Angelton Interview Notes  
Agency: HSCA  
RIF: 180-10110-10006  

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Pages missing at: 133-134, 67-68, 124-125, and part 2
Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10110-10006
RECORD SERIES : SECURITY CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 014720

April 7, 1997

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 0

Number of Postponements: 19

Postponement # 1 (Page Doc List 1):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: The information is the true name of the individual whose pseudonym is John Scelso.

The postponed information will be opened in full on either May 1, 2001, or three months after the decease of the individual, whichever occurs first.

Release Date: 05/2001

Postponement # 2 (Page Doc List 2):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act. The Board is awaiting additional evidence from the CIA, at which time it will reconsider the postponement.

Substitute Language: CIA Employee

Review Date: 05/1997

Postponement # 3 (Page 18):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it discusses sources and methods that properly
may be withheld under Section 6(1)(B) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: Refers to CIA Employee, CIA Installation in Northern Europe

Release Date: 10/2017

Postponement # 4 (Page 18):
Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it discusses sources and methods that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(B) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: Refers to CIA Employee

Release Date: 10/2017

Postponement # 5 (Page 27):
Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it discusses sources and methods that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(B) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: Country

Release Date: 10/2017

Postponement # 6 (Page 28):
Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it discusses sources and methods that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(B) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: CIA Installation in Northern Europe

Release Date: 10/2017

Postponement # 7 (Page 82):
Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: The information is the true name of the individual whose pseudonym is John Scelso.

The postponed information will be opened in full on either May 1, 2001, or three months after the decease of the individual, whichever occurs first.

Release Date: 05/2001
Postponement # 8 (Page 83):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: The information is the true name of the individual whose pseudonym is John Scelso.

The postponed information will be opened in full on either May 1, 2001, or three months after the decease of the individual, whichever occurs first.

Release Date: 05/2001

Postponement # 9 (Page 83):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: The information is the true name of the individual whose pseudonym is John Scelso.

The postponed information will be opened in full on either May 1, 2001, or three months after the decease of the individual, whichever occurs first.

Release Date: 05/2001

Postponement # 10 (Page 83):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: The information is the true name of the individual whose pseudonym is John Scelso.

The postponed information will be opened in full on either May 1, 2001, or three months after the decease of the individual, whichever occurs first.

Release Date: 05/2001

Postponement # 11 (Page 83):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: The information is the true name of the individual whose pseudonym is John Scelso.

The postponed information will be opened in full on either May 1, 2001, or three months after the
decease of the individual, whichever occurs first.

Release Date: 05/2001

Postponement # 12 (Page 84):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: The information is the true name of the individual whose pseudonym is John Scelso.

The postponed information will be opened in full on either May 1, 2001, or three months after the decease of the individual, whichever occurs first.

Release Date: 05/2001

Postponement # 13 (Page 85):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: The information is the true name of the individual whose pseudonym is John Scelso.

The postponed information will be opened in full on either May 1, 2001, or three months after the decease of the individual, whichever occurs first.

Release Date: 05/2001

Postponement # 14 (Page 129):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it discusses sources and methods that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(B) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: Refers to Job Title

Release Date: 10/2017

Postponement # 15 (Page 155):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: Rest of CIA Employee Name

Review Date: 05/1997
Postponement # 16 (Page 155):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: Rest of CIA Employee Name

Review Date: 05/1997

Postponement # 17 (Page 156):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act. The Board is awaiting additional evidence from the CIA, at which time it will reconsider the postponement.

Substitute Language: CIA Employee

Review Date: 05/1997

Postponement # 18 (Page 156):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act. The Board is awaiting additional evidence from the CIA, at which time it will reconsider the postponement.

Substitute Language: CIA Employee

Review Date: 05/1997

Postponement # 19 (Page 161):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it discusses sources and methods that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(B) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: Location

Release Date: 10/2017

Board Review Completed: 12/17/96
JFK RECORDS

Cross Reference: None

Status in System:

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RECORD NUMBER: 180-10110-10006
RECORD SERIES: SECURITY CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 014720
Other Agency Equity:

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CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS: 256
CURRENT STATUS: REFERRED
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 08/08/93
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Record Number: 014 720

Record Series: SECURITY CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY

Agency File Number: 41

Originator: HSCA

From: Angleton, James

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Title: Testimony of James Angleton

Date: 10/5/78

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Subjects:
1. Angleton, James, testimony before the Committee
2. CIA methodology
3. CIA files
4. CIA association with Oswald
5. Mexico City

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Current Status: 0 X

Date of Last Review: 1/93

Opening Criteria:

Comments: Includes notes about CIA documents on Oswald and two duplicates of testimony, in next two folders.

Box #: 3

Folder Title:
ANKLET DEPOSITION.

CIA DOCUMENTS.

14/04 CUBAN CONNECTION (W/ BENIN)

1934 CUBAN CONNECTION (W/ BENIN)

3 TELEPHONE TRANSCRIPT 10/1/63 (OSWALD + KOSTIKOV)

74 COLEMAN - SAWSON MEMO ABOUT O. BEING OBSERVED IN
    OFF. OF GOV. MILITARY ATTACHE IN MEXICO CITY

1977 TELEGRAM FROM MEXICO STATION RE: PHOTOGRAPHIC
    CONTRACT

2008 1/31/64 RE: O'S CONTACT IN MEXICO CITY

177 DESCRIPTION OF AMERICAN MAN ENTERING GOV. EMB.

2033 7/23/64 RE: COLEMAN RE: REPRODUCING MCMN PHOTO.
    WE REPORT

179 HP RESPONSE TO MEXICO STATION 10/10/63 BY CORRECT
    DESC OF O.

2144 CABLE 12/29/63 BY [SC/50] RE: WITHHOLDING INFO
    ON THE 2RD
197. 11/22/43 Cable from Mexico Station to HQ. Station unable to compare O's voice

205. 11/23/43 Cable from Mexico City to Dir: Sat to same person who caused Gov. refs prior to 10/1/43

248. 11/27/43 Memo to Papich: that there was continued photo coverage.

1874. 5/5/44 That O was in contact w/ Calderon, Perez, Rodriguez

1892. Allegation that Calderon was connected w

1990. 5/5/44 Debriefing questions for Amnus

1899. 5/4/44 Follow up for Amnus

1891. 5/8/44 Summary of meeting 4/4

129. 30. Transmittal of Amnus info to UC

1432. 33. Actual info provided by Amnus: no ref to Cal

1907. 5/14/44 Brief for presentation to Commission

1406. Angleton on Transmittal of info to UC
1950-54 Issue of Calderon's Possible Foreign Involvement

1928 Material from Mexico station shown to US.

No ref to Calderon

1967 Cable: Mann wanted Calderon arrested

1968 Calderon et al: Request that no action be taken w/o agency clearance

2022 11/24/63 Cable: O + Arrieta Rodriguez

1957-59 Elena de Paz Allegation

2065 [4/5/64] Possibility of KGB Training School in Minsk

796 10/3/59 State Dept de on O. Attempting to renounce citizenship

016 Naval Message: That O. offered to furnish radar secrets to Soviets

943 Obtained file cards

2139 * 3/5/64 Angleton on transmittal of materials to LC

2138 * 5/12/64 Angleton to Roka
House of Representatives
Select Committee on Assassinations
Subcommittee on John F. Kennedy

TESTIMONY OF:
Mr. James Angleton

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* * *
ASSASSINATION OF JOHN F. KENNEDY

Thursday, October 5, 1978

U. S. House of Representatives,
John F. Kennedy:Subcommittee of
Select Committee on Assassinations,
Washington, D. C.

Deposition of:

JAMES ANGLETON

called for examination by staff counsel for the Subcommittee,
pursuant to notice, in the offices of the Select Committee on
Assassinations, House Office Building Annex II, Room 3369,
Second and D. Streets, Southwest, Washington, D. C., beginning
at 10:00 o'clock a.m., before Albert Joseph LaFrance, a Notary
Public in and for the District of Columbia, when were present
on behalf of the respective parties:

For the Subcommittee:

MICHAEL GOLDSMITH, Staff Counsel
SURELL BRADY, Staff Counsel
CHARLES BERK, Staff Counsel
MARGO JACKSON, Researcher

For the Deponent:

WALLACE DUNCAN and PHILIP L. CHABOT, JR.
of the firm of Duncan, Brown, Weinberg & Palmer, P.C.,
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.w., Washington, D.C. 20006
PROCEEDINGS
TESTIMONY OF JAMES ANGLETON

Miss Brady. Let the record reflect that present this morning for the deposition is the witness, James Angleton, who has been administered an oath by the reporter, Albert Joseph LaFrance empowered under the laws of the District of Columbia to administer oaths.

Present for the deposition is Miss Surell Brady, counsel for the Select Committee on Assassinations, Michael Goldsmith, also counsel for the Select Committee on Assassinations, and Margo Jackson, Research for the Select Committee on Assassinations.

At this time, will counsel for Mr. Angleton identify themselves?

Mr. Duncan. Wallace Duncan of Duncan, Brown, Weinberg and Palmer, and Philip L. Chabot of the same firm.

Miss Brady. Let the record reflect that I have been designated by the Select Committee on Assassinations of the House of Representatives, pursuant to House Resolution 222 and Committee Rule 4 to depose witnesses for the Committee.

Mr. Angleton, is this correct that you are appearing here voluntarily?

Mr. Angleton. That is correct.

Miss Brady. You have been advised of your right to counsel and have selected counsel of your choice, is that...
correct?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, but I would like to explain later why I chose counsel.

Miss Brady. You may do so at this time, if you wish.

Mr. Angleton. I chose counsel simply because of the surprise witness John Hart, that I was not notified in advance of his appearance either by the Agency or by the Committee. It seemed to me that lack of notification of a surprise witness of this sort changed the whole context of what I regard this inquiry to be. Therefore, having had the experience with the Church Committee and not having had counsel in giving depositions and all of that and not having the right of discovery during the course of the Church Committee hearings you might say I learned a lesson.

Miss Brady. Your comments will be noted in the record.

Mr. Angleton, at this time, are you under any restriction or privilege that would prevent you from answering all questions fully and accurately and without any intent to withhold information?

Mr. Angleton. As far as I know, if I understand the correspondence between the Chairman of the Committee and Admiral Turner, CIA, there are no restrictions although the cover letter signed by the Deputy Director Carlucci stated if I had any question I was to refer them to Mr. Breckenridge.

Miss Brady. Have you consulted with Mr. Breckenridge
or the Agency about your appearance today?

Mr. Angleton. I consulted with him as to certain docu-
ments which I wish to see as it affected Mr. Hart's appearance.
That was the General Counsel's office through my attorneys.

Miss Brady. Have you also been provided with a copy of
the Committee's Rules and have you and your attorney had time
to peruse those rules?

Mr. Angleton. I haven't perused them but I don't need
to. I read them sometime ago. I have not really seen them for
the last month.

Mr. Duncan. His counsel are familiar with the rules.

Miss Brady. Mr. Angleton, also the Committee Rules
provide that at the end of the deposition the witness may be
furnished a copy of that transcript. As you are aware, much
of the information you will be dealing with this morning will
contain classified information to some extent. We are asking
if you will waive your right to have an actual copy of the
transcript but of course it will be available to you and your
attorneys at the Committee for your views.

Mr. Angleton. Can I reserve until we finish this session
as to whether I want a transcript or not?

Miss Brady. Certainly.

Mr. Angleton. Since I don't know what we are going to go
into.

Miss Brady. That is fine.
Mr. Angleton, first I would like to go into the background of the Nosenko case. Can you tell me what position you held with the Central Intelligence Agency in 1961?

Mr. Angleton. I was Chief of Counterintelligence.

Miss Brady. When did you first become involved in the Nosenko case?

Mr. Angleton. I can't give you the exact dates but it was when the first telegram arrived from Geneva that he had contacted our people through an American diplomat.

Miss Brady. Which individual in Geneva did Mr. Nosenko first contact in 1962?

Mr. Angleton. It was David -- the name will come back -- David somebody in the State Department who had previously been stationed in Moscow.

Miss Brady. Do you know what the person's assignment was?

Mr. Angleton. He was a part of the American delegation. You mean the person being the American diplomat? He was a member of the American delegation to the UN Conference or whatever it was.

Miss Brady. In Geneva?

Mr. Angleton. In Geneva.

Miss Brady. When did word of Nosenko's first contact first reach the Counterintelligence Staff at Headquarters?

Mr. Angleton. Almost immediately.
Miss Brady. Through whom was that communication made?

Mr. Angleton. Through the Agency.

Miss Brady. Was that through a cable or what type of communication?

Mr. Angleton. Telegram.

Miss Brady. Which division within the Agency was responsible for the case at the time of the first contact?

Mr. Angleton. The Soviet Division.

Miss Brady. What was the role of the Counterintelligence Staff?

Mr. Angleton. The Counterintelligence Staff is the principal counterintelligence advisor to the Director.

Miss Brady. Was it normal for Counterintelligence to handle defectors? Had they handled any defectors previously?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, we had handled a Hay Hanan, who had been previously handled by others unsuccessfully and had been turned over to Counterintelligence Staff and it was through him that Colonel Abel was apprehended.

Miss Brady. Was it normal procedure then for the defector cases to initially go through the Soviet Division and only to Counterintelligence if problems developed? Was that the procedure?

Mr. Angleton. No, there is no procedure. It is a question of precisely how the events transpire. I can take up much more in detail when we come to the person to whom Hart referred.
to as "X". But in short, we did not have jurisdiction over Nosenko, then or any other time.

Miss Brady. What role were you playing? Were you in a consulting role at that time? How was information about the case disseminated to you individually?

Mr. Angleton. It was not unusual in cases that dealt with Soviet intelligence that copies of the telegram would be sent to us automatically.

Miss Brady. What action was taken by the Agency after Nosenko was first contacted?

Mr. Angleton. There was no action taken. There was great excitement. The first thing that one does in those cases is to begin to run tracers against the registry and files to see if there is any previous knowledge of the individual.

Second was to consider the information which he submitted in terms of file and tracers.

Miss Brady. What significant information was provided by Nosenko at that time of the first contact?

Mr. Angleton. I have not seen those telegrams, I might add, for several years but one of the more astonishing pieces of information which he gave was to the effect that a Soviet by the name of Belitsky, who was in contact with the Agency was in fact a plant. He gave the name of our case officers quite accurately who were handling Blitsky. He stated that
Belitsky was an agent of the Department of Disinformation.

Miss Brady. Within the KGB?

Mr. Angleton. Within the KGB.

Miss Brady. Was that the first allegation you had of a serious Soviet penetration by the KGB?

Mr. Angleton. From whom? I am afraid I don't understand your question.

Miss Brady. Was that the first information you had had either through your own intelligence or through any other Soviet defector of a possible serious Soviet penetration?

Mr. Angleton. We had had hundreds of them, allegations.

Miss Brady. How would you characterize this allegation by Nosenko. Was it more serious? Was it more substantive?

Mr. Angleton. The facts were, to explain this -- it is a complex case, as you will find out all of these cases are, they cannot be simply explained in a few words -- Belitsky was a person connected with the media in the Soviet Union who traveled extensively in the West and who had in fact attempted in our view to be recruited by another allied intelligence service. Eventually he fell into the hands of the CIA or the Soviet Division who believed that they had made a firm recruitment of this individual and therefore, for a great period of time, I don't know how many years, they were in fact running him as an agent.

He would travel to and from Moscow to the West. Therefore,
from that point of view, to have it declared that their

case officers whose names were given accurately by Nosenko,

were in contact with a control agent of the KGB, particularly

the Department of Disinformation, they regarded that as an

enormous discovery. But when we got that trace and began to

analyze it we found the following:

Miss Brady. Excuse me. When you say we are you referr-
ing to Counterintelligence?

Mr. Angleton. I am talking about Counterintelligence.

We found that the Foreign Service, whose favor Belitsky

had curried at one time, had put him under surveillance and

a number of other things while he was in their capitol. They

came to the conclusion that he was in fact what we would call

coat dragging, he was trying to be recruited. Therefore,

they wouldn't have anything to do with him on the grounds

that he was a suspected plant. So that was found in the files.

Second, we had information -- I will put it another way

-- when we had "X" in a safe house there was some kind of

entry made into his personal papers and we found, not the

Counterintelligence but either the Office of Security or the

Soviet Division found, on some notes that he had made

apparently he was jotting down things to talk about -- and on

that he had the name Belitsky; in other words, the files showed

that had any analyst gone to Belitsky and so on that this was

not startling news because here was, number one, a Foreign
Service two or three years prior to that having given us a full report on Belitsky as a suspected provocateur.

At the same time, we had in our possession information from "X" that Blitsky was a plant.

Miss Brady. Based on that information, what conclusions were you able to draw from Nosenko in terms of his giving this information as a startling revelation?

Mr. Angleton. We drew no conclusions. I gave you only one piece of information that I can recall. It stands out because he also gave, I believe, the alias of Belitsky.

Now, I would like to have seen the telegrams that came in at that period because when he had met our people there, Bagley and whoever it was, he had made the statement that he would only give them three or four pieces of information in return for about $200 or so, and that was a one time affair. That was his original approach, and he needed that money in order to make up for a deficit of what he had been using in drinking.

So, he gave other pieces of information, which may come back to my memory, but at the moment, as I recall, they were not the most startling in the world. Nevertheless, that is not the basic point. The basic point was that the information which I have just described on Belitsky would have made an enormous impact on someone in Bagley's position if he was unaware of the file checks.

Miss Brady. You have mentioned the testimony of John
Hart. I take it therefore you are familiar with the transcript of that testimony?

Mr. Angleton. I am indeed.

Miss Brady. Are you also familiar with Mr. Hart's allegations or assertions that at the time of Nosenko's first interviews in Geneva, in an effort to sooth himself and calm himself he had been drinking heavily and admitted later to case officers he was drunk in the earlier interrogation?

Mr. Angleton. I am familiar with it and I regard it as part and parcel of the Hart myth.

Miss Brady. What other information do you have on that bearing on what the condition of Hart was at the time of the first interviews?

Mr. Angleton. I happen to know that there was some drinking being done. My own feeling is that the CIA people were doing as much, if not more, drinking than Nosenko.

Miss Brady. Were there ever any reports, telegrams or other type of information from those persons interviewing him that he was in fact drunk.

Mr. Angleton. There may have been some description, operational description, that he had been in some bars or something of that sort. There may have been. You see, I have to say to you that for many years, after I left the Agency, I have not left Counterintelligence. So, I see my friends and we still go over a lot of the same points and so on because we
have this unhappy choice of leadership in the Counterintelligence and in the Agency.

So that when I make some of these comments they are comments that may not have been known to me at the time of my activity but which I have learned subsequently.

Miss Brady. Is your lasting impression of Nosenko's first contact that he was unstable or in any way unable to give accurate information?

Mr. Angleton. If you have been 31 years in Counterintelligence you don't draw any kind of inference at all. Conclusions are the last thing you make based on a one time walk-in who is only asking for $200.

- There is a certain unreal air, to begin with, that a man whose father was a Minister of the Soviet Union, to whom they had erected a statue as a hero of the Soviet Union, would have degenerated to the point that he would be willing to betray his country for $200 in exchange for four pieces of information.

In other words, there is an unreal aspect to that which is illogical because he knows the trade, he could have asked for several thousands of dollars for one piece of information, if he liked to drink and have girlfriends and all that type of thing, the thing simply doesn't jibe.

Miss Brady. What other factors about the circumstances of his contact would you say had an air of unreality?
Mr. Angleton. Because he alleged to be from the Second Chief Directorate and the primary concerns of the Second Chief Directorate of the KGB are domestic, the same as the FBI. Therefore, if he was going to be in Geneva it was illogical up to a certain extent because there is what is called the "SK" or the security part of the First Chief Directorate, CIA part, who would normally be occupying that position.

Miss Brady. At that time was Nosenko challenged or questioned about any of these circumstances about his contact?

Mr. Angleton. I think in all honesty that Pete Bagley was so taken up by the Belitsky and other leads, other information imparted, that his basic concern was to break down this man or at least to induce this man to remain in contact with a view to future recruitment; therefore not to get three or four pieces of information but to get a lot of information and to offer him all kinds of inducements so that there would be a permanent relationship.

But in this sense it stood to reason that if a man was prepared to sell himself for $300 or $200 or whatnot, that you would have leverage over him in the ultimate if you desired to use such leverage, that he would have no options but to work for you.

Miss Brady. Was Bagley the case officer assigned to Nosenko at that time?

Mr. Angleton. He was stationed in Switzerland and he was
a good Soviet expert.

Miss Brady. Within the Soviet Division?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know whether he depended directly on them or whether he depended on the Western European Division, but he knew several languages and had studied in Geneva and was a part of our mission.

Miss Brady. Was any of the information or lead provided by Nosenko at that time given to another source to evaluate?

Mr. Angleton. I will put it this way. When Pete came back, I permitted him to read hundreds and hundreds of pages of transcript from "X".

