operational theory concerning the relationship between the successful invasion and lodgement and the potential for development of support from the anti-Castro forces inside Cuba. The DDP did concede that in future operations there should be closer

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cooperation between the DDP and the DDI on questions of intelligence evaluations and estimates--a point on which the new DCI, John McCone, subsequently "insisted that the estimative function of the Agency be privy to planned operations and provide their estimative judgments early and often." 37/

In response to the lengthy segment of the IG survey expressing displeasure about the operations and activities of the Miami base, the DDP defended all aspects of the Miami-Washington relationships as not only understandable but also as the best possible. It was suggested that those who had prepared the Inspector General's survey did not understand operational problems. The DDP analysis also defended the security record of the task force noting that pre-invasion moves of the anti-Castro brigade and the landing on Cuban soil had not been discovered, despite the traditional insecurity of the Cubans, particularly in the Miami area, and the vigorous attempts of the press to expose the operation. 38/

The seventh section of the DDP analysis of the IG's survey is a 23-page review of the personnel situation. As with the critiques of other portions of the IG's survey, the DDP analysis lamented that the generalizations and the failures to identify specific cases or specific individuals made intelligent response very difficult. It was pointed out, for example, that the vague references to given individuals contained in the IG survey made it impossible to determine whether that individual was from the DDP, from the Department of Defense, or from WH/4. The DDP review made a strong pitch to demonstrate that a serious and successful effort had been

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made to implement the DCI's suggestion in the spring of 1960 indicating that he wanted top quality people assigned to the anti-Castro project. The DDP analysis emphasized that its senior officers, including the Clandestine Services Personnel Officer (CSPO), were particularly alert to this problem. In this instance, however, the IG's survey probably was more accurate than the DDP's rebuttal. The view of three very senior officers in the WH/4 project indicated that many of the assignees to WH/4 were strictly by chance, and in other instances the Divisions and Staffs saw an opportunity to use the anti-Castro project as an elephant's burial ground for marginal performers.*

The DDP's dismissal of the IG's charge that the competitive ranking status of many of the assignees necessarily indicated a low-caliber performer was probably correct. The DDP pointed out, for example, that in the initial competitive rankings non-WH personnel assigned to the project were rated by long-term WH staffers in competition with long-term WH personnel. The results of such rankings were obviously predictable--that they would work to the disadvantage of the newcomers. As the DDP survey pointed out, however, this situation was recognized and rectified. 40/

Except for its questionable statement that "PM instructors were quite able to perform effectively without the [Spanish] language since they taught by showing an example," the DDP response

* The three senior officers in question were Jake Esterline, Chief, WH/4; Dick Drain, COPS/WH/4; and Bill Eisemann, Chief, Support/WH/4. 39/ Eisemann, in fact, specifically criticized the DDP for its failure to abide by its own contingency planning regulations which would have insured that only top people would have been assigned to WH/4.

also refuted the IG's charge that the lack of Spanish language capability seriously hurt the anti-Castro project. In an Annex to the discussion of personnel, the biographic sketches of the senior personnel assigned to WH/4 supported the conclusion of the DDP that:

It can be asserted that Spanish speakers were available for all needed uses. Some inconvenience may have been caused on occasion due to not having even more Spanish speakers, but a lack of adequate Spanish speakers cannot honestly be alleged as a ground for any major failure in the project. 41/*

The eighth section of the DDP's analysis of the IG's survey is an 18-page segment on "The Political Front and Relations with the Cubans." The charges by the Inspector General that the Agency treated the exile leaders as though they were puppets; that the decision in November 1960 that the FRD would no longer have a monopoly on paramilitary aid from the US; and that prevention of "close contact between the political leaders...and the military forces in training in Guatemala" worked to the disadvantage of the anti-Castro effort were flatly denied by the DDP. The DDP, however, did not try to deny that relations with the FRD and various of the Cuban leaders at times proved to be extremely difficult. The DDP report pointed out that such difficulties traced directly to the evolution of the anti-Castro movement in Cuba, with many of the exile leaders in Miami having once been either affiliated with, or at least in philosophical agreement with, the Castro movement. Once having broken with Castro and becoming aware of the US interest in his ouster, there was intense competition among both political and

* As noted in the preceding chapter, the DDP analysis probably understated the degree of "inconvenience" because there was a continuing emphasis on the need for Spanish speaking personnel throughout the course of the operation.

military leaders to try to insure positions of power and influence for themselves in any government which might succeed Castro's.

The DDP's analysis then went into a great deal of rhetoric about the ongoing competition among the Cubans and the increasing difficulties of keeping exile politics out of the training camps. It also emphasized that the CIA Inspector General's survey had undertaken an impossible task in attempting to relate the problems of the Cuban exiles exclusively to the CIA because the fate of the Cuban exiles was closely tied to policies which were being evolved by the White House and the Department of State--not CIA. The situation with regard to the IG's criticisms of the Agency's relationship with the Cubans was perhaps best summarized in the DDP's statement that the survey contained "a series of criticisms and preachments which are so general, unsupported, or unconnected to some specific consequence that we can only comment that they have been noted with dismay and that we regret that until more detail is furnished, an answer is not possible." 42/

The ninth and final section of the DDP analysis was "Air-Maritime Operations" (18 pages). The DDP made a desperate effort to prove that black was white in an attempt to refute the Inspector General's contention that the air drop operations prior to 17 April contributed nothing of significance to the anti-Castro effort and that, in fact, the record was one of almost unmitigated disaster. After using such obvious excuses as the prohibition against the use of US air bases, the prohibition against using US pilots, untrained reception parties, lack of communications between

ground and incoming aircraft, and difficult terrain, the fact remained that of 30 air drop missions flown up to 21 April 1961, there were only four drops in which a cargo was actually received by the people for whom it was intended. Despite this miserable record--which also included emergency landings by C-54's in Mexico and Jamaica--the DDP analysis had the chutzpa to state:

In conclusion it might be said that the DPD overall air drop record is a good one and will stand close examination. The failures in Cuba were not the result of lack of competence nor poor organization. They were rather the result of many complex factors, some beyond Agency control, some undoubtedly within Agency control. During the project, the only real solutions were believed to be in the area of political infeasibility [e.g., specifically the use of US pilots and US air bases], although an improved record might have otherwise been achieved. 43/

Indicative of the manner in which the DDP was willing to stretch the point with regard to the success of the air drop operation was the explanation for the loss of a 100-man arms pack. After citing various mitigating factors, the DDP analysis stated "the first drop was close but missed by 7 miles." 44/ The Cuban aircrew in the cockpit of that C-54 had 45,000 hours of flight time, but it not only missed the drop zone, it also missed the home field at Retalhuleu in Guatemala; and it ended up making an emergency landing in Mexico.

