Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

AGENCY: HSCA
RECORD NUMBER: 180-10110-10026
RECORD SERIES: SECURITY CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 014737

June 13, 1997

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 1
Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 7

Postponement # 1 (Page 6):
Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it discusses sources and methods that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(B) of the JFK Act.
Substitute Language: CIA Installation in Western Hemisphere 28
Release Date: 10/2017

Postponement # 2 (Page 13):
Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.
Substitute Language: The information is the true name of the individual whose pseudonym is John Scelso.

The postponed information will be opened in full on either May 1, 2001, or three months after the decease of the individual, whichever occurs first.

Release Date: 05/2001
Postponement # 3 (Page 13):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: The information is the true name of the individual whose pseudonym is John Scelso.

The postponed information will be opened in full on either May 1, 2001, or three months after the decease of the individual, whichever occurs first.

Release Date: 05/2001

Postponement # 4 (Page 23):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act. The Board is awaiting additional evidence from the CIA, at which time it will reconsider the postponement.

Substitute Language: CIA Employee

Review Date: 05/1997

Postponement # 5 (Page 45):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: The information is the true name of the individual whose pseudonym is John Scelso.

The postponed information will be opened in full on either May 1, 2001, or three months after the decease of the individual, whichever occurs first.

Release Date: 05/2001

Postponement # 6 (Page 47):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: The information is the true name of the individual whose pseudonym is John Scelso.

The postponed information will be opened in full on either May 1, 2001, or three months after the decease of the individual, whichever occurs first.

Release Date: 05/2001
Postponement # 7 (Page 54):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it discusses sources and methods that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(B) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: Date

Release Date: 10/2017

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Board Review Completed: 12/17/96
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: HSCA
RECORD NUMBER: 180-10110-10026
RECORDS SERIES: SECURITY CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 014737

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: HSCA
FROM: SCALETTI, ELSIE I. [ R ]
TO:
TITLE: DEPOSITION OF ELSIE I. SCALETTI [ R ]
DATE: 05/19/78
PAGES: 71
SUBJECTS: SCALETTI, ELSIE I., TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMITTEE [ R ]

CIA, METHODOLOGY

OSWALD, LEE, POST-RUSSIAN PERIOD, TRAVEL, TRIP TO MEXICO

CIA, FILES

OSWALD, LEE, RUSSIAN PERIOD, RETURN TO US

DOCUMENT TYPE: TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS: 1A, 1B
CURRENT STATUS: RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 12/17/96
OPENING CRITERIA:
COMMENTS: Three duplicates continue into next folder.

Box 8.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
Agency: HSCA
Record Number:

Record Series: SECURITY CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY

Agency File Number: 014737

Originator: HSCA

From: Scaletti, Elsie I.

To: 

Title: Deposition of Elsie I. Scaletti

Date: 05/19/78

Pages: 71

Subjects:
1. Scaletti, Elsie I., Testimony before the Committee
2. CIA, Methodology
3. Oswald, Lee, Post Russian Period, Travel to Mexico
4. CIA, Files
5. Oswald, Lee, Russian Period, Return to US
6. 

Document Type: Transcript

Classification: UCST

Restrictions: Open 1A 1B 1C 2 3 4 5 D

Current Status: 0 X

Date of Last Review: / /93

Opening Criteria:

Comments: 3 duplicates continue into next folder

Box # 8

Folder Title:
HEARINGS

Before The
John F. Kennedy Subcommittee
of the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTENTS</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TESTIMONY OF:</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elsie I. Scaletti</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ASSASSINATION OF JOHN F. KENNEY

Friday, May 19, 1978

U. S. House of Representatives,
John F. Kennedy Subcommittee of Select Committee on Assassinations
Washington, D. C.

Deposition of:

ELSIE I. SCALETTI

called for examination by staff counsel for the subcommittee, pursuant to notice, in the offices of House Annex II, Room 3370, Second and D Streets, S. W., Washington, D. C., beginning at 1:15 o'clock p.m., before Albert Joseph LaFrance, a Notary Public in and for the District of Columbia, when were present on behalf of the respective parties:

For the Subcommittee:

MICHAEL GOLDSMITH, ESQ., Staff Counsel

For the Deponent:

(There was no representation by counsel)
Whereupon, ELSIE I. SCALETTI, having first been duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you please state your name and occupation for the record?

Mrs. Scaletti. My name is Elsie I. Scaletti and I am presently a housewife.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is the name Scaletti your true name?

Mrs. Scaletti. No, it is not. It is a registered pseudonym.

Mr. Goldsmith. With whom is it registered?

Mrs. Scaletti. With the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Goldsmith. In what state do you live?

Mrs. Scaletti. Virginia.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you here testifying today voluntarily?

Mrs. Scaletti. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. You are testifying without subpoena?

Mrs. Scaletti. Right.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you received a copy of the Committee Rules and the supporting resolution?

Mrs. Scaletti. Yes, I have.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had an opportunity to read Rule Number 4?
Mrs. Scaletti. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you understand Rule Number 4?

Mrs. Scaletti. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you understand you have a right to counsel?

Mrs. Scaletti. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you waive that right?

Mrs. Scaletti. At this meeting I waive that right.

Mr. Goldsmith. If at any time you decide you should like to have counsel, please indicate that.

Mrs. Scaletti. Right.

Mr. Goldsmith. Under the Committee Rules you have a right to receive a copy of the transcript of the deposition statement that you are going to be giving today. However, by virtue of the agreement that has been worked out between the Committee and the Central Intelligence Agency, the Agency has asked us to request witnesses who were formerly employed with the Agency or presently employed with the Agency to waive the right actually to receive the transcript.

We would naturally be willing to give you an opportunity to review the transcript for accuracy. However, in terms of actually giving you the transcript to keep we would like to ask you to waive that right.

Mrs. Scaletti. I waive my right to keep a copy. I would like to review a final transcript.
Mr. Goldsmith. No problem and you will be notified when the transcript has been prepared. Have you had a chance to review the letter dated March 25, 1978 from the Acting Director of Central Intelligence Carlucci to the Chairman of this Committee?

Mrs. Scaletti. I have.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you understand that letter?

Mrs. Scaletti. I do.

Mr. Goldsmith. For the record that correspondence with JFK Exhibit 94 at the JFK hearings.

My name is Michael Goldsmith. I am staff counsel with the Committee and I am authorized by the Committee to take your statement for this deposition. For background purposes I would like to tell you what the mandate of the Committee is and that is to investigate the assassination of President Kennedy, specifically who did it, was there a conspiracy, and also to evaluate the performance of the investigative agencies including the FBI and the CIA.

Finally, another aspect of the mandate of the Committee is to evaluate the work done by the Warren Commission. Do you understand that?

Mrs. Scaletti. I do.

Mr. Goldsmith. Prior to coming here today have you had any discussion with any present or former employee of the CIA concerning your testimony that you are about to give today?
Mrs. Scaletti. I went to the Agency, to the office of General Counsel to find out what my rights were, what restrictions were placed on me. They told me I had no restrictions placed on me and I could have counsel with me today if I wanted to.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did anyone in the Agency discuss the substance of the testimony with you?

Mrs. Scaletti. No. I discussed with him only -- they did not discuss with me what I should say or in any way I could say it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you spoken to any present or former Agency employee about testimony or statements which those persons have given to the Committee in the past?

Mrs. Scaletti. No, I have not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it fair to say that other than the interview you had previously with staff members of this Committee you have not discussed the substance of this case with anyone?

Mrs. Scaletti. No. Just OGC and OLC about my rights and procedures, et cetera.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mrs. Scaletti, for how many years were you employed by the CIA?

Mrs. Scaletti. Twenty-six plus.

Mr. Goldsmith. What years were you working for the Agency?
Mrs. Scaletti. 1951 to -- I retired December 1977.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you give us a brief summary of the positions that you held during that 26 years?

Mrs. Scaletti. I started as a typist and I retired as a Branch Chief. I went all the positions in between, reports, IA.

Mr. Goldsmith. IA stands for what?

Mrs. Scaletti. Intelligence Assistant officer, Chief of Station, Branch Chief, Deputy Branch Chief.

Mr. Goldsmith. Where were you Chief of Station?

Mrs. Scaletti. [ ]

Mr. Goldsmith. When you retired were Chief of which branch?

Mrs. Scaletti. It was over Venezuela, Colombia, Equador.

Mr. Goldsmith. One of the branches in the Western Hemisphere?

Mrs. Scaletti. A Western Hemisphere Branch.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever have any experience as a case officer dealing with agents in the field?

Mrs. Scaletti. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. In 1963 where were you assigned?

Mrs. Scaletti. Washington.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was your responsibility at that time?

Mrs. Scaletti. I was on the Mexican desk or branch.

Mr. Goldsmith. My understanding is that a desk would be
a subunit of a branch, is that correct?

Mrs. Scaletti. Right.

Mr. Goldsmith. So if you were assigned to the Mexican desk that would be one of the desks in the Western Hemisphere, in a particular Western Hemisphere Branch?

