IV. Reconstruction of the CIA Mexico City Station and Headquarters Actions Prior to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

A. Introduction--CIA Interest in and Liaison with FBI Regarding American Citizens in Contact with Soviet Bloc Embassies in Mexico City.

The Central Intelligence Agency has claimed that no investigation of Oswald was made in Mexico prior to the assassination of President Kennedy. For this reason, the Agency claimed, the fact that Oswald was seeking a visa and that he had also been to the Cuban Embassy was not discovered until after the assassination:

It was not until 22 November 1963, when the Station initiated a review of all transcripts of telephone calls to the Soviet Embassy that the Station learned that Oswald's call to the Soviet Embassy on 1 October 1963 was in connection with his request for a visa to the USSR. Because he wanted to travel to the USSR by way of Cuba, Oswald had also visited the Cuban Embassy in an attempt to obtain a visa allowing him to transit Cuba.

Inasmuch as Oswald was not an investigative responsibility of the CIA and because the Agency had not received an official request from those agencies having investigative responsibility requesting the Agency to obtain further information, the Station did nothing other than ask Headquarters on 15 October for a photograph of Oswald. 497/

Neither of the above assertions is accurate. An analysis of the information available will show that the first assertion of the above quote, that the Station did not learn of Oswald's contact with the Cuban Consulate and
the fact that he was seeking a visa until after the assassination is incorrect. 498/

CIA's IG Report inaccurately implies that no action would have been taken by the Mexican City Station with respect to an American in contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico other than merely reporting the contact unless the Station had received a specific request from an interested U.S. government agency. The IGR's implication is inaccurate because, as will become apparent in the following discussion, the CIA had an understanding with the FBI regarding this class of cases and often did more than just report without any specific interest being expressed by any other agency of the United States government. 499/ In fact, the station often monitored and mounted operations against Americans in contact with Bloc Embassies. 500/ At a minimum they attempted to collect as much information as possible on Americans in contact with the Embassies. This was routine, it was also the case with Lee Harvey Oswald.

B. Narrative of Mexico City Station Actions Prior to The Assassination

On 27 September 1963 Silvia Duran contacted the Soviet Consulate on behalf of Lee Harvey Oswald. 501/
Later that same day, the Soviet Consulate returned Ms. Duran's call. Under normal procedures, these transcripts would have been in the CIA Station by the first of October and Ms. Goodpasture brought these transcripts into the Station on that morning and put them on the desk. Recognized the transcripts as containing information of a possible counterespionage or counter-intelligence interest and routed them to Mr. Shaw, Ms. Goodpasture and Win Scott (in reverse order.) Mr. Scott wrote, at the top of the 9/27/4:26 call, "Is it possible to identify?"

This was the first interest in Oswald recorded by the Mexico Station even though the caller was as yet unidentified. It indicates a routine interest in an American who is in contact with the Soviet Embassy. After the transcripts were routed they were filed in a general subject file.

The 9/28 call was probably received at the CIA Station on Monday, 30 September 1963. The routing and filing instructions indicate that it was handled in much the same way as the 9/27 conversations.

On 1 October 1963 a conversation in which an English speaking person identified himself to the Soviet
Consulate as Lee Oswald came to the attention of a monitor in the electronic surveillance base-house. The monitor immediately notified the American technician who then listened to the tape. The technician had instructions "to alert the Station immediately if a U.S. citizen or English speaking person tries to contact any of the target installations." The technician called Ann Goodpasture and a meeting was arranged. The technician marked the tape "Urgent," specifying where the conversation occurred on the reel, put it in a box, and delivered it to Ms. Goodpasture within fifteen minutes of the telephone call to Ms. Goodpasture. The tape was delivered to Boris Tarasoff who transcribed it and returned it to the Station on that same day.

As soon as the Station learned that an American had contacted the Soviet Embassy (Ms. Goodpasture began to screen the photographs from the Soviet Surveillance operations. The photographs from the coverage of the Soviet Embassy, however, were not delivered as promptly as the transcripts. The photographs from October 1, 1963, were not removed from the camera until 3 or 4 October. Hence, they would not have been received until 4 (Friday) or 7 (Monday) October by the Station.
A cable reporting Lee Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy was written and sent to Headquarters by [CIA C1] on 10/8/63. Various reasons have been advanced to explain the seven day delay in sending this cable. David Phillips explained the delay by saying that [CIA C1] was too busy to be bothered by something of such a routine nature. 516/

[CIA C1] was a busy man, sometimes procrastinating. His wife was working for him, and on one or two occasions I spoke to [CIA C1] kidding him about his being a fellow, or something like that, or maybe to his wife. I am not sure. In any event, what happened a few days passed and [CIA C2] prepared a message--she was working for her husband, and as I recall it she typed it herself, but I am not positive on that point, but in any event, she prepared the cable and took it to [CIA C1] at which time he signed off on it. During that process, it did come to me, also to sign off, because it spoke about Cuban matters, and then went to the Chief of Station and was released. 577/

A blind CIA memorandum entitled "Delay in sending the first cable about Oswald" was located in a soft file on the Unidentified Man photograph. This memorandum asserts that Dave Phillips "didn't know what he was talking about." The memorandum's assertion is correct. [CIA C1] did not sign off on the cable reporting Oswald's contact
with the Soviet Embassy. Mr. Phillips did not sign off on that cable. The cable did not mention anything about the Cuban Consulate or Oswald's contact with it. Mr. Phillips never discussed the cable with the \[ \text{CIA cl/c2} \] In fact, Mr. Phillips was on a temporary duty assignment in Washington, D.C., and Miami, Florida, from at least late September to October 9, 1963.