In similar fashion, the DDP also was willing to write off the operation which earned General Cabell the nickname of "Old Rice and Beans." Commenting on the operation, the DDP analysis stated:

In order to fill out the load, the DDCI [General Cabell] decided to drop some food, as food shortages were clearly a problem with the resistance. Probably

too much food was dropped and the Agent was disturbed and angry. 45/*

With reference to maritime operations, the DDP did concede that the Inspector General's survey was correct in saying that the infil-exfil and materiel supply activities of a maritime nature left much to be desired. Even though suggesting that they faced difficulties, the DDP admitted that the maritime operations probably should have been under the supervision of a senior naval officer from the inception of the operation--Captain Scapa, the USN adviser, was not assigned this role until mid-February 1961. 47/ In concentrating on the nits and lice with which to castigate the DDP, the Inspector General's survey overlooked the very serious problems involving the acquisition of aluminum boats to be used in off-loading troops and supplies at Red Beach. As noted in the volume on the Taylor Committee Investigation, this involved an intensive search of the Atlantic seaboard in an attempt to match about three dozen boats and engines together--only to find that even after they were acquired additional modifications had to be made. More important, however, was the high rate of failure among these boats during a crucial period of off-loading the Houston at Red Beach on the day of the invasion.

* The 15-man reception team received, not only 1,500 pounds of materiel which was different from the original request...but also 800 pounds of beans, 800 pounds of rice, and 160 pounds of lard. This was the only drop to this Cuban agent. He was so vexed with the drop that he came out of Cuba specifically to make a complaint and to cancel a succeeding drop which had been planned. He stated that he would not accept another drop, no matter what the cargo was. He pointed out that the Agency had endangered his safety by dropping cargo which he had not asked for, did not need, and could not handle. Furthermore, the aircraft had stayed in the vicinity too long, had flown with its landing lights on, had circled around and made numerous U-turns, and even dropped propaganda leaflets on his property. He decided the Agency lacked the professional competence to make clandestine air drops. 46/

The section on air-maritime operations also discussed training of underground leaders--something of a misnomer since the Inspector General's survey got into the story of the training sites in Guatemala and Louisiana (Belle Chasse) which involved the training of ground forces--not the training of underground leaders. Among other criticisms, the DDP analysis emphasized that despite the statements by the IG that the training facilities at Guatemala couldn't accommodate 500 men and that the training site near New Orleans was a near disaster area, both did serve the purposes for which they were intended.

In contrast to the IG's survey which criticized the failure to have all training done in the US, the DDP pointed out that it was not a question of "druthers," it was again a question of what was politically permissible. With the exception of the small cadre of tankers who were trained at Ft. Knox, the communicators who were trained at various US installations, and the two-week emergency session at the last minute for the Nino Diaz diversionary group near New Orleans, all other Cubans had to be trained outside of the United States.

The DDP concluded its comments on training by noting that:

Obviously, there is a good deal of adjusting to the needs of the moment in a project of this sort. It is believed, however, that the record will show that the training plans were reasonably detailed and complete. Moreover, that wherever a training course of any length was involved, there was a specific training plan. 48/

C. Readers, Reactions, and Responses to the DDP Analysis
of the IG's Survey

The DDP analysis of the Inspector General's survey of the Cuban operation was completed on 18 January 1962. There then

followed a series of memorandums which reflected the bitter feelings which were engendered by Mr. Kirkpatrick's work. In the month from 19 January to 19 February 1962, there were seven memorandums written by the principals most closely involved with the two reports--Messrs. McCone, Dulles, Cabell, Bissell, Barnes, Kirkpatrick, and Kirkpatrick's inspection team. Because the full story of this dispute has been held so closely for so long, presentation of the complete text of these memorandums more sharply illustrates the differences between the Inspector General and the DDP than can be done in paraphrased review.*

On 19 January 1962, John A. McCone, then Director of Central Intelligence, forwarded copies of the Inspector General's survey, the DDP analysis of the Inspector General's survey, and General Cabell's 15 December 1961 memorandum on the Inspector General's survey to Dr. James R. Killian, Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.** The memorandum to Killian read as follows:

Attached is [a] copy of the CIA Inspector General's "Survey of Cuban Operations" together with comments thereon by General C.P. Cabell, Deputy Director of CIA and [an] "Analysis of the Cuban Operation" by [the] Deputy Director (Plans). This latter report is intended as a comment on the Inspector General's report.

As you readily understand, I am not in any position to render a personal opinion concerning the validity of the IG's report or the statements by the DDCI and the DDP because I was not in CIA at the time. However, it is my personal opinion as a result of

* Segments of the seven memorandums in question appear in the histories of both Wayne Jackson and Kenneth Greer in the CIA historical series, but neither work does justice to the full story. 49/

** General Cabell's 15 December 1961 response to the IG's survey was discussed in Chapter I of this volume and is not repeated here (see pages 109-111).

examinations I have made of this operation after the fact that both the report and the rebuttals are extreme. I believe an accurate appraisal of the Cuban effort and the reasons for failure rest some place in between the two points of view expressed in the reports.

I believe it is safe to say the failure of the Cuban operation was Government-wide and in this respect the Agency must bear its full share (though not the entire) responsibility. For this reason I would recommend that your board, in reviewing the Inspector General's Survey also review the ~~comments~~ and analysis of the DDCI and the DDP. 50/

On 19 January 1962, C. Tracy Barnes, the principal author of the DDP's analysis, forwarded a memorandum to Mr. Bissell and suggested that Mr. Bissell forward the memo to DCI McCone. The thrust of Barnes's memo was that the Agency needed to decide on a single CIA position vis-a-vis the Bay of Pigs operation and also to lay out specific guidelines for any future IG surveys. Barnes wrote:

1. My work in support of your "Analysis of the Cuban Operation" gave me an unusual opportunity to study with care the document which caused the Analysis to be written, namely the "Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation," October 1961.

2. My consideration of the Survey has forced me to reach certain conclusions which I feel that I must record. I do so in writing because these conclusions are, in my opinion, of sufficient significance to demand the discipline of a written expression. Moreover, I feel that those who disagree with me should have the opportunity to direct any replies that they may choose to make to specific identifiable comments.*

3. I may say that my decision to write this memorandum was reached with considerable reluctance and only after long deliberation. The deciding

* This was obviously a reference to the charge made throughout the DDP analysis that the Inspector General's survey consistently failed to identify individuals to whom specific statements were attributed. Considering the experience of some of the complainants and the nature of their complaints--frequently petty and sometimes vicious--it is understandable why the IG did not provide identities.

factor was my belief that the suggestions for action in Paragraph 6 below are worthwhile and should be submitted. They would have been meaningless without the reasons set forth in the earlier paragraphs. The views expressed are, needless to say, exclusively mine.

4. In my opinion the IG survey is most unfortunate for three reasons:

a. It is an incompetent job. The authors never understood the problems with which they were dealing and failed to express their views with any precision or proper use of relevant facts.

b. It is biased. Basically relevant evidence on vital issues was not only left out but never even mentioned. The survey undertook only to present those items which suggested failures or inadequacies. These items, however, were not fully depicted so that a false picture was given. Admittedly, an IG must expose fault but it is also his job to do so accurately.

c. It is malicious, or, to put it alternatively, it is intentionally biased. Admittedly, this is a serious charge and is, at best, merely a statement of opinion. I can only say I hold such opinion firmly. In my view it could be supported solely on the basis of the survey's total omission in many places of significantly relevant evidence. Such omissions are so excessive and one-sided as to substantiate the conclusion that they must have been intentional. In addition however, I would like to mention four other points.