Miss Brady. At this time could we identify "X" for the record?

Mr. Angleton. Anatole Golitzen. I can't give you dates or anything but he was absolutely shocked when he read this information.

Miss Brady. What was the basis for his surprise or shock?

Mr. Angleton. Because he was unaware of it. Now, I might add, we have one missing point here. Before he came back I had sent a long telegram, a questionnaire, to Geneva, for which I drew heavily upon "X's" information, because, to use a word I sort of invented in the business and I don't like to have folks around know where it came from but I always believed in using "litmus paper", in other words, having a fact not known, that the other side does not know we know.
So that in the course of elicitation that thing is exposed to an individual and he is unaware of the fact that we do know the whole story, say, on that particular matter.

Now, if he is in a position where he had had access and knows that and withholds it from you, it is an indicator, because, after all, a defection is a change of allegiance. Further than that, a person who defects has to transfer his sense of security and everything to the other people. He has to tell you about penetrations in your organization and all of the troubles of your organization in his own defense because he could be assassinated by somebody within your own organization. Therefore, it is in his self interest to expose everything.

So that this was a very long telegram, which I again have not seen since practically that day, you might say, in which I spent many hours pulling together those questions for them to submit to Nosenko. To this day I don't know whether those questions were submitted. I can't recall them. I mean, whether he left before they got the telegram or not, I don't know.

But I did not tell them that it came from "X", as I recall. It only simply stated as a follow-up in his position as Second Chief Directorate "will you please take up the following names" There was no explanation. "Will you take this up. Have you ever heard of this? Have you ever
hard of that." And so on.

I can't recall, there may have been responses in all of that. In my time frame it is all telescoped down to Pete's return. So, to go back to your question as to whether this was taken up with any other source, the logical thought that occurred to me was that since Golitzen was the first defector who had ever given us in any department had the order of battle of the Second Chief Directorate, that he would be the logical man to turn to for evaluation.

This was put up to Mr. Helms and Mr. Helms -- the decision was that he would never wish to disclose the name or circumstances or the fact that we had been approached at that given time and moment by this defector. So we resorted to another device, and we took a page out of the chapter of the operation in which for some months, if not years, a member of the Eastern Bloc intelligence communicated to us through an Embassy anonymously, and therefore we took the information, basic information, that was given by Nosenko and we disguised it as though it was an anonymous letter sent to us, and we showed that anonymous letter to Golitzin, who read the information and who stated this is disinformation, this is a provocation.

Miss Brady. What was Golitzin's status with the Agency at that time?

Mr. Angleton. His status with the Agency was a defector
who had supplied several thousands of pages of very hard core
information which had resulted in perhaps the most major
counterespionage cases in this country, I mean in the whole
Western world.

Miss Brady. At the time of Golitzin's defection, did he
give any indication of what he expected the KGB reaction to
be to his defection?

Mr. Angleton. Exactly. He said that when he defected
-- I mean at some given stage, and again I can't tell you the
exact dates on this -- let me put it this way: He defected
in Helsinki. We sent him on to Sweden and put him on an air-
plane with his wife and child with a view of a direct flight
to the United States. Either through bad weather or for
reasons I do not know his plane was diverted to Germany. He
had warned [ ] that there was a penetration of
the Agency.

Miss Brady. Was he able to identify it any more than
that?

Mr. Angleton. No, he just said "you have to be very
careful how you treat my information because there is a pene-
tration."

Now, [ ] in my view committed a terrible
error in giving a very brief, excitable summary of the infor-
mation disclosed by Golitzin which he was able to derive in
that short period of time. He included this allegation of.
penetration whereas anyone more mature would know that you do
not send that type of information through a cable where dozens
of copies are going to be made and disseminated to various
desks. It is the type of thing that you would have almost
traveled home with the agent and reported to the Director.

But that was not done and it was paragraph 7 in the cable that
had this statement that the source states we must be extremely
careful and he is fearful because there is a penetration in
the Agency.

So, that was 11 that he told our man. He gave him a
warning in order for him to be careful and how he handled
whatever he did send back about him.

As I recall, Golitzin was supposed to have met a delega-
tion coming in from Moscow at the airport at the time we were
putting him on the plane and sending him on to Stockholm, so
we knew the alarm would be immediate. So, when the plane
was diverted -- and I might also add that I don't think his
wife and child had ever flown before or anything but they
were terribly ill, and I don't think she knew anything about
the defection until about the last minute, and she had
relatives behind in the Soviet Union, so there were a lot of
emotional problems -- so when the plane was diverted to
Germany his suspicions were immediately that something was up
and therefore he began to fear for himself, because this was
not in accordance with the understanding. It was supposed to
be a direct flight to the United States.

Therefore, when he arrived in Germany he did what he would not have done under other circumstance. He warned our people in Germany that the agent to which he was referring about the penetration had operated in Germany. Since the person was a Russian speaker and of Russian origin, in fact born in Russia, it would be logical that the Agency would put him in contact or use as a handle that very man who could assassinate him since he was one of the number one Russian experts.

Not knowing this at all, he had all the suspicions in the world of that diversion. So, it entailed his disclosing to us or to the German station a great deal of information regarding that agent.
Miss Brady. Did he identify the agent?

Mr. Angleton. Only by cryptonym.

Miss Brady. What was the cryptonym.

Mr. Angleton. Sasha, S-a-s-h-a.

Miss Brady. Was the agency able through that cryptonym to actually identify that person?

Mr. Angleton. Eventually. I will go into that if you would like.

Miss Brady. All right.

Mr. Angleton. First I want to get him back to the United States. He is stranded here in Germany.

So, he arrived with his family and was put up in a safe-house. In the meantime the very night that some of these cables came in, the Deputy Chief of the Soviet Division was Mr. Howard Osborn, later our Director of Security, and he came rushing to my home with the telegram that had arrived at night, as I recall, therefore he got in touch with me. We spent some time discussing it with a view of implications and all those things you want to have in mind before the opening of business next day.

I will now digress on Sasha. Under the charter or under the regulations of the Agency all matters dealing with CIA personnel are strictly jurisdictional matters of the Director of Security. In other words, the security investigations of personnel, their security files as distinguished from personnel
files, the polygraph, the investigations of applicants, the
periodic reexamination of personnel, the periodic repoly-
graphing of personnel, allegations regarding personnel,
employees, et cetera, are strictly within the sole jurisdic-
tion of the Director of Security. That also includes physical
installations and so on.

So that they would be obviously the first party to whom
one would turn with an allegation regarding penetration and they
would have under all circumstances the right of direct contact
with the source because they alone would have the files from
which they could analyze gathered information for interroga-
tion and followup, et cetera, description or any small item of
information that might lead to identification.

Now Golitzen's story basically was this that he had
been on the Emigre Desk in the First Chief Directorate of
Soviet Intelligence and the file of this agent, Sasha, had
been transferred at a given time, I think it was 1951 or there-
abouts, had been transferred to the American Department and
that he had a chance to look at that file and they knew that
the individual's name ended in "insky" or something of that
sort, and that agent had come back into Russia at one stage
while in Germany to see his parents.

Miss Brady. What do you mean by coming back?

Mr. Angleton. That means that unbeknownst to anybody,
say, he might have walked down a street in Berlin, walked
in a house, out the back entrance, changed clothes, identity, disguise or what not, been put on a plane, flown there, and the redepósited in West Berlin, and no one would ever have known that he spent a week in Moscow. In other words, he had a cover story that he was on vacation or sick and so on. It means any kind of covered travel, covert travel.

So that the Security Office interrogated him at tremendous length. We were privy to much of this information. Therefore, it was the duty of the Security Office to delve into all personnel files and all security files of all employees past and present, to try to come up with somebody who fit the puzzle because there were enough indicators. They came up with the name of an individual, and they were fairly certain they had made an identification because he had asked them "Give me all the names of the personnel whose names end in 'insky' and I will go through all those names and it may strike me," because after all 10 years had passed since he had seen that file. He had seen it illegally as it was transferred from one department to another. But this told us something. This told us that if we had been really sharp that while the man was on the Emigre Desk, his file was on the Emigre Desk, he was an agent in the emigration movement, but when his file was transferred to the American Desk, then it means that his status must have changed, which in fact had happened. The actual Sasha had worked as a penetration agent of Russian
emigre groups. During the course of that employment sought out the CIA and gave the CIA information betraying the emigre groups and built himself up with the CIA people in Germany to a point where they recruited him as an agent.

So he ceased to be a man working on emigres and he was transferred to the American Department. That coincides precisely with the career of Sash when he is finally identified. But this terrible blunder was made that they omitted from this list real Sasha.

Miss Brady. How was that possible?

Mr. Angleton. You would have to ask the Office of Security.

So they go down there, and of all the names he says, "This is the closest that I can come to it," and it so happened that the person that he pointed out was a person who had been in OSS and who did have relatives in Russia and who had changed his name but his original family name did end in "insky." This was true because among the information that "X" had given us, he had taken actual documents out of the embassy in Helsinki, Soviet documents, we had a very sophisticated research and development program of an electronic device by which we could shoot a beam against a windowpane and turn the windowpane into a receiver so you could listen to conversations within a room. There was a communication from Moscow to Helsinki and it appeared to be a general communication to all stations
and it stated "beware of this kind of CIA-FBI gadget."

Then it went on even to describe that so many had been
ordered by the FBI and so many by the CIA and so on and so on.

Now this was not the kind of thing that a desk officer --
I mean this was not giving away anything other than it showed
that they knew in fact about one of the most secret things
we had. So it did not lead you anywhere by having that docu-
ment. But the man who was wrongly suspected was the secretary
of our technical production board of which I was the oldest
member, who therefore sat in as the secretary in all our
meetings in which all the sophisticated research and develop-
ment was discussed. If you looked at it with this mistaken
"insky" business, he conformed to a "T" with an individual
who could have supplied that basic information embodied in
that document taken out by "X."

Miss Brady. How long from the time of the first "insky"
information by Golitzen was it until you resolved which person
you were actually talking about?

Mr. Angleton. It took a very long time because finally
they came up with the "insky." We had some very curious things
about the "insky." Number one, he has been described and
downplayed by everybody as only being "a contract agent." If
there is anything that has disgusted me throughout my career
it has been from the time of the Colby period up to the present,
with a brief respite during the time of Director Burke, who
I think was really putting the Agency, after all the travels and so on, back on course. I mean he had gained the respect of foreign intelligence chiefs. He had sensitivity to what intelligence was about, the personnel. He was making strikes in trying to bring back some luster to CIA after the Church Committee. But nothing has disgusted me as it has from the Colby period all the way on through in what I regard as destroying a profession.

This present director gives me no confidence whatsoever both in terms of his firing of employees, the falsity of the justification, putting out that they had to get rid of people because we had overrecruited during Vietnam was the official statement, things of this sort. There is no truth to these matters. We did not recruit during Vietnam. Every component of the Agency had to supply X percentage of their own personnel to be directed to Vietnam. I had to give up X percentage of my people for tours of duty. It was compulsory. So that everyone went through this agony of taking people with families and what not and deciding which man you were going to choose to send to Vietnam.

And we had troubles, the Agency had troubles because you had all kinds of hardship problems come up. You had all kinds of things and at one stage the idea was that if a person did not go when he was told, that then he would be separated from the Agency, and that was regarded as too harsh and so on. It
was a very dre-dful period. So that these so-called alleg-
gations on the firing and so on are just simply not true.

While I am on the firings, I might also state that any
of us who regard ourselves as professionals knew many of the men
who were fired. But Turner didn't know any of them then. Some
of the finest men were fired. This goes back because Colby
had salted the place with his personnel so that they remained
on a long time after his departure in very prominent positions
such as the head of the Clandestine Service, the Deputy Head
of the Clandestine Service, and so on and even into the Bush
period.

Hart was one of Colby's men from the Far East Division.
I was astonished to read the statement that he was supposed
to be an expert because Hart's first job that I think he
ever had in the Agency was under me as a very junior employee

Miss Brady. I know you want to go into some detail ---

Mr. Angleton. I am saying my strong views on the kinds
of distortions and self delusions that have gone on when it
came to the identification in fact of the true Sasha, of
trying to brush him off as a minor contract employee when in
fact in Germany he was in the most influential positions of
recruiting agents that we would sent into the Soviet Union.
In other words, we would sent 10 people from Berlin but all
of those people were identified by Sasha to the Soviets and
all of them were put under control. So that the rot set in.

In other words, from a espionage point of view the moment that the opposition knows one of your agents who is in contact with another, and then unbeknownst, it is not long in a police state before identification of the entire net is ascertained.

Being Russian, he worked in a very influential position in the actual operations that had to do with penetration, I mean with recruitment of Soviets for the purpose of espionage in the Soviet Union.

Miss Brady. When roughly was Sasha identified as the person that Golitzen mentioned?

Mr. Angleton. I can't be precise on this but I would say around '63, '64. It became more and more -- we found, for example, that shortly after Golitzen's telegram that was given wide dissemination to the effect that there was a penetration, we found a letter, which may have been pre-dated, of Sasha writing a letter denouncing a member of the Soviet Division as a Soviet agent, and this man's nickname was Sasha.

Miss Brady. The man being denounced by Sasha had a nickname Sasha?

Mr. Angleton. His name was Alexander and the nickname of Alexander is Sasha.

In all of his duties while he was in Germany Sasha's superior was the man he denounced. He stated that if the
Agency did not do anything about Sasha that he would go to the Attorney General. It was not too long after that he resigned from the Agency.

Miss Brady. Which, the superior or the ---

Mr. Angleton. The real Sasha. In other words, the man he was denounced, but in all of his dealings with him in Germany as subordinate never referred to him as Sasha. He referred to him as Alexander or by his last name.

So that is a very important point in terms of either, one, the Soviets notifying him that in their damage report they knew that Golitzen had seen the file on him, which was entitled "Sasha," and the question then is, which we don't know because he has never been broken, as to why it is that we have him denouncing a man whose nickname is Sash, known to everybody as Sasha?

Miss Brady. Was there ever any evidence that the superior named Sasha had in fact been an agent of the Soviet?

Mr. Angleton. No, but the sort of man that had been so much dealing in this kind of affairs, knew so many Soviets and was so exposed to to speak, and served in the field so long in Germany and all that, that it was not beyond the realm of imagination when you had such an allegation, that one might have been diverted to him, being tied up for months and months believing that he was the person to whom Golitzen was referring.
Now let me explain to you that Golitzen stated what the Soviet reaction to his defection would be because this is very important to us to have a member of that organization describe to us, what we had to watch out for, and therefore since he knew the inner workings of the organization because he had served at a time when other people had "defected," he had been on the Far East Desk when a Soviet officer was going to defect to the Brits and the British had a Soviet agent penetration in their organization who informed the KGB and this was a man who was going to defect in Japan and from KGB or "GRU," it may have been the military intelligence, he was going to defect to the British.

The British official in the field cabled London about this would-be defector he was going to meet and all that and nor other than George Blake was the recipient of that telegram. He went to his Soviet control and the Soviets kidnapped this individual and brought him back to Russia and Golitzen was on the Far East Desk handling that case. So we are dealing with an expert therefore on what you do when you have defectors.

So, Golitzen told us that the first stage would be that everything would be dropped to do a damage report, namely he was 16 years in KGB, he had many jobs, it would be laborious, they would have to go through all the materials that he could possibly have had access to.

Now it is not as difficult for KGB to make a damage
report as it would be in the United States Government.

Miss Brady. Why is that?

Mr. Angleton. Because the controls over information and the controls on access and all of that are so rigorous that if a man saw a file there have to be signatures, and time out and time in, and so on and files do not float around and they don't use Xerox machines, and I can go on and on.

Compartmentation is the key to their security. Therefore, in making the damage report their first concern would be to protect agents and to get at those matters where they knew that he knew names of people where we could react immediately. They would also know from the damage report there were things that would take us a long time to arrive at. If you only have a cryptonym and one or two events how are you going to make any identification? Do you see what I mean?

Whereas if you have the name, address and telephone number of the agent, they can almost write him off as being burned. So that would be number one. That would be the damage report.

Then that damage report would go to two places. It would go to the 13th Department, which would be the Department of Execution or Wet Affairs, assassination, and it would go the Department of Disinformation, the Department of Disinformation, being concerned with strategic deception ---

Miss Brady. Excuse me, before Golitzen's defection had
the Agency independently decided or learned that there was a Department of Disinformation? Was there corroboration of the existence of that?

Mr. Angleton. We knew of Soviet deception for years but we did not know the magnitude of its elevation to a Directorate in May of 1953. In other words, from the beginning we knew from the days of Dzerzhinsky and Lenin, Dzerzhinsky who was the head of Cheka, we knew that deception played a most prominent role in Soviet covert activity. We knew that all through the war. And we knew it through our double agent handling and we knew it through literally thousands of cases. In other words, no one can run a double agent, you don't run double agents unless you also resort to deception, and deception is integral to that because you are not going to give away all your real stuff. You give away false stuff to achieve your objectives.

When I come in to describing the background of Sasha, then I think you will see more of what I mean by way of sophistication by the Soviets and why this thing to try to shuffle him off as a contract agent is ridiculous.

But going back to Sasha again, we held many meetings with the FBI on that since they were brought fully into it. Since it was dealing with a Soviet agent in a sense they have concurrent jurisdiction.

Miss Brady. Were they brought into it as soon as the
Golitzen allegation had become well known?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Miss Brady. What position did they take on the possible penetration?

Mr. Angleton. For a long time they went into it. We had many meetings. We had meetings with the Bureau, FBI, members of the Counterintelligence and Security Office on this matter. We had to our satisfaction identified the real Sasha.

They sent us a letter in which they said that we were wrong in our identification and therefore they proposed that we send all our information to the Defense Department so that they could look into it and see if the individual did not fit somebody in Defense. That is a matter of record.

It shows exactly that the FBI at that time, for whatever it was worth, that with all the same information, with all those facts, et cetera, et cetera, they perceived that this was not the right identification and the information should be transferred to the Pentagon.

Miss Brady. Did Sasha touch any of their operations or programs?

Mr. Angleton. Off the top of my head I can't say because one would have to go over a damage report of the real Sasha, of all of the things that he would have had access to, of all of his friends that would talk about their cases which would impinge on the intelligence community. Since he did not confess,
the FBI in my view were not simply sophisticated enough to
directly. Then he went and disappeared. He was seen emerging
from the Soviet Embassy and then they challenged him, "Why were
you in the Soviet Embassy?" He said, "Well, you are asking
me all these personal details about my mother and father and
all this, so I went in there to find out about them." But
later on, and this is very important, we had this agent Rgor,
who has been referred to in the press, who was responsible
for the Shadrin case, the kidnapping of the person in Vienna.
The Counterintelligence Staff took the firm position, unequiv-
ously, that Igor was a plant.

That was our 100 percent position. Both the FBI and the
Office of Security took opposite positions. They are the
ones who took Shadrin -- his real name was Artamanov, and took
him to Vienna where he was kidnapped. This is where you have
all the stories -- I have newspaper clippings of the Nicholas
Horrocks' article which is the most detailed leak that I know
of in the government by way of accuracy and so forth. I
only ask why anyone would leak that because if he had been a
true agent of the Agency he was killed by that article.

It first appeared in Time Magazine. The New York Times
brought up this entire matter. It is very important because
Igor, to establish his bona fides told the FBI and the Office
of Security that Shadrin was their agent, that we must not do
anything to hurt him because he was an idealist, not a mercenary and he threatened us that if we did anything about Sasha, the Central Committee had already approved a plan of great retaliation, propagandawise and so on against the Agency and the country.

Miss Brady. Was that the reason for the inaction in the Sasha case, that he was merely allowed to resign?

Mr. Angleton. Oh, no. This is after he had already resigned.

He went on to say that they had 29 volumes of Sasha's reports to them while working for us and all this material was the ammunition that would be used in the event that Sasha was hurt.

Now, the reason I explain this to you is that having represented for 31 years probably the most distinguished group of loyal people that I have ever known and the most hard working people, to have the Agency send as a representative of the Agency an individual of Hart's character and inexpertise before that Committee to take up a case of this magnitude and to listen to the committee people talk about the Chamber of Horrors of the Agency was redolent of the Church Committee, totally adversary, reviving the past, and it raises very grave questions about the integrity of your committee and it raises those questions in a way that the American people have been horn-swoogled.
In other words, you can't set the clock back. You have unleashed something here that is going to go very far, one, in destroying the climate of defection from the Soviet Union of other defectors who will have access to that testimony, who are on the American Desk.

There was no pre-conference held in the Agency by anyone bringing in people who worked for 31 years in the counterintelligence field. Mr. Hart never interviewed -- he interviewed me once and violated our agreement. I volunteered to appear before him and I asked that there be a recording machine and I asked that there be a transcript so that there could be an accurate record and I could go over the transcript. I had one interview with Mr. Hart and I was never called again.

Miss Brady. Mr. Angleton, I understand fully your position on it.