The blind memorandum referred to above regarding the delay offers another explanation for the seven day lapse before sending the cable. After explaining that the photoproduction would not have arrived at the Station until Monday, 7 October, the memorandum says:

A name trace could have been requested on the basis of the name alone but that wasn't the way Win Scott ran that Station. He wanted the photographic coverage tied in with the telephone coverage...sometimes there was a U.S. automobile license number. It was also part of the "numbers game" of justifying a project by the number of dispatches, cables or reports produced.

In all likelihood the delay in sending this initial cable was due to a combination of factors. testified that, in fact, he was not too concerned with the task and left it to his wife.
The only action I took was the action my wife took, was to send the cable to Washington summarizing the information we had on Oswald and his contact with the Embassy... We also asked our headquarters for a trace of an American. That was routine. 524/

The delay could also have been partially due to the wait for the photo-production. Ms. Goodpasture did check the photographs and did add a paragraph to the cable concerning a photograph. 525/

Another reason that the cable was delayed was that there was some question within the Station about who had the responsibility to report Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy.

Q: What action did you take after seeing this transcript (from the 10/1 conversation)?

A: I think I was the third or beyond person who saw it. It was brought to my attention by the chief, the Head of the Soviet Section, and by Ann Goodpasture who was discussing this and who was going to notify headquarters and whose responsibility it was. As I recall, I was told to write it up.

Q: Why was there discussion about whose responsibility it was?

A: I think because when it was an American it sort of fell between whether we should have to do it, whether it was our responsibility to send this up because it had to
be accompanied by a memo and it took
time, or whether it was Ann's responsi-
bility. It was just a little, not
argument, but a discussion about, well,
"you do it, I don't want to do it, you
handle it," and I had to do it. 526/

The reason that the responsibility would have
lain with the Soviet Section is obviously because the
American was in contact with the Soviet Embassy. Ms.
Goodpasture also had a potential basis for responsibility
because she was responsible for liaison functions with
the Legal Attache, Army, Navy and Air Force on routine
counter-espionage cases. 527/ She also assisted the
Chief of Station and Deputy Chief of Station on these
cases as they occurred. 528/

The primary reason for the delay was most likely
a combination of the responsibility dispute and the
routine nature of the case as perceived by the CIA of-
ficers at that time.

(Ann Goodpasture) probably came in--it
was really a matter of here is another one
of those things again and we were having
a little gabble about who would send it
up because it was pain to do these. I pro-
bably, I think I handled it as soon as I
got it but I think there was a discussion,
as I say maybe a half a day, about who
was going to do it. It was done because
it was required but it was considered un-
important. 529/
Important or significant information was usually sent to Headquarters by cable as opposed to the slower dispatch which was sent to Headquarters by diplomatic courier.

Cables were sent if the information was of such a nature that it had to be acted on within a day or a day and half or two days. Dispatches took so long that you really could not take any kind of operational action predicated on dispatch. 530/

[Cl] the Chief of the Soviet Section in Mexico City recalled that the criterion for a cable as opposed to a dispatch was the perishability of the information being transmitted.

The normal criterion would be the urgency attached to that information, the perishability of the information, not its importance necessarily. The perishability was the criterion...If it was something that concerned an event that was going to happen in the two or three days you did not want to use a medium which was going to take a week to get to Washington. 531/

Hence, it is possible that Oswald's contact was reported by cable because it was considered significant by the Mexico Station; but this interpretation is not supported by the weight of the testimony.

Two other criteria for reporting by cable were pointed out: information concerning Soviets, Cubans and Americans. Generally, "everything Soviet was of high
priority. Cuban Operations, a lot of cables were sent. And, in the case of Oswald:

In this specific case, a cable was used to send this information to Headquarters only because it concerned an American, not because it concerned a matter was considered to be of importance.

The testimony of former CIA Mexico City officers consistently supports the position that Oswald's initial contact with the Soviet Embassy was considered fairly routine. The testimony indicates that the routine procedure of the Station was to report such a contact by cable whether it was considered routine or not. The Station had instructions to report Americans in contact with the Bloc Embassies to Headquarters because it was of interest to the FBI. The following quotes illustrate these points. Allan White said:

Q: Was Oswald's contact at the Embassies in Mexico considered to be important?

A: At the time it first occurred?

Q: Yes.