Mrs. Scaletti. Right, unless it became a branch all by itself. This is just internal organization, re-organization. It does not mean anything.

Mr. Goldsmith. In 1963 how many years had you been working on the Mexican Desk?

Mrs. Scaletti. I don't remember unless I get my chronology but I would say at least, to be honest, I don't remember but I think it is at least three or four. I just don't remember.

Mr. Goldsmith. How many years did you stay at the Mexican Desk before going on to your next assignment?

Mrs. Scaletti. From there I went to Mexico in 1967.

Mr. Goldsmith. In 1967 you actually went to Mexico?

Mrs. Scaletti. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. As a case officer?

Mrs. Scaletti. No, as an IA.

Mr. Goldsmith. During that time did you work under Win Scott?

Mrs. Scaletti. In Mexico?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mrs. Scaletti. In Mexico, yes.
Mr. Goldsmith. While in Mexico did you ever work with Ann Goodpasture?

Mrs. Scaletti. We worked with everybody in the station. So, indirectly but not directly under her.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what here responsibilities were at the station?

Mrs. Scaletti. Broadly. She assisted Mr. Scott and handled some of his cases. I really don't know what she had full responsibility for. I know she assisted him on some of the things that he handled.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it fair to say she was his right hand person?

Mrs. Scaletti. Not exactly because his right hand person would have been the Deputy Chief of Station.

Mr. Goldsmith. As a formal matter that would certainly have been the case. Informally did he rely on her a great deal?

Mrs. Scaletti. Yes, but I wouldn't say that she was his really right hand person. He did depend upon her but not for everything.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether she had any responsibility for the surveillance operations in Mexico City?

Mrs. Scaletti. That I can't remember. There was a lot of coordination. She would do some of the work but I don't think she ran them and I don't remember she had the responsibility for them.
Mr. Goldsmith. Turning back to 1963 again, what were the general responsibilities of the Mexican Desk?

Mrs. Scaletti. To support the Mexico City station and to handle things at headquarters concerning Mexico and the Mexico City station.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were the responsibilities of the Mexican Desk solely administrative and procedural in nature?

Mrs. Scaletti. The Mexican Desk was handled like any other desk. If you say administrative and procedural includes budget work, name traces, handling requests from Congress and that is administrative and procedural. But in my terminology administrative can mean support and administration, which is a completely different thing, like personnel or logistics, no.

Procedural, if you mean day to day answering of cables, yes. If you would like to elaborate on administrative or procedural I might be able to --

Mr. Goldsmith. Could you give me a brief laundry list of the types of work that the Mexican Desk did when it gave support to the Mexico City station?

Mrs. Scaletti. In intelligence reporting it would process the report, positive intelligence reports. It would do the counterintelligence dissemination, if it were required, to the FBI, et cetera. It would handle budget and submit projects requesting money in support of the station's operations. It would do name traces. It would handle requests from
Congress, requests from other government agencies. We would write any memo that was required in response to a request from anybody, from the next echelon all the way up to the Director. We would be responsible for replying to matters having to do with Mexico per se or operations in Mexico. Does that clarify it?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, that is helpful.

Did the work involve at any time substantive analytical work? In other words, you would get information from the Mexico City station and you would then have to analyze that information and perhaps make a policy decision on it?

Mrs. Scaletti. No. At that time we are not analysts, we only process raw material. Occasionally they might ask you for a memo, like if there is an election, but we do not do analytical work. We only put down facts that have been reported. We do not do analysis. We do correlation. That is a much better word.

Mr. Goldsmith. What about actualy decisions? If Mexico City station communicated with the Mexican Desk and asked for a decision to be made, would the Mexican Desk make the decision or would someone else in the Branch make the decision?

Mrs. Scaletti. I think we misunderstood each other. When you say policy, analytical, or intelligence, no, we did not analyze intelligence. We only correlated. By policy you mean operational policy?
Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mrs. Scaletti. On operations a lot is left to the station to have a certain amount of autonomy. We had almost no authority to make final decisions.

We could prepare a message with a recommendation and then it would go for release or signature and at the time it was released or the memo signed, that person would be making the policy. Is that clear?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. That person would be someone higher up above the Mexican Desk?

Mrs. Scaletti. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. How many people worked on the Mexican Desk?

Mrs. Scaletti. I cannot remember. I have been trying to think. I cannot recall. I cannot remember where we were sitting.

Mr. Goldsmith. It was not just you?

Mrs. Scaletti. I would say two or more, between two and fifteen.

Mr. Goldsmith. When you say two or more are you thinking in terms of case officers only or are you thinking in terms of case officers, secretarial help, administrative help?

Mrs. Scaletti. Yes. I know where were at least two of us because if I wasn't there, there had to be somebody else there.
Mr. Goldsmith. You say two or more, you are not making any distinction between case officer and other --

Mrs. Scaletti. Don't stick me with the two. I know I was there and somebody else must have been there. But how many people were there -- there are tables of organization available. Honestly, I cannot remember. If I could visualize what room I was sitting in then maybe I could try to think who sat where but I cannot visualize where I was sitting at that time.

Mr. Goldsmith. How many years did you work at the Mexican Desk?

Mrs. Scaletti. We worked all over. Your table of organization changes every four months or six months. Do you understand? You said at that time? You said 1963?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mrs. Scaletti. I can remember at times temporarily when there were 15 and I can remember times when I was practically alone.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who would have been your immediate supervisor in 1963?

Mrs. Scaletti. I cannot remember who the Desk Chief was.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would the Desk Chief have been someone different from the Branch Chief?

Mrs. Scaletti. Yes, unless there was no Desk Chief. I mean, if there was a vacancy.
Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever work with

Mrs. Scaletti. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall when you worked with him?

Mrs. Scaletti. The Years I don’t remember. It was a matter of a couple of years I believe.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think that you worked with in 1963?

Mrs. Scaletti. I know I did because I saw a message.

Mr. Goldsmith. In other words, you saw a cable of some kind that had his name on it?

Mrs. Scaletti. It was mine.

Mr. Goldsmith. As a case officer working on the Mexican Desk would you have been aware in 1963 of the various surveillance operations that were in effect in Mexico City, being conducted by the Mexico City station?

Mrs. Scaletti. Not the surveillances but the team.

Mr. Goldsmith. Could you elaborate a bit on that?

Mrs. Scaletti. I mean from the budget standpoint and from the clearance of agents, I knew that there were so many teams with about so many people, or basically what they did. But we were not privy necessarily to what those people did every day.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you know that there was a wire tap operation against the Cuban and Soviet Embassies and Consulates?

Mrs. Scaletti. Right.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you also know there was a photo
surveillance operation against the Cuban Embassy and Consulate and Soviet Embassy and Consulate?

Mrs. Scaletti. Right.

Mr. Goldsmith. If we can just clarify your last answer, you were aware of the fact of these surveillance operations. Could you explain to me again what you were not aware of?

Mrs. Scaletti. You know from your budget preparations and from your handling of everyday traffic that you have certain operations. Like, you know you have a surveillance team. That is a project. You need so much money. You have so many people. You have so many cars because they come in and request permission to buy a car or to sell a car. Or you know you have a clearance for so many people or this man quit, you know, personnel.

You know basically from the quarterly reporting or the reporting that is required under the regulations, the general target, because you have to get higher approval to hire a team to do such and such.

But I do not know that on Monday, June 2nd, two cars went to this house and looked at this window and Thursday -- do you understand?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. You would not be aware of the operational information being picked up by the surveillance operation?

Mrs. Scaletti. Unless the field bothered to tell you,
because they wanted to find something out or check something out.

Mr. Goldsmith. How often would the field contact you with regard to this types of situation?

Mrs. Scaletti. You could go a month or two without having any, or longer.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would your answer to that question be that you did not frequently get information from the Mexico City station pertaining to the operational aspects of the surveillance teams' work?

Mrs. Scaletti. Correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. When you did get this kind of information would it come to headquarters from the Mexico City station by means of a dispatch or cable?

Mrs. Scaletti. Either one.

Mr. Goldsmith. How would it be determined which form of communication would be used to contact headquarters?

Mrs. Scaletti. The priority and if a reply was requested, because if you need an answer in order to do some more investigation you had better send a cable or you are never going to hear. If it is a dispatch it could take maybe a month by the time you got to the desk and by the time you answer it it would take a month.

Mr. Goldsmith. During the summer months, and I am talking generally not just 1963, but during the summer months, at least...
of the years you were at the Mexico Desk, do you recall
whether there were frequent communications from the Mexico
City station reporting the fact of Americans visiting the
Embassy or Consulate of a communist country?

Mrs. Scaletti. I don't recall any difference between
summer months and any other months.

Mr. Goldsmith. When did Lee Harvey Oswald first come
to your attention?

Mrs. Scaletti. When the station sent a cable asking
for a name trace, a routine name trace.

Mr. Goldsmith. At that time how important was the fact
of Oswald's contract considered?

Mrs. Scaletti. It was a routine name trace.

