I would like to expand a bit, in the brief time I have, on what was footnote 30 in my Pittsburgh presentation. In a way, I feel a bit like I did when we first began this investigation. As a result of our being shut down in 1978, all I can do today is point out some interesting things that have come out that may be relevant to where we go from here, and raise some questions. As then, before we got access to the CIA files, we have bits and pieces and we are left guessing about how to fill in the blanks. But there are ignorant guesses and informed guesses. I hope that mine are relatively informed.

Here’s what we know. David Phillips recruited the leadership of DRE while serving in Havana in the late 1950's and was the DRE’s first case officer. When the DRE’s leadership fled Cuba in 1960, William Kent organized them into an effective organization in Florida. After moving to Headquarters, Phillips was responsible for some of the early disinformation operations aimed at the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. During the Bay of Pigs, Phillips was in charge of anti-Castro propaganda operations at Headquarters. As such, he worked closely with Doug Gupton, who was his counterpart at JMWAVE in Miami. Phillips described their working relationship as very close.

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1 This paper would not have been possible without the groundbreaking work and assistance of John Newman. Thank you, John.


3 Email, John Newman to Dan Hardway, 9/9/2014.


6 Id. at p. 73.

7 Id.
Gupton was not a registered pseudonym but was, rather, a cover name that William Kent, the officer’s true name, used in the field. It is very likely that William Kent/Doug Gupton’s registered pseudonym, in 1963, was Robert K. Trouchard. Phillips’s work on Cuban disinformation continued after his transfer to Mexico City in 1961 until he left in 1965.

In the fall of 1962, George Joannides was hand picked by Richard Helms to replace Ross Crozier as the CIA’s DRE case officer in Miami after DRE’s public opposition to the government’s policies during the October, 1962, missile crisis. Joannides reported directly to Helms. Joannides’s registered pseudonym was Walter D. Newby. His supervisor was Robert K. Trouchard. Up to 90% of the DRE’s operating funds came from the CIA.

The ARRB managed to force the CIA to declassify a few of Joannides’s fitness reports. On

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8 Id.

9 John Newman will address this, at least briefly in his presentation. Summarizing, Kent’s prior registered pseudonym was Oliver Corbuston. Corbuston disappears from the record at the same time Trouchard appears. In 1961 Trouchard was head of psychops at JMWAVER. Trouchard is in the record as the case officer for Bernard Baker. Other records reveal that Baker was sent to JMWAVER to help take the work load off William Kent. Kent’s intelligence medal narrative also suggests that he was Trouchard.


11 Memorandum for the Record, Mr. Helms’ Conversation with Luis Fernandez Rocha...., RIF 104-10170-10022.

12 Id.; Stockton, p. 221.

13 Memorandum, RIF 104-10170-10022.

14 Five Fitness Reports on Joannides, RIF 104-10304-10000. There are some interesting anomalies in the disclosed Joannides Fitness Reports. The first annual report was signed by the JMWAVER employees in pseudonym (Newby & Trouchard) on 19 Jan 63, reviewed by the Chief of Station one month later on 2/15/63. The next report is a quarterly report signed by the JMWAVER employees on 27 March 63, Reviewed by the Chief of Station one week later on 2 April 63 with a date stamped 16 Apr 63 on page one which may represent the date received at
July 31, 1963, Joannides’ supervisor, Robert K. Trouchard, with whom David A. Phillips had a “very close” working relationship, commended Joannides for doing “an excellent job in the handling of a significant student exile group which hitherto had successfully resisted any important degree of control.”15 The same report lists his second specific duty as “Case officer for student project involving political action, propaganda, intelligence collection and a hemisphere-wide apparatus.”16

Between August 9 and August 21, 1963, Oswald becomes something of a celebrity in New Orleans after his encounter with the local branch of DRE while passing out Fair Play for Cuba leaflets. Joannides’s quarterly fitness report covering this period is one of the ones that has not been released. At some point between July 31, 1963, and May 15, 1964, Joannides replaced Kent as chief of covert operations at JMWARE. While the scanty released documents on Joannides makes it impossible to determine the time, Kent/Trouchard references in JMWARE files end after 7/25/63. By October, 1963, Kent is working at HQ WH/CA.17 Where Kent/Trouchard was between the end of July and