Mr. Angleton. But I want to be very clear on this because I would not be going into any of these details necessarily with you if it were not for the fact that Mr. Hart opened up a great number of doors which you can't close.

Miss Brady. I agree fully with that. Within the scope of the questions I want you to go into depth and explain it. If we go off in this ---

Mr. Angleton. I don't want anyone to read the transcript and wonder why I am going into these details on Sasha, Colby, the FBI and all these others matters with a committee investigati
the assassination of JFK, when it is only relevant in terms of the actions of your committee.

Miss Brady. I understand that.

Mr. Angleton. Therefore, we have to go in parallel. Since the door is opened I find it my responsibility in terms of the integrity of the counterintelligence and in terms of the national interest that I close some of these doors and put it into perspective one way or the other.

Miss Brady. So that context stays clear, too, if I can continue to ask questions I think we will get out all the information you want.

Mr. Angleton. I am trying to make it coherent though in terms that these sidetracks and diversions are also influenced by the Hart testimony.

Miss Brady. That is fine.

Bringing us back to the Nosenko case, was the Sasha allegation being investigated at the time of Nosenko's either first contact or at the time of his actual defection?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Miss Brady. Did he give information on the allegation or possible penetration?

Mr. Angleton. To my recollection his statement was that they had never been successful in making recruitment.

Miss Brady. Was he interrogated specifically about the Sasha allegation?
Mr. Angleton. Let me point out here again by way of explanation that the Counterintelligence Staff had no jurisdiction whatsoever over Nosenko. Nobody in the Counterintelligence Staff ever interviewed him or saw him. The Counterintelligence Staff never signed up nor was every consulted on any of the administrative setups. We didn't know anything about his salary and all that type of thing or the projects and so on. So that when you are asking me this thing it is all hearsay or things I can remember from reports that were submitted to us by people in other components, so to speak, who were dealing with him. I am not saying for the moment that we got all the reports and transcriptions and so on. I am just simply stating that they got into another Sasha which led to the identification of an army officer who had been recruited in Germany, and he said that this was Sasha.

That was an operation continued by the Office of Security in the Bureau for a long period of time. I think it evaporated in the end. I can't remember any of the details. I can remember that he stated how he was trying to recruit somebody and how recruitment of Americans was impossible. I mean page after page after page of their lack of successes on recruitment of Americans.

Miss Brady. Was his information about a possible penetration just of no substantive value or did it actually detract from the information that Golitzen had given about Sasha?
Mr. Angleton. Totally detracted from what Golitzen had to say. In fact, the two pieces of information cited by Hart, one, about the foreign agent in the west, all of that had been Golitzen. The microphone business was all from Golitzen. I sent a memorandum to the State Department in June 1962 alerting them to the microphone in the embassy.

Miss Brady. Was that based on information that Golitzen had provided?

Mr. Angleton. That is right. Also, if I recall correctly Nosenko said we were to look into one part of the embassy and not in the other part. They were found where he said we were not supposed to look.

Miss Brady. Was there any contact with Nosenko from the time of his first contact in '62 —

Mr. Angleton. No.

Miss Brady —— by the Agency?

Mr. Angleton. No.

Miss Brady. Was that normal?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, because he said that he would not report from the Soviet Union because of the total police control and controls which they had in Russia. Therefore, he would not risk his life in trying to communicate and we should not try to communicate with him.

Miss Brady. Whom did he contact finally when he made the actual defection in '64 and where did the contact take place?
Mr. Angleton. He had some kind of contact of notifying our people. I don't know the details of it. Immediately a member of the Soviet Division or a person who was taking over the Soviet Division and others went there and got him and brought him to Germany.

Miss Brady. What reason did he give in 1964 for being willing to defect when earlier he had only wanted money?

Mr. Angleton. I think he gave ideological reasons.

Miss Brady. Were they accepted as credible at that time?

Mr. Angleton. I can't really say. I will put it this way. I can't really answer you honestly without telling you that there was another case that occurred after he went and left us. Two American tourists were walking down the street in Moscow. A man came up and handed to them a batch of documents. This batch of documents was documents of the Second Chief Directorate, files from the Second Chief Directorate, which is the FBI, internal memoranda of their operations against us. It explained how we lost certain agents, Penkovsky, for example.

The American Ambassador was not there. The tourists brought them to the Embassy. The Ambassador was not there but the Charge d'affaires feared that this was a Soviet provocation and insisted that the documents be returned to the Soviet Government, the Foreign Office. We photographed the documents before they were returned. Obviously the very
giving back of those documents were permit the Soviet Government to identify beyond a shadow of a doubt the individual who gave those documents, whether he was genuine or not genuine. The individual concerned was a man named Cherepanov and Cherepanov was a man known previously to us in Yugoslavia at the time when Philby was in the British intelligence and who had offered his services to the British and to ourselves and was regarded as a provocateur.

He returned to the Soviet Union. Knowing Philby, and I know him very well personally, Philby had also given away to the Soviets a very high grade defector in Turkey. A very high grade defector named Volkov contacted the British authorities and promised to give them the identities of X number of Soviet agents in the British Government in return for X number of British pounds. The telegram and communications of Volkov came to Philby. He went to his Soviet control. Volkov was kidnapped immediately by the Soviets. That was the end of Volkov.

So, we had a similar situation that when Cherepanov made his overtures to the British, Philby was in the British Intelligence Service, he was a Soviet expert, and Cherepanov ends up many, many, many years later being in the Second Chief Directorate with alleged access to the most sensitive information which is the internal documents and how they picked up Penkovsky.
Nosenko's story was that he personally engaged in the search and running down of Cherepanov at the Turkish frontier and that he had been captured and executed.

We began to get this same playback, through other sources of the Cherepanov story. An illegal, for example -- if you know what an illegal is -- an illegal agent of the Soviets who had been in touch with us for a long time made a trip back to Moscow. He said that he went to the house of a General for dinner and they were discussing the Cherepanov case and how Cherepanov was tracked down at the border and arrested and executed. Now it is inconceivable that an illegal who is really at the bottom of the totem pole in terms of the hierarchical matters, would be dining with a Soviet general who would reveal to him the Cherepanov case, because the world of the illegal is something so divorced from the internal parts of the bureaucracy or headquarters, if you see what I mean, and yet here all of these confirmations of Nosenko started popping out of the walls from all kinds of sources who are not in the position to know.

This characterizes a great deal of things said by Nosenko which were confirmed by Soviet agents of the FBI or CIA. The orchestration began immediately. We were inundated with confirmations, even of stories which he later denied, even of stories which he later denied. In other words, where he said, "I was wrong, there was no recall telegram," et cetera, et
...cetera, but the others had already said that he had been sent a recall telegram.

Miss Brady. Were these confirmations of his story happen between the time of his contact and his defection or later?

Mr. Angleton. Later after he defected.

Miss Brady. Were you able to get any other independent information about Nosenko between 1962 and 1964 about who he was where he had served, what his background was?

Mr. Angleton. Obviously we knew a great deal about his father. We have had one or two sources. I can't give you the time spent, whether it was between defections or not of people who go to school with him. We had a case in Turkey that came up that some lady's husband had been in the same class or things of that sort. I can't recall whether it was before or after the defection.

Miss Brady. I am going to need to take a short break if I can for just a minute.

Mr. Angleton. Surely.

(A brief recess was taken.)

Miss Brady. During the recess, Mr. Angleton, you referred to an article you wanted to make part of the record. Will you do so at this time.

Mr. Angleton. Yes. I had a telephone call yesterday from a friend who subscribes to the London Economist and who read out the following statement from the foreign news section, which...
is a special blue bulletin, dated 27 September 1978. The subtitle is "Nosenko footnote."

Paragraph one. "Mr. James Angleton, the former Chief of Counterintelligence, CIA, was due to testify for six hours on 22 September to the House Subcommittee that is investigating the Kennedy assassination. (See last week's foreign report.)

"He pulled out for the time being on the grounds that, (a) he needed time to review the testimony of John Hart, who had made damaging allegations about the handling of the suspected defector Yuri Nosenko, and, (b), he wanted his lawyer upon (sic) classified information."

I simply don't know how this was acquired. I haven't had time to try to analyze it in terms of dates and so on. But I had a telephone call from the reporter from the Wilmington Delaware paper whose name is Joe Trento, who has written a series of sensational reports about moles in the CIA, including myself as a mole and others, and who purports to have agents in the CIA and who purports that a former colleague of mine, Cleveland Cram, who I understand has been called back in service to write the history of the counterintelligence, is actually working on this question of moles. Treto also wrote an article in "Penthouse" together with a colleague named Roman for the August issue which deals with KGB penetration through the United Nations. The article on the whole is totally apocryphal in terms of allegations attributed to me, I mean statements
attributed to me regarding that.

I was shown a draft of this article by one William Corson, a colonel, several weeks before its publication. William Corson is a former Marine colonel who purports to have excellent contacts with the Senate and House intelligence people, including Senators and including the Director of the CIA and others. He is listed as the Washington representative of Penthouse magazine. He has also written a book, which is in the public domain, on the Office of Strategic Services, OSS. He is an author of that book. I can't recall its title.

I received this telephone call at the Army-Navy Club in which Trento stated that the Agency had put my head in a basket by producing John Hart and whether I had any comments to make. I said no. Then he went on to make a statement that Yosenko was going to sue the CIA, that he mentioned names, which I did not catch at all, the operation I think he mentioned was Meadowlark and he insisted that he and Corson wanted to see me immediately.

I told him that my lunch was getting cold and that I had guests, et cetera, and "no, thank you." Now I don't know whether he said anything or not but it has been my experience that when he has called me to give me information, which is his sole purpose, that he said, "I have great admiration for you and therefore I want to inform you of the following," and he gives me a lot of things and whether I say "no" or "hum"
He has a long quotation from me out of whole cloth, and I only heard a fragment on the radio last night about the Wilmington, Delaware newspaper, something of this sort and I didn't hear it, I lost it. It must be on the Paisley case. But he alleges to have informants in the committee.

I will say that I have a tape recording of 20 or 30 minutes of Joe Trento, this man Roman, and the editor of Penthouse, there way up in New York, and myself down below, denouncing their going ahead with that article, since Corson had been put on notice that this was all false, I mean that the whole thing was full of fabrications. I think they are unaware of the fact that I made that tape recording, I know they are unaware of it, in which they apologized to me and they offered me all the space I want in any forthcoming issue, et cetera, et cetera.

When I threatened that I would take legal action they announced that three million copies had already gone through the printers, et cetera. When I pointed out to them that it creates a lie, in other words, that we must never lie regarding KGB because it destroys the climate of defection, it means that the Soviet on the American Desk who reads all of that then says, "Well, they are just as bad as we are, so therefore there is no inducement to come over," and it is a tremendous disservice, because they had such allegations as the fact that Department Five staffs the United Nations. Well, Department Five
is the new name that the Western Counterintelligence have learned to be the old Department 13 of Assassinations and Sabotage.

In other words, the whole thing is a complete hysterical piece of spies in the United Nations. So you have the editor of Penthouse pleading with me that he thought he was doing me a great favor, that their whole purpose had been to balance out all the adverse media business against CIA, by printing something against KGB and citing me as discovering agents inside the Agency and all this kind of thing.

I only put this out because of Trento's call to me regarding the Hart testimony and also the fact of what his sources stated and so on.

There is much more than I can recall because I was standing up with waiters on both sides and a great deal of noise and I was extremely irritated by the abruptness with which he stated that Corson wanted to see me immediately, et cetera, et cetera. He does mention real names of people within the CIA. In other words, what I am saying is whether he had sources or not I cannot say or whether he is an innocent being manipulated by dissident elements in the Agency and so on, or retirees, I do not know.

I might add that Mr. Helms gets the brunt of this because he has a vacation place there in Lewes, Delaware, and somebody keeps calling him every time these Trento articles come out.
in which he is mentioned as a mole and investigations by the Agency about that and so on.

Miss Brady. Let us turn again to the Nosenko matter, if we can. Are you able to describe or characterize the Agency's attitude toward Nosenko when he actually defected in 1974?

Mr. Angleton. Yes. I can't characterize it at that time. I think it was regarded generally as a great coup.

Miss Brady. Did you share that view?

Mr. Angleton. I regarded it as a very interesting development.

Miss Brady. Referring again to Hart's testimony, he mentioned I believe that the Deputy Chief of the Soviet Branch gave great weight and significance to the case whereas you just felt either that it was not that significant or that there were great doubts. Is that accurate?

Mr. Angleton. He quotes me as stating that when Bagley came over that he had "a great efficiency," or words to that effect. Now my recollection is, and this is where I would have to go back to the files, that I don't recall whether Bagley came over after the first meeting with Nosenko -- I think it was in the first meeting with Nosenko that Bagley came over. I would have to know which one it was, whether it was the first meeting or the second meeting in which I displayed to him, exhibited to him, the transcript of Golitzen. But when he
read those he was thunderstruck. In other words, what I am trying to say is that I did not influence him one way or the other. I just simply pointed out these are the things to read. He spent three days and nights in my office, outer office, reading and taking notes of the interviews with Golitzen that had taken place many, many months before.

I can tell you this, the moment that the news broadcast carried the information that Nosenko had defected in Geneva and that Tsarapsin, the head of the Soviet Delegation, had denounced the Swiss Government for being in collusion with terrorist powers and had kidnapped him and what not, that we were, many of us, including foreigners, in conference with Golitzen in another building.

Immediately that Golitzen heard of the defection of Nosenko, he immediately said "that has to be the source of that letter you showed me." It so happened that Mc Cone, as I recall, was in that building. It was not our normal building in McClean. It was a building that we had in town. If I recall correctly, he want-d to see Mr. Mc Cone immediately.

As I recall I took him into see Mr. Mc Cone. It was a building where Mr. Mc Cone would use those offices where he was going to go to the White House back and forth, to the Secretary of State, in town, and very few minutes from the White House, so that he would use it every so often. Golitzen made the definite statement that this was in fact the author of all of those
items that he had seen before and that this was obviously a proc-
ocation.

Miss Brady. Was that the beginning of some of the charac-
terization of Golitzen as paranoid, to use Mr. Hart's term?

Mr. Angleton. I find that kind of accusation the kind
that must have set off the greatest peals of glee in the KGB
of the many statements of his defection.

Miss Brady. To your knowledge had there been any diagnosi
of Golitzen as paranoid prior to that time?

Mr. Angleton. I imagine in the short time that you and
I have known one another that you could write a psychological
profile of me and I could write one of you. I would say that
that is about the kind of imprecision or unprofessionalism of
writing a profile on Golitzen by a trained psychiatrist or
psychologist.

While we are on it, at some stage I could have gone
through this thing page by page, which I would like to do, and
just simply point out as one went along, but I will take it up
from there. Golitzen was a man who at a very early age had had
the opportunity, because of a study which he did in training
school together with his colleague, one named Kersheyev, had
written to the Central Committee, which was permissible in
the Soviet system, a critique of Soviet espionage based on their
studies, and that critique went to the Central Committee
and as a result of that, going through channels and it took
several months, it arrived at the highest level, including Stalin.

Out of the blue, and he was way down in the south of Russia, he and his colleague were flown to Moscow and met with Stalin. Berea, and all the chiefs of intelligence, because it had gone through those channels to Stalin and it pointed out what the glaring errors were in the modus operandi against the United States. So, it wasn't once but it was twice that he saw those personalities.

Second, his great quality was the analytical quality. In other words, where two separate components within the KGB had different points of view he was brought in many times to do the analytical side for the superiors in terms of the two points of view. His mind without question is one of the finest analytical minds. He is not necessarily an operations officer, but he is an analytical type and he is a historian by background.

I dare anyone to dispute a historical date or time, whether it deals with Mamelukes or Byzantine or whatever it may be. He is a true. Therefore he is very precise in terms of what he states and he separates the fact from speculation and so on. So that I don't regard a man who comes from that system as being paranoid who wishes to impart to the President of the United States the strategic matters which he derived from documents of the Soviet Government.

After all, he knew Stalin, he had access because the
KGB is the underpinning of the regime. Unlike what happens in the Western World you could take many of the senior people in the CIA who do not have the slightest idea of what is going on in the State Department or in the National Security Council or in the President's mind. They would not have access to the thinking or the policy in its formation, whereas the KGB is the underpinning of the regime who supplies all the guards to the Kremlin, who have the only intimate knowledge of who is related to whom, which are the best kept secrets in the Soviet Union, have access to the Central Committee and have access to strategy and to plans, because they are an integral part of the policymaking.

In other words, Andropov, the Chairman of State Security, is a member of the ruling class. He has been elevated as an equal with Brezhnev and with others so that it is a terrible mistake, which I think runs through all of Hart and through all those people who have really never dealt in Soviet matters either historically or casewise. I can recall no achievement of Hart's in his entire career that ever came to my attention of any value whatsoever as a contribution to counterintelligence.

Miss Brady. At the time Golitzen was assisting in the assessment of Nosenko was there any type of assessment in the Agency about Golitzen's value to the Agency?

Mr. Angleton. Of course. When you say within the Agency I want to clarify again and take exception to some of the
niceties of Hart'd delusions that he foisted on your committee. He keeps talking about a small group in the CIA. He keeps talking about the fact that he didn't know about certain things the thousands of us that didn't know, if one quotes on of his things, that were unaware of this or unaware of that or unaware of the other. Therefore, he puts it in a prejorative sense, that there were very few people who knew.

Now let us give consideration to the people who knew.

The Director knew. The Deputy Director knew. The head of the Clandestine Services knew. The Deputy Director of Clandestine Services knew. His deputy knew. The Chief of the Soviet Division and all of his selected people, the Chief of the Counterintelligence and his selected people, the Chief of the Office of Security and his selected people, the FBI and their selected people. So that it is not "some kind of cabal that was jealous reasons of its own denying Hart an others" "knowledge," because an intelligence service has only one defense against penetration and that is compartmentation. In other words, it is because of compartmentation that we didn't know thousands of things about the Soviets.

But because Golitsen had made up his mind to defect many years before he actually arrived, he was actually without our knowing an agent in place trying to bring down their compartmentation, therefore he got himself into positions which permitted him to break down their compartmentation into fields
where they weren't realizing that he was doing this for the purpose of acquiring vast knowledge in other fields which were not his duties, and amongst those was attending the higher counterintelligence school where visiting KGB people would come in to speak and talk about their operations.

Reading all of the KGB training books, knowing how those training books were -- for example, a case would be given there they would change the name of the locus of the operation, but he would know and find out the secret that if it was signed by so and so, released by so and so, that that man was in the Western European desk handling Scandinavian matters and therefore the case as described in the training school did not occur in Turkey, as it was so stated in the training lectures, but was handled in Scandinavia or in West Berlin, by knowing who the case officers, et cetera, were who approved that being submitted to the training school.

So that compartmentation was in the line of authority of the Director. It was not something which the CIA staff imposed. It was not something that people without authority imposed. It was the approved handling of the Directorship and the leadership of the Agency and it is based on the need to know principle in which you do not bring people in who have nothing to contribute to the case. It is not a matter of cocktail talk or what not. It is compartmented and it is compartmented hopefully in a way that if there is a leak at least you have a
bigger list of people you know for your investigative leads.

In other words, if Golitzen gave a highly sensitive piece of information and there was evidence that that information fell in the hands of the opposition, then we would be in a position to know that these are the X number of people alone who had access to that information as a basis for a leakage or whatever it may be. So that I simply state that when I mentioned earlier that Hart if a creature of the Colby regime I will go a step further and state that in my dealings with Colby and the first dealings when he took over as the Deputy Director of the Clancy destine Service from Mr. Karamessines, who unfortunately passed away a couple weeks ago and could have been very eloquent on this subject, his statement was that we are now in a new period in which you have to open the windows and let the fresh air in.

Now that may be all right for a lunatic assylum or sanatorium to have all that fresh air come in but in the intelligence business it just does not work.

So that throughout Mr. Hart seems to be a person who seems personally aggrieved that he was unaware of all of these things happening. But this was the real world. It is the real world that we have been engaged in for 31 years with the Soviets. It was not a world which we created. In other words, we had the first major defector in the West who was Gouzenko who took all the telegrams from the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa
out with him when he defected, which lead to the huge atomic espionage going on in Canada and the U.S. He was a code clerk and he had that kind of access. That was the number one magic eye opener to Western counterintelligence in the largest sense of the word.

The second major defector was Petrov who was Chief of the KGB in Australia, and his wife who was a code clerk in the KGB and who had been in many stations. He defected to the Australian security. He gave abundance of information.

So that, in other words, this is the world that specialists in counterintelligence live in which is the factual world of what they do. So we are not dealing with Nosenko as some abnormality in the thing. It was simply a part of the continuum which we had seen all the manifestations of during World War II when we were in counterintelligence working against the Germans. We began to bump into the Soviets right and left working against us.