Mr. Goldsmith. So at that time it was not considered at
all unusual. Is that what you are saying?

Mrs. Scaletti. Yes. We handled it as any normal --
because we would have gotten similar name traces on other
Americans who might have been identified as going to the Soviets.

It was a routine way of handling that for the Bureau.

Mr. Goldsmith. So even though the fact that Americans
did not frequently contact the Soviet Embassy or the Cuban
Embassy, when they did and Mexico City station communicated with
headquarters the fact of that contact, was supposed to be
considered routine?

Mrs. Scaletti. Right. It was still handled in a routine
manner.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would the fact that a cable had been used to communicate with headquarters indicate that the contact was considered to be important?

Mrs. Scaletti. No. As I told you previously, and I will repeat, you generally would use a cable for a name trace for the expediency so that you could get a reply back within a reasonable working period.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let us take a look at that cable now. I would like to show you what has been marked CIA Number 177, and when I refer to these numbers, I am referring to the red numbers at the bottom of the page. The Agency has been kind enough to make these documents available to the Committee at our offices. For purposes of allowing the Agency to make sure that each document is properly returned to it, the Agency has numbered each piece of paper. I use those numbers for the purpose of the deposition for our record. Would you please examine CIA Number 177?

Mrs. Scaletti. Is that the cable that first brought Lee Oswald to your attention?

Mrs. Scaletti. I presume so. I can't remember that far back.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is the date of that cable?

Mrs. Scaletti. 19 October 1963.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it 19 or 9?
Mrs. Scaletti. 19 October 1963. That is the way I read it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let us take a look at CIA Number 178.

Mrs. Scaletti. It could be 9. That is not really that pertinent, is it? Here it is 9 because here is the zulu time. So that is 9.

Mr. Goldsmith. What time?

Mrs. Scaletti. Zulu time.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is zulu time?

Mrs. Scaletti. Greenwich. I believe that is what it is. Zero nine zero four three would be the 9th of 043 zed.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is zed?

Mrs. Scaletti. Z.

Mr. Goldsmith. That refers to Greenwich time?

Mrs. Scaletti. I believe. But you can check the date with that.

Mr. Goldsmith. I was going to say if we take a look at CIA Number 178, that is the Mexico City station copy of that telegram --

Mrs. Scaletti. I am sorry, what number?

Mr. Goldsmith. Number 178. That indicates that the cable was sent on 8 October, so it is likely that headquarters would have received it by the 9th.

Mrs. Scaletti. Right. What am I supposed to do with this one?
Mr. Goldsmith. Just wait for me to ask you a question.

Would you please read that cable?

Mrs. Scaletti. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. My first question is does that cable contain a request for a name trace?

Mrs. Scaletti. No, unless I really goofed reading.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please reread it.

Mrs. Scaletti. No, it requests no specific name trace.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, in the absence of a name trace what significance would you attach to the cable in light of the fact that it was sent by means of cable instead of dispatch?

Mrs. Scaletti. That they were informing headquarters of a possible American, because even though it says American male, when you check them out it is not an American male. They alerted headquarters to the fact that a possible American had contacted the Soviet Embassy.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that is what they are informing headquarters about. My question is, does the fact that they used the cable suggest that Mexico City station considered this to be a priority item?

Mrs. Scaletti. I really cannot read into their thinking. As a spot thing like this I probably would have reported it by cable. I can't really comment on that.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand. The reason I asked the question is because earlier, my recollection of the statement
was that you said a cable would be used for something that was priority item or if there was a request for a name trace. There was no request for a name trace there. I am wondering if this fits into the other category, a priority item?

Mrs. Scaletti. Not necessarily. We did an awful lot of cabling out of Mexico of these spot things instead of writing full dispatches. This is a lot quicker and really less expensive to do than in a cable. A lot of this is just how you react and how you handle things.

There is no regulation which says what has to be done by cable and what has to be done by dispatch. It is up to the CO or the individual.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are there no written regulations governing when dispatches are to be used as opposed to cable?

Mrs. Scaletti. Sometimes.

Mr. Goldsmith. So there are regulations governing the instances?

Mrs. Scaletti. Right.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does this cable contain a description of Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mrs. Scaletti. It provides a description of a male that looked to be an American who entered the Soviet Embassy.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is the answer yes or no.

Mrs. Scaletti. I can't tell.

Mr. Goldsmith. Read the description contained in the
second paragraph.

Mr. Goldsmith. The first paragraph mentions Oswald?

Mrs. Scaletti. The first paragraph mentions Oswald.

Mr. Goldsmith. The second paragraph also refers to a photograph and then it describes the person who appears in the photograph, is that correct?

Mrs. Scaletti. That is correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is this photograph linked to Oswald?

Mrs. Scaletti. In this cable it is not directly linked to Oswald.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it indirectly linked to Oswald?

Mrs. Scaletti. In this cable it is not indirectly linked either. I might say, to clarify, that in many instances we would receive cables like this and it would be the same person. Rather than put a lot of wordage in they put this down, what they heard and this is what they have seen, and maybe without putting all the language there may be or may not be indentifiable or this could possible be the same person.

We were very careful to do this when we go out to third agencies.

Mr. Goldsmith. Certainly the Mexico City station would not send up a cable containing simply the information reflected in paragraph number 2?

Mrs. Scaletti. No, because it was worth nothing.
Mr. Goldsmith. So you are saying you believe, and you may correct me if I am wrong, that the cable would not put in all of the extra verbage such as saying "this may be Oswald". Instead they would give you the information on Oswald in paragraph 1. In paragraph 2 they report the fact of a photograph and the fact that they report the particular photograph simply means this may or may not be Oswald?

Mrs. Scaletti. Yes. What they have done is obvious to me now and I would assume this might have been the way I interpreted it at the time, that they got the phone call. The station went and said "now, look, can we identify him" and they went to the photograph.

The only photographs they saw which could have been -- you know, in case this man had walked in around that time, maybe this is the one they think it is, so let us give them the description, it might help Washington.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, the significance of that second paragraph is that this might be Oswald?

Mrs. Scaletti. This is the way I interpret it now. I probably interpreted it at the time but I can't remember my exact though processes so many years ago. I would not now have gone back to the station and said "why did you send me paragraph 2?"

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that paragraph 2 does not say "Have photograph of Oswald."
Mrs. Scaletti. Right.

Mr. Goldsmith. I just wanted to clarify that your answer was that paragraph 2 meant this may be Oswald even though that language was not expressly used.

Mrs. Scaletti. Right.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know, and I realize you just gave an opinion as to what may have happened, do you know how the people in Mexico City station went about the process of obtaining that photograph and suggesting that that photograph may be Oswald?

Mrs. Scaletti. I have no knowledge of how the station did this. I could only guess what the process of a person in the station would be.

Mr. Goldsmith. You never talked to anyone from the station about this?

Mrs. Scaletti. No. I never have talked to [ ] I only talked to Annie Goodpasture when she was doing some research on where she could find some photos, you know, that might have been retired in Washington. That is all.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did she give you any indication of what she did, if anything, to pick out this particular photograph?

Mrs. Scaletti. It is my understanding she didn't have anything to do with picking out the photograph.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am not suggesting she did.

Mr. Scaletti. No, she did not mention anything about
that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever see the photograph that is referred to in paragraph number 2?

Mrs. Scaletti. I think I might have seen it. I don't remember. I could have seen it when Ann was up here about a year ago trying to find the photographs but I don't think she ever showed it to me. But I can't swear one way or the other because I was not involved in the case.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, the first paragraph of that cable refers, I believe, to a statement by the person who identified himself as Osald, to the effect that Oswald had been in contact with Kostikov, does it not?

Mrs. Scaletti. Whom he believed to be Kostikov.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. Do you recall whether the fact of the reference to Kostikov may have enhanced the importance of this particular cable? In other words, not only do we have an American who contacted the Soviet Embassy but he also was in contact with Kostikov?

Mrs. Scaletti. I sort of doubt it. I don't remember that it did but I don't think it did.

Mr. Goldsmith. Even though Kostikov was known by the KGB?

Mrs. Scaletti. Almost 50 percent are KGB or GRU.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is GRU?

Mrs. Scaletti. Military Intelligence.
Mr. Goldsmith. Kostikov in particular, however, was working out of this unit of the KGB that was involved in sabotage and assassination operations?

Mrs. Scaletti. I probably didn’t even know that because all the matters on the Soviets would be kept up in the Soviet Branch. I would have known possibly if I had looked hard enough that he was KGB but that would not really have made any difference in my name tracing.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, CIA Number 177 has some numbers written on the left hand side of the page.

Mrs. Scaletti. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Can you identify what those numbers refer to?

Mrs. Scaletti. This is a file number.

Mr. Goldsmith. 200-5-41?

Mrs. Scaletti. The 200 is always the general series and I believe that 200 stands for something international. The second number is the more specific category and I believe 5 has something to do with politics. 41 is just the title of the folder that is next in line. It starts out with "D" colon. I don't know what that means but I guess it means cross filing or something or duplicate maybe.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you now refer to CIA Number 179 and read that document in full?