Langley HQ. The third report was signed by the JMWARE employees on 31 July 63, reviewed by the Deputy Chief of Station (pseudonym Frederick J. Inghurst, most likely David Morales) on 9/24/63 (Note that the date stamp beside the Newby and Inghurst signatures are different than any others appearing in the fitness reports.) Note that this quarterly report was not reviewed for three months after being signed by Newby and was not date stamped at HQ until 17 Oct 63. The quarterly report for 3rd quarter covering August and September 1963 is missing from the disclosed sequence. The quarterly report for 4th quarter of 1963 is also missing. The fourth disclosed report is the an annual report covering 4/63 -- 3/64 (the other annual report covered 1/1/62 to 12/31/62) which was signed by the JMWARE employees on 15 May 1964, reviewed by the Deputy Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division at HQ two weeks later on 1 June 64 and date stamped HQ filing of 8 Jun 64. Also interesting that the June 64 fitness report is the first indication that Joannides has security duties and it is reviewed by Morales.

15 Id.

16 Id.

17 See Newman email, supra; RIFs: 104-10100-10329; 104-10100-10216; 104-10100-10210.
October 11, 1963, is not known. It is reasonable, therefore, to presume that Joannides became the
director of covert operations at JMWAVE sometime between the end of July and the beginning of
October, 1963. As that director, he is said to have had “a distinct flair for political action operations
and can translate policy directives into meaningful action programs....” As director of covert action,
Joannides only retained direct responsibility for one operation: the student project involving
“distribution of printed propaganda, production of radio programs, and the development of political
action programs.”

On September 16, 1963, the CIA informed the FBI that it was considering action to counter
the activities of the FPCC in foreign countries. In New Orleans, on September 17, 1963, Oswald
applied for, and received, a Mexican travel visa. On September 27 Oswald arrived in Mexico City.

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18 This is supported by the next fitness report available for Joannides covering the period 1
April 1963 and 31 March 1964. This report states that the “period covered by this fitness report
represents [Joannides’s] initial Agency exposure to those first echelon management
responsibilities which are implicit in a branch chief’s assignment....” Fitness Reports, RIF 104-
10304-10000.

19 Id.

20 Id. Interestingly enough, it was during this time frame that he also assumed
responsibility for security reviews on JMWAVE’s covert action operations and has his fitness
review conducted by David Morales, who noted “that he would be pleased to have [Joannides]
work with [me] at any other Field Station that might be entrusted to [me].” A hope that would be
subsequently fulfilled in Viet Nam.

21 Church Committee, Vol. 5, p. 65 (The Church Committee’s conclusion, on p. 67, that
“there is no reason to think the CIA propaganda program was underway before the assassination”
is based on the unfounded, and unsupportable, assumption that the CIA would not have begun the
operation before receiving information requested from the FBI).

22 Interestingly enough, the person in line in front of Oswald to apply for a visa was
William Gaudet, a known CIA agent. Gaudet claimed that this was merely a coincidence. HSCA
On that day, and the following day, Oswald may have visited the Cuban Consulate. On those same days, the Mexico City CIA Station was testing an impulse camera in their photo surveillance operation aimed at the door of the Cuban Consulate. Sometime in late September Phillips leaves Mexico City TDY for Headquarters. It is at this time that Phillips was promoted to chief of anti-Castro operations in Mexico City – the Cuba desk. On October 1 the Mexico City Station sent “bulk materials” to Headquarters by an untraceable transmittal manifest in a diplomatic pouch “to be held in registry until picked up by Michael C. Choaden presently TDY HQS.” We were not able to find out what was in the pouch. On October 8, 1963, HQ sent a cable to JMWAVE advising them that Phillips would arrive there the following day for a two day visit. That means he would have been back to Mexico City by around October 11, 1963.