In other words, we did not create a cold war or have a paranoid attitude about the Soviets. They taught us. In other words, they did it by kidnapping people, by murdering people, by shooting down our aircraft as they did over Yugoslavia and not giving up the bodies until Truman gave them an ultimatum and we had the 10th Mountain Division about ready to go in, which probably would have been a good thing. That is when they gave up the bodies and the aircraft.
In other words, what I am trying to say is that there is an attitude in the Agency that there is no regime and therefore the past is the past and we will forget it and we will start fresh again. But you can't undo all the cases of the continuum of penetration and of everything that has been going on from the days of Lenin. These cases keep going on.

I will give one example which I think is a very simply-minded one but one that is true and which is illustrative of the problem with Mosenko. Again it is illustrative of the Agency's inability and the Directorship over there to understand what intelligence and counterintelligence is all about.

Now during the war there emerged a General Turkul. General Turkul had been a White Russian general who after the revolution fled. He worked in many Balkan countries as a mercenary military man. I think among other things he helped restore King Zog to the throne in Bulgaria. He established a residence in Istanbul and he became sort of a magnet for White Russian or anti-Soviets. He was I believe in the cavalry and he was very prominent and what not and he became quite a personality in his own right. He made contact with the Fascists and with the German general staff and gave such high grade information regarding the Red Army that he was being paid fantastic sums of money both by the Italians and the Germans for his intelligence. Now his cover story or legend -- and keep in mind I haven't been on this case for 25 years, so I am just reading
the highlights of it -- his cover story or his legend was that he had a network of agents throughout the Red military, throughout the Red Army, and that the Chief of the Signal Corps of the Red Army was his agent and that this network reported through well-handled cells, well compartmented cells, up to the Chief of the Signal Corps.

So that the head of the Signal Corps, who also ran the school for training young WT operators -- that means wireless telegraph operators in morse code and transmissions for the armed forces -- would give them practice messages which they would transmit, say, from Archangel to the Crimea or what not, but that these were actually encoded messages for which he had the code, and therefore he wouldn't go and explain anything further about all this but the fact that he could have the most recent information of troop movements, of internal things going on in the Soviet Government and all the rest of it was because of this fantastic network that he had and the fact that alone he had the code and that he could receive this information by wireless et cetera, and that here all of these hundreds of students, which is typical, and you have in cryptographic work what are called practice messages.

They can be the same groups this way and a thousand groups this way and a thousand backwards or they can be all kinds of things that are gibberish, in other words. They are also used to confuse anyone who is listening to those messages.
But his statement was that these were actually the encoded intelligence reports and the he therefore had the proper signals and he could intercept all this and he could decode it and this was the intelligence.

Now he eventually ended up very highly favored by the German intelligence and the German general staff during the war. He went to Germany. His information proved extremely valuable to the Germans because Soviet divisions were destroyed based on his information on troop movements and all of that. Had the war gone on another three months or more, he would have replaced, because what he had been doing was undermining General Blassov who had a tremendous army of Russians working with Hitler.

I am not going into speculation that if Hitler had treated Blassov as an equal he could have been a major factor in the Soviet campaigns if he didn't have his whole attitude on race problems and so on.

But Blassov represented to the Soviet Government the most dangerous single element since the revolution because Stalin had made a decree that any captured Soviet officer or enlisted man was a traitor. In other words, he put out that proclamation that anyone who was captured, who did not fight to the death, was a traitor. So here you found brave men being captured who were already traitors and Blassov who was an anti-Bolshevik accumulated really the cream of the prisoners of
war and so on who wanted to fight against Russia and against Bolshevism and they came from all over, the Georgians, from all of the provinces. So that Western intelligence began to go into the General Turkul case as to bona fides because there were interceptions of messages which are known as the MX-MORUT which were intercepted and they pertained to this whole overall operation.

Now the question on bona fides of General Turkul was split right down the center. It split the Allied intelligence service in terms of whether he was bona fide or not bona fide.

We had his German case officer in the Abwehr. We had him in Vienna in a high security prison and on a given day NKVD officers who were part of the repatriation commission -- that was forceful repatriation of Russians back to Russia -- came over in American uniforms and raided that prison trying to get the case officer and they were caught by a colleague of mine in OSS in flagrante.

Now that only heightened the whole question of bona fides on Turkul. It was not until 1967 or 1969 that my deputy Rocca broke the case, the General Turkul case, through General Orlov who was the most senior defector that there has ever been from the NKVD or the OGPU or the KGB.

Miss Brady. When did Orlov come over?

Mr. Angleton. He came in 1934. He defected but he never made his presence known until the death of Stalin in 1953. He
wrote for Life Magazine a series of articles on the crimes of Stalin. He wrote a letter to Stalin on his defection outlining all of Stalin's crimes and stating that "if you bother me or my relatives or there is any sign of trying to touch me I will publish your crimes." He submitted in an attachment all of the crimes and the Soviets never made any effort whatsoever to take retribution against him.

He was the head of the NKVD in Spain during the Civil War. When Stalin died the pact was over, the agreement was over, and therefore Life magazine I believe paid him $40,000 for three articles in which he spells out the crimes of Stalin which later on are incorporated in Khrushchev's secret speech. General Orlov is without question one of the most intelligent and most valued men who had never been properly debriefed by the United States Government.

Miss Brady. What was his status in the United States?

Mr. Angleton. He had relatives and he just emerged and then he was interviewed by the FBI without any human base being created which you need with a defector and he broke off with them. They did not even tap the wealth of information which was at his disposal. It happened in the Huntington case as well. When you go in and try -- in other words, these men don't regard themselves as agents of the country. In other words, it is the same as Golitzen has stated on occasions that "I have left them but whether I have joined you is another
matter." It is a treatment that is accorded to them and what not.

Miss Brady. Was the Turkul case and the Nosenko case the two most obvious cases that were split on the bona fides issues? Had other cases been significantly split within the Agency than those two?

Mr. Angleton. In the Agency there were practically few people who were involved in Turkul unless they were in OSS although later on we had people in Germany working still on the Turkul case when we became CIA. The point I am trying to say is that here you take all the years that Orlov told ROCCA you have to keep in mind this is going back and recreating from the revolution all the way through NKVD, OGPU, all the rest of it, building up machine computerized records of every single Soviet case from the day of Lenin so that you would have a data base where you understood comprehensively all of the activities, organizations, changes in modus operandi and so on.

In the course of all of this he took up the Turkul matter and Orlov read the critical fact which was that a man by the name of Katz Nelson who was under Dzerzhinsky around 1934 came to Paris, I believe it was Paris, and one of the purposes of his trip was to meet with Turkul. Now Katz Nelson was the Deputy Chief of the NKVD for the Ukraine, a personal friend of Dzerzhinsky and Lenin. He was a cousin to Orlov and he was the one who warned Orlov of the forthcoming purges and that
he had better be careful of recall telegrams. There were
many attempts by, I think it was Jassov, head of the Service,
to try to invite Orlov to come to Belgium and to go on to a
Soviet ship to have a conference on a very important matter,
et cetera, et cetera. He found in Spain a code clerk who was
loyal to him, told him there was another member in the mission
of the NKVD who was there unbeknownst to Orlov and probably for
purposes of assassinating him because of the fact that he had
put off any recall to Moscow.

His cousin was one of those executed in the 1937 purges.
So that the wealth of information is such that I can say,
and I understand the agreement that you have, if I understand
it correctly, with the Agency and the Chairman, that any
security oaths and what not are suspended for the purpose
of this.

Miss Brady. Yes.

Mr. Angleton. I just want to repeat it because I am
getting into fields that have never been gone into and which in
my own view are more properly the field of the Senate Intelli-
gence Committee rather than the Assassination Committee. But
had anyone patiently worked with Orlov, and I might add in
this respect that the Agency once contacted him and the
relationship fizzled out because of personalities, the Soviet
Division tried to have a contact with him and it fizzled out.
It was only when Mr. Allen Dulles was writing his book on the
craft of intelligence that I suggested to him that he pay a
tribute to General Orlov's book which is one of the really great
books, and Mr. Dulles wrote and we helped him out a lot on
the book in different ways -- and Mr. Dulles wrote a fine
tribute to General Orlov's book and so on.

One day Mr. Dulles called me to tell me that the Orolvs
were in town and that General Orlov had called him to thank him
for the fine tribute, that he had invited him to dinner. Mr.
Dulles was no longer Director or anything. He asked me whether
I would come to the dinner. I said, "No, I am not the man
for that. I would like to send Rocca." So that is how Rocca
met him and handled him up to his death. He recreated in
one country alone 34 Soviet cases. That was a country that had
been overrun by the Germans, where the Germans had taken away
all the Soviet files so they didn't have any archives. He
recreated 37 cases in that country.

In other words, the most important cases to them and so on.
The most important thing was that when he was in Spain he
knew that on Franco's staff -- he himself was chief of NKVD,
with the Republicans fighting Franco, but he knew the senior
agent they had was on Franco's staff, that he was a young Brit-
ish reporter whose father was an Arabist and he knew his code
name, SINJAN, that was Philby, whose father was the famous Sir
John Philby, an Arabist. All of that was available in 1953.

I am simply trying to stress what it means that when someone
tries to take the Nosenko case and go and believe that they are going to resolve it against a time factor, whether it be the Warren Commission or whether it be the fact that the Director wants it resolved or whether it is any other kind of artificial constraints, it is out of kilter and not in step with counterintelligence.

In other words, the philosophy of the counterintelligence is not to have his hostile interrogation because hostile interrogation gets one nowhere unless you have a superior piece of intelligence unbeknownst to that individual.

Miss Brady. Who made the decision to go to the hostile interrogation of Nosenko?

Mr. Angleton. The Soviet Division.

Miss Brady. Were you consulted?

Mr. Angleton. No. In fact I think I was in Israel but I am not certain.

Miss Brady. Which individual, the Chief of the Soviet Division?

Mr. Angleton. I never reconstructed exactly who made the decision.

Miss Brady. Do you know when the decision was made?

Mr. Angleton. I know it was after they thought they had enough ammunition to break him.

Miss Brady. At that point, the so-called thousand page report had already been issued, had it not? Prior to the
decision to go to hostile interrogation had it been written?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. Let me dwell on the question of hostile interrogation so that we understand one another.

I was many years in espionage and I think I can say in all modesty I probably recruited more agents than any person in the CIA who would be known to you, by that I mean whose names have ever come out. I recruited very high level people in terms of access to codes and so on. I simply say that because I was not just simply counterintelligence but I was also in the espionage game for a long time before I became Chief of Counterintelligence. I was Chief of Special Operations among other things. The ultimate in our business is that espionage, the ultimate of an espionage case is to get the codes of the opposition. The ultimate in counterespionage is to protect your own codes.

That is the ultimate. There are all kinds of achievements from recruiting a man all the way on up. But the heart of everything is documentation. It is not just simply agent reports. It is to be able to have the documents of the opposition or to read their telegrams so that you know at the same time they know, so that you can make your own evaluation, not based on what someone told you but on the actual documents.

So my statement to you is a world that I am very familiar with, I mean in terms of when I am dealing with Golitzen he
refers to documents or codes and all of these things, they are part of my life. It is the only life I have known because I started off as a corporal in our organization, in the Army, and I never went to an officer training school or anything and I never asked for anything.

So, my commendations or rewards by foreign governments or by my own government can be seen there. They are on the record and I didn't write them. So, the men I chose were of like caliber, Rocca, Scotty Miler, and I can go through a whole series of them, because experience taught me also how to judge men. For example, when we come to Peter Bagley, who has been denigrated publicly through the auspices of your committee with the help of Admiral Turner, Bagley was one of the finest officers in the organization. Bagley didn't know it but it had always been on my mind in evaluating a man that he might well be one of my nominees for somebody who might become the head of the Clandestine Service some day because he had certain qualities to him that I observed that were needed for that type of leadership.

First in intelligence, his schooling, his knowledge of languages, his total dedication. He didn't have a penny to his name. I mean he drove a car that I think was the oldest car in the Agency. He had personal misfortunes, his son was blinded in one eye and a number of other things. But at the same time it was a part of his whole upbringing. Two
of his brothers were admirals of the fleet. One brother was the senior admiral in London which controlled all the fleet in the Atlantic and what not. The other brother was an admiral, chief of the Bureau of Personnel of the Navy.

His uncle was Admiral Leavy. I don't have to describe what that means when your uncle is Admiral Leahy. So does anyone believe that a man of Pete Bagley's qualities is the same person described by Hart?

Miss Brady. I believe you are referring to a memo or so-called letter that Mr. Hart ascribed to Mr. Bagley?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Miss Brady. Did you have any knowledge of such a letter or memo?

Mr. Angleton. Of course not. I never heard of any such thing. But I know that a case officer who is working, I mean who is really thinking through a problem, can go from the logical to the reductio absurdum. In other words, if you follow me, if you are told to think of everything that was the color blue you could start off with the blue of Tintorreo and start getting down into the fact that I am going to sing the blues or something.

You go from those things that you would communicate to somebody to those things which would be I mean in reductio absurdum. The memo never went anywhere.

It was a personal paper of the man himself. All I am
trying to say is that Pete Bagley is the first man in the world that knows that the Agency would never tolerate liquidation. He would never dare come into Helms and say that "We have to liquidate the man."

The thing is so absurd that the very thought of it shows the motivation of Hart to sensationalize and to put some kind of onus on the past, because Hart is married to a young lady, she is not so young but she is a senior supergrade in the Soviet Division.

Miss Brady. Was she there at the time of the Nosenko assessment?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, but she was not in counterintelligence. She was in estimates with Len McCoy. When Colby destroyed the Counterintelligence, as far as I am concerned, Len McCoy was put into counterintelligence to take over from Rocca. He has no qualifications for that job. Len McCoy and Mr. Hart's wife were in the same group in the Soviet Division.

Miss Brady. Were you ever party to conversations about what is termed the embarrassing consequences of Nosenko's detention or possibly disposal even short of liquidation?

Mr. Angleton. I am personally aware of that because I go back to what I have always felt about any of these people. I am not opposed to taking in anyone, all defectors are welcome. In other words, what I am trying to say is the more the merrier. But you don't ever tell them that you disbelieve them. In
other words, you elicit, you get their whole cover story from A to Z. You put up all kinds of hypothetical things to them. You feed them litmus and so on.

Miss Brady. What was your role in the counterintelligence after the decision had been made to go to hostile interrogation and he was actually incarcerated? What was the CIA doing at that time?

Mr. Angleton. We were following up traces. Let me put it this way. Much was made of the fact that out of X numbers of days of incarceration he was only interrogated X number of days. I worked it out that every three and a quarter days he was seen. Now let us logically look at it. The people who would do the interrogation are people who also have other responsibilities. They have In boxes and other cases that are breaking. That is number one.

Number two, they have to take the product of that interrogation back to headquarters from a distant location and do all the research and analysis and traces and dossiers on what has been provided during that day's interrogation.

I can assure you, having don this many times, myself, with other defectors, having to travel to New York and spending until four o'clock in the morning and getting two hours sleep and getting the first plane down and calling in people to get traces run and go back that same afternoon, it is a little gruelling when you are also Chief of Counterintelligence
handling hundreds of telegrams and new cases that come in.

I am certain that when I figured that they saw him once every three and a half days, that, without knowing this as a fact, this would be the logical time factor of doing, one, your work as Deputy Chief of the Soviet Division and whoever else he had helping him, and doing the traces, preparing your questions for the next encounter, et cetera.

So that I find nothing illogical in that.

I personally believe that the trouble with hostile interrogation is that you can foresee that you are not going to be successful unless you have something so incriminating that the man cannot deny it. In other words, if you photograph him actually in the company of a known Soviet agent passing a document or if you had a cipher break of a telegram which says, "Go and see Nosenko and tell him that we enjoyed his report on Bagley but try to find out about his brothers who are admirals to give a fanciful thing, if you had such a thing of that sort where it is incontrovertible evidence, then you could go to hostile interrogation. I don't mean by hostile you could tell him that he is a liar. Hostile interrogation to me would be to show your card to the man, that you disbelieve him. Whereas there is no reason to do that. In other words, you listen to him. You thank him for his information but you have never let him know that you disbelieve him until you have heard and exhausted his entire story and that can take several months.
to get all the details out. It is only after you analyze all that you see that you still don't have anything on which you can break him. The fact that there was no telegram, the fact that his rank might be wrong, or you can take all the dozens, which I don't have at hand, dozens of contradictions, my attitude was that these were fundamental contradictions reinforced by the fact that other people under suspicion were fortifying his testimony and that, most important, that Igor when he came out confirmed that Sasha, Alexander, had submitted enough reports within the Agency, 29 volumes, to be used by the Central Committee against the United States, in a plan approved by the Central Committee, if any harm came to him, et cetera, et cetera, that he went to the Soviet Embassy.

At the same time he confirms the bona fides of Nosenko and goes into a long thing about how important Nosenko is, he is more important than Goliath and so on. Now we know he is a fraud.

So then you take all the cases where that same earmarked information of the lie is and you go through that to make the identification of the other channels. When you begin to find that an FBI source made the identical statement and so and so made the identical statement and then you have Nosenko saying "I lied, I didn't receive the telegram," and you look at these other sources who said he received the telegram, et cetera, et cetera, what does it raise in your mind except the classical
thing, when you become involved in a double agent case you are inviting for yourself a lot of trouble unless you have a superior source. In other words, to run a double agent or penetration who is going to pass on information compels you to exhaust a great deal of real information to build up his credibility with the other side. You find yourself at time not achieving your objective and therefore you have to throw more good information after good information and still not achieve your objective.

If the other side is astute enough, they can force you to the wall in terms of having to give up stuff finally that you can't give up and maintain the credibility of that agent. You are on a train going to fast to jump off.

That is the reason I don't believe in hostile interrogation. In other words, I prefer the elicitation thing regardless of the time span, whether it be the Warren Commission or whether it is the Director who has to have an answer right away, et cetera.

I gave the Turkul case as one of the most obvious kinds of cases, showing how long all Western counterintelligence worked on Turkul and how it eventually was resolved.

So that I can understand the Director who wants an answer, who has to resolve it, who can't go any further with it. I don't step away from Bagley and I don't step away from those people. They had the jurisdiction. In their judgment they had
to make a decision, if you follow me. Therefore, when Helms was
confronted with that entire thing and the recommendations were
made and all that and he goes to Katzenbach and so on, I may
have known at the time or heard it or something but it was the
first time I knew that Dave Murphy had gone to see Katzenbach
and they had had such a meeting.

I did know Katzenbach very well before he became Attorney
General. So when I read or heard the testimony of Helms I
was quite surprised about that meeting. My point is that I
can see that once they embarked on hostile interrogation it
would be very hard to get off that train because once you
starting telling a man you don't believe him, then he can shift
his story and you don't know what he would have told you had
you continued the elicitation. There were very many pieces of
litmus, as I call it, things which if he was bona fides in
the ultimate sense, in the sense of wanting to join our society
and protect our society, there are priorities of information
which he would have volunteered immediately as benefit to
the United States.

Miss Brady. I think you mentioned you wanted to break
at 12:30. Is that correct?

Mr. Chabot. It might be a good time.

Miss Brady. Let us be back here at 2:00 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:45 a.m., the hearing was recessed, to
reconvene at 2:00 p.m. the same day.)
Mr. Goldsmith. Did the CIA conduct an investigation into the assassination of President Kennedy?

Mr. Angleton. There was never any formal investigation as such in the sense that there was never any thing like an inspector general thing or task force.

Mr. Goldsmith. How would you characterize the responsibility of the Agency vis-a-vis the work of the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. I think when the assassination occurred -- I will state the obvious, that no one in the history of the Agency had even been confronted with the assassination of a president. In other words, practically anything that ever happened in the Agency always had some precedent. In this area, there was complete chaos, so to speak. So, the original jurisdiction of course, devolved on the Bureau, the FBI.

When the Commission was set up I think it took it a long time to get to focus as such. In other words, I don't think the community as a whole -- I mean Johnson in forming the Commission, obviously there was advice from a lot of people -- my view is that he just simply hit on the Commission idea as spreading the responsibility with some kind of blue ribbon panel.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand the purpose of the Commission in general terms. My question though is how would you
characterize the role of the Agency vis-a-vis the work of the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. I think it went through a metamorphosis in the beginning. You had the Director, who was a very close social and personal friend of the President and therefore in a sense he wasn't just the Director of Central Intelligence, he was also a very close personal friend. So that I think he had broad views on it that went beyond the Agency and I think his Agency responsibilities.

I think that the metamorphosed into a thing where it began to focus more on it as an agency would facing any problem. In the beginning you had the Director, you had the Deputy Director, you had case officers, you had division chiefs, all seeing the Warren Commission independently. You had FBI liaisoning at many different levels. We had liaison offices. That would be the normal way of approaching any kind of business.

In a sense, it took some time to get this thing to focus. There was some control of knowing what different elements in the Agency were capable of doing or knew or whatnot.

Mr. Goldsmith. How long did it take to get focused so there was an effective team of some kind at the Agency providing the Warren Commission on a regular basis with information?