Mrs. Scaletti. Okay.
Mr. Goldsmith. Before we discuss this document in detail, after receiving the cable from Mexico City station, the cable dated October 9, what action, if any, did you take in response?

Mrs. Scaletti. I took the normal procedure for a name trace. You would submit a form and you would get a reply from the main registry and what documents and things might be available in the Agency on the person whom you are searching.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you receive a reference to a 201 number?

Mrs. Scaletti. I believe so. Unless I see my name trace reply I couldn't tell what I got.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why would you make a name trace if the cable didn't request one?

Mrs. Scaletti. I was over eager, I guess. You are not limited to a name trace only if somebody asks for it. But if you feel it is appropriate you can do it. I was being a little facetious. Actually it would be the normal thing to do.

If you found an American in touch with the Soviets you normally see if there was any problem there.

Mr. Goldsmith. After doing the name trace did you receive access to Lee Oswald's 201 file?

Mrs. Scaletti. I received access to a file. I don't know whether it was the 201 file or not.

Mr. Goldsmith. What other files would there have been?
Mrs. Scaletti. I just don't know. Sometimes you have a document that references a document or soft folder or something. I am trying to be honest. I don't want to say I saw a 201 file if it were not a 201 file which is a very specific type folder.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let us take a look at CIA Number 179. Did you send this cable to Mexico City station?

Mrs. Scaletti. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to CIA Number 179, that document in the first paragraph refers to Oswald's 201 file.

Mrs. Scaletti. Oh, then there would have been a 201 file probably.

Mr. Goldsmith. Then you were the author of that cable?

Mrs. Scaletti. Right. I am not trying to be difficult. It is just that I am trying to be accurate.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that. I should indicate to you at the same time that we have been told by other witnesses before the Committee that you were known for having an excellent memory. Your reputation before this Committee is a very good one.

Mrs. Scaletti. Thank you very much.

Mr. Goldsmith. The description contained in the second paragraph of that cable, where would that have been obtained?

Mrs. Scaletti. From the 201 probably. As much as I can recall it would have been in the 201 file.
Mr. Goldsmith. I said the second paragraph. I really meant --

Mrs. Scaletti. The remainder. All paragraph 2. Paragraph 3 could have been in the 201. It could have been in other miscellaneous documents. Under the current system and ever since the early sixties not all materials is necessarily in a 201 because it is just too time consuming. You find an occasional documents which are not in the 201 which could have been the source. It is up to you to get it in the 201.

Mr. Goldsmith. What about the information in the first paragraph, the description of Oswald?

Mrs. Scaletti. That would have come from the 201. We sanitized that. That is fairly sterile thing that could be passed out to government agencies.

The third rule precluded the rest of it from being passed. That is why it is separate.

Mr. Goldsmith. What do you mean by the third agency rule precludes other information --

Mrs. Scaletti. Because the last paragraph, paragraph 4, says station should pass the info in paragraph 1 to the Embassy, to the Navy, to the FBI and to I&NS locally.

The info in paragraphs 2 and 3 originated with the State Department. Since it originated with the State Department you cannot give it to the other government agencies. You have to refer them to the Department of State to get it themselves.
Mr. Goldsmith. What about the information in paragraph 1?

Mrs. Scaletti. That was just a very basic sentence so that we could identify them. We took the liberty of passing that but not the sensitive information from the State Department.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, once the information in paragraph 2 had been obtained by you did that in any way increase the significance of Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy?

Mrs. Scaletti. As I recall that is what I thought made it very significant.

Mr. Goldsmith. Can you explain why?

Mrs. Scaletti. Any American who had tried to renounce his US citizenship in the Soviet Union, now having again a relationship with the Soviet Embassy would lead one to wonder why he had tried to renounce his citizenship in the first place, and why he was still in contact with the Soviets, whether there was a possibility he really was working for the Soviets or what.

Mr. Goldsmith. Paragraph 5 I believe requests Mexico City station to send any additional information either relevant to further contact by the individual or positive identification. Is that true?

Mrs. Scaletti. Yes, it is.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did Mexico City station prior to the assassination send any additional information about Oswald...
to headquarters?

Mrs. Scaletti. Not that I recall but I could not swear to that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does Karamessines appear anywhere on that cable?

Mrs. Scaletti. His signature appears as the ADDP releasing officer.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is the function of a releasing officer?

Mrs. Scaletti. He takes full responsibility for the cable.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why would someone as high up in the organization as Karamessines ask to be the releasing officer of this particular cable?

Mrs. Scaletti. I can only surmise now what I might have thought or what several of us might have thought at the time, that since it involved somebody of this nature who had tried to renounce his citizenship, who was in the Soviet Union, married to a Soviet, got out with a Soviet wife presumably, which is very strange, and now the contact with the Soviets, we could have a security, a major security problem.

This was one way of informing him and getting attention at the higher level.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am asking you now to speculate a bit. Had the 201 file not contained the information about --
Mrs. Scaletti. Not in paragraph 2?

Mr. Goldsmith. Had not the information contained in paragraph 2, would you have gone to Karamessines?

Mrs. Scaletti. Probably not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would Karamessines be apprised of every situation where the CIA was taking action with regard to an American abroad?

Mrs. Scaletti. No, probably not.

Mr. Goldsmith. It would not be standard operating procedure to notify someone such as Karamessines in cases where the Agency was going to take further action in regard to an American abroad?

Mrs. Scaletti. In 1963?

Mr. Goldsmith. 1963?

Mrs. Scaletti. In 1963 I don't believe so.

Mr. Goldsmith. How many people actually worked on the cable that appears in CIA Number 179? In other words, you wrote it but how many people were actually involved?

Mrs. Scaletti. One in what is now "SB" Division, Soviet Branch. One in CIA Staff, two in CIA Staff and a Branch Chief. These people have the right to change a cable.

Mr. Goldsmith. By "these people" you are referring to the initiating officer?

Mrs. Scaletti. Yes, and authenticating officer. If they had changed the message they would have changed it and
they initial on the side. If there is a major revision at
either of these levels it can be sent back for a complete
retyping.

Mr. Goldsmith. How many of these people were actually
involved in the substance of writing the cable?

Mrs. Scaletti. Probably myself and Mrs. Egeter and
possibly Rowe in SB Division. Since there is very little to
do about the Soviets here, there is not a lot of bio on the
Soviet, my feeling is that SR, this is counterintelligence
section, they probably had some role in assessing whether this
could possibly be a serious matter or not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was it common for that many people to be
involved in the writing and reviewing of a cable?

Mrs. Scaletti. Yes. Sometimes you have many more. The
rule of thumb is anybody who has any interest in any cable
gets their name on it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you now please read CIA Number
785?

Mrs. Scaletti. All right.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you identify that document?

Mrs. Scaletti. I have just read Directive 7467 --
I can't read it. It is 3 I believe. Your code is Number 785.
Your document.

Mr. Goldsmith. When I asked you to identify it, what is
that cable?
Mrs. Scaletti. This is not a cable. This is an out
teletype to the Department of State, the FBI, and Navy which
sends electrically to those three other government agencies
basic information received from Mexico in our name trace on
Oswald.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was the purpose of sending the
teletype?

Mrs. Scaletti. The purpose of the teletype was to notify
basically the FBI because it is an American, it is a CI case.
The Navy and State Department because here you have an ex-Navy
man I believe and somebody whom the Department has reported.
This man is of interest to the Navy and State Department and
the FBI just for the security of the United States it is
important to notify all those government agencies.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who wrote this particular teletype?

Mrs. Scaletti. I did.

Mr. Goldsmith. This was done after having reviewed Oswald'
201 file, is that correct?

Mrs. Scaletti. It would have been written at the same
time the cable to Mexico was written in all likelihood.

Mr. Goldsmith. In light of the fact that the cable to
Mexico City and this dissemination teletype to the other
government agencies were both written at the same time, I think
if we refer to the time on these documents it would indicate
that they were more or less simultaneous, can you explain why
the cable to Mexico City contained a relatively accurate
description of Oswald whereas the teletype to the government
agencies does not contain an accurate description of Oswald?

Mrs. Scaletti. What do you mean by accurate?

Mr. Goldsmith. Let us go over it.

Mr. Scaletti. It is just a synopsis. Number one, you
are not going to send the Department of State information to
the FBI and the Navy. That is number one. So all that detailed
information we sent to Mexico City station we did not tell
them to pass it locally and we are not going to pass it locally.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am not talking now about the detailed
information regarding Oswald's background. I am talking now
about the description of his physical characteristics.

Paragraph 1 of the cable to Mexico City contains a
general description of Oswald that is more or less accurate.

Mrs. Scaletti. Paragraph 1 of the cable to Mexico City
gives the physical description of Lee Henry Oswald who is the
subject of 201, 289, 248. Paragraph 1 of the teletype did
not include -- gave the bio but not physical description,
which is more important really, and what we gave the Navy was
the information from our sources on the person we thought could
have been Oswald, but we did not repeat for them what would be
a physical description. It would not have been normal unless
the Navy had come back and said "look, we have a file on
Oswald. Now, do you have such and such a description?
This is strictly for the investigative use of the station.