23 We do not know the date he left Mexico City. A cable from Headquarters to Mexico City, dated September 30, 1963, indicates that Phillips was, on that date, TDY at HQ. Phillips, Executive Session Testimony, p. 50 (4/25/1978). While Phillips frequently lied about Oswald and Mexico City, in a footnote in a little known book he self published, Secret Wars Diary, he once said: “I was an observer of Cuban and Soviet reaction when Lee Harvey Oswald contacted their embassies.” The chapter of the book in which the footnote occurs was first published in article about Allen Dulles, "The Great White Case Officer", in the first issue of the Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (Spring 1986) which article did not include the footnote. I would like to thank Steve Rosen for calling this to my attention. It is particularly interesting, on many levels, that Phillips here phrased his involvement as observing the Cuban and Soviet reactions to Oswald’s visit; exactly what you would expect him to be doing if Oswald was a counterintelligence dangle.

24 Id. at 51.

25 TM 251905

26 No. 4083


So, what questions does all this raise in my mind? What inferences might be drawn? It appears that, sometime in the fall of 1963, Trouchard/Kent was promoted from JMwave to WH/CA in HQ, Joannides was promoted to Trouchard’s old position in JMwave, and Phillips was promoted to the Cuban desk in Mexico City. Were these rewards for a successful operation? In August, Lee Harvey Oswald and DRE had had their fun in New Orleans. In September the CIA notified the FBI about exporting their successful, but unspecified, domestic anti-FPCC operation overseas. The day after the CIA notice, Oswald applied for a Mexico visa in New Orleans, standing in line behind an acknowledged CIA agent. “Oswald” “visits” the Cuban Consulate on September 27 and 28, while the CIA tested an impulse camera photographing the door he would have used, generating over ten feet of 16 millimeter film that has disappeared. 29 There were also reports that Oswald spent time with pro-Castro Mexican citizens and students. Our efforts to find those people to interview them were repeatedly frustrated and blocked by the CIA. 30

Phillips observed the Soviet and Cuban reaction to “Oswald’s” “visit,” but by October 1, Phillips is TDY HQ where the Mexico Station sends him an untraceable transmittal manifest is sent with unspecified bulk materials-- to be delivered to him personally. From HQ Phillips arrived in Miami on October 9 where he spends 2 days TDY at JMwave on his way back to MC. Did he meet with Trouchard/Kent at HQ? Did he meet with Newby/Joannides in Miani? Did they review the results of the operation and dangle they had just run in Mexico City? Did they review the production from the impulse camera? Was that production the “bulk material” in the pouch? We don’t know,

29 HMMA-22433, 11/7/63.

30 See Lopez Report, Ed Lopez presentation at this Conference.
they were never asked; George Joannides shut down the HSCA investigation into this area. But, if you ask me, I’ve just described to you, in outline form, an intelligence operation that had both counterintelligence and propaganda purposes.

And when we start digging into things a little more, we find that Kent was in an assignment in New Orleans in 1967. Does’t it make you wonder whether Trounard/Kent was in New Orleans in 1967 to help Garrison in the same way Joannides helped us?

My conclusion: The CIA has something to hide. Joannides knew what they had to hide. The CIA knew he knew and knew that we did not know who or what he was or what he was hiding. Joannides hid what they wanted hid. That may just have been the fact that Oswald had been used in a CIA operation – as William Kent’s daughter allegedly once told Gaeton Fonzi, Oswald was a useful idiot – and that could have caused severe embarrassment and, hence, the cover-up. That is the most benign explanation. I do not believe that the more benign explanation of embarrassment over missing him in their embassy coverage can be considered as remotely possible. But whether that is the explanation, or just the next layer of the cover story, it still leaves open the much more serious question of whether, at a minimum, the Agency through its employees had advance knowledge of the assassination and did nothing or, even worse, were involved in the conspiracy to kill John Kennedy.

31 David Phillips, in his executive session testimony, could not even recall making this trip and was not asked about this kind of detail, because the details were not known at the time of our last interview with him.

32 Enclosure 28, CIA Employees Currently in New Orleans Office of DCS, RIF 104-10105-10168. Mr. Kent, the memorandum notes, had “office cover” while in New Orleans much as the Agency has acknowledged that Joannides was operating covertly when assigned as a liaison with the HSCA. I do not know what name Kent was using in New Orleans in 1967.