1) The fact that the inspectors, in making their investigation, omitted any discussions of their findings with the senior officers responsible for the project. Although, technically, the IG can accurately state that he talked to the DDP and the then ADDP/A about the survey, the fact is that these discussion[s] were exceedingly brief and covered none of the real issues in the survey. The AC/DPD was not spoken to at all. The Security Officer of WH/4 was not spoken to at all. Other senior officers, such as C/WH and C/WH/4 were never given an opportunity to express their views in relation to statements in the survey.

2) Some officers with whom the inspectors had discussions felt after they had a chance to see the survey, that it did not impartially express the information which they had provided and left out much of the relevant information given. Moreover, some officers have reported that the attitude of the inspectors in their line of questioning indicated a desire to obtain facts or views to support judgments already formed. Opinions contrary to these judgments were not only disregarded but resisted.

3) The distribution of the final survey was so peculiar and contrary to normal practice that it raises an inference of intended partiality. The method of distribution is known and will not be repeated here. It might be added that there were other facts with respect to the distribution of the survey worthy of mention. C/WH/4 was called one day and asked if he wanted to read the survey. He said that he would like to do so but since both C/WH and DC/WH were away he could not leave since he was Acting Chief of the Division. Particularly, he could not meet the requirements of the offer which were that he would have only an hour from the time of the telephone call to see the survey (including travel time) since it had to be sent to the printer. Why the urgency was so great is not clear. As far as is known, only one individual outside of the IG staff saw the survey in final or substantially final form before it was distributed, namely, an officer who was the Chief of Operations for WH/4 during the project. Why he was selected instead of one of his superiors who was connected with the project is not known.*

4) Since this particular operation, without question, involved more political interest and dynamite than any in which the Agency has ever participated, there was every reason for following regular procedures meticulously. In addition to the distribution point mentioned above, it seem relevant to wonder how Dr. Killian and the Attorney General knew of the survey's existence so as to request a copy.

* The reference is to Richard D. Drain. Barnes apparently had forgotten that Drain had been designated as the official point of contact between the Inspector General and WH/4 when the IG survey began. 51/

5. I should say that, whatever the appearance of the foregoing, I have not been trying to IG the IG. The information reported came to me unsolicited and in the normal course of my work with you and your analysis. Maybe there is additional evidence of importance, but I have not looked for it and do not plan to do so.

6. The significance of the foregoing is to provide the reasons for the main purpose of this memorandum, i.e., the submission of the following recommendations for action:

a. The DCI should resolve to his own satisfaction the conflicts on major issues between the IG's survey and your Analysis. Since both these documents are internal to the Agency, there is no Agency position on the Cuban Operation unless the conflicts are resolved. In view of the importance of, and the continuing interest in, the operation at high levels of the government, an Agency position seems essential. Such a position is also important for the future. The operation is bound to be studied for various reasons and there should be an Agency position at least as to what happened, what were the mistakes, and what were the lessons. Moreover, the DCI, having assumed office after the operation was thoroughly finished, has every reason for wanting to have some definitive findings and conclusions.

b. If the DCI agrees with a, above, each recipient of the survey and analysis (and it is understood that they will only be distributed together) should be advised of the fact that such an Agency position is being sought. This might help to avoid independent conclusions outside of the Agency being reached first.

c. The following requirements should be imposed on all future IG surveys at least on any aspects of the DDP area of responsibility.

1) No survey shall be undertaken without specific written terms of reference approved by the DCI.

2) The DDP shall be satisfied that in each future survey covering any portion of his area of responsibility the IG or his staff will interview at least all officers having had responsibility for any part of the activity inspected by the IG; and prior to the distribution of the survey, the DDP and

each such officer will be given an opportunity to express his views on points included in the survey. Obviously the IG need not accept these views. Such procedure, however, will save an enormous amount of time required to answer surveys such as the Cuban one which fail to present a full factual picture regardless of the conclusions reached.

7. I am addressing this memorandum to you as my immediate superior. I hope, however, that you will agree with my request that the memorandum be passed to the DCI for his consideration. I do not, of course, ask that you associate yourself with it or any part of it merely because you transmit it. 52/*

On 22 January 1962, Lyman Kirkpatrick responded to the Barnes's memo cited above. Classified SECRET, it also was marked PERSONAL and CONFIDENTIAL for C. Tracy Barnes. The memorandum read as follows:

Dear Tracy:

Thank you for your courtesy in sending me a copy of your memorandum of 19 January [1962] concerning the Inspector General's survey of the Cuban Operation.** I do hope that Dick [Bissell] forwards it to the DCI, and I am enclosing a copy of this note to you in case you wish to send a copy to Dick.

I have not had time to study your memorandum, or even in fact, do more than glance at the DD/P analysis in view of the meeting with the President's Board all day Friday and the fact that I am going to be away all this week. However, I will make the following comments. Needless to say, I completely disagree with your statement that it is an incompetent job. I feel that it is competent and I believe that the more than one file cabinet drawer full of background documents will prove its competence.*** I do not believe that it is biased. We made it very clear at the start of the report that it would only deal with inadequacies and failures and would not purport to be a thorough analysis of the operation.

- * Barnes was relieved as ADDP/A shortly before Christmas 1961. He continued to serve as Senior Planning Officer (DDP/SPO) until March 1962 when he became Chief, Domestic Operations Division.
- ** The only distribution shown on the copy of Barnes's memorandum used by the author of this history showed an original and one for the DDP.
- *** Kirkpatrick obviously confused quantity with quality.

Most of all I object most strongly to your third observation, namely that it is malicious and intentionally biased. I have asked the men who did this survey to review your memorandum and perhaps acknowledge that more time should have been spent with you or Bissell, but inasmuch as this devolved on me, if there is a fault, it is mine personally. But to imply that for some reason, unknown to me, that we would slant this report is an unfair comment. You apparently feel that there was something unusual in the distribution of the final report. The only thing unusual in it was that we had two Directors at the same time, and Mr. McCone having asked for it received it as he was leaving for the West coast on the day before Thanksgiving and everybody else got their copies on the day after Thanksgiving.* Your concern as to how the President's Board and the Attorney General knew of the survey's existence can be answered very simply. In 1956, the President's Board, in writing, advised all Agencies that all Inspector General reports should be forwarded to them automatically. I don't believe it was a week after the Cuban operation that the direct question came from that Board as to whether an inspection was going to be done. To which an affirmative reply was given. The Attorney General's source I do not know.