Mr. Goldsmith. When you say this you are now referring to paragraph 1 of CIA number 179?

Mrs. Scaletti. Right. Let us start over again. The actual physical description on Lee Henry Oswald from your cable numbered 179 was sent to the station to assist them in further investigation to see if they knew of anybody or had anybody down there that really fitted what we thought was an accurate physical description of the Oswald that we had a file on.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that.

Mrs. Scaletti. When we came to document number 785, the teletype to State, FBI and Navy, we did not, and I would not normally even today, provide those investigative agencies with the physical description of Lee Henry Oswald as we thought it to be then.

We provided them only with our intelligence, not with State Department intelligence which gave the stuff out of the audio and the possible physical description. The wording here in paragraph 1 on our teletype shown in document 785 is worded that the American was described.

As I told your man from your Committee earlier, it possibly would have been better, although it did not occur to me at the time and this is the way those things were written in those times, to say that an American described as this could
possibly be identifiable and qualified but the normal procedure in 1963 was to provide to the other government agencies information and intelligence from our sources.

Mr. Goldsmith. Whereas the information contained in paragraph 1 of CIA document number 179 was not from your source?

Mrs. Scaletti. Was not our source, was not our information.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, paragraph 1 of CIA number 785 does not contain any language or qualification indicating that?

Mrs. Scaletti. I agree with that.

Mr. Goldsmith. It is only an indication that it was possibly Oswald or this was possibly his description?

Mrs. Scaletti. Or possibly not. I agree with that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why wouldn't the teletype indicate that the description that you gave was not consistent with the description that you had in your files from these other agencies?

Mrs. Scarletti. I don't know why.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were you aware when you sent out the cable and the teletype that you were giving different descriptions?

Mrs. Scarletti. Yes. I assume I was. I don't remember now. This is some time.

Mr. Goldsmith. By the manner in which the language is displayed in the first paragraph in document 785 does that
suggest to you that in fact when you received the cable from Mexico City you did link the photograph referred to in that cable to Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mrs. Scarletti. It would appear that I did.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was there any intention on your part to deceive any other agencies by giving a description contained in that paragraph in the teletype?

Mrs. Scarletti. None at all. The point is that we considered the basic information to be taking place at birth, not a physical description which can change. As a matter of fact, we tried to go overboard. As you already have pointed out, this station did not even ask for a trace but as soon as we got this we immediately sent it out hoping to get a response. We gave it to the field. I can honestly say there was certainly no intention to keep anything or to hide anything. We were trying to put something forth and see what the other agencies could do.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever get any response from the other agencies regarding Oswald?

Mrs. Scarletti. Not that I recall. What was the date of our teletype out to the other government agencies?

Mr. Goldsmith. 10 October 1963.

Mrs. Scarletti. So there was certainly no delay on our part in getting that material out.

Mr. Goldsmith. That is correct. The information contained
in paragraph 2 of the teletype would also seem to have been obtained from another agency. Therefore, why didn't the third agency rule preclude you from communicating that information?

Mrs. Scaletti. You can put a few sentences like we gave to the field to give to the other government agencies.

This was sent to the Department of State.

Mr. Goldsmith. It was sent to the FBI, too?

Mrs. Scaletti. I don't know. This would have been cleared with the CIA Staff which is responsible for the third agency rule. You can see it is only a five line synopsis with no detail.

Mr. Goldsmith. It still would have been obtained from third agency sources?

Mrs. Scaletti. Right. Just like we gave one sentence to Mexico City to alert other government agencies without passing the document. I am sure this must have been in discussion with the CI Staff as to how much we thought we should pass out. We cannot give nothing because how are you going to identify to the Department of State or Navy, here is somebody who might be identifiable with somebody in your records?

You don't want to say just look at your records. You find that unfortunately if you tell the Navy that if you want any more information on Oswald go to the Department of State, then you have to say if you go to the Department of State you had better ask for records on Lee Henry Oswald who was born on
such and such a date in such and such a place, otherwise they
don't know how to ask for that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Incidentally, you have been referring to
Oswald as Lee Henry Oswald and the cable refers to him as Lee
Henry Oswald. In fact the 201 file refers to him as Lee Henry
Oswald. Do you know why the file would have been referring to
him as Lee Henry Oswald instead of Lee Harvy Oswald?

Mrs. Scaletti. If I mentioned Lee Harvey it is because
I am brain washed with all the events. But the Lee Henry, we
generally will put in a cable the name as the 201 is opened.
So, my only guess is that the basic documents from the Depart-
ment of State or from somebody in that 201 file probably said
his name was Lee Henry Oswald.

Until you find a cause or reason to change the name you
leave a file in whatever name it is opened. Then you would
later on amend it and correct the file.

Mr. Goldsmith. Before we refer to these documents from
the State Department that apparently led to the opening of
Oswald's 201 file, let me ask you this general question. If
you were to run a name trace on Lee Harvey Oswald in the CIA
indices --

Mrs. Scaletti. Today?

Mr. Goldsmith. If you had run one in 1963 on Lee Harvey
Oswald, would you have received a reference to a file on Lee
Henry Oswald?
Mrs. Scaletti. Very possibly. They are pretty good about that. But in 1963 I think we had to do our own. I might even have done some of that searching myself. Today it is automatic, you are not allowed to do your own name traces. In 1963 sometimes you would do your own name trace. It was up to you to look far enough.

Mr. Goldsmith. It is possible in 1963 if you looked up Oswald, Lee Harvey, you might miss Lee Henry?

Mrs. Scaletti. Right. I would look enough to the Lee Oswald. If you saw Henry and you saw Harvey and they both had the same birth date you would pick it out and see that there was a mistake.

Mr. Goldsmith. What I meant was if you did a name trace on Lee Harvey and you saw Lee Henry and didn't check, it would be possible for you to miss it entirely?

Mrs. Scaletti. It would be possible. With your good checker, especially if there is some identifying data on the card, you would pull -- lots of times you pull many variations.

Mr. Goldsmith. The reason I ask the question is fairly obviously. The suggestion has certainly been made by virtue of this information being released to the public, the suggestion has been made that by opening the file in the name of Lee Henry Oswald if someone wanted to do a name trace on Lee Harvey Oswald they would miss that person and for some reason they may have had the tendency to have that name Lee Harvey Oswald over-
looked for whatever reason.

Mrs. Scaletti. The only thing I can say is that it is standard procedure to open up a file and register it in the first name that becomes available. I am not saying what was done in the case of Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald. This is the normal procedure. The normal procedure is as other names, which are a variety of that, come up cross reference cards are placed in the system. So that possibly until it is determined for sure that Lee Harvey is correct that might appear in the file as a cross reference alias to Lee Henry, in which case under Lee Henry you would have a cross index card listing the alias, "see also Lee Harvey", which would mean that you would have to do name traces under Lee Harvey.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to show you CIA number 822 which is a list of American defectors which had been provided to the Agency by the State Department. On the list is Lee Harvey Oswald. According to testimony received by the Committee that letter and the attached list is what led to the opening of Oswald's 201 file. It refers to him by his name in the correct manner, Lee Harvey Oswald, and not Lee Henry Oswald. That is why there is a question as to why the file was opened in the name of Lee Henry Oswald.

Mrs. Scaletti. I would have no idea about that. The only thing I can point out and put in the record is that unless one has worked with name trace indices one has no comprehension.
of the variety of the way names appear and are spelled and are taken off records. It just boggles the mind on how anybody finds anything sometimes.

Mr. Goldsmith. The issue I am concerned with is whether by opening the file under Lee Henry Oswald it would have been possible to in effect hide the information that the Agency has on Lee Harvey Oswald.

Mrs. Scaletti. I would say there was no idea of any birth date or there was an erroneous birth date which would make you look at the card and say "this could not be the same because this man is older than this person." A good name tracer probably would come up with all the references.

Mr. Goldsmith. If the Mexico City station was aware of the fact that Oswald had also contacted the Cuban Embassy and that he was requesting a visa, should that information have been communicated?

Mrs. Scaletti. Could you repeat that?

Mr. Goldsmith. If Mexico City station was aware that Oswald in addition to contacting the Soviet Embassy had also contacted the Cuban Embassy and that with regard to his contacts at each Embassy was requesting a visa, should that information have been passed along to the Mexican Desk as requested by the cable from headquarters to Mexico City station?

Mrs. Scaletti. It probably should have but it probably not necessarily would have been because the same people do not
read that traffic. In other words, the people who listen to
the Cuban things would not have known anything about the Soviet
traffic. They would not have known anything about Lee Harvey
Oswald.

Mr. Goldsmith. Assuming that the people at the Mexico
City station knew of these contacts at the Cuban Embassy and
of the fact that Oswald was requesting a visa, in other words,
assuming that the person who sent the original cable to head-
quarters reporting Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy,
assuming that person very shortly afterwards found out about
the contact with the Cuban Embassy and about Iswald's request
for a visa, should that person have sent that information to
headquarters in compliance with the request in the headquarters
cable for further information on Oswald?