Mr. Angleton. I can't give you a time factor. I know, and this is only memory without having seen any papers, from
my own memory I know I was raising certain questions of duplication and of the fact of trying to get all the papers pulled together in one place. In other words, if you got a call from the Director you could not be really sure that you were giving a final answer. It did not necessarily mean that was the answer.

Mr. Goldsmith. Eventually was the responsibility for coordinating the Agency's work given to any particular unit or component?

Mr. Angleton. We had what I called at that time, and still refer to as the point of record. In other words, it didn't have any command function but at least it was trying to get hold of all the telegrams, all of the memoranda of record, all the agency participation, et cetera.

Mr. Goldsmith. By we are you referring to the CI Staff?

Mr. Angleton. That is right.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why did this responsibility devolve upon the CI Staff?

Mr. Angleton. Basically because you might say it was trying to find someplace of common concern. We had research and analysis. We were very strong on research and analysis in the person of Rocca, the fact that he had some pretty good legmen around him that could be diverted from what they were doing to run errands and do work.

Mr. Goldsmith. You made reference to Mr. Rocca. Who
within the CI Staff was primarily responsible for coordinating
the effort to assist the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. He was the principal point.

Mr. Goldsmith. What responsibilities, if any, did you
have at that time with regard to the work that was being
performed to assist the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. I never saw anybody from the Warren Commiss-
ion. I am coming back to what you are saying. I preface
it by saying that I never did meet anybody from the Warren
Commission to my knowledge, outside of Mr. Dulles and that
was not in an official capacity. My basic thing was to read
over everything that came across my desk but basically shoving
the responsibility on to Rocca to the point of the legwork
which meant that he didn't have to go through me to deal with
other people in the Agency.

The normal course of events, if he was going to go, if the
Director called him or Deputy Director and so on, the channel
would normally be that he would be on the phone to me about it
and we would confer. He was given a lot of latitude. But I
have to explain something here.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please do.

Mr. Angleton. Our main concern -- when I say concern, I
don't mean it in the sense of importance or anything, but at
that time we were in the middle of the day of the assassina-
tion, I can recall it very distinctly, there was a high
representative of a foreign government who had arrived the day before and had presented a letter of complaint to Mr. McCone regarding an allegation as to one of his service's number two man, a Soviet suspect. So he had come with this letter from the Chief of that service to register this complaint.

If I recall correctly, he had lunch with the Director and then he was to meet with me and my Deputy. Now, this was one of those ball-ups of an individual from that country, our representative, who had been back and had been privately briefed as to the security problems relating to that station and to that country. Without authorization he disclosed to the chief of that service the name of this individual who was in fact this chief's deputy. So you can imagine the crisis that devolved from this unauthorized leakage.

So this snowballed into quite a package, I might add, and it went on for I think about a year, with many visits from the Internal Security of that country to us during which all kinds of cooperation was given, depositions, and all that, and in the end they determined that -- I will put it this way, whatever they determined they gave us no final report but the head of that government appointed a special commission which got rid of him, in short.

So that the day of the assassination this was one of the primary concerns of Counterintelligence. So it was running in that office, I mean running in the conference room, running to
people, finally getting rid of the follow, staying on at night, seeing what happened, et cetera, et cetera.

In the meantime, the Western Hemisphere Division was involved, the Soviet Division was involved, the Deputy Director was involved, et cetera.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that you were working in the context of a crisis situation by virtue of the facts that you made reference to. In light of that understanding, however, my question is what responsibilities did you have with regard to the work that the Agency was performing to assist the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. I didn't have and specific responsibility.

Mr. Goldsmith. The CI Staff became a point of record?

Mr. Angleton. That is right.

Mr. Goldsmith. You were head of the CI Staff?

Mr. Angleton. But that does not follow in that strict sense. The Director could call or anyone could call Rocca without reference to me. In other words, it was a very special situation. He was doing a job of common concern.

Mr. Goldsmith. To what extent did you get involved in the work of the Agency?

Mr. Angleton. I got very much involved in the immediate question, having been 31 years in the business and probably as much knowledge as anybody about the Soviet assassinations, assassinations as such by foreign services. My immediate
concern was the question of Soviet intelligence, Soviet Bloc intelligence.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did Rocca, as a matter of routine, pass on to you information that he considered to be important?

Mr. Angleton. Yes. It was not just passing it on. If he had a matter that he regarded as a development or something that I had to know because of its relationship to whatever I might be doing or anybody else in the Staff might be doing, then he wouldn't hesitate after hours to get on the phone and break in and so on, if there was such a type thing.

Our relationship was such that it was only 20 feet away from his office to me.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did he keep you apprised of the key developments in the Kennedy case so far as the Agency was concerned?

Mr. Angleton. There was an awful lot of activity going on which I wouldn't say that we knew at the moment that it was happening. In other words, there were a lot of people who would be in the WH Division that might not know about that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Even though the CI Staff was a point of record it does not necessarily follow that the CI Staff was informed of all key developments that the Agency had become aware of?

Mr. Angleton. I can't say that as a fact. I am simply saying there were so many things going on that you couldn't
be sure because, after all, unless somebody sent you something
how did you know that activity or that particular thing was
going on? In other words, my memory is one that, unlike what
I said earlier where you have a task force or you have a
problem where there is no point of record but somebody who is
charged and where no action is taken without the clearance of
that individual, there wasn't that kind of situation.

Mr. Goldsmith. Insofar as information was made available
to Mr. Rocca, did he actively keep you apprised of those facts
that he considered to be important?

Mr. Angleton. I think so, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. From what you are saying I get the
impression generally that the situation was not all that well
organized. Did Mr. Helms or anyone else issue an order indic-
ating that CI Staff was a point of record and that all perti-
inent information for the Warren Commission or information
relevant to the investigation was to pass through the CI
Staff?

Mr. Angleton. I think it was to be at least deposited
there. There was an order of some sort, some kind of instruc-
tion, that made it clear that everything was to be pulled
together in the Counterintelligence Staff. That man was
Rocca.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was I responsible for coor-
dinating the aspects of the Agency work on the assassination?
Mr. Angleton. J. C. King was the head of the WH Division and was his right hand man handling all the Western Hemisphere stuff.

Mr. Goldsmith. My question was probably more specifically was given responsibility for coordinating the Agency's initial efforts to support the FBI in attempting to investigate the Kennedy assassination?

Mr. Angleton. I can't remember exactly the terms of reference except that he was very prominent.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall ever having any conflict with concerning areas of responsibility with regard to the Agency's effort to investigate the assassination?

Mr. Angleton. Nothing that I can recall except that I always felt uneasy when anyone met with the FBI or anybody else that we didn't either have a participant or somebody present.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why was that?

Mr. Angleton. I am talking about the regular counterintelligence liaison being centered in the Counterintelligence Staff.

Mr. Goldsmith. If I understand you correct, what you are saying is that the CI Staff essentially was responsible for liaison with the FBI. For that reason, you would have wanted to be kept informed?

Mr. Angleton. That is right. Simply that my experience
with liaison is that when you speak with him voices to an 
organization you are bound to have misunderstandings. In 
other words, if you have people who have never dealt with the 
FBI, there is a art of dealing with any interagency or 
investigative group, you know -- but [see also] was very promi-
nent because obviously the trip to Mexico and the telegrams 
were coming in to SH Division as the action division.

Mr. Goldsmith. By Mexico you are referring to Oswald's 
trip?

Mr. Angleton. Yes. The cable when it comes in has in 
the upper left hand corner a place where it says "action". 
It will designate the component. Then it will have another 
line which shows dissemination. So that action would be 
WH Division unless it was the Deputy Director himself who 
signed the cable in which case the action would be indicated 
on that cable at the designated point. Dissemination showed 
everybody else who had a collateral interest of some sort.

All of a sudden you might see somebody on there that you 
worried why he was on it. Something like that might arouse 
the question, why has the cable gone here, there and so on.

Mr. Goldsmith. What individuals within the Agency to 
your knowledge were responsible for maintaining contact with 
the Warren Commission, communicating information to the 
Warren Commission.

Mr. Angleton. Just simply from my recollection, it would
have been the Director, Mr. Helms, J. C. King, Dave Murphy, who was the Chief of the Soviet Division, Rocca, and perhaps, but I am not certain, maybe one or two of his men.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was there any formal procedure established for communicating information to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know that it was formal. It was more on what the subject matter was.

Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, I take it that the CI Staff per Helms order would have been informed of the information that would have been available to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. We tried to keep on top of it. I think as time went on we got a little more of a grasp, I mean the people who were involved, and also they began to call us in the sense that we were passive, once we started getting all the information and making sure that traces were run and all that, it was in their interest to call us and ask questions.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, you are referring to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. Both the Warren Commission and any of the other components in the Agency dealing with them.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you able to state in general terms what areas the Agency attempted to give emphasis to in attempting to support the Warren Commission? In other words, were there investigative hypotheses that were pursued?

Mr. Angleton. I think the fundamental one was the whole
thing of trying to get some idea on Oswald and traces, hypotheses, on the question of whether there was any foreign influence involved.

Mr. Goldsmith. Which area of foreign influence received emphasis?

Mr. Angleton. The Soviet would be one, and of course Cuban.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you feel that you were given by your superiors at the Agency all relevant information concerning the assassination which would have ensured that the Agency's investigation and ultimately the Warren Commission's investigation would be completely thorough?

Mr. Angleton. At the time I did.

Mr. Goldsmith. What about today?

Mr. Angleton. After I left my job as Chief, Counterintelligence, but while they kept me on ice for the Church Committee -- let me put it that way, I had been working very hard on that AF story that came out about Castro's warning about attempted assassinations against him.

Mr. Goldsmith. When did you first learn of the anticastro assassination plots sponsored by the Agency?

Mr. Angleton. I had wind of something from time to time but never one I didn't stick my nose into in the sense that I had been brought up in a world of compartmentation and I tried to live up to that. I regarded it as a twoway street.
But when someone has assigned things from the Directorate it is not your job to try to break down that compartmentation.

I learned by pure accident that there had been a Mafia contact.

Mr. Goldsmith. When did you learn that?

Mr. Angleton. I learned that, and I can't give you a date but it is obviously in the record someplace, I learned it because the FBI liaison fellow was at my house one evening when the Bureau was frantically trying to get hold of him.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you remember when that was?

Mr. Angleton. I can't remember the date.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was it before or after the Warren Commission work was completed?

Mr. Angleton. I think it was after the Commission.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who was the FBI liaison?

Mr. Angleton. Sam Papich. According to the Bureau procedures, he had left what his schedule would be and where he would be at every moment. The call came in from the field office, as I recall, and they stated that from surveillance of Rosselli from California, I think it was California, he had met an individual whose description was precisely that of Bill Harvey. They were a little upset.

I heard enough of it to tell Sam not to say anything and tell him he would call back or words to that effect. Then he told me that they had said that Rosselli got off a plane
by such an individual. They were baffled.

So I immediately called, I told Sam, I said "Look, this thing, you have to keep in mind that the FBI had separate liaison with the Cuban group because of the complications of Miami and all that."

I said, "It is not my affair but don't start getting a lot of explosions happening until we get this thing clarified a bit."

Sam agreed. I think he told me he would be back at them but not to get excited, or words to that effect.

I called Harvey's wife and asked here "Where is Bill?" She said, "Duke Zeiberts."

"Will you get hold of him and tell him to call me immediately, that there is a crisis?"

Bill called within a few seconds so to speak. I just handed the phone, I said, "Bill, a Gernam somebody wants to talk to you." So I gave him the telephone. I didn't listen in on the conversation but I know that Sam got the answers he wanted and he called back the Bureau and apparently had the surveillance called off. This was around 10 o'clock, between 9 and 10 o'clock at night. Then he took it up with Bill the next day.

I mean, from then on it left me and became a privileged matter between him and the desk.

Mr. Goldsmith. I realize that I have asked this question
one time. I would like to ask it again.

Mr. Angleton. I seem to be avoiding your question.

Mr. Goldsmith. No, you have answered my question. You have given me a lot of detail about the circumstances surrounding your first learning of the anti-Castro assassination plot. The question I want to ask again is, do you recall approximately when you learned this information?

Mr. Angleton. No, I don't know the time. I was working on a lot of that before I left the Agency.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you able to state whether it was before or after the Warren Commission had completed its work?

Mr. Angleton. I am certain it was well after the Warren Commission had completed its work but I have no feeling for dates.

Mr. Goldsmith. This is really the only relevant issue so far as we are concerned.

Do you think that the work of the CI Staff in attempting to facilitate the efforts of the Warren Commission was affected in any way by the failure of other CIA officials to inform the CI Staff of the anti-Castro assassination plots?

Mr. Angleton. I will put it this way, whether it would have facilitated the Warren Commission I don't know. I think the problem, I just told Miss Brady I was very unhappy not to have been informed either by your Committee or the Agency in advance that Hart was going to testify, he put me at a
terrible disadvantage in the sense that I would have been glued to the radio to have heard him, therefore, I lost three or four or five days and nights to dredge up that testimony with a lot of calls coming in from a lot of concerned people.

Then, forewarned, I heard a lot of Helms testimony except for interruptions. This question keeps coming up, whether it would have helped the Warren Commission. I would answer in this fashion, that the counterintelligence concern with the assassination could not keep pace with the life of that Committee. In other words, the Committee's requirements or demands, or whatever it may be, they had a life of their own and they had deadlines to meet.

In other words, they were working at a faster pace than we were in terms of our activities and they couldn't coincide. In other words, for example, in private discussions with Allen Dulles I told him that personally I believed there should not be a finality to the report. In other words, the door ought to be left open. You don't have an assassin assassinate the assassin so to speak, without all these terrible things going to come out of the closet. I didn't have in mind at that time the Cubans, so to speak, so much as I did the whole question of the Soviets, the Nosenko business, and many other things.

Mr. Goldsmith, I believe that Mr. Helms in his public testimony indicated that in retrospect he would have taken the information on the anti-Castro assassination plots and put them
in a truck and driven to the steps of the Warren Commission and simply delivered them there.

Mr. Angleton. I heard the statement.

Mr. Goldsmith. That is the statement in substance. Do you think that the information should have been given to the Warren Commission.

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I still haven't seen all that information. Before leaving the Agency I can recall going through a file and I found that there seemed to be a -- I won't say disappearance but when I went to a certain individual and said "Where is the report on Fitzgerald, et cetera, et cetera, "In Paris?", whatever it was, that I could feel the door shutting around me.

Mr. Goldsmith. Can you think of any good reason for not giving that information to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. What puzzles me is whether even if they had that, whether they would have seen its significance. In other words, I even wonder whether people in the Agency understood the significance of what that assassination business meant. I think we would have seen it probably more sharply.

Mr. Goldsmith. By "we" you are referring to the CI Staff?

Mr. Angleton. Yes. I think we would have seen it more sharply because of the fact that we were more intensely engaged in this whole Soviet Bloc assassination. We had more
experience in terms of Department 13 and the whole history of 30 years of Soviet sabotage and assassinations. It was not something to us that was a dream world. We knew of cases and we knew of the modus operandi and so on.

Also, I never had much confidence in the Cuban operations, whether it was run by Bissell or anybody else so far as security went. I just didn't feel that you can run operations of that sort, imigre groups and all the rest of it, and maintain security.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever receive any positive indications that there were in fact security problems with regard to these anti-Castro plots?

Mr. Angleton. I just happened to know a lot of the people involved and I couldn't see it. You would hear too many rumors. I don't like to make that statement and leave it there. I went through the whole Bissell period of the Bay of Pigs -- not having been a part of it, in other words, I was in the TB sanitarium and I got back -- while I was in the TB sanitarium I heard a great deal about the Cuban operations from people who were not even party to it.

I had lunch with Bissell and he asked me, I mean he raised the thing in some fashion, he invited me to lunch when he got back. I asked him only one question. I said, "Do you have any escape hatch?"

He took quite an offense at that. He said, "What do you
mean?

"In case the thing falls flat on its face is there someone who goes to Castro and says 'you have won the battle. What is your price?'

In other words, have you planned for the failure as much as planned for the success? We never met again until after the Bay of Pigs. We never had one word exchanged.

So I say this only because I can't take an operation -- and then we had all this experience through the SS period, we had it with the Polish immigration, we had it with the failure of the Albanian operations and everything else -- when you start dealing with large masses of people and try to have these fictional covers they simply don't hold up.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think that the Cuban aspect of the assassination was thoroughly and adequately investigated by the Agency and by the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. No. I personally believe that the United States intelligence services did not have the capabilities to ever come to an adjudication. I don't think the capabilities were there.

Mr. Goldsmith. This is regardless of whether or not the anti-Castro plots would have been made available to the Warren Commission, you are saying regardless of that, our intelligence agencies did not have the capability to investigate that thoroughly.
Mr. Angleton. Unless they had a code break or a defector or something.

Let me take a case by say of example to show you what I am trying to say. I think it was in 1962 or thereabouts we had this young man from Hungary who was aviation internal security, Hungarian Intelligence Security, Bela Lapusnyik, a very important defector to the Austrians. who knew of the internal activities of AVH against embassies, recruitment of personnel in embassies and their whole modus operandi, et cetera.

The Austrians were very reluctant to give us the custody we wanted and yet as a service they didn't have the leads and have the comprehensive knowledge of a VH0. It was only indirectly that we could pose questions to them and get answers but the answers we were getting were enough to show the tremendous importance of this individual.

Finally, with a lot of pressure it came to an agreement, that on a Sunday they would have exhausted all international interest in the man and he would be transported to the United States. On the morning of his being transferred to us, even though he was in a high security jail, with police and whatnot, he was found dead. He was in his late 20's, in perfect health.

Immediately it was declared that it was food poisoning. It just didn't stack up that it would be food poisoning.

Now, we had had an allegation from reliable sources of
penetration of the Austrian security service. It was a positive type of allegation from a high grade source. So Stern Hagsen sent all kinds of people down there. They printed and everybody reprinted the fact that the official finding was food poisoning. Even the Vienna Institute of Forensic Medicine, which is one of the most famous ones in the world, supported the statement.

Some years later, we had another Hungarian defector. The moment he got off the plane I got hold of him. I met him out in a safe house and one of the first things I hit him with was about Lapusnyik. He gave the story that he had access to that file, that that file was in the custody of the Chief of Ministry of the Interior and so on, and he explained in detail that he had access to it and they did not have the means of conducting an assassination but the Czechs had the agent and the Czechs were the ones who did the assassination. That was on the eve of the man coming to the United States.

I will say this. He had only been skimmed on the surface in terms of the way he would have been, in the way of the assets, and I mean recruitment, who the agents were in embassies and so on. That showed capability, it showed flexibility, but it also showed collaboration among Bloc services, the sharing of resources and cohesiveness of action, and that is supported by many other cases. Rumanians, Soviets and so on, all prove able cases, all cases which had
prosecutions involved and evidence certified.

Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to another area now, to what extent did the Agency's concern for protecting sensitive sources and methods have an effect on the nature and quality of the information that was made available to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. By quality what do you mean?

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the information given to the Warren Commission in sanitized form, for example?

Mr. Angleton. All I can say to that is that I hope so. I don't know. I know that my view is that no piece of information should go out of the Agency where if that document is compromised it destroys the source.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know if in fact that was the Agency's position that when information touching on sensitive sources and methods was involved it would be sanitized at least to those sensitive aspects and then given to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. What I am trying to say is that I can see the Chief of the Division or somebody if he was talking to the counsel there and there wasn't any record being made and so on, that he might feel that he ought to tell him a little bit more to give him some sense of evaluating that this is more important and this is important, something of that sort.
Mr. Goldsmith. Overall, was there a concern about protecting sources and methods when giving information to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. I can't answer that question because I really don't know. I know that you had a lot of people dealing with them. My personal view is that if we ever had information that incontrovertibly showed that there had been a foreign power that had assassinated the President, then that would supersede all sources and methods.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let us go off the record for a moment.

(Off the record discussion)

Mr. Goldsmith. Did Mr. Dulles play any special role on the Warren Commission so far as the Agency was concerned?

Mr. Angleton. Only by virtue of his having been the Director.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know if he in any way represented the interest of the Agency to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. I don't think that he had any understanding with Mr. McCone at all. In fact, I am quite confident he would not have had an understanding. They were not on the best of terms.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have any personal knowledge one way or another about that?

Mr. Angleton. I personally had a relationship with him?

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have any personal knowledge
concerning whether he represented the interest of the Agency on the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. Explain that to me.

Mr. Goldsmith. For example, there would have been areas that the Warren Commission and the Agency may have been somewhat at odds. One area that comes to mind is in the Nosenko area where the Agency may have had a preference for having the Warren Commission not treat the Nosenko issue at all whereas the Warren Commission may have wanted to deal with that issue in some way. That would be a case where the Agency's interest would be at stake.

My question is, do you know whether in a case of that kind Mr. Dulles would have made an effort to represent the Agency's position to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. No, I don't think so. I think that you have to first keep in mind that Dulles was pretty much his own man. He was an attorney with Sullivan and Cromwell. He was about as independent a man as I know when it came to questions of his personal integrity. He wasn't a person who tried to compromise a lot of things, if I can put it that way.