Finally, as far as to what should be done next, you and Dick should know that at the conclusion of my discussion with the President's Board I urged that a group, or individual, who had not in any way been associated with the operation be charged with taking the Taylor Report, our report, and your comments, and all background material and writing a truly national and detailed report. I believe that would be a far better solution than trying to develop a CIA position, which really is not very practical inasmuch as there were so many outside factors affecting this operation. 54/

This final statement was so eminently sensible that one can only conclude that the purpose of Kirkpatrick's single-tracked approach was to cause the controversy that it did.

* Obviously it is impossible under law to have two Directors of Central Intelligence at the same time. At the time that he received the copy of the report, Mr. McCone was the designated Director of Central Intelligence, but he had not yet been sworn in. In his history of the Dulless administration, Wayne Jackson challenged Kirkpatrick's statement that the IG's survey was delivered to Mr. McCone on Wednesday, the day before Thanksgiving. Jackson stated that Kirkpatrick's transmittal Memorandum was dated 20 November 1961, which would have been the Monday before Thanksgiving rather than the Wednesday. 53/

In his "Personal and Confidential" memorandum of 22 January 1962 to Barnes, the IG had specified that he had asked his inspection team to review Barnes's memorandum and to provide comments on the reasons why Barnes thought that the IG survey was biased. The 26 January 1962 report forwarded by members of the IG inspection staff stated:

1. The scope of the IG Survey is briefly and clearly stated in the Introduction. The Survey's intent was to identify and describe weaknesses within the Agency which contributed to the final result and to make recommendations for their future avoidance. The IG had no authority to conduct a survey of the machinery for making decisions and policy at other levels of the government. This field was covered by the group headed by Gen. Taylor. The Survey expressly avoided detailed analysis of the purely military phase of the operation.

2. Much of the DDP's Analysis is devoted, however, to a discussion of governmental decision making and to a rehash of the military operation. It criticizes the Survey for insufficient attention to these matters, putting the major blame for the operation's failure on factors beyond the control of the Agency.

3. The Analysis attempts to refute most of the weaknesses described by the Survey. The few which it admits were, it contends, not significant to the final result. It rejects the Survey's statements that intelligence was inadequate and misused and that staffing was inadequate. It blames the failure of the air drops on the Cuban reception crews and air crews. It states the small boat operations could not well have been handled in any other way. And it states that other weaknesses were not important because they were not the decisive reason for failure.

4. There is a fundamental difference of approach between the two documents. While the Analysis is preoccupied with interdepartmental policy making and military strategy, the Survey is mainly concerned with the failure to build up internal resistance in Cuba through clandestine operations. The Analysis fails to shed any further significant light on this fundamental issue.

5. The Analysis shows a poorer grasp of what was going on at the case-officer level than of events in policy-making circles. This is apparent in a number

of inaccuracies in the Analysis. For example, the discussion of activities in Miami is inaccurate and misleading. Conduct of training in Miami is defended although it was not criticized by the Survey. The 178 trainees alluded to in the Analysis as trained in Miami were in fact trained in Guatemala. The PM section in Miami was being built up beginning in November 1960, rather than being deemphasized. These and other inaccuracies suggest that the Analysis should be read with caution where it deals with events on a working level of the project.

6. The IG investigators centered their investigations on certain phases which were significant to the success or failure of any operation and of the Agency's overall mission itself. They cannot be ignored or argued away just because of policy decisions made outside the Agency.

55

The memorandum prepared by the team which drafted the IG's survey clearly indicated that the point which was made time and again in the DDP analysis of the IG report and which was spelled out in a single sentence in Barnes's memorandum of 19 January was correct--"The authors [of the IG survey] never understood the problems which which they were dealing and failed to express their views with any precision or proper use of relevant fact." To attack the DDP analysis because of its concern with policy decisions which had direct, positive, and often immediate effects upon the operation rather than being concerned with developments at "the case-officer level" was unrealistic. Certainly if Kirkpatrick had made clear that his investigation would ignore the interdepartmental aspects of the operation in order to focus exclusively on internal CIA problems, he would have been disabused quickly of the rationality of such an approach--if indeed he were not laughed out of office. Clearly he did not specify such an approach to Bissell, Barnes, or Esterline; and when he did verge on it with Hawkins, he was quickly informed that such an approach was invalid.

If it had not been established before, the final sentence of the memorandum prepared by the IG inspection team was conclusive evidence of the team's complete dissociation from the very real world of the Bay of Pigs operation. They said that the bag of internal problems to which they had addressed themselves "cannot be ignored or argued away just because of policy decisions made outside the agency." One wonders how these three individuals explained the fact that even though the Agency had carefully selected and trained a group of Cuban pilots for a mission which might well have made the difference between victory and defeat at the Bay of Pigs, it was a last minute policy decision by the President of the United States to cancel that D-Day air strike--an act which guaranteed that the operation would fail.

On 27 January 1962, the Deputy Director for Plans sent a memorandum to the DCI forwarding copies of both Barnes's memorandum of 19 January and a copy of Kirkpatrick's 22 January memorandum in response to Barnes. The DDP's memorandum said:

1. As you are aware, Mr. Tracy Barnes did a major part of the work in preparing our comments on Mr. Kirkpatrick's Survey of the Cuban Operation. At the conclusion of the task, Mr. Barnes wrote me the attached memorandum which I hereby pass on to you.
2. I may say that I am in agreement with Mr. Barnes that the Survey, largely by reason of the omission of material relevant to its conclusions, constitutes a highly biased document and that the bias is of such a character that it must have been intentional.
3. I will be glad to discuss this with you if you so desire. 56/

That the failure of the Inspector General's survey to consider external factors apparently puzzled Bissell was indicated in the following entry in the IG's diary:

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~~SECRET~~

[Dick] Drain reported to me that he had noted to Bissell that the report (Cuban) specifically stated it was not going to deal with decisions made outside the Agency and that this answers their inquiry as to why it would not take these into account. 57*

Allen Dulles's response to Kirkpatrick's investigation was forwarded to DCI McCone on 15 February 1962, and it read as follows:

1. Upon receipt of the Inspector General's report of October 1961, on the Cuban Operation, which reached my desk prior to my resignation as Director of Central Intelligence, I immediately transmitted a copy to the Deputy Director (Plans) for his comment. This was in line with the practice I had consistently followed in dealing with the reports of the Inspector General: namely, the Office which is the subject of the inspection is given an opportunity to comment on the IG report before the Director determines the action to be taken thereon. The reply of the Deputy Director (Plans), dated 18 January 1962, of which I have received a copy, was submitted to you following my resignation.

2. Meanwhile, I have also received and considered the comments of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General Cabell.

3. I remain at your disposal for any comments you may wish me to submit on any phases of the matter relating to CIA responsibilities. Hence I will not submit detailed written comment on the Inspector General's report.