Mrs. Scalelli. I think that would be expected.

Mr. Goldsmith. What would you have done had you received
that information?

Mrs. Scalelli. I probably would have jogged our memory
again and we might have gone back out to the Department of
State or FBI and said "Look, here is this man again, he is
showing up. Now let us know what you have."

Mr. Goldsmith. The FBI and the State Department would
have been notified?

Mrs. Scalelli. Yes. We would have gone back and referred
to our original out message and also maybe there would have been
additional information coming in on the contact with the
Dubans which would have made us feel that either the physical
description was not right or we might have more bio, or whatever.

Mr. Goldsmith. When was the next time after you sent a
cable to Mexico City station and you teletyped these other
agencies, when was the next time you heard of Lee Harvey
Oswald?

Mrs. Scaletti. I don't remember. The only thing I can
say is that based on what is in the file that I must have heard
about it when the station came in and asked -- well, if there
was nothing else in the file the name popped up again, I just
don't remember about the assassination or whenever.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would the testimony be that to the best
of your recollection the next time you heard the name was when
you heard about the assassination?

Mrs. Scaletti. Probably.

Mr. Goldsmith. At that time did the name Oswald ring a
bell? Did you remember the earlier cable traffic about him?

Mrs. Scaletti. I just don't know. When he was assassi-
nated, I don't even remember how long it was before they go the
name of Oswald.

Mr. Goldsmith. Oswald was picked up within two hours
after the assassination and the name was made public.

Mrs. Scaletti. Immediately?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.
Mrs. Scalaletti. If I were in the office unless I had the radio on -- we didn't have a radio in the office necessarily -- I would not have heard the name Oswald until the next day probably. I would assume this was a little bit unusual, I might have tied it in. I am sure the first thing they would have done is make a name trace when they came up with that name and they would come up with a 201 file all over again.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall where you were on Friday, November 22, 1963?

Mrs. Scalaletti. The only thing I remember about it is going home and finding my husband sitting in front of the TV and talking about it. I probably was at the office but I don't remember anything. I blanked out. I must have been at the office.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you remember bringing the Oswald file on that day?

Mrs. Scalaletti. I wouldn't remember that. If he had asked for it I probably did. It would have been natural for me to if I did. I just don't know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever find a photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald at CIA headquarters?

Mrs. Scalaletti. I don't remember ever finding an Oswald photograph.

Mr. Goldsmith. Right around the time of the assassination?

Mrs. Scalaletti. I don't remember it.
Mr. Goldsmith. Did you find a photograph of someone whom you thought to be Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mrs. Scaletti. I don't remember that either.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know Phillip Agee?

Mrs. Scaletti. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is your opinion of his reputation for veracity?

Mrs. Scaletti. You mean in the book or just in person?

Mr. Goldsmith. As a person.

Mrs. Scaletti. I think Phil had lots of problems. I certainly think he is capable of exaggerating. I certainly think he is capable -- talking about the book or as a person, I think he plunges into things, thinks they will be great and then he is disillusioned and things never turned out the way he thinks they are going to and he is dissatisfied. I am talking about personal setbacks. I don't think he is quite capable of handling things.

Mr. Goldsmith. In terms of telling the truth do you think he generally tells the truth or not?

Mrs. Scaletti. I would probably say that sometimes he thinks he does but I don't think he necessarily always does.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever know a CIA employee named Joseph Smith?

Mrs. Scaletti. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is your opinion of his reputation?
Mrs. Scaletti. I didn't know Joe as much as I knew Phil. I might guess possibly that Joe might have his feet more soundly on the ground than Phil. This is just off the top of my head. I only knew him in the office and very superficially, Joe Smith.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever tell Joe Smith or Phillip Agee that you had found a photograph of Oswald or someone you thought to be Oswald?

Mrs. Scaletti. I did not know Joseph Smith in Mexico City. I had never seen Joe except at the station in Mexico City and Phil I only saw when I was in Mexico. I would have no reason to say that.

Mr. Goldsmith. So your answer to the question is no?

Mrs. Scaletti. I don't recall it and I don't see that I would have any reason.

Mr. Goldsmith. I guess for the purpose of clarification I would like to ask the question one more time. Did you ever tell Phillip Agee or Joseph Smith that you found a picture of Oswald or someone whom you thought to be Oswald?

Mrs. Scaletti. Not that I can recall.

Mr. Goldsmith. After the assassination of the President did you have any responsibility with regard to the Oswald file?

Mrs. Scaletti. I don't believe so.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you work with at all on the investigation of the assassination?
Mrs. Scaletti. No. Not that I recall. I think that was taken away from the branch immediately.

Mr. Goldsmith. Will you please read CIA number 246?

Mrs. Scaletti. Right. I wrote that.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is the date of that?

Mrs. Scaletti. 18 May 1967.

Mr. Goldsmith. That pertains to Oswald?

Mrs. Scaletti. I wrote a dispatch on 18 May 1967 requesting the station to forward any photographs that they have. I don't remember this.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would the fact that you wrote that help refresh your recollection at all as to whether you worked on the Oswald case after the assassination?

Mrs. Scaletti. The only thing I can remember is that I was not a member of any task force. Somebody could have said "Charlotte, write this," and I could have written it.

Mr. Goldsmith. In terms of responsibility for the Oswald file did you have any responsibility for that after the assassination?

Mrs. Scaletti. I would say that the desk might have had responsibility until it was turned over to a task force, not necessarily myself.

Mr. Goldsmith. At the time of the assassination the file was at the Mexico Desk, is that right?

Mrs. Scaletti. It may not have been. It could have been
I returned to where it was where I got it from. We do not keep all the files like that, necessarily. I could have kept the file pending a reply or further investigation but that is not necessarily normal. I generally keep a copy of my cables just until I get further --

Mr. Goldsmith. In fact, according to the Agency's records the file was on the Mexico Desk at the time of the assassination.

Mrs. Scaletti. It was just waiting then for a reply.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was there anything unusual about its being at the Mexico Desk at that time?

Mrs. Scaletti. No, because we had written correspondence on it. Either we can hold the file until anything else comes in or we can send it back and when we get material we can send it on. There is nothing unusual about that. In those days we were more apt to keep files than we are in these days. They try to keep them down in the central repository.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the Mexico City station ever obtained a photograph of Oswald?

Mrs. Scaletti. No, I do not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether they ever obtained a tape recording of his voice? Let me rephrase that. At the time of the assassination do you know whether they had a tape recording of his voice?

Mrs. Scaletti. I don't know and they would have if they kept the tapes but they normally do not keep those tapes on
Mr. Goldsmith. What is done with the tapes?

Mrs. Scaletti. They are erased.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why are they erased?

Mrs. Scaletti. They erase them because they need them. They extract from them what they feel is pertinent and then they are kept a certain -- at that time they were kept a certain amount of time, I don't know how much it was, a week or two weeks, in case somebody decided they wanted to keep on for the record. But they had to resue these tapes.

Mr. Goldsmith. As a matter of routine?

Mrs. Scaletti. As a matter of routine.

Mr. Goldsmith. This dispatch conained in CIA number 246 with regard to the photograph of the man who had been seen leaving the Embassy, was the agency concerned about the particular photograph?

Mrs. Scaletti. Yes, because you can tell from the way it was written.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why the Agency was concerned about these photographs?

Mrs. Scaletti. To see if they could clarify whether it was Oswald or was not who had gone in.

Mr. Goldsmith. This is 1967. By then they should have clarified that issue, I would think. Was there any other reason why the Agency would have been concerned about that?
Mrs. Scaletti. Somebody must have said, "Look, we never
got an answer to that," or "let us see what they have", or
something. Somebody must have been doing a file review or
something. It says here "The recent reopening of publicity
regarding Oswald and Agency evidence, headquarters would like
to determine...." Apparently somebody did a name trace. They
were asked to look something up and they could not find it.
We had to go to the station to see if the station still had
negatives. Most of this information was held at the station
and was never sent to Washington.

This is a dispatch going out to Mexico asking if they
have something in their files.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let us look at CIA number 197. Will you
please read the second paragraph? It is to the Director from
Mexico City.

Mrs. Scaletti. Okay, I have read paragraph 2 of 197.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does that paragraph suggest to you that at
the time of the assassination the Mexico City station still had
at least one tape of Oswald's voice? In other words, the
paragraph does not say that both tapes had been erased. It
says one was erased.

Mrs. Scaletti. This was 23 November. When was the
assassination?

Mr. Goldsmith. 22 November.

Mrs. Scaletti. This was the day after the assassination.
It says "station unable to confirm first tape erased prior to second call." The second call was 28 September. No, it does not necessarily mean that they had the second tape in hand on 23 November. They were only saying that before 28 September telephone call they had erased the tape from the first call.

Mr. Goldsmith. The sequence of the calls was one on September 22, one on September 28 and one on October 1.