When it got down to something as serious as going on the Commission he did not give the President an answer right away. In other words, he raised with the President, according to what he told me, because he called me the very day he got back from wherever he was up in New York and had received a call from
the President, and he recounted to me the fact that he had raised all these conflicts, possible conflicts, in the public eye if he took that job.

We kicked that around as to the pros and cons. I knew he wanted the job. Like anyone in retirement this was a challenge to him and so on. But I think by way of character there would be no loyalties to the Agency or anybody else superseding his mandate from the President.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me who you a document that corresponds with JFK Exhibit F-529 at the Committee's final hearings. This document actually is one that we reviewed that was the basis for the question that I just asked you. I would ask you to skim two paragraphs. Read the third one and the fourth a bit more carefully and then we will talk about it.

Mr. Angleton. I don't think that necessarily changes anything that I said. What I am trying to say is that I am certain if he believed that this was a proper course on it and the doubts on Nosenko were expressed, whether it was the Bureau talking to him or anybody else talking to him, that he would still be persuaded by the facts, not by the fact that it was the Agency.

Mr. Goldsmith. The third paragraph there simply suggests the possibility that Mr. Dulles was attempting to represent the interest of the Agency and the Committee was concerned with (a), whether that was more than just a possibility,
whether it was a fact, and (b), to what extent that was prevalent?

Mr. Angleton. I will say this. If there was anything in that memorandum that he regarded as being detrimental to the Commission's work, my view is that there would have been an explosion and he would have exploded.

Mr. Goldsmith. By that you mean then that he would be giving priority to the work of the Commission rather than to the Agency?

Mr. Angleton. And I think in there he is giving priority to the Commission. Whatever briefing he received -- I was unaware of the meeting that is being referred to here but I am just saying that he was obviously persuaded, if there were these doubts on the Nosenko thing, that this thing, the controversy as to bonificides, that it would -- I mean, it was one of those kinds of things that would be detrimental to a finding of the Commission.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to have that marked as Angleton Exhibit Number 1.

(The above referred to document was marked Angleton Exhibit Number 1 and follows)
Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Mr. Dulles had any special arrangement with Mr. Helms?

Mr. Angleton. No. I was never present with both of them together. I don't know the content of any of their meetings so far as I can recall.

Mr. Goldsmith. What role did the Mexico City station have in the Agency's investigative effort?

Mr. Angleton. It had a very important role for two reasons. One, Win Scott was the Chief of the Mission down there, was perhaps one of the more capable officers we had. He had been in the FBI. He was a very highly intelligent man. He had assets, to wit, the overage, sources. If you had to grade stations across the board in terms of different kinds of coverage or assets or agents or whatnot, I would give him a very high batting average. He was a real professional.

Further, he had an excellent relationship with the FBI which had a huge station down there, and I would say a lesser man would not have been on speaking terms with them because they had once owned the Western Hemisphere in terms of jurisdiction and it was with some reluctance, so to speak, that they transferred it to CIA. So he was highly regarded by the FBI people. That was by force of his own personality.

Mr. Goldsmith. The Mexico City Station had a major role?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. I take it one reason is because Oswald
had visited Mexico City?

Mr. Angleton. That is right.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you review the cable traffic that flowed when the Mexico City station and headquarters after the assassination?

Mr. Angleton. I saw a lot of jumbled messages. I saw an awful lot of messages that always seemed to be contentious and that is the only way I can describe them.

Mr. Goldsmith. Contentious in what way?

Mr. Angleton. In the sense of headquarters saying certain things to Mexico and coming back and overlapping. I never was able to sort out, I don't know that I saw all the cables but there seemed to have been a lot of confusion.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me see if I can summarize that accurately. You saw a lot of cables. You did not see all of them, is that correct?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know if I saw all of them. There was no reason why I should see all of them because I think on some occasions Win would telephone directly or the station would telephone him directly.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would Mr. Rocca have reviewed all the cable and dispatch traffic between the Mexico City station and headquarters?

Mr. Angleton. If they sent it to him, yes, if we were on the dissemination.
Mr. Goldsmith. I take it after Mr. Helms' order that the CI Staff would have been on the dissemination.

Mr. Angleton. We probably would have been. You see, every station chief had the privilege of what is called "eyes on cable" in different categories of dissemination that cable people only follow what the code word is. They don't know about Mr. Helms' order in that sense.

Mr. Goldsmith. You indicated that the cables were contentious. Was there any conflict apparent in those cables between Mexico City station and headquarters?

Mr. Angleton. When I use the word contentious it may be overdoing it but I can remember somebody saying, "have you done this or that?" Or demanding that you send it up here or something. I can't give you details. All I meant is that Win was usually the tidiest of men. In other words, he always had a big fat In box but he never left, regardless of an appointment or anybody else, until he finished his day's work. He was a prodigious worker.

So, what I am trying to say is that having been down there and seeing him function at one time when there was some problem with the Bureau and all that, I had the highest regard for the way he ran his outfit.

Mr. Goldsmith. How common was it for Scott or anyone else in the Mexico City station during the aftermath of the assassination to communicate with headquarters personnel
telephonically?

Mr. Angleton. It was very rare.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever communicate with them tele-
phonically relative to the assassination?

Mr. Angleton. I don’t think so, no. I mean, I wouldn’t
have the right to.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Mexico City station have any
surveillance operations in effect in 1963 against Soviet and
Cuban Embassies and Consulates?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was information regarding Oswald obtained
as a result of these operations?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what information was obtained?

Mr. Angleton. Unless I saw the cables I could not tell
you precisely what was obtained. I know that there was infor-
mation about his going into the Soviet Embassy. In other
words, there was both telephonic and other surveillance of some
sort.

Mr. Goldsmith. Photographic?

Mr. Angleton. Photographic surveillance.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether this information was
given to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. I think the substance of everything was
given to the Warren Commission.
Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the Warren Commission was told about the specific surveillance operation?

Mr. Angleton. I don't really know whether they were in the end. The reason I say that is because I can remember a question about whether to black out the background behind the face or something so that it could not be identified in terms of location.

Mr. Goldsmith. Your answer is that you do not know whether or not the Warren Commission was told specifically about the surveillance operation?

Mr. Angleton. No. My feeling is that they must have been told in the sense -- I mean, it stands to reason that they would be pressuring, the attorneys would be pressuring, to know more and more about the coverage and all that.

Mr. Goldsmith. We have made reference now to a photograph. Why don't we start examining some of the cable traffic that is available to me. I am going to be making reference to documents by their numbers. The numbers have been assigned to the documents by the Agency. Essentially the Agency has assigned the numbers for security purposes so that every document that is given to the Committee can be accounted for. For convenience purposes I have taken those security numbers and I use the for reference purposes in this deposition.

At this time we are going to refer to CIA document number 177, which is a cable dated 9 October 1963. The 177 appears
at the bottom right. I would ask you to read that particular cable.

Now, the second paragraph of that cable makes reference to photograph and it gives as description of someone. The description, however, does not correspond to Lee Harvey Oswald. Do you have any information concerning the discrepancy between Oswald and the description given of him in that second paragraph?

Mr. Angleton. No, it does not mean anything to me.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Agency ever able to learn the identity of the individual to whom reference is made in the second paragraph?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know when the Warren Commission was told about these photographs to which reference is made in the second paragraph?

Mr. Angleton. No. I mean, I don't know when.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think that they were told about the picture but you don't know when?

Mr. Angleton. I heard much about the picture but I still don't have a coherent picture of the picture.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me show you CIA Number 2139. This is a memo dated 5 March 1964 for the attention of Richard Helms. Raymond Rocca is the author of the memo.

Mr. Angleton. Who gave it this title?
Mr. Goldsmith. Pardon me?

Mr. Angleton. Who gave it this title?

Mr. Goldsmith. I don't know who gave it the title. That is a xerox copy of the document in the form that we found it to be in the Oswald file.

Mr. Angleton. Where is the reference to --

Mr. Goldsmith. I am sorry.

Mr. Angleton. Where is the reference? Where is Rankin's letter which has been referred to?

Mr. Goldsmith. I will make that letter available to you.

Mr. Angleton. I can't get it in the context.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me ask you this question which I do not feel requires reference to that letter.

The second paragraph clearly makes reference to those photographs?

Mr. Angleton. Let me finish this because I only got this far.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am only going to ask you a question about the second paragraph.

Mr. Angleton. It starts off here, paragraph two of the letter, this says "this is in response to paragraph three of this letter."

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. We will make the letter available if you feel you have a need to see it.

Mr. Angleton. Yes sir.
Mr. Goldsmith. Now, the second paragraph of that memo makes reference to the photographs that were the subject of the controversy. According to the second paragraph there was apparently an inclination on your part to "wait out the Commission" with regard to its request for these photographs.

Mr. Angleton. Does it say that?

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me read the relevant sentence to you.

Mr. Angleton. I don't read it that way. I don't see what it means, wait out what? I have to see what Rankin --

Mr. Goldsmith. Otherwise it refers to "Jim would prefer to wait out the matter covered in paragraph two of that letter.

Mr. Angleton. Which I don't know anything about.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that. I will show you the letter. Later on in the same paragraph it says "We have either passed in substance to the Commission in response earlier levies for the items referred to, reported leads. For example the famous six photographs which were not of Oswald."

I am asking you, in reference to these six photographs which were not of Oswald, was there any inclination on your part not to provide those materials to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. I really can't answer you until I see what paragraph two means. I don't even know whether paragraph two refers to the photographs because here it says "We have either passed material in substance to the Commission", which I assume is what I am referring to, in other words. what I am saying
is that whatever I am objecting to seems to have already been
passed in substance.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. I won't quarrel with that. I won't
quarrel with you at all. It does say that it was passed in
substance. Perhaps the best thing to do would be to get the
Rankin letter for you to review and then we will come back
to this point later on.

Mr. Angleton. All right.

Mr. Goldsmith. At the time of Oswald's contact with the
Embassies in Mexico City, was that contact considered to be
significant and important in any way by the Mexico City
station?

Mr. Angleton. I think all contacts were.

Mr. Goldsmith. All contacts with whom?

Mr. Angleton. Americans.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever talk to Win Scott about
Oswald's trip to Mexico City?

Mr. Angleton. No, not to my knowledge.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please review CIA number 179 which is a
cable dated 10 October 1963. It is three pages. Now, this
cable contains a correct description of Oswald in the first
paragraph. Do you know what the source of that correct
description would have been?

Mr. Angleton. It looks like it might have been Navy or
the Bureau.
Mr. Goldsmith. Would that information have been obtained from his 201 file, do you think?

Mr. Angleton. I would assume so. Wait just one minute. Let me see what the dissemination was on this. This wasn't to Egeter. She worked for me. CIA liaison Roman in draft. Does that mean that she was acting as Liaison? So they had a role?

Mr. Goldsmith. Would they have had access to the 201 file?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, but they would have access to the 201 file but the originator here is a fellow from WH Division, Bustov.

Mr. Goldsmith. Charlotte Bustoff?

Mr. Angleton. Charlotte.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you know her?

Mr. Angleton. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. The first paragraph also makes reference to Oswald by the name "Lee Henry Oswald". That has become somewhat subject of controversy by the Warren Commission critics. Do you know how the Agency ever started to refer to Oswald by an incorrect middle name?

Mr. Angleton. I would like to -- when I look at this, this is obviously a -- the memo starts getting down here to birth date and all that. It looks like passport information. Therefore, I assume that is either State or Navy. I mean,
somebody who had a record on him.

Mr. Goldsmith. The next paragraph makes reference to background information concerning Oswald's defection. Would that have escalated the significance of his contacts with the Soviets in Mexico City, in your opinion?

Mr. Angleton. Let me see that again. I think that would be a solid trace. In other words, it would be from Scott's point of view a matter of considerable interest.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why is that?

Mr. Angleton. Because it does not read like a lot of third hand information. It looks like it is pretty solid information. It is not a lot of allegations and so on.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why would Scott be concerned about the fact that Oswald was a defector? I guess I am asking you to state the obvious.

Mr. Angleton. He had been in counterintelligence all his life and he had handled an awful lot of Soviet cases.

Mr. Goldsmith. The last sentence of paragraph five indicates "Please keep headquarters advised of any further contacts or positive identification of Oswald."

Assuming that the Mexico City station, prior to the assassination, knew that Oswald had also contacted the Cuban Embassy, should that information have been communicated to headquarters and by using the words or the phrase "assuming that Mexico City station knew", I mean actual knowledge, they
had linked the contact of an individual with the Cuban
Embassy, specifically Oswald, should that information have
been communicated to headquarters?

Mr. Angleton. You mean if they thought the same indi-

dividual here had been in touch with the Cubans?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Angleton. Sure.

Mr. Goldsmith. I note at the bottom left hand corner
of the document that Thomas Karamessines was the releasing
officer. Why would someone as high up in DDO as Karamessines
have been the releasing officer for a cable of this kind?

Mr. Angleton. I think that the reason for that would be
that when you have more than one division involved plus a
staff and all that, he probably wanted to have his finger on
it.

Mr. Goldsmith. What other division besides DDO was
involved here?

Mr. Angleton. SR Division. Since the fellow was from
Russia and all that Russian background it would be involved.

Mr. Goldsmith. We have Western Hemisphere units con-
cerned and also Soviet Russian units concerned?

Mr. Angleton. That is right.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the Mexico City sta-
tion ever obtained a tape recording of Oswald's voice?

Mr. Angleton. I would assume so but I don't know. I
assume they did when they talked about that previous information you showed me. Wait a minute. Let me recapitulate:

"According to so and so American spoke broken Russian and said his name was so and so." It was obviously a tape.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know if there were any tape recordings of Oswald's voice in existence at the time of the assassination?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to show you a letter dated November 23, 1963 which I regret is not in very good form, in other words, a poor xerox. The letter is from Mr. Hoover to the head of the Secret Service. I am only going to ask you to read one paragraph in it--starting at the bottom of page four, going on to page five. If you have difficulty reading this, I will be glad to read it to you.

Mr. Angleton. This is from whom to whom?

Mr. Goldsmith. This is from Mr. Hoover to Mr. Rowley of the Secret Service.

Mr. Angleton. I can't read it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me read it then and I apologize for the poor form.

"The Central Intelligence Agency advised that on October 1, 1963, an extremely sensitive source has reported that an individual identified himself as Lee Oswald contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City."
Then it is sanitized. The next relevant sections are as follows: Special agents of this Bureau who have conversed with us from Dallas, Texas, have observed photographs of the individual referred to above and have listened to a recording of his voice. These special agents are of the opinion that the above referred to individual was not Lee Harvey Oswald."

In other words, the substance of this paragraph suggests that there was a tape recording that was listened to after the assassination by FBI agents. The recording purported to contain Oswald's voice but the agents were of the opinion that it was not Oswald's voice. Do you have any information concerning this issue?

Mr. Angleton. No. Does that indicate whose tape it is?

Mr. Goldsmith. It does not. The inference is that it is a CIA tape. Frankly, this is a sanitized document.

Mr. Angleton. I wondered if the Bureau had a tape.

Mr. Goldsmith. The inference here is that at the time the Bureau was in possession of the tape.

Did the CIA's Mexico City station ever obtain a photograph of Oswald as a result of its photo-surveillance operation against the Soviet and Cuban Consulates?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think that they should have obtained a photograph of Oswald in light of the scope of the coverage?
Mr. Angleton. I don't know how good the coverage was.

In other words, I don't know -- in those days cameras were not what they are today, I mean in germs of automated or the type that takes one very minute. I don't know what it was set to.

Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, you have no personal knowledge of this?

Mr. Angleton. No. I don't know whether this is a movie or still.

Mr. Goldsmith. You made reference earlier to Win Scott whom I take it you regarded as an extremely competent individual?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was Win Scott well known for maintaining an extremely thorough record system?

Mr. Angleton. He was. He was always fighting the administration part of the Agency, who always wanted to reduce the files or burn stuff and so on.

Mr. Goldsmith. The administration people wanted to burn files and he was inclined to keep them?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know where his files are stored?

Mr. Angleton. He had a big office.

Mr. Goldsmith. In Mexico City?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.
Mr. Goldsmith. Did Win Scott also maintain materials in a personal safe?

Mr. Angleton. I am certain that he did.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know where that safe was?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know but I know it would certainly be under his eye and it would be in his office, I would assume.

Mr. Goldsmith. After Win Scott's death did you ever visit Mexico City for the purpose of removing materials from Win Scott's safe?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, I visited there but not for the purpose of removing stuff from the safe.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was the general purpose of the visit?

Mr. Angleton. Well, number one, I was appointed as an official by Dick to go down there to the funeral. Number two, Win was going to write a book, a manuscript. My purpose was to go down and get all copies of the manuscript.

Since I was a close friend of his and I knew his wife and all that, I combined both things and talked to her and explained our position on it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were you able to obtain this manuscript?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you have occasion to review it at all?

Mr. Angleton. I looked through it. He made more than one draft.
Mr. Goldsmith. What was the general purpose of the manuscript, to give an account of his experience with the Agency?

Mr. Angleton. Well, it was sort of a last will and testament of an operator in which a lot of it was camouflaged and romanticized into a story. It had a plot and all that. Wilson had written under a pseudonym some seven stories of his youth in Alabama which were sort of Mark Twainish. He had it privately printed.

It was an extremely good book. I think that he was trying to write a mystery novel but at the same time he was making a lot of observations about the world of espionage and me in particular.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was this particular manuscript ever published?

Mr. Angleton. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was it intended to be a fictional or nonfictional account?

Mr. Angleton. Both. I mean, it was fictional but it was recognizable. I mean, anyone who was in the business would have recognized a great deal in it.

Mr. Goldsmith. How did the Agency know that Scott was writing that manuscript?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I know that his wife, as I recall, his wife didn't know he was writing. I don't know precisely how we found out, whether he told us or how it came.
to us. I knew at one time but it slips my mind precisely how we knew.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you obtain any materials other than this manuscript?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I can't remember. I know I got an awful lot of material which I turned over to the Chief of Mission down there to dispatch back through the pouch.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall how long the manuscript was? How many pages?

Mr. Angleton. It was sort of thickish, about that thick. (Indicating). I can't tell how many drafts there were. Apparently it was far from being finished. It was well on --

Mr. Goldsmith. Did he ever discuss it with you?

Mr. Angleton. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why don't we take a brief recess now or perhaps Miss Brady will resume questions. I will review some materials that have been provided to me by the Agency. I might add that so far as I am concerned, we are in pretty good shape in terms of time.

Miss Brady. Did you have any contact with Bernard Barker, Howard Hunt or Eugenio Martinez during your CIA career?

Mr. Angleton. Who was the first one?

Miss Brady. Benard Barker.

Mr. Angleton. None of them.
Miss Brady. At any time?

Mr. Angleton. No. I want to explain the Hunt business. One of the things that this Joe Trento, the reporter, gave out that he learned from this Committee, he put it that he learned from the Committee that they had a memorandum between myself and Dick Helms to the effect that I wrote a memo to Dick saying that Howard Hunt was in Dallas at the time of the assassination and I was suggesting or proposing a cover-up.

Miss Brady. To whom?

Mr. Angleton. To Helms. Now, when I was called before the Watergate Committee I was challenged about such and such in the Executive Office Building. I didn't even know what they were talking about. I determined that that is where all the Watergate people were hanging about, Hunt.

I kept getting all these threatening telephone calls from Seymour Hirsch of the New York Times and all of that. I couldn't honestly understand what they were talking about until the whole Hunt thing hit the fan and they arrested Hunt and so on.

Then a journalist came to me and told me that there was in inspector Bast, he called himself Inspector Bast, who is supposed to be a well to do man, a lawyer of some sort, a private investigator in McLean, and he had invited Colson to his swimming pool and that he had a hidden microphone in the shrubbery and that Colson told him that Angleton had recruited
Hunt and was running Hunt in the White House as his agent and 
that Hunt reported to Angleton daily.

East was reported to have this tape recording which he 
made known to this journalist. The journalist was going to 
print all of this.

Miss Brady. When was this? During the Watergate period?

Mr. Angleton. Sometime maybe a little after or during.

So I laughed at this fellow and told him, I said "That is just 
about as crazy as anything I have ever heard." I said, "If 
you pursue that", I told him, "YOU will be exposed on this.
I never met Howard Hunt in my life."

He was arrested on a Friday or Saturday. The first work- 
day I asked the Office of Security to supply me with eight 
by ten photos of his security badges. In our organization 
you go to hundreds of meetings without knowing all the people.
It is part of the compartmentation, if you would like. There-
fore, I had to be doubly sure because the newspaper picture of 
Hunt was about this big and you couldn't get any features out 
of it.

So, when they showed me the photographs, I had never 
seen Hunt in my life.

The curious thing here, and I never explained it to the 
press or anybody, is the fact that my Deputy's name is Jim 
Hunt and I just let them go along, since they started the myth, 
let them live with it. But Jim Hunt being retired and playing
golf, I saw no reason to give an explanation and ruin the 19th
hole so to speak.