4. At this time, however, I wish to make certain general comments:

a. As a member of the Taylor Committee appointed by the President, I participated fully in the work of his Committee and joined in his Memorandum and oral reports to the President on this subject. While I do not now have a copy of these documents, I made only one or two

*

* It would appear that Mr. Kirkpatrick made a quantum jump in assuming that his mere statement that external factors would not be considered was in itself sufficient explanation. Based on Kirkpatrick's personal interview with Bissell, it is not surprising that the DDP would have anticipated coverage of external matters--these had been the focus of much of the interview. Bissell also would have been informed of the IG's joint session with Hawkins, Drain, and Esterline--a session not limited to review of internal matters.

reservations to the general conclusions and recommendations to these reports. I consider them to be sound and believe they should be accepted as the best available survey of this particular operation.

b. The Inspector General's report suffers from the fact that his investigation was limited to the activities of one segment of one agency, namely, the CIA. Opinions based on such a partial review fail to give the true story or to provide a sound basis for the sweeping conclusions reached by him.

c. Judgments could not properly be rendered in this matter without a full analysis, as was made by the Taylor Committee, of actions of all the participating elements in the operation and the influences brought to bear outside of the Agency which affected the operation. This applies particularly to the participation of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to certain elements of the Executive Department of the Government.

d. At no time during the preparation of his report did the Inspector General request any information from me and he made certain serious errors in areas where my direct responsibility was clearly involved.

5. Two major areas of criticism in the IG report cover (1) the operational arrangements for the organization, training, transportation, and deployment of the Brigade and, (2) the relations of Agency personnel to the Cuban emigration [sic] and their political organization. As to these points, I submit the following:

a. First, while certain organizational matters, in the light of developments, may be open to some criticism, the Brigade with its entire complement of men and equipment reached the landing area on schedule and under circumstances which achieved complete surprise. The situation in the landing area was substantially as predicted. The enemy battle order intelligence was essentially correct. The failure to get the ammunition and supplies ashore was due to circumstances beyond the control of the Brigade commander or its personnel.

b. Second, with respect to the organization of the Cuban emigre political committee in support of the operations, I would point out that prior to engaging in the operation a broad coalition of Cuban leaders, and one acceptable to our State Department, was realized.

These two important achievements covered major areas of CIA responsibility.

6. As Director, I deemed it desirable and necessary in view of my other duties to delegate certain responsibilities within the Agency for the day-by-day management of the operation, and on military matters and judgments I relied heavily on military personnel and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, I assumed throughout full responsibility for the Agency's participation and actions and kept currently advised of all important developments. During the concluding days of the operation, I was particularly influenced by the judgments in Colonel Hawkins' dispatch dated April 13, 1961, relating to the high state of readiness of the Brigade (Annex A to Chapter IV [sic] of DDP report...)*

7. Whether or not the operation would have succeeded if the Brigade had landed with its entire personnel and equipment is a matter which can be debated and on which even today military experts differ.** Certainly, the responsibility for failure does not lie primarily in the main areas of criticism stressed in the Inspector General's report.

8. Of course, there are lessons to be learned as pointed out in the Taylor Reports. These reports, I believe, should be taken as the main basis for any review of the Agency's actions in support of the operation. 58/

Mr. Dulles's comment that the IG failed to interview him (Par. 4d, above) raises the interesting question of why this was done. It seems particularly strange for at least two reasons:

* The reference should be to "Annex A to Chapter VI of the DDP Report."

** The question wasn't one of whether the operation would have succeeded even if the Brigade had landed intact. The question was whether the Brigade supported by control of the air could have succeeded. This obviously was a serious oversight on Dulles's part.

First, there were on-going, apparently familiar contacts between Dulles and Kirkpatrick during this period as evidenced by their discussions concerning the future of both Bissell and the DDP.* Second, the IG's inspection team did draw up a list of questions on the operation for Kirkpatrick to discuss with the DCI. The questions were prepared by Shea and Dildine on 20 August 1961 and apparently were seen by the IG about that time; but no action appears to have been taken then. The questions were "Recirculated per meeting [of] 9/29--for your talks with DCI and DDCI" by Shea on 1 October 1961; but there is no record of any subsequent discussions between the IG and the DCI or DDCI.

The questions proposed for the interview, like the questions asked Mr. Bissell, Jake Esterline, Dick Drain, and Jack Hawkins, focused heavily on the relationships with State, DOD, and the Joint Chiefs and their impact on the operation. Many of the questions were leading and others reflected on failures in the areas of tradecraft and personnel--they seemed out of place for an interview with the DCI. As an example, the final item in the list surely would have raised Mr. Dulles's ire for it requested the DCI/DDCI to comment on the following:

It is the view of the investigating team that the project was ill-conceived, badly administered, poorly led, and that tradecraft doctrine was violated on a massive scale. Our report will reflect this view in detail, with a great deal of supporting evidence.
59**

As Kenneth Greer noted in his history of the Office of the Inspector General, Dulles's memorandum to McCone was quite temperate but:

* See Chapter 3.

** See Appendix D for a list of questions.

Although there is no reference to it in Kirkpatrick's diary or in any of the other papers available for review, Dulles and Cabell confronted Kirkpatrick with their views on the inadequacies of the survey in a meeting in Kirkpatrick's office. John Earman was present and recalls that it was an extremely stormy session. Dulles, once a close friend of Kirkpatrick, did not even speak to Kirkpatrick for over a year following the meeting. 60*

The concluding memorandum in this series of exchanges involving the DDP's response to the Inspector General's survey of the Cuban operation was McCone's 19 February 1962 letter to Allen Dulles reading:

Dear Allen:

I have received your memorandum of 15 February 1962 containing your comments on the Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation. Copies of this memorandum, together with the DDP analysis of the survey, the comments made by General Cabell, Mr. Kirkpatrick, and the personal views expressed by Mr. Tracy Barnes, will be bound in the report--and therefore will be known to anyone who might have occasion to read it. 61

Based on an extract from Kirkpatrick's diary, it appears probable that McCone consulted with Kirkpatrick prior to this response to Allen Dulles. The Kirkpatrick diary stated: "The DCI then talked about the Cuban report and we agreed that it should be bound together with all of the comments and that the only copies to be retained should be in the Agency." 62 Possibly the last words from any of the principals involved in the in-house evaluation of the Bay of Pigs were recorded by Lyman Kirkpatrick in the early fall of 1963 when he reported:

* Mr. Earman was Mr. Dulles's Executive Officer. When Kirkpatrick became Executive Director of CIA in the Spring of 1962, John Earman became Kirkpatrick's successor as Inspector General.

Meeting with DCI: I asked him whether he thought the Bay of Pigs report was a knife job. He replied he thought it was a tough report and perhaps bore unnecessarily hard on the Agency. He then mentioned that he thought the most shocking failure in the Bay of Pigs was the fact that Allen Dulles was off in Puerto Rico giving a speech to the Young Executive Group at the time the operation was being carried out. He said he had mentioned this to Eisenhower who had been completely shocked, and had said that he thought that this has [sic] been simply a cover story. I then said that I thought one of the greatest failures on the part of the Agency in the Bay of Pigs was that the Agency never acquainted the President with the realities of the operation and its chances of success or failure. 63/*

* At this time, Kirkpatrick was Executive Director of the Agency having been appointed to that position 10 April 1962.