Mrs. Scaletti. The first tape was erased before the second tape came in. That is why they didn't compare those two voices. It does not say they had a tape in hand.

Mr. Goldsmith. Really it does not say that but a person sending a cable --

Mrs. Scaletti. I would not interpret it that way.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am not suggesting we are necessarily giving it that interpretation. It gives rise to the possibility of that interpretation because the person sending the cable did not say all tapes are erased. It says "Unable to make voice comparison as first tape erased prior to receipt of second call."

Mrs. Scaletti. I was taking at face value the person is saying that we did not compare the voices because when we got the call on the second one we didn't have the first one to compare it or the transcriber did not have the first one.

Mr. Goldsmith. Could you look at CIA number 208? Would you read the fourth paragraph?
Mrs. Scaletti. That indicates that the transcriber believed that the two people were identical.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does that suggest to you that after the assassination the transcriber made a voice comparison?

Mrs. Scaletti. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. How could he make that determination?

Mrs. Scaletti. When you work with these transcribers, in no matter what language, to get this they replay and replay some of these conversations. They know the people who talk all the time, they can tell by their voice. They have an exceedingly good ear. This happens quite frequently, this is not infrequent, where a transcriber will say "look, the person I heard today I know is the same person who called in last week" or something like that. This is what they do. They train their ears and they live by their ability to identify voices, accents.

Mr. Goldsmith. After the assassination would all the Mexico City files pertaining to Oswald have been sent to headquarters?

Mrs. Scaletti. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Headquarters would not as a matter of routine have requested all that information?

Mrs. Scaletti. I don't know what they did. You don't ask for the entire file. They were working with the file there. They would have been doing the investigation. What would be normal I would think would be for the station to review its
files to see if there was anything pertinent that had not been sent to headquarters but I do not think it would be logical for them to send the file. This is my own impression and this is what I would feel would be the case.

But if they sent the file they would have nothing left on which to base further investigation.

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, after the investigation had been completed would the file have been sent to headquarters?

Mrs. Scaletti. Probably not. They probably would have just -- as things occurred the pertinent matters would have come by cable or dispatch to Washington. I believe it was sent subsequently because I was in the field, we did a purging of the files because the files were voluminous, and I believe we sent Oswald's file to Washington.

Mr. Goldsmith. This is when you were in Mexico City?

Mrs. Scaletti. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. During what years were you in Mexico City?

Mrs. Scaletti. '67 to 7, I could be wrong but I believe it was at that time we sent the file up.

Mr. Goldsmith. Turning back for a moment to the surveillance operations in Mexico City, do you know how many telephones were under electronic surveillance at the Cuban compound in 1963?

Mrs. Scaletti. I would have known in 1963. I can give
you a ball park guess like three to five.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know specifically whether the Cuban Conulate's phone was tapped?

Mrs. Scaletti. I would say in all likelihood.

Mr. Goldsmith. A moment ago you mentioned the purging of files. I certainly do not mean to take that out of context. I understand what you are saying, they are voluminous files in Mexico City, particularly I imagine in Mr. Win Scott's station, and you were cleaning out the files as a matter of routine procedure. Do you know whether in your experience with the CIA files were ever purged, removed or doctored out of the ordinary course of business?

Mrs. Scaletti. No, I do not.

Mr. Goldsmith. In other words, for deception purposes?

Mrs. Scaletti. As a matter of fact, we were extremely careful to make sure that every document was looked at and cross references were made or abstracts were made. We did not throw away complete things without processing every paper to make sure it was of value or not.

Mr. Goldsmith. To your knowledge there was never any incidents of purging of files in the ordinary course of business?

Mrs. Scaletti. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what the term CI/SIG stands for?
Mrs. Scaletti. It is a special office within the CI Staff.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what function of the group is?

Mrs. Scaletti. Was that Mrs. Egeter?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, it was.

Mrs. Scaletti. It is a secret group. We never knew what went on down there.

Mr. Goldsmith. How many units were there in the CI Staff?

Mrs. Scaletti. I don't remember how many there were. I can tell you the ones I knew were there.

Mr. Goldsmith. Can you tell me which ones were there?

Mrs. Scaletti. CI OA, the place where we got our clearances. We had CI R&A which did some research.

Mr. Goldsmith. That was research and analysis?

Mrs. Scaletti. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Can you tell me what each one was involved in doing?

Mrs. Scaletti. CI R&A. CI/SIG, CI liaison.

Mr. Goldsmith. What about CI -- did you say IO?

Mrs. Scaletti. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was the first one you mentioned with regard to getting your clearance?

Mrs. Scaletti. CI OA.
Mr. Goldsmith. What does the OA stand for?

Mrs. Scaletti. Operational Approval I believe. But this is what I remember because the names change and the number of offices changed.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever work for CI/SIG?

Mrs. Scaletti. Never.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether CI/SIG would ever have been involved in opening up the 201 files?

Mrs. Scaletti. They could have. Probably did.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you say that CI/SIG was a particularly secretive unit of the CI Staff?

Mrs. Scaletti. I don't know. All I know is that they had special files down there. If you would go down there a lot of times they would not want to give them to you, they would let you read certain things. We never asked that many questions of them. We didn't have much contact at all.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to show you CIA Number 788. Will you please examine that document?

Mrs. Scaletti. I see it. 788 is a normal routine file opening form.

Mr. Goldsmith. Whos is the subject of this particular opening?

Mrs. Scaletti. The subject of the opening is Lee Henry Oswald.

Mr. Goldsmith. On the upper left hand corner of the page:
it says "to headquarters, RI". Do you know what the RI would have stood for?

Mrs. Scaletti. That is the main file room. That is a preprinted form.

Mr. Goldsmith. In the middle of the page where it indicates other identification it is written in --

Mrs. Scaletti. Here or this part?

Mr. Goldsmith. Here. It indicates other identification. It is written in "AG". Do you know what AG would stand for?

Mrs. Scaletti. No. There is a whole pamphlet either on the back of this or regulations which tells you how to fill out all these. It is very complicated. They assign certain symbols that mean certain things. If you don't remember you hope somebody else does.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does your handwriting appear anywhere on this page?

Mrs. Scaletti. My handwriting does not appear on 788.

Mr. Goldsmith. Could you now read Commission Exhibit 197?

Mrs. Scaletti. I read this document. I have looked at this document.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would the information contained in that document normally have led to the opening of the 201 file?

Mrs. Scaletti. I cannot tell. This was not my responsibility. I wouldn't have found it necessary because I had
nothing to do with US citizens.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that. I am not suggesting at all that that document with the information contained in it was your responsibility. I am asking now, based on your experience of over 25 years with the Agency, would the information contained in that file normally as a matter of routine operating procedure have led to the opening of the 201 file?

Mrs. Scaletti. I would say no. It might have been indexed.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why would you say no?

Mrs. Scaletti. Because there is hardly anything here.

Mr. Goldsmith. It indicates that someone is defecting and is going to offer military or has offered military information to the Soviets.

Mrs. Scaletti. Yes. But you can retrieve it with an index card. Why open a folder? You open a file if you are going to gather material on it. Now, this would be the basis for opening a 201 file. If you did a name trace in central registry and you found 10 or 15 other documents on this same man. Then you would open the 201 with this document and put copies of the other document in there and there you would have a folder on this man. If there was nothing, just by itself with no other reason, if you were interested in US citizens who were going to renounce their US citizenship the most I would do would be to index it.
Mr. Goldsmith. If I were to go to the Agency today and ask them how many documents they had, if any, on Oswald, when this particular cable came in, would they have that kind of information?

Mrs. Scaletti. No, I don't think so because the documents they would have by date but they would not know what date they might have received it. Now, I am sure they received a lot on Oswald dated way back but they don't necessarily date time stamp them in. Even one of those name trace forms would not necessarily -- I mean that is what they would tell you from registry if that is what came in. I don't see what they could tell you what they had available.

Everything is now on the computer. You would have to ask a computer expert in registry. I think you would be barking up the wrong tree.

Mr. Goldsmith. If someone were working as an agent, asset or source at the CIA would there be any indication to that effect in the person's 201 file?

Mrs. Scaletti. You mean if he were an agent of ours?

Mr. Goldsmith. An agent, source, asset?

Mrs. Scaletti. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would that always be indicated?

Mrs. Scaletti. The only time it may not be the case, if a person were a casual informant of a chief of station or a case officer overseas but that would not be a real agent relationship.
Mr. Goldsmith. As a matter of normal procedure a 201 file would indicate that a person was an agent, an asset or source?

Mrs. Scaletti. You are not supposed to use anybody as an agent without getting clearance which requires form after form and they all go into a folder.

Mr. Goldsmith. That goes to the Security office?

Mrs. Scaletti. No, it goes into the 201 file. You mean what we call an agent or what the press calls an agent?

Mr. Goldsmith. I think the press would refer to a case officer as an agent. I do not use that terminology.

Mrs. Scaletti. I am responding the way you --

Mr. Goldsmith. The case officer gets an agent out in the field.