So, when Trento called me at the Army-navy Club, one of
the things he also said to me at that time was, "Has Hunt
been in touch with you?" Again he is on that same Colson-Bast,
et cetera, route as the others.

Miss Brady. So it is fair to say, apart from whatever
was made known publicly about the Watergate incident, you had
no independent knowledge of Hunt's activities with the Agency?

Mr. Angleton. No. Later when he was picked up, yes, I
called for his file and read his file. I might also add that
I feel quite honestly that the man has suffered a great deal,
I mean a very great deal, the death of his wife and all the
things he went through and tragedies and trying to put his
life back to gather again with all these character assassins
still running after him. He paid his price. So I am a little
sympathetic with the fellow without even knowing him.

Miss Brady. Was there ever really any Agency document
about Hunt's whereabouts on November 22, 1963?

Mr. Angleton. I don't remember any such thing. As I
said, Hunt didn't mean a thing to me until after the Watergate.

Miss Brady. Do you have any knowledge of the pre-Bay of
Pigs operation called "Operation 40?"

Mr. Angleton. By that name? What is it about?

Miss Brady. Another one of the anti-Castro groups
involving some of the anti-Castro groups down in the Miami area.

Mr. Angleton. No.

Miss Brady. Targets and operations against Cuba, you had no knowledge of that?

Mr. Angleton. I may have at some time or another but you have to keep in mind that the Counterintelligence Staff was not involved, that the Special Group on Cuba had its own liaison with the FBI and their own counterintelligence. In other words, I loaned them or gave them one man in particular whom I know who was fluent in Spanish, and he ceased to be a member of my, I mean, he was taken off my rolls and transferred to them.

He was one of the principal counterintelligence people. Then later on, when Harvey was running it, he had another one of my men, but they were severed from the CI Staff and integrated within that.

In other words, they allegedly had their own counterintelligence capability built into the Task Force.

Miss Brady. What is the extent, if we can call if, of domestic counterintelligence in Miami and New Orleans during the early sixties?

Mr. Angleton. Domestic counterintelligence in New Orleans and Miami? Are you talking about the Domestic Branch? We had what is called Domestic Operations which was on the overt
side of the house.

Miss Brady. I am asking more in particular if there were any covert activities that you were aware of?

Mr. Angleton. No. The only people who had that capability would be the Office of Security which had I think people under cover.

Miss Brady. So if there were domestic operations you are saying the Office of Security would have been in charge of them?

Mr. Angleton. They would not have run operations there. They had people under cover for investigative purposes, personnel and security checks. I mean applicants, field security checking.

Miss Brady. Was either Counterintelligence or the Office of Security aware of Castro G-2 operatives in the Miami area? Have they been identified?

Mr. Angleton. What period are we talking about?

Miss Brady. The early sixties again.

Mr. Angleton. That would have been the jurisdiction of the code name J.M. WAVE outfit who had direct liaison with the Miami field office of the FBI.

Miss Brady. Was J. M. WAVE a separate component or was it run out of another office?

Mr. Angleton. I think J. M. WAVE was the code name on communications for that entire task force based in Miami.
Miss Brady. Did you at any time have any knowledge of any contact by Oswald with the Cuban G-2 in either New Orleans or Miami?

Mr. Angleton. None.

Miss Brady. Now you mentioned a Domestic Intelligence Office, is that how you phrased it?

Mr. Angleton. Yes. It had different names. It was once called "00". I can't remember what that means. Anyway, it was a collection part of the Directorate of Intelligence, which means that it was not a part of the Clandestine Services but of the Deputy for Intelligence.

It was a domestic so that it did not work clandestinely. Its offices were in the telephone directory of the major cities where they were located and its basic thing was to interview Americans who had been behind the Curtain. It was a vacuum cleaner so to speak of every kind of human being they had the manpower to interview, and they did some very good work.
Mr. Goldsmith. We were discussing the manuscript that you obtained from Winn Scott's residence in Mexico City shortly after his death. Do you recall whether Winn Scott's pen name was Ian Maxwell?

Mr. Angleton. How do you spell the first name?

Mr. Goldsmith. I-a-n.

Mr. Angleton. I think it was, at least from the books that he published.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you read through that manuscript in its entirety?

Mr. Angleton. I read it in its entirety but my problem is that there was more than one draft, but I read it pretty thoroughly at one stage.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall if it contained a chapter which discussed Lee Harvey Oswald's visit to Mexico City?

Mr. Angleton. No, I don't recall that. In fact I didn't know there was a chapter on it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me show you what we have obtained from the Agency by virtue of a committee request for materials that were obtained from Mr. Scott's safe or residence after his death. This is a chapter from a manuscript.

It is fairly long.

Mr. Angleton. Is it a part of the book?

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, I only have one chapter here. It says Chapter 24 from a draft manuscript of "The Foul Foe," a
book which purports to be an account of the writer's career in intelligence. I have no way of knowing one way or another whether this was included in the material that you actually read. But I would like to ask you to review those materials now. For the record the CIA number starts with 11112364 and it ends at 11112371. Please take five or ten minutes to read through that.

Mr. Angleton. This as far as I know I have never seen. I don't recall seeing this.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it possible that this was among the materials that you obtained but simply that you did not review it at that time?

Mr. Angleton. You see, the copies that I saw were before the Xerox. They were what you call thermofaxes. Has this been retyped from something?

Mr. Goldsmith. This is not the original or anything. Maybe Mr. Berk can shed some light.

Mr. Berk. It was contained in the files. There were other copies of this manuscript in somewhat edited versions. This seems to be the final form.

Mr. Angleton. Were the documents in the files thermofaxed?

Mr. Berk. I am not versed in the distinction between thermofax and Xerox.

Mr. Angleton. Thermofax is a special kind of paper, very dark.
Mr. Berk. No, it was not thermofax.

Mr. Angleton. It is a heat treatment thing so that unless you are using the original you have a very poor copy and it is very hard to make a thermofax from a thermofax.

Mr. Berk. The paper itself is dark?

Mr. Angleton. Yes. I mean it is dark by having gone through the heat process, you don't get a sharp black and white.

Mr. Berk. It did not seem to be that type.

Mr. Angleton. I picked up an awful lot of materials there.

The thing comes back to me that I also arranged for the Chief of Mission to be able to see Mrs. Scott after-wards and she said she would cooperate a hundred percent.

Mr. Goldsmith. This particular chapter I asked you to read discusses Oswald's Mexico City trip; is that correct?

Mr. Angleton. This is not the style of the manuscript.

Mr. Goldsmith. The manuscript you reviewed?

Mr. Angleton. It is not in his style because he was writing a more novel type of style.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that and I really don't intend to dwell upon that manuscript since that is different from what I have apparently shown you today.

Mr. Angleton. Although the title there must be the same one that he had on the manuscript. Would you read that title again?

Mr. Duncan. "The Foul Foe."
Mr. Angleton. That rings a bell as being the title of the book.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me tell you that the committee has every intention of reviewing this in more detail. This was just made available to us very recently. In any event the chapter that you just read discusses Oswald's trip to Mexico City, is that correct?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does it appear to you, based upon your knowledge of the case, to be an accurate reflection of the events that took place in Mexico City when Oswald visited there in 1963?

Mr. Angleton. I can't say that I necessarily have the same picture from reading all that. My memory of headquarters, it reads very much like Scott in terms of the actions that he took and his feelings.

Mr. Goldsmith. This then does not strike you as a fictional account?

Mr. Angleton. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. When Mrs. Scott gave these materials to you to bring back to the Agency or for you to arrange for the material to be sent back to the Agency did she in effect make those materials a gift to the Agency? Was she giving them all to the Agency?

Mr. Angleton. As I remember it there was no dispute.
When I went down there, one, I did not know her mood. In other words, Win had retired and he was working I think for some international investigative agency which had originally been set up by a former employee named Al "Immer who lived in London and now lives in Geneva. I think Win, who was a very powerful man in Mexico, got a number of his Mexican friends to invest in it and I think it failed, went bankrupt. So I didn't know what the state of mind of the wife was going to be in terms of certain bitterness that Win did feel.

I went down there very open-minded as to what might happen. I was disturbed because, as I recall, we only had Xeroxes or these thermofaxes and there was the whole question of being able to get all the copies and all that type of thing and whether he had sent them out to publishers and so on. So, I was a little apprehensive about her greeting. When I went to see her, her first words were "Why did it take so long?" So to speak. When I took her in the side room and said "I had an unpleasant task" -- I put it very clearly -- "there are some papers. If these are published this violates Win's oath. We want to recover all of them," there was absolutely no opposition. She said, "You can have everything." Whoever was the Chief of Mission was with me and so it was arranged that he would follow up and pick up all the stuff.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was at that time a man named John Horton?
Mr. Angleton. That is correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you familiar with the cryptonym A.M.MUG?

Mr. Angleton. No, I mean not with that -- A.M.?

Mr. Goldsmith. MUG, a Cuban defector.

Mr. Angleton. It does not mean anything in that way. The "M" as I recall was Cuban, "A.M." or Cuban operations.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you remember a Cuban defector in 1964 providing information to the Agency about Oswald's contacts with CBI, Cuban Intelligence?

Mr. Angleton. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let us go back to this particular document at this point. I call your attention to paragraph two of this letter.

Mr. Angleton. I am trying to get the date.

Mr. Goldsmith. This is 5 March 1964 and that is 12 February 1964.

Mr. Angleton. Tom Karamessines' address was Acting Director which meant that Dick Helms was away.

Mr. Goldsmith. To Odum of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

"In order to complete the records of the Commission regarding this matter the Commission would like to be informed of the circumstances surrounding the obtaining of this picture by your Agency and the identity of the individual shown if
this information is currently available. Thank you for your assistance.

Mr. Angleton. Read that once more.

Mr. Goldsmith. "In order to complete the record of the Commission regarding this matter the Commission would like to be informed of the circumstances surrounding the obtaining of this picture by your Agency and the identity of the individual shown if this information is currently available."

Now I would refer to the second paragraph of Document Number 2139 where you indicate that the Commission has received the substance of their request but in effect I think you are suggesting that the Agency wait out giving the Commission the specifics.

Mr. Angleton. My only concern would have been the elaboration of surveillance and telephonic surveillance, letting that be known.

I want to make one observation. People say, well, the Soviets always know that you photograph them or they always know that their lines are tapped. There have been too many times in history that an unknown, either an American Army officer or somebody else that doesn't know, that makes the slip. Those are all provable cases of where even though the Soviets know -- I can remember one case, an emergency situation with one of our agents in Paris on the run, getting to Rome and telephoning the embassy that he is in trouble, et cetera --
even though they know they try to shut him up but it is too late. That type of thing.

Therefore with all the past experience the idea that even though they knew that, this thing would get further, would have complicated things for the Mexican Government because Win's relationships with the Mexican Government were at the top, with the President. Therefore the repercussions would have been far more than just simply losing the operation.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you familiar with the name Louisa Calderon?

Mr. Angleton. I have heard but I can't place it?

Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to a completely different area at this time, on what basis would the CIA staff has occasion to open a 201 file on an individual? I am referring now to the time period 1959 to 1960.

Mr. Angleton. We opened up many files.

Mr. Goldsmith. In other words, what would the criteria have been for opening a 201 file? I am speaking now with reference specifically to the CIA staff?

Mr. Angleton. It would be anyone who was suspect or who has contacts with the Soviets, I mean with the bloc or with an espionage net, regardless of how remote.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me show you CIA document Number 796. This is a Department of State telegram dated October 31, 1959. Let me read it to you.
Mr. Angleton. Let me look at some of the address that.

Mr. Goldsmith. CI is listed on the side. I might add we obtained it from the CI files. It reads, "Lee Harvey Oswald, unmarried, age 26, passport issued September 19, 1959, appeared at the embassy today to renounce American citizenship. Stated applied in Moscow for Soviet citizenship following entry U.S.S.R. from Helsinki October 15. Mother's address and his last address. U.S., 4926 Commonwood Street, Ft. Worth, Texas. Says action contemplated last two years. Main reason 'I am a Marxist.' Attitude arrogant, aggressive. Recently discharged Marine Corps. Says has offered Soviet any information he has acquired as an enlisted radar operator. In view Petrulli case we propose delay executing renunciation until Soviet action known and Department advises. Dispatch follows. Press informed."

Mr. Angleton. In view of what?

Mr. Goldsmith. In view of Petrulli case. My question is whether the information contained in that telegram would normally lead to the opening of a 201 file?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. I take it essentially because it suggests that Oswald was a counterintelligence threat?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.
Mr. Angleton. No. The rule was that if they had likely prospects of somebody going from any American company that they might contact him to pick up something but they didn't have a budget for payment. They didn't have the rites of security oaths, all of that. In other words, if it was to become operational or sensitive in any way then they would have to pass it through the Clandestine Services who might or probably wouldn't even consider it seriously.

Miss Brady. Returning again to the Soviet, do you know what investigation was done to test Nosenko's allegations about Oswald?

Mr. Angleton. I think it was simply a question of interrogation and reinterrogation and how many files did he read and trying to press him on detail, detail, detail. I know there were some conflicts because at one stage when the Warren Commission was going to ask the Soviet Government for, I mean to request the Soviet Government for information regarding Oswald here he stayed there, that we composed a very detailed questionnaire that the State Department turned down on diplomatic ground that it would disturb the water.

Miss Brady. A questionnaire for the Soviet Government?

Mr. Angleton. Yes. Then I know that we had questionnaires that we prepared for the Office of Security to use in their polygraphing, which they did not use. In other words,
there were a lot of things that in our view were testings and that type of thing which were not employed.

Miss Brady. Did the CIA examine the documents turned over by the Soviet Government about Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union?

Mr. Angleton. I am certain of that. I know I saw them.

Miss Brady. Do you know whether any assessment was drawn as to whether or not they were authentic?

Mr. Angleton. I am just remembering my own reaction was that it was a lot of puffery. It was just filling space with stuff of no consequence.

Miss Brady. Were any of the people in the Agency who work in the area of foreign documents or Russian language asked to make any intensive analysis of those documents?

Mr. Angleton. I am certain that that was done.

Miss Brady. Do you believe that reports exist on that kind of thing from those evaluations?

Mr. Angleton. There should be. Whether they went to the Agency on that or whether the recipients, the Warren Commission -- how they handled that I don't know. All I can say is that if we had the originals it would be almost automatic for that to go to what we call our "TSD" and have them examine everything from the point of view of the typewriters and so on, if there was on the surface something to be gained by it, if there were stamps or certifications or whatever. Also, just from a technical point of view they would be interested in the
quality of paper because one of their jobs was to make paper look like Russian paper.

Miss Brady. I know that many of the documents contain names of Russian officials who either had occasion to see Oswald or work with him. Would there have been traces or followups on those individuals?

Mr. Angleton. I am certain of that. That would be the normal job for the Office of Security — I am sorry, I will correct that — for the Soviet Division.

Miss Brady. Did the CIA have any independent knowledge of the Minsk radio factory where Oswald worked?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know.

Miss Brady. Was it normal for some type of evaluation of installations like that in the Soviet bloc countries to be maintained?

Mr. Angleton. I think that in those days any information on any Soviet factory regardless would be maintained. That would be again where the "OO" or the Domestic Intelligence people produce volumes of material on that because they would interrogate so many American businessmen who had different kinds of jobs and so on. It was really a very productive inexpensive operation.

Miss Brady. What investigation to your knowledge was conducted about Marina Oswald?

Mr. Angleton. I think she was checked out against all the
files and records and relatives or whatever she gave on her application. All that type of thing would be automatic.

Miss Brady. Did we have some way of verifying or checking if, for example, she gave the name of the uncle she lived with? Did we have resources to do that?

Mr. Angleton. No. All I would say is that if somebody found in the 00 or in the computers that some traveller had lived in Minsk or had this or that, it is conceivable that there might have been a request levied on 00 to see their contact.

Miss Brady. Given the lack of resources to go into those kinds of areas about Marina Oswald, do you have any opinion about how thorough that part of the Warren Commission's investigation was or are there still remaining questions as far as you are concerned about Marina Oswald?

Mr. Angleton. My only concern I think is the concern of everybody. It is the facility with which she was able to leave the Soviet Union. I have known one case where a man, an American was recruited by the Soviet intelligence in order to get his wife out, a prominent man. He lived and died before we discovered that he was a Soviet agent.

Miss Brady. He did return to the United States with his bride?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know -- I think he got her out as a result of making a deal.

Miss Brady. How close was that in time to Oswald's
stay in the Soviet Union?

Mr. Angleton. It was a long time ago. In other words, this is the whole history of "soviet espionage making use of hostages, people in the immediate family as a way of control and as a leverage over agents. In other words, agents who were ideologically opposed to them, yet they operated very effectively for them by virtue of hostages in the family, and even some famous agents who did high grade work for KGB did it only by virtue of the hostage situation.

Miss Brady. Returning now to Golitzen, did you have any knowledge during the initial briefing of Golitzen about a story or allegation about him that the KGB had a plot in existence prior to the 1960 election to assassinate Nixon if he were elected?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I heard this before. I don't think that is the way, to my memory, the way he put it. That is again the trouble I find with the Hart testimony, the inaccuracies of making those kinds of statements, whether he said this as a positive fact. What he did say was that through the reorientation of the KGB as a part of the de-Stalinization of the KGB, of bringing it in as an integral part of the government, because under Stalin the KGB had deteriorated to an instrument of personal terror to preserve Stalin's cult of personality, in other words, to advance Stalin but not necessarily to advance the Soviet or the Communist
Government as such across the board, that is the reason he had chiefs and executed them, chiefs and executed them, and so on; so part of the de-Stalinization was to raise the KGB -- and it took several years, six years, before this was culminated -- to where it was restored to the same role it had under Lenin, namely as a integral part of Soviet policy and as a part of a full-fledged member of the Soviet community, which by implication would mean that every action would have a political objective and would therefore advance the cause of Communist strategy.

In describing all of that it got into the fact that even foreign leaders who stood in the way would be executed. In other words, Department 13's role was in effect to remove obstacles in the West.

Miss Brady. So, your recollection of the story of the allegation is that it was that general and not specifically related to Nixon?

Mr. Angleton. All I am saying is that having talked thousands and thousands of hours with him I don't remember his saying that to me about Nixon. All I am trying to say is that that would have rung a lot of bells. Maybe he did say it. If he did I don't think he ever said it to me because you had to keep in mind that when he first came to the United States he was in the hands of the Soviet Division. Then there were a lot of misunderstandings, and fumbling out between the Division and Golitzen.
Then he left the country and went abroad with his family and broke the ties with the Soviet Division and then eventually there were negotiations by the foreign country he was in and it was finally negotiated that he would be prepared to come back as long as the Counterintelligence took him over from the Soviet Division. So he had tremendous numbers of sessions with the Soviet Division before finally they deteriorated totally.

In other words, there was a tremendous amount of material which had accumulated, transcripts and all of that.

Miss Brady. So, the initial debriefings were conducted by the Soviet Division?

Mr. Angleton. That is right, and also with the participation at times by my men, namely Burch O'Neill and I think a man called Jean Evans. In other words, these two men would get into see him on special questions of a counterintelligence nature, compartmented on certain agent cases and so on.

Miss Brady. Why was a decision made ultimately to turn the Yosenko case over to the Office of Security and roughly when was that decision made?

Mr. Angleton. The Office of Security had a right to defectors in terms of their own needs as being primarily responsible for the personal security and physical security of installations. So they had maintained with the Soviet Division very close relationships in terms of daily visits back and forth on...
Nosenko. It became then a question that the person handling
that in the Soviet Division, Bruce Solie, gradually took the
position that Nosenko was bona fide.

Miss Brady. Is it correct that that was after an early
assessment that he was not bona fide?

Mr. Angleton. That is right. I think the polygraphic
test showed that he wasn't and so on. So that when the Soviet
Division failed in breaking him through hostile interrogation,
and obviously his relationship with all those people had evap-
orated, it was not illogical to let -- I mean if you are
going to have sugar-vinegar -- the Office of Security pick it
up from there and sweeten the situation, particularly because
they believed in him. Then they had a keen interest in arrivin
at all the information he could volunteer and being able to pre
sent cases to him and handle him.

So that is what took place. I didn't give you a date
because I don't recall the date but it was in Hart's testimony.
I don't know whether that date is accurate.

Miss Brady. Is it fair to say at that point that the
Counterintelligence staff was of amind that he was not bona fide?

Mr. Angleton. I will put it this way. To my knowledge I
never have ever stated, in other words, I never took the
position in extremis, a flat statement. If I had had to give
it without any further -- I mean if I just had to stand still
and look at everything, I would have had to say that he was
is-9

a dispatch agent. But again since I have a different philos-
phy of modus operandi, which is to give rope and never inform:
Nosenko that I doubted him, I would have continued to milk him
and milk him. I would never have hired him as a consultant
to the Agency or FRA, giving counterintelligence lessons and
seeing people and personnel and having freedom of movement and
that type of thing. You see, under the National Security Act
of 1974 you have the implementing directives of NSCIDs, National
Security Council Intelligence Directives which control and
govern the interagency relationships.