Chapter 4

Evaluation of the Evaluations

Although Inspector General Lyman Kirkpatrick's "Survey" of the Bay of Pigs operation did offer some valid criticisms, it by no means deserved the kudos given it by Thomas Powers as "the only serious official investigation of the Bay of Pigs."* Even with its obvious bias toward protection of the reputation of John F. Kennedy's administration, the Taylor Committee report on the Bay of Pigs was far more objective than Kirkpatrick's post-mortem.

The thrust of the IG's review was to denigrate DDP Richard Bissell's management of the anti-Castro operation. To this end, the IG's investigation made the unrealistic assumption that CIA's role in the Bay of Pigs could be examined and valid conclusions drawn without reference to the Agency's continuous interrelations with other US agencies and the White House. Moreover, this unique approach was never made clear to those being interviewed by the IG and his team. In fact, the record of his meetings with the key personnel of the operation, including Bissell, was quite to the contrary. The focus of those meetings was on the impact of external pressures.

* The Man Who Kept the Secrets (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), p. 106. Powers's evaluation of Kirkpatrick's inspection provides an excellent example of the difficulty presented to the author who attempts to write objectively about CIA activities which remain protected for security reasons. If he had had access to IG interviews, it seems unlikely that Powers would have made the above statement, nor would he have regarded Kirkpatrick as the purist who "was determined not to whitewash a CIA failure of such magnitude that it threatened to destroy the Agency itself" (p. 332). Completion of the Taylor Committee's report several months before the IG's survey--a report to which Kirkpatrick had access--made it clear that the CIA was not going to be "destroyed" because of the failure at the Bay of Pigs.

Even where the IG's survey had valid criticisms, many of its suggested remedies could not have been made unilaterally. Other agencies were necessarily involved in an operation which was in support of US policy and authorized by the White House. Among the viable criticisms found in the Kirkpatrick report were the following:

1. Senior Agency personnel were negligent in failing to recognize that there was a point beyond which they should no longer have tolerated political interference with the planned military operation. Although the IG did not specify it, with the cancellation of the D-Day strike, the project leaders should have recognized that the margin between success and failure clearly had been exceeded; and they should have ordered the immediate recall of the invasion force, even if it meant the loss of materiel already off-loaded.

2. In this same context was the IG's suggestion that too many important briefings were conducted by individuals not thoroughly familiar with the operation. This was a point which was supported by Jake Esterline, Chief of the anti-Castro project. Both Esterline and the IG suggested that if Col. Jack Hawkins (paramilitary chief for the operation) had been at the meeting with Dean Rusk on the evening of 16 April 1961 when the D-Day air strike was cancelled, the situation might have been reversed.

3. The IG was far off base in his broad condemnation of the caliber of the personnel assigned to the anti-Castro task force, but there was justification for his criticism that DCI Dulles's instructions that the best qualified people were to be selected for the task force were not implemented. There were no directed

assignments, even though the DDP was supposedly bound by its contingency assignment policy. Supportive of the IG's contention that the DDP failed to provide its best people were Dick Drain, Chief of Operations for the task force, and Bill Eisemann who was Chief of Support for the operation.

4. In this general context, the IG's criticism of the lack of Spanish language capability in the project was, of course, denied by the DDP which noted that many of WH/4's most senior personnel were fluent in Spanish. The cable traffic from the training bases, however, requested the assignment of Spanish linguists as an ongoing need throughout the course of the project.

5. The IG's survey was sharply critical of the independence of the Agency's air arm, DPD, from control by the anti-Castro project chief. If there had been direct control of the air operations by the task force, there might have been better coordination and greater effectiveness in air drop operations. There is little doubt that the project officers should have made stronger appeals concerning the selection of targets and the armament--specifically pushing for the use of napalm--for the D-2 and D-Day air strikes.

The IG's survey lost its credibility by trying to limit its review exclusively to the role played by CIA during the operation. This course of action gave the IG as many straw men as he desired to knock down, but as stressed throughout this volume, the anti-Castro effort was an interagency program from the time of its inception under the Eisenhower administration until its collapse on the beach at Playa Giron. Moreover, the IG's report suffered severely from

its obvious attempts to denigrate both DDP Bissell and DCI Dulles. Even as he criticized the DCI and the DDP for failing to use Col. Hawkins as a principal briefer, Kirkpatrick also was making disparaging remarks about Hawkins--perhaps following the bias of the Taylor Committee in portraying Hawkins as the dominant voice in pushing for the invasion.

The Inspector General's survey also showed a complete lack of understanding of the anti-Castro paramilitary plan. The task force was criticized at length for its failure to develop numerous cadres of well-armed, well-trained guerrillas within Cuba. The inability of WH/4 to successfully supply the internal dissidents with adequate material by either air drop or maritime operations drew extremely harsh criticism. From the IG's point of view the success of the anti-Castro effort should have hinged on an almost immediate uprising by dissident units which the Agency had trained and supported. As the Taylor Committee report had made clear and as the IG and his inspectors has been told, any hope for such an internal uprising had gone by the board as early as November 1960 and had no place in the planning from that time forward. This change in concept was neither understood nor conceded by the IG.

The IG's survey also was seriously flawed by its extreme emphasis on the organizational difficulties between Headquarters and the Miami base--the IG concern being that the base was never upgraded to a station. The IG's criticism of Headquarters in this instance focused on the treatment of the leaders of the various Cuban factions in the Miami area. Paradoxically, however, even as Headquarters was being castigated for failing to give the Cuban leaders--particularly the officers of the FRD and the CRC--a stronger voice in planning operational activities against Castro,

the IG's survey specified that the impetuosity and emotionalism of the Cubans could have led to precipitate action.

Such limited credibility as the IG's survey warrants is negated almost completely by the dissumulative manner in which the report was prepared. When he conducted his personal interviews with Richard Bissell, Jake Esterline, Jack Hawkins, and Dick Drain, the IG's questions and comments clearly reflected his understanding of the interdepartmental nature of the Bay of Pigs operation and his clear recognition that Agency actions--on all critical issues--were not judgments made solely by CIA. As emphasized in the preceding chapter on the IG's survey, on the one reported occasion when Kirkpatrick tried to fly the idea that he could limit his review solely to CIA, he was jerked up immediately by Col. Hawkins. In his ill-disguised attempt to discredit the DDP/DCI management of the operation, it was apparent that the IG was determined to prove that the anti-Castro effort was doomed from its inception.

As might have been expected, the DDP's "Analysis of the Inspector General's Survey" took issue with every point and criticism which was made by the IG. The DDP's objection, of course, was that the survey was based on the false and artificial assumption that during the course of the operation, CIA was independent of other agencies of government. It seems unfortunate that the Deputy Director for Plans and the Director for Central Intelligence did not simply make this statement in lieu of any other response to the Inspector General's survey. Instead, however, the DDP's rebuttal was even more lengthy than the Inspector General's survey and, with minor exceptions, denied the validity of all of the charges made by

the Inspector General, including the IG's condemnation of the "rice and beans" air drop ordered by General Cabell.