Mrs. Scaletti. His 201 file has copies of all those documents. You have to request a 201. You have to get your clearance. You have to do your name traces. There are a lot of things involved. Copies of all that go into the 201

Mr. Goldsmith. The file, for example, would have an indication that operational approval had been granted?

Mrs. Scaletti. Or requested and denied.

Mr. Goldsmith. In normal cases then the 201 file if the person was an agent would indicate that?

Mrs. Scaletti. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would there necessarily be a 201 file on
a person who was an agent?

Mrs. Scaletti. I would say I have never known anybody who was an agent who did not have a 201 file. I will put it that way.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would the 201 file contain information pertaining to the individual's operational activity?

Mrs. Scaletti. Not necessarily.

Mr. Goldsmith. Where would that information be contained?

Mrs. Scaletti. In the project.

Mr. Goldsmith. In the project file?

Mrs. Scaletti. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. If you wanted to find out all the projects that a particular individual had been involved in, assuming you had a need to know, you are the Director.

Mrs. Scaletti. If I were the Director you would turn that place over, you would have thousands and thousands of man-year.

Mr. Goldsmith. You could not, for example, just get out of the file of that individual a list of all his projects?

Mrs. Scaletti. No. Some people are very careful and they keep all this in a file. Some people don't. All the budgeting and reporting on activities comes in by project, not by man.

Now, you could possibly do research by getting the first time he requested and try to get a cryptonum. Then you can track this, track that but I tell you --
Mr. Goldsmith. If you had the cryptonum would that not refer you to all the person's projects?

Mrs. Scaletti. No, because you could use an old cryptonym and keep it on even though he is on different projects that don't have a cryptonym.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have any reason to believe that Oswald may have been a KGB agent?

Mrs. Scaletti. That is what probably came to my mind when I read the information that he was in the Soviet Union and came out with a wife and then he was in contact with the Soviets in Mexico because that would be standard operating procedure for the Soviets to meet someone in Mexico. That is the only reason I would have believed so.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have any reason to believe that Oswald had any type of relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mrs. Scaletti. No, none whatsoever.

Mr. Goldsmith. When you had access to Oswald's 201 file you saw no indication in there that he had any type of relationship with the Agency as an agent, source, asset, et cetera?

Mrs. Scaletti. No, none whatsoever. There certainly would not have gone out all this cable traffic if anybody along the way had known he was an asset. You would not have gone out with traces and things.
Mr. Goldsmith. If he was an agent would you have notified the Mexico City station?

Mrs. Scaletti. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would that normally be done as a matter of standard operating procedure?

Mrs. Scaletti. Yes. Then somebody would be very upset that it was an agent in Mexico without telling the Chief of Station because the Chief of Station is responsible for all operational activities in his area.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the Mexico City station was ever criticized for failing to obtain a photograph of Oswald during his stay there?

Mrs. Scaletti. No, I don't.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think it is unusual that Oswald after having made five or six visits to the Soviet and Cuban compounds managed to avoid being photographed?

Mrs. Scaletti. I don't know whether you can say he managed to avoid being photographed. What you can say is that we have not found a photograph or we don't believe we have found a photograph. Also, the photographic LPs are not 24 hour a day operations. Sometime the person maybe goes to the bathroom or they miss something or the person comes in early or a person comes in late or you just get a shot, it is the back.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that. We have a situation
where Oswald made five or six visits at least. Apparently
he was never photographed.

Mrs. Scaletti. Then if he was not photographed, he was
not photographed.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand. Do you think that it is
unusual that the Agency station would have gone on for so long
with regard to Mr. Oswald?

Mrs. Scaletti. I don't know. I would say I would have
thought the likelihood -- if I had gotten all the take from all
the people, because the photographic LPs sometimes did not
give you all the photographs that were taken, they would give
you what they got -- but if you got every negative from every
shot from every camera during those times I would have thought
you would have had a photograph. What you might have had were
shots that were blurred or backs of heads or something that
you could not identify.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Oswald was ever
debriefed by the CIA when he returned from the Soviet Union?

Mrs. Scaletti. I have no way of knowing that. I have
no reason to think he was.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would it have been standard operating
procedure to have interviewed him, debriefed him?

Mrs. Scaletti. That has nothing to do with the DDO. What
section would do that I have no idea. Besides, that would be
the Soviet Branch. We wouldn't have had anything to do with it.
Mr. Goldsmith. I am talking about based on your experience at the Agency. Apparently he would have been someone of interest. He worked at a radio factory while he was in Russia.

Mrs. Scaletti. I don't know how much about how the Soviet Branch handled it. What they were interested in. I really cannot answer that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know the name of Alexis Davison?

Mrs. Scaletti. Alexis?

Mr. Goldsmith. Alexis.

Mrs. Scaletti. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. William Gorday?

Mrs. Scaletti. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Precilla Johnson McMillan?

Mrs. Scaletti. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Richard E. Snider?

Mrs. Scaletti. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. George DeMoreschild?

Mrs. Scaletti. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. J. Walton Moore?

Mrs. Scaletti. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Morris Bishop?

Mrs. Scaletti. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether David Philllops ever used the name of Morris Bishop as an operational alias?

Mrs. Scaletti. I have no way of knowing.
Mr. Goldsmith. Have you ever used any operational aliases?

Mrs. Scaletti. I guess so. Not a regular one with any particular person.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me ask you this then, again based on your general experience with the Agency. Is it customary for someone over the years to use many different operational aliases, as many as a 100, for example?

Mrs. Scaletti. A 100 sounds like an awful lot. Some people could change. It depends on the sensitivity of the place or how small it is. You could use the same operational alias with three or four people or you could change operational aliases with every single person.

Mr. Goldsmith. If you changed it for every single person you would have a tough time remembering which one you used for which particular individual.

Mrs. Scaletti. No, you really wouldn't because, don't forget, it is like handling members of your family. If it is a surveillance team of course you would use one name with ten or 15 people, whoever is on the team. Say you handle ten people with an alias. That is just like talking to ten of your children. You are not going to forget that.

A lot of times it is only a first name alias. Then when you move to a different city or different station either you can use the same alias all over again with different people or...
you can use a new alias. These are people you are talking
to every single day. It is not like remembering "gee, what did
I call myself four months ago when I talked to so and so."

Mr. Goldsmith. I have no further questions. I would
like to thank you very much for giving us this interview time.
We have gone over the hour that I originally anticipated.

As I said at the outset the Committee at a hearing nor-
mally gives the witness five minutes to make a statement. This
is not a hearing but if you would like an opportunity to make
a statement at this time, please feel free to do so.

Mrs. Scaletti. The only think I wrote down when I
thought you were a little confused, not confused but I didn't
think you had a real fine appreciation for, was the organiza-
tion of the Agency and how we move around. Why can't I remember
where I sat and who worked with me in '63 versus '65 unless
there is something that happened, like I know maybe where I
sat when I got married or things like that.

You can be working on a desk one day and that morning you
are asked to go to another desk or that morning you lose four
people and then you are without somebody and within the last
year when I was back from overseas I sat at the same desk but
I had a couple of different bosses. The desk under me rotated
twice.

At one point I only had three people working under me.
Another time I had 20. So it is very, very volatile. It is
not a set pattern. You may have a slot there but you don't have the people or then you have the people plus you have TDY's coming in and out. It is a constantly changing thing. It is not an easy thing unless somebody has been overseas at a station which is pretty steady, but at the headquarters jobs there is an awful lot of movement and a lot of changing. You are pulled out to go and do a special assignment or you are asked to write this or somebody down the hall isn't there and they will drop a file on your desk and say "look, we have to get a message out on this and please do this."

You do it and forget it the next day because you have handled it because there was a crisis and somebody wanted something done. It is not a set pattern, it doesn't change for six months or one year or something like that. There is an awful lot of change.

Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you very much.

I would like to add that the entire record of this deposition will be transcribed and you will be given an opportunity to sign it and to verify it. Our office will notify you through the Office of the Legislative Counsel at the CIA and I would like to state for the record that the court reporter is to certify that the transcript is a complete, accurate and true record of all the testimony given here today.

(Whereupon, at 3:20 p.m., the deposition was concluded)
CERTIFICAT OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Alfred Joseph Lafrance, the officer before whom the foregoing deposition has taken, do hereby certify that the witness whose testimony appears in the foregoing deposition was duly sworn by me; that the testimony of said witness was taken by me in shorthand and to the best of my ability and thereafter reduced in typewriting under my direction, that said deposition is a true record of the testimony given by said witness; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which this deposition was taken; and further that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties thereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.

Notary Public in and for the District of Columbia

My Commission expires November 14, 1980.
CERTIFICAT OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, ______________________, the officer before whom the foregoing deposition was taken, do hereby certify that the witness whose testimony appears to the foregoing deposition was duly sworn by me; that the testimony of said witness was taken by ______________________, shorthand reporter, and thereafter reduced to typewriting by him or under his direction; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which this deposition was taken, and further that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties thereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.

________________________________________
Notary Public