Under that there is a NSCID specifically on defectors.
For example, it advocates that you must preserve the climate of
defection and so on. It goes on down and charges the
Central Intelligence Agency with the rehabilitation of defec-
tors. Therefore, I would have rehabilitated him but without,
one, giving him any information, I would work him out of his own
material; not give him anything new, I mean anything that
wasn't worked out of his own material. I would continue to
test question him and financially look after him and all of
that, but with nothing to be gained by learning anything about
the Agency.

Now in that same directive there are provisions made for
an inter-agency defector committee so that all components in the
government have a right to use that asset for their own purposes
But the rehabilitation is strictly on the shoulders of the
Director who also is empowered to do certain things with the Attorney General in terms of the status, citizenship, and bills in Congress and so on.

I will put it this way, the FBI was disseminating his reports. I have to backtrack on this. It is very difficult to explain it. When McCone was before the hearings of the Church Committee he made the statement in an interview with Daniel Schorr that the material had not gone to the Warren Commission, or words to that effect, because there were doubts as to the bona fides of Nosenko. But that since then he had been assured by the Agency or had been told by the Agency that the bona fides had been established. When I heard this on television I immediately called the Agency and raised a serious question on how they could make a statement that his bona fides had been established.

There was a lot of waffling on this. They said that had been accepted when Security took over, or words to that effect. So I called Tom Karamessines. I said, "What is your understanding of the status of the man Nosenko?" He said the man's bona fides had not been established. So even in the FBI report information disseminated by him was sourced as information from a KGB, or whoever they might put down there, whose bona fides had not been established.

So that this was a determination hurried up by Colby and company because they had another embarrassment on their hands.
They had one journalist, TV commentator in Moscow, who had
been named Sam Jaffee whose uncle was the famous Hollywood actor
he was a great character actor. Nosenko had accused him, had
made the statement that he was a Soviet agent while he was a TV
man in Moscow, and named his case officer. Jaffee got on
this business and couldn't get jobs and therefore challenged the
Agency as to whether he was bona fide or not. So, Colby sent
him a letter stating that he wasn't a Russian agent, et
cetera.

But the Bureau refused to give him such a letter. He is
still running around. He has been on the Tomorrow Show and a
lot of other things. So he is still in the woodwork.

Miss Brady. The next area I would go into would be the
initiation of the Hart report. I think at this point I am
going to defer again to Micky and then we can arrange our own
time.

Mr. Angleton. Fine. Would you make a note there, that last
questionnaire, to go back again, because I want to make it more
cogent than it remains at this moment.
Miss Brady. What was the general purpose of the CI/STG unit within the CI Staff?

Mr. Angleton. The purpose of it basically was that the Office of Security has jurisdiction, the Director of Security has jurisdiction over the physical installations of the Agency and has sole possession of security files and is responsible for the security clearance of personnel. That is an exclusive jurisdiction.

In any intelligence organization the most sensitive thing is the security file, particularly the CIA. It is a very thorough thing from birth plus everything that every hostile neighbor might have to say about somebody.

Now, I set it up in 1954 for the purpose of, one, that no one in the Counterintelligence, which is part of Clandestine Services, would ever have access to anybody's security file. I chose an individual who had been ex-FBI and who had worked in the Office of Security as the man to run that component. So that I never had access to the security files nor did anybody else.

But in the event that there was an allegation about an employee, he could review with the Security Officer the entire file. But all that he would give to me or to any of my subordinates would be purely any relevant extract from that file which pertained to the lead as a way of sanitizing, I mean of keeping inviolable the security file. Now, that was one of
their functions.

Second, prior to this there was no place in the government where you could find a list of defectors from the United States. Normally that should have fallen on the FBI to keep a list of all defectors and so on. So when I took over the Counterintelligence, my whole thing first was to build up a data base and all those gaps in government that one could find where you should have counterintelligence coverage and that was, for example, among other things, all the German captured documents.

Miss Brady. Have you finished with your answer?

Mr. Angleton. No, I am just saying -- you were asking for the functions of the SIG and I was trying to explain what they are.

Miss Brady. Yes, I asked for the functions in general terms and your answer was responsive.

Mr. Angleton. It is not responsive because it had many duties that had to do with other categories of sensitive cases involving Americans and other things which were not being handled by anybody else or just falling between stools and so on.

Miss Brady. Would the organizational charter of the CI/SIG make reference to these various organizational functions?

Mr. Angleton. It would probably in fairly camouflaged
terms, yes. It was not a unit, however, whose duties were in
other words, explained to people. I mean, in training school
and so on it was very much fuzzed over if anyone was laying
out the CI Staff.

Miss Brady. Can you state with certainty that one of
the essential functions of the CI/SIG unit was to maintain
a current list of American defectors to other countries?

Mr. Angleton. It would fall within that but there was
never, it was only until after the assassination that the
major effort was done to try to get all this. It was also
to do all the defectors from the Soviet Bloc which had never
been done.

Miss Brady. Prior to the assassination this was not one
of the general purposes of the CI/SIG unit?

Mr. Angleton. I can't say that for a certainty. I can't
say it for a certainty because it had so many duties. This
time you are referring to -- to come back to reality, the
heaviest burden on them was Mr. "X", Golitzin, because there
were bodies of sensitive intelligence that as far as I know
have never been disclosed running into thousands of pages of
hard documents relating to Soviet intelligence, and they were
also primarily responsible for that.

Miss Brady. Let me show you a number 706. This is an
opening request form. Byt that I mean it is a form to request
the opening of a 201 file. I ask you to review that particular
form.

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Miss Brady. First, I would like to ask you the following question. According to this document the file was opened in December of 1960. Earlier I showed you a State Department telegram reporting Oswald's intention to provide the Soviets with military intelligence. That document was dated October 31, 1959. It has been alleged by critics of the Warren Commission that there is something unusual about the delayed opening of the 201 file.

In your opinion, is there anything unusual about the delayed opening of the 201 file?

Mr. Angleton. That date again is what?

Mr. Goldsmith. October 31, 1959.

Mr. Angleton. What time was it received by Egeter?

Mr. Goldsmith. The earlier telegram is dated October 31, 1959. This is dated December 1960, more than a year later.

Is there anything unusual about that apparent delay in the opening of the 201 file?

Mr. Angleton. Was she the only recipient of that telegram?

Mr. Goldsmith. The telegram does not indicate who was the recipient. In fact, I think it went to the Security Office.

Mr. Angleton. Normally there is a cover sheet, a registry. When that telegram comes in -- let me see that...
telegram again.

In other words, the procedure, when that telegram came in from Moscow that would go to the Soviet Division who should have the action on that telegram. It would have probably gone to the Office of Security simply because of the relationship between the Security Office --

Mr. Goldsmith In fact, this document was obtained from the Security Office.

Mr. Angleton. I am trying to reconstruct what the internal dissemination was. It might well have gone to liaison of some sort. We had a lot of liaison. But the action on that telegram would have been the Soviet Division to open a 201 file.

Mr. Goldsmith. Again, my question is why would it have taken more than a year to open the file on Oswald. Is there anything unusual in your view?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know the circumstances. I don't understand why it would take that long. In my view that should have hit the Soviet Division pretty hard.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why would CI?SIG have responsibility for opening the 201 file on Oswald at this time?

Mr. Angleton. That is what confuses me a bit, and I am confused here because if there was anyone more meticulous than I ever ran across it was Miss Egeter.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me give you some background information.
According to the record, in late October of late 1960 the Agency received from the Department of State a list of defectors. I am referring now to CIA number A-21 and A-22. A-22 has Oswald's name on it. You might want to read this letter, A-21, skim it.

Mr. Angleton. I see that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, this information was all routed to CI/SIG apparently but until today --

Mr. Angleton. Is there a routing slip?

Mr. Goldsmith. I am sorry, Mr. Angleton. For that document you are looking at right now, we don't have a routing slip. I guess you will have to take my word for the record.

Mr. Angleton. All I am saying is that we had so many difficulties with Bissell as Deputy Director of Plans that I am amazed it actually came to us.

Mr. Goldsmith. According to the Agency’s records, these letters were routed to your office in 1960, late October 1960. Approximately a month later the file was opened. However, until you testified earlier, no one had really indicated to us that one of the purposes of the CI/SIG was to monitor defectors.

Mr. Angleton. It was to build up the most sensitive cases on Americans. I have to explain two things here which I don't think are clear and are the most sensitive of all things. Number one, are the transcripts of thousands of pages.
of the Golitzin interrogations which included the interrogations by four to seven other services, Foreign Services, the condition of their having access to him was that they give us copies of all of their own interrogations. So we are running into thousands of pages with only a few personnel, very few personnel.

In addition to that, there were several thousand of the most sensitive kinds of documents of Russian origin with cryptonyms of agents in which part of their task with another person was to try to make identifications of these people who were Soviet agents both here and in Western Europe.

So that this was totally unknown, let us put it that way, unless the people had special clearances. But the action of anyone, whether he is a defector or not, goes with the geographic area. In other words, the person who is supposed to open up a 201 file is supposed to be the person whose geographic area it pertains to.

Mr. Goldsmith, SR, for example?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, the persons in Moscow. They are the ones who have assets. They have people in the Embassy. Ours rode piggyback on everything else that everybody else was doing. Also, if we had an intercept -- can I go off the record here --

Mr. Goldsmith. Sure. Off the record.

(Off the record discussion)
Mr. Goldsmith. On the record.

By opening Oswald's 201 file and marking it restricted, would that normally mean that if someone else in the Agency requested access to the file, Miss Egeter or someone else in the CI/SIG unit would be notified?

Mr. Angleton. It is not a question of marking it restricted so much. It is a question that if she entered, without knowing any of the circumstances, if she opened up a 201 file with her name and her extension and all of that, it would be there so that anyone in registry could call to her attention the fact that the Uganda Desk did or whatnot was asking for the file or had submitted something.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would that be done as a matter of routine or only if she marked the file as restricted?

Mr. Angleton. I can't really answer that question. There is a book about that thick on registry procedures. Sometimes there is a notice in there, a piece of paper which says any inquiry on this should be reported to so and so on extension so and so. So the case officer can then call that person and say "What is your interest in that case?" That is the only means of making sure that somebody who is sitting way up in this section immediately is notified of some new information that the case has been working on that no one was believed to know about, that something has hit registry.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would a 201 file always indicate the fact
of an Agency relationship between an individual and the CIA if in fact there was such a relationship?

Mr. Angleton. It could and many of them do. The general rule is that the hard file, the file kept by the case officer, would be the file that would show any relationship to the Agency.

Mr. Goldsmith. That is the soft file, is it not?

Mr. Angleton. No, the soft one is the 201, unless I am getting my terminology confused.

Mr. Goldsmith. The hard copy would be the official Agency copy whereas the soft copy would be the one maintained by the case officer?

Mr. Angleton. Right. In other words, I kept thinking of soft in terms of not as important. In any event, I always thought the soft file was the one with a lot of material missing. That is what I am trying to get.

Mr. Goldsmith. We need not spend much time on the distinction between soft and hard.

Let us talk in terms of the one that the case officer maintained and the one that is maintained in registry. The one that is maintained in registry, I take it, does not have all the materials, is that correct?

Mr. Angleton. Not where there is a special interest in that person, I mean where it is still an active case or where somebody has a particular interest.
Mr. Goldsmith. That information would be in the file maintained by the case officer?

Mr. Angleton. That is right.

Mr. Goldsmith. How would someone actually get access to the file maintained by the case officer?

Mr. Angleton. By registry telling him that "If you want to know anything more you have to call so and so on extension so and so," and there may be a legitimate interest and he would permit him to read it. It might be a superior interest and the file gets transferred to the next fellow.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me show you CIA 943. This is a xerox copy of some index cards that were found in Oswald's 201 file. I would like to refer you to the card on the top of the page which is marked "Secret Eyes Only" and has Oswald's name on it also. It makes reference to CI project/RE. The date is 5 November 1959. Do you know what that would be referring to?

Mr. Angleton. These were in what?

Mr. Goldsmith. Oswald's 201 file. The Committee is specifically interested in whether Oswald was the subject of any CI project. By that, was he actually a participant or was he under surveillance by any CI project?

Mr. Angleton. I would have to go back into all the symbols that they used down there to understand "RE" unless it had something to do with defectors.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was there a special project group in the
CI Staff?

Mr. Angleton. I think that was another name for SIG at one time.

Mr. Goldsmith. To your knowledge, was Oswald ever the subject of any CIA project?

Mr. Angleton. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know RL J ESL J?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what responsibilities he had?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, mail intercept.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, this card has the initials "RE" on it. Is it possible that it is making reference to that individual?

Mr. Goldsmith. It could be, it is probably a mail intercept.

Mr. Goldsmith. H. T. Lingual program?

Mr. Angleton. Yes. That explains a lot because he probably passed that to Egeter.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the Agency ever had experience with case officers setting up fictitious 201's, fake 201 files?

Mr. Angleton. When you say fake what do you mean?

Mr. Goldsmith. For example, in the case of a project file you might set up a project file indicating that the project was intended to serve one purpose when it was actually intended to serve another, by way of example?
Mr. Angleton. That is possible.

Mr. Goldsmith. Can you think of any projects where that was done?

Mr. Angleton. I can't off hand think of them but I know there might be cases where the sensitivity of the case was so that you either would not open up a 201 file because the very existence of the name of the person in the file would disclose -- say there was an illegal that had been identified, the very fact that you have a file with an illegal's name has destroyed your case.

Mr. Goldsmith. So it was, I take it, then, accepted Agency practice under certain circumstances to either not open a file at all or if you were to open one, open it under somewhat misleading circumstances?

Mr. Angleton. I think so.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were you familiar at all with ZP RIFLE program?

Mr. Angleton. Only from listening to testimony on the radio.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever have any active involvement with Mr. William Harvey in regard to that program?

Mr. Angleton. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you know [ ]?

Mr. Angleton. I know who he is. [ ]

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you consider him to be a reliable
individual?

Mr. Angleton. He was down in the Argentine. I think he may have been ex-FBI. I am not certain. He was a great friend of Harvey's and well regarded. I never had any real business with him.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you know Ann Goodpastor?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. What were her responsibilities in the Mexico City station?

Mr. Angleton. She was very close to Win Scott, as I recall, and to Bill Harvey. I mean, she knew a lot of the old timers. I can't tell you exactly, but there was bound to be someone very sensitive.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know if she in fact was Win Scott's right hand person in Mexico City?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I know that she is, I personally have had very little dealings with here but my men had had a lot of dealings with her. She was always in on very sensitive cases.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know David Phillips?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

What is your opinion of his reliability?

Mr. Angleton. I have always regarded him as a little bit of a romantic. I think he is a very honest, straightforward fellow who is not really much of a professional. I
think he is a very decent, upright, forthright person. But
I don't think any subtleties of the business ever penetrated.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know an individual named Maurice
Bishop?

Mr. Angleton. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you ever heard reference to the term
"Black Tape 201 File?"

Mr. Angleton. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you know Paul Harman?

Mr. Angleton. Very well.

Mr. Goldsmith. Will you give us your opinion as to his
reliability?

Mr. Angleton. Very high. Paul is a person who fell on
bad times when he was running operations in the German Divi-
sion or something when I salvaged him.

Mr. Goldsmith. How many years did he work on your staff?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. It seemed like eternally
but it wasn't. It was many years. I regard him as a very
unique individual.

Of course, Paul was trained by Rocca to begin with and
that is very important because he learned everything from
Rocca. He is the only man I ever knew in the Clendestine
Service who never failed you on tracking down something or
finding it, whether it is a system in the Library of Congress;
in other words, he made discoveries which had been there had
the Agency ever known it was there for anyone if they had the imagination, the drive, the total dedication that he had. Therefore, he made tremendous breakthroughs of bringing us the efforts and labors of other people in government at no cost.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did he have a good memory?

Mr. Angleton. A tremendous memory.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was he a record retrieval expert?

Mr. Angleton. He was. He was a bird dog.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Angleton, that just about exhausts my questions. I would like to thank you very much for your assistance today.

Mr. Angleton. Thank you.

Mr. Goldsmith. I also would like to add that normally when the Committee takes a statement from a witness at a hearing, at the conclusion of the hearing, the witness is given an opportunity to make a statement. This is not a formal hearing and the same procedure does not automatically apply. However, if you would like to take advantage of the opportunity to make a five minute statement for the record, please feel free to do so.

Also he is coming back another day to finish my questions.

Mr. Angleton. I simply want to recapitulate this would have been the end of my session had it not been for the surprise witness, John Hart. I don't think I can let 31 years
of my life go down the drain listening to Hart. So that I
will be back when I have annotated what I regard to be one
of the worst torpedoes that the Director has launched into
the depths and has missed the target and it may make a U turn.
I use nautical terms because he has been launching a lot of
torpedoes in a very brief career.

So I will go on record with all my observations regarding
that and I want to point out first, so that you will under-
stand the depths of my feeling, that I was not notified by
the Committee and I was not notified by the Agency that Mr.
Hart was going to appear and therefore I had a great deal of
personal troubles that came about as a result of that surprise
testimony which I had not heard. It involves the reputations
of a great number of men.

Number one, the CI Staff did not have any jurisdiction
over Nosenko. The CI Staff was never involved in any of the
administrative details, payments or whatever. Contrary to
Hart's statement, I never saw the installation or visited the
installation with the Chief of the Soviet Division, which he
states as a categorical fact in his testimony.

I never was consulted regarding hostile interrogation,
to which I am very much opposed. I don't mean by that torture
or anything else. I mean alerting Nosenko that there are
suspicions regarding his testimony. That is totally contrary
to my philosophy of counterintelligence. So that it was a
frolic of others. But I do not stand aside from those others because all those decisions went up through the channels of command and were made and therefore I stand by what the ultimate decisions were.

But he coalesced this into an accusation against the Counterintelligence that has no foundation whatsoever. He was permitted to give that testimony in public and in that way he has hurt a great number of people. I won't go into the big impact it had on my personal family and friends. Therefore, I want to be responsive to that.

My hope had always been with the Church Committee that these matters would be pursued as they said they would be pursued when they turned the files over to the Senate Intelligence Committee. It was to be a continuity of these matters that would be followed up. There has never been.

I might also add if the Admiral had any judgment in my view, he would have called together people who were familiar with these cases, with Hart present, and he would have had a normal discussion or conference with them and I don't think he would have put Hart up there for testimony. Because I question, one, Hart's qualifications, his first job having been as a very junior subordinate under me. I know his career. I have been on all the senior promotion boards from the very beginning and therefore, his file has crossed my path many, many a time.
He was a Colby man when he was put in. He was put in by Colby's successors. He was brought in a case for which he did not have the slightest qualifications or knowledge.

Therefore, those are my feelings about it. I never have brought attorneys to this meeting or consulted about attorneys in terms of my original meeting with Miss Brady until all these doors were opened. Now, it is a question of who is going to close those doors because there is also Mr. "X" who resides in this country who listened to the stuff about his psychiatric conditions and whatnot, his paranoid condition.

I think the Bureau showed great wisdom when they refused to send somebody because these are all continuing cases. Just because there is no directory, no chief counterintelligence has changed, it has changed none of the basic counterintelligence functions and the counterintelligence challenges that exist today.

They didn't show me the Colby manuscript but they showed it to everybody else before they cleared it. Had I seen it I would have given them information which Colby omitted from his book and they would have seen that they could not clear his book because it was a distortion of classified information.

So there is a whole series of things which I may find necessary to take up with the President's Oversight Committee before this is all over.
I don't want to end by throwing an apple of discord but I really do say that the judgment factors that have been involved here are open to very serious question.

Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you very much for your statement. I am sure that Miss Brady will give you an opportunity to communicate on the record your opinion on this matter.

Mr. Angleton. Thank you very much.

Whereupon, at 5L45 p.m., the taking of the deposition was recessed, to be resumed at a time mutually agreed upon between counsel.)
CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Albert Joseph LaFeance, the officer before whom the foregoing deposition was taken, do hereby certify that the witness whose testimony appears in the foregoing deposition was duly sworn by me; that the testimony of said witness was taken by me in shorthand to the best of my ability and thereafter reduced to typewriting under my direction, that said deposition is a true record of the testimony given by said witness; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which this deposition was taken; and further that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties thereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.

My Commission expires November 14, 1980
have read the foregoing pages 1 through 155, inclusive, which contain a correct transcript of the answers made by me to the questions therein recorded. Signature is subject to corrections.

(Deponent's signature)

I, Albert Joseph LaFrance, Notary Public in and for the District of Columbia, do hereby certify that I am notarizing and witnessing the signature for the deposition of James Angleton on this ____ day of _____.

Notary Public in and for the District of Columbia

My Commission expires