After denying the validity of the Inspector General's focus on CIA alone, the DDP then proceeded to argue that the setup for air operations with DPD was successful; that the project had ample Spanish language capabilities; that the best possible use was made of the intelligence reports from USIB, ONE, and OCI; and never admitted to failure in terms of the IG charges that as the margin for success began to be diminished sharply by political considerations that the Agency should have called for a halt. The DDP response was resentful of the personal nature of the attacks made by the Inspector General, and it was correct in that CIA could not be studied out of context from its relationships with other agencies in the government. The fact that the Presidential authorization for the project had specified that CIA work with both State and DOD negated the IG's charge that the Agency's Project Review Committee should have been consulted about the operational plan.

With reference to the charge that the Agency had failed to estimate the chances of success, the DDP's analysis pointed out that the chances of success were judged to be favorable not only by CIA's planners, but also by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense. The basis for this estimate was that that the D-Day air strike would take place--and there was no dispute between the Agency and DOD about the essentiality of control of the air over Cuba if the project were to have any chance of success. It was in light of the cancellation of the D-Day strike that the DDP was able to point

out--quite properly in response to the IG's charge that the plan was poorly conceived--that because of that cancellation the plan was never really tested.

DCI John McCone made a politic decision in ordering that the Inspector General's "Survey" and the DDP's "Analysis" should be bound together with the pertinent memos from the concerned parties. In choosing this course because of his unfamiliarity with the situation, it was unfortunate that McCone didn't arrange to have a copy of the Taylor Committee Report bound with the two Agency originated documents. As Kirkpatrick had suggested to PFIAB, the only way a realistic evaluation of the operation could be made was to put these documents in the hands of an impartial investigator. Reviewed without reference to the four memorandums which make up the Taylor report, the IG and DDP documents appear to be the results of a skunk pissing contest.

As with other aspects of the Bay of Pigs story, it is unfortunate that the effort to put the Inspector General's "Survey" and the DDP's "Analysis" in proper perspective has been so long delayed. The erosion of records and memories in the more than twenty years between completion of those reports and this volume--particularly the paucity of papers from Bissell, Barnes, and J. C. King--makes for a less complete picture than desirable. Although it is unlikely that a volume such as this would be considered for overt publication, it would seem in order that

thought be given to broad circulation of this story on an internal basis.* As with other misinformation about the Bay of Pigs operation, the only version of this story that has been publicized has been based on Kirkpatrick's own less than objective writings.**

* This appears unlikely, however, considering the unchanging resistance from the Operations Directorate even to the writing of classified CIA histories. Note, for example, the similarity of the philosophies expressed on this subject by two DDO principals--one in 1971, the other in 1981:

1. The recent publications by the New York Times of the Top Secret history of the Vietnamese war and related highly classified documents suggest that we would do well to re-examine the arrangements and procedures under which our own history program is being administered. Needless to say, there is enough highly sensitive material in some of these histories to cause the Government and the Agency tremendous embarrassment and to put a real monkey wrench into large segments of our operational activities, particularly those relating to other governments and liaison services.

I know a lot of good work has gone into the history program and yet I cannot conceal a nagging question as to what ultimate useful purpose such a program serves for an Agency such as this one. I wish it were possible to terminate the program and destroy the material that's been put together. Because I realize that such a course of action is improbable, I urge that those in charge of the program be impressed once again with the importance of the security aspects of it. I for my part will do this with respect to the Clandestine Service role in the program. 1/

2. [Ben Evans] is hot on completion of BOP [the Bay of Pigs history] and noted that he had given [a copy of] my work plan [on the final volume of the Bay of Pigs history] to Mr. [Nestor] Sanchez [Chief, Latin American Division]; and Sanchez opposes [the] whole idea of BOP history. 2/

**Kirkpatrick, Lyman, The Real CIA (New York: Macmillan, 1968) and Kirkpatrick, Lyman, "Paramilitary Case Study: The Bay of Pigs," Naval War College Review, Nov-Dec 72, pp. 32-42.

Appendix A

**Correspondence between Dr. Jack B. Pfeiffer and
Charles A. Briggs, 29 May 1981 - 4 June 1981.**

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

29 May 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR : Inspector General
THROUGH : Acting Chief, History Staff
SUBJECT : Seventy page report prepared by Lyman
Kirkpatrick on Bay of Pigs

1. In the course of the investigation which the Inspector General's office conducted (May-October 1961) on the Bay of Pigs Operation, Lyman Kirkpatrick personally interviewed three of the principal officers of the Branch (WH/4/WHD) which ran the operation. Kirkpatrick identified two of the three officers in attendance as "Mr. [Jacob D.] Esterline and Colonel [Jack] Hawkins [USMC]." Kirkpatrick also indicated that he prepared a report of "some 70 pages" on this meeting. If possible, I should like to obtain a copy of Kirkpatrick's 70 page report and, also, learn the identity of the third member of WH/4 who was a participant in the interview.

2. Reference to the 70 page report on his interview is contained in two memos of transmittal of copies of the Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation from Kirkpatrick to Mr. McCone (20 Nov 61) and to Mr. Dulles (24 Nov 61).

3. I am aware that Kenneth Greer's reference to Kirkpatrick's report on the BOP in his history, The Office of the Inspector General, Jan 52-Dec 71 (DCI-7, Oct 73) states that "Kirkpatrick directed the [inspection] team members to destroy all of their working papers relating to the survey because of the report's sensitivity." Hopefully, perhaps, Kirkpatrick excluded his own working papers from destruction.

4. If there is any way that I can assist you in the search, please let me know.

Dr. Jack B. Pfeiffer
CIA History Staff
316 Ames Bldg., x2621

4 June 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Jack B. Pfeiffer
Acting Chief, CIA History Staff

FROM: Charles A. Briggs
Inspector General

SUBJECT: Seventy Page Report Prepared by Lyman Kirkpatrick
on Bay of Pigs

1. I have searched OIG files for additional information on the 70-page report referred to in the two memoranda cited in paragraph 2 of your 29 May memorandum. We cannot locate a copy of this report, nor can we shed any light on the identity of the third officer.

2. We have no record of any Kirkpatrick "working papers" on this subject. As far as we can tell, all of the OIG survey team's working papers related to the Bay of Pigs Operation survey were destroyed in accordance with Kirkpatrick's instructions.

3. I am concerned that your unclassified 29 May memorandum to me contains information which I understand is still classified and sensitive. Since the Agency is in the process of denying release in toto of these reports, I suggest that your memorandum be classified CONFIDENTIAL.

/s/ Charles A. Briggs

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CONFIDENTIAL

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OFFICIAL HISTORY
OF THE
BAY OF PIGS OPERATION

Appendices B, C, & D from

DRAFT Volume V

CIA's Internal Investigation of the Bay of Pigs

Jack B. Pfeiffer

Submitted to the
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency

18 April 1984



(b)(3)

11/18/92 gkmD

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~~SECRET~~

APPENDICES B, C, & D ARE TOP SECRET
AND REQUIRE SEPARATE HANDLING

J. K. McDonald
Chief, CIA History Staff

18 November 1992

SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

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OFFICIAL HISTORY
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(b)(3)

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APPENDIX B

Memorandum for Mr. McCone

from Lyman Kirkpatrick

20 November 1961,

Subject: Survey of the Cuban Operation

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COPY

20 November 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. McCone

SUBJECT : Survey of the Cuban Operation

1. Presented herewith is a 150 page survey of the Cuban operation, together with the most important basic documents on the operation which are included in the five annexes. In this report we have not attempted to go into an exhaustive step by step inspection of every action in the operation. Nor have we tried to assess individual performance, although our inspection left us with very definite views. Rather, we have tried to find out what went wrong, and why, and to present the facts and conclusions as briefly as possible. This report has been double-spaced for ease in reading. The ten recommendations for corrective action start on page 148.

2. In conducting this survey we reviewed all of the basic files and documents, including all of the material prepared by the Agency for General Maxwell Taylor's Committee, as well as the minutes of that Committee which were made available to us. In addition, we conducted extensive interviews with all of the principal officers on the project from the DD/P on down, and made detailed memoranda for our files on all of these discussions; e.g., my meeting with the top three officers of the Branch reviewing the operation the week after the landing failed is reported in some 70 pages. Thus, while the analysis and conclusions presented herewith regarding the operation are those of the Inspector General, the bases for these conclusions are extensively documented in the files.

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3. This, in my opinion, is a fair report even though highly critical. Unfortunately, there has been a tendency in the Agency to gloss over CIA's inadequacies and to attempt to fix all of the blame for the failure of the invasion upon other elements of the Government, rather than to recognize the Agency's weaknesses reflected in this report. Consequently, I will make no additional distribution of this report until you indicate whom you wish to have copies. In this connection, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board has requested a copy in time for Mr. Coyne to give a brief report on it at their December 9 meeting. I will await your wishes in this regard.

/s/ Lyman Kirkpatrick
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Inspector General

Attachment

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APPENDIX C

Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence
from Lyman B. Kirkpatrick,
24 November 1961
Subject: Report on the Cuban Operation

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COPY

24 November 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Report on the Cuban Operation

1. The report on the Cuban Operation, as is true of all Inspector General reports, was prepared under my personal direction and worked on by myself and my deputy, Mr. David McLean, as well as the three officers who did the principal collecting of information and preparation of the text: Messrs. Dildine, Shaffer, and Shea. The final editing was done by myself personally and the report represents the views of the Inspector General.

2. In preparing the report we had access to all of the material prepared by this agency and submitted to the Taylor Committee, as well as the minutes of the Taylor Committee meetings, and a chance to see their final conclusions and recommendations. In addition to this, we had all of the documentary material available in the WH Division, WH-4, and other staffs and divisions of the agency who had cognizance of or prepared material for WH/4. These particularly included ONE, OCI, and Staff D of the DD/P.

3. As is noted particularly in our report, we did not go outside of the agency in any respect and tried to confine our inspection to only internal agency matters, except where reference had to be made to outside actions that affected the operation. In interviewing persons connected with this operation, we talked initially to three of the top officers in the operation, commencing

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with Mr. Esterline and Colonel Hawkins, and having our initial lengthy discussions with them within a week of the operation. We interviewed all of the appropriate supervisors in the DD/P, starting with the DD/P himself and including: the A/DDP/A; Chief, WH; Chief, WH-4; and some 130 other officers and employees directly involved in the operation. We kept extensive notes and material of all of these discussions which are documented in our files.

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick

Inspector General

cc: DDCI

CC/P

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APPENDIX D

QUESTIONS FOR MR. DULLES

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8/20/61

Appendix D

Questions for Mr. Dulles

1. Ask for his own view as to errors made and weaknesses disclosed by the Agency in the course of the operation generally and under specific headings of organization, staffing, and operational.

2. The JCS-developed overall-U.S. plan of action for Cuba:

(Background: Gen. Lemnitzer said to the Taylor Committee (meeting of 18 May 61), following his statement that DOD had participated in the Cuban operation only in the role of support, that JCS developed an overall-U.S. plan of action for Cuba in late January, which he discussed with Messrs. Rusk and Dulles on 22 January; also, that Gen. Gray tried to interest State and CIA in preparing a national plan based on the Trinidad concept. State was receptive but the people at CIA were not quite as receptive because they were involved in planning this operation, as a result of the decision of 17 March 1960 by President Eisenhower.)

Questions: Obtain Mr. Dulles' recollection of the foregoing. Did the Agency commit an error in not giving up its role as sole director of the Cuban plan at that time? Was Agency attitude the result of considered judgment?

What was the basic reason why the Agency did not see that the changed operation (1,500 man force, overt) required joint operations with DOD, e.g., by creation of a Joint Task Force?

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Was the Agency on the "defensive" and did it therefore feel that it must carry the project through to completion?

Was it the case that Col. Hawkins' forcefulness and confidence in the strike force carried the others (Bissell, Barnes, Esterline) with him, thereby preventing them from giving a cold, objective look at the situation and where it was taking the Agency? Circumstances under which Col. Hawkins was brought into the project?

3. Ineffectiveness of our clandestine PM efforts (in air and maritime operations; in establishing contact with the guerrilla bands, building them up, etc.)

Was this disclosed to the Director? To the Special Group and later to President Kennedy? If not, did this failure to disclose amount to deception?

Was it the case that Bissell, Barnes, etc. accepted Hawkins optimistic intelligence sitreps without comparing them with the incoming reports, especially SI, of arrest of agents, compromise of nets, highly effective Castro counterintelligence action, etc.? If so, why? Were they too busy with other things? Or was it lack of technical tradecraft skill on their part?

(b)(3)

4. The role played by the DDCI:

(Mr. Dulles told the Taylor Committee that he asked the DDCI to follow closely the air side of the operation.) Did this amount to an operationa role? Did the DDCI in fact exercise operational functions, e.g., in changing instructions as to various technical details of air operations: height of flight, amount of load, etc.

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5. Was Mr. Dulles aware that his assurance to WH/4 (in April 1960) that personnel with qualifications essential to the operation would be recalled from anywhere in the world was not being carried out by subordinates?

6. It is the general view of the investigating team that the project was ill-conceived, badly administered, poorly led, and that tradecraft doctrine was violated on a massive scale. Our report will reflect this view in detail, with a great deal of supporting evidence. Comment?

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SOURCE REFERENCES

NOTES ON SOURCE REFERENCES

1. Unless otherwise indicated, the original classification of all source references was SECRET. Original classifications to the contrary are shown in ()'s.

2. Commercial publications including books, magazines, newspapers, and articles are UNCLASSIFIED.

3. The writer's interviews, conversations, and correspondence are UNCLASSIFIED.

The Internal Investigations of the Bay of Pigs Operation

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