A: I would have to conclude that it wasn't recognized as anything extraordinary at the time it first occurred.

Q: Why do you conclude that?
A: Because had it been, it would have been pulled out and sent to Washington either with a complete transcription, a complete excerpt out of the transcription, or the entire tape and transcript would have been sent to Washington by the first available pouch, probably by special courier.

Q: Does the fact that Mexico City Station sent to Headquarters a cable reporting Oswald's contact suggest that the station considered the contact to be important?...

A: You are asking what is the significance of the cable?

Q: Yes.

A: Well, operational, that is all. Here is an American citizen, at least a man who appeared to be an American citizen, speaking broken Russian and in contact with the Embassy. This is of operational interest. This is the kind of information that we were directed among others, to get back to Washington because they passed that kind of thing to the Burea.

Q: Were contacts by Americans with the Soviet Embassy considered to be unusual?

A: Well, we were 1963 then. They were considered worthy of note, let me put it that way. Of course, from an operational point of view we were looking for any way we could exploit a contact with the Soviet Embassy.

Q: Were such contacts by Americans frequent?

A: Not terribly frequent. Not terribly frequent. There were members of the exile...
colony in Mexico City who were in kind of routine contact with the Soviets, usually on cultural matters. No, I would say they were relatively infrequent. That is why--

Q: The cable was sent?
A: Yes. 537/

The Chief of the Soviet Section testified on this point also:

Q: Was this particular contact considered to be unusual or routine?
A: Routine.

Q: Why is that?
A: During the summer period, particularly, or toward the end of the summer period, a relatively large number of Americans, for various reasons, made contact with the Soviet Embassy. This appeared to me, when I had the information reported, to be just another case of an American contacting the Embassy, for no significant reasons.

Q: In each case that an American contacted the Embassy, would a cable be sent to Washington?
A: Yes, indeed. 538/

the person who actually handled the reporting, also considered the case to be routine:

Q: Was the Oswald contact with the Soviet Embassy considered to be unusual?
A: No.
Q: Why not?
A: Well, there were cases of other Americans who contacted the Embassy for various reasons. We were only obliged to report the contact of any American with the Soviet Embassy.

Q: So in Oswald's case it was just a routine contact by an American as far as you were concerned?
A: Yes.

Q: If that is the case, then why was the cable sent concerning Oswald?
A: That is why I asked you earlier, because in the case of Americans we were required to send it by cable and not by dispatch.

Q: Was that a written regulation?
A: I don't know if it was written but it was understood at our Station that any Americans who were in touch with the Soviet Embassy that that fact had to be known to Headquarters by cable. It was always sent that way, whether we considered it very unimportant or routine or not. So there must have been a regulation but I am not aware of it. 539/

The reader should be reminded here that the only conversation that had been linked to Oswald at that point in time was the one that occurred on 1 October. 540/ The other transcripts had passed over the CIA C1/c2] and Goodpasture's desk 541/ but had not been linked to Oswald because his name was not mentioned in them. [c=ca/c2]
did not recheck the earlier transcripts, but did check the Station's index system to see if it had any record of a Lee Oswald, which it did not. 542/

Q: (H)ere it says in brackets, comment by the translator, "the same who phoned a day or so ago and spoke in broken Russian."

A: Right.

Q: Despite this indication here I believe your testimony is that you did not go back to check the transcript because by virtue of your memory you knew that Oswald's name had not come up in any earlier conversation, is that correct?

A: Yes. 543/

So, [CIA C2] drafted the first paragraph of the 10/8 cable on the basis of the 10/1/10:45 conversation alone even though the other information was available. 544/

That paragraph of the cable provided an accurate summary of the intercepted conversation. It said:

Acc (Soviet wiretap) 1 Oct 63, American male who spoke broken Russian said his name Lee Oswald (Phonetic), stated he at Sovem on 28 Sept when spoke with Consul whom he believed to be Valeriy Vladimirovich Kostikov. Subj asked Sov Guard Ivan Obyedkov who answered, if there is anything new re telegram to Washington. Obyedkov upon checking said nothing received yet, but request had been sent. 545/

Ann Goodpasture added a second paragraph to the
This paragraph concerned a photograph that she had found in the production from one of the photosurveillance bases that covered the Soviet Embassy. This paragraph said:

Have photos male appears be American entering Sovem 1216 hours, leaving 1222 on 1 Oct. Apparent age 35, athletic build, circa 6 feet, receding hairline, balding top. Wore Khakis and sport shirt. Source: LIMITED

The explanation for mistakenly linking this photograph to Oswald advanced by the CIA officers in Mexico who had knowledge of the circumstances is that this was the only photograph taken on October 1, the day that the conversation occurred, that appeared to be of a non-Latin, and, hence, possibly an American.

Q: Do you know how that photograph was linked to the person mentioned?

A: By date. It was taken entering the Soviet Embassy and leaving on the same date this conversation took place. I remember that proceeding because we were combing through the takes for that day to determine any person who looked like an American male. I believe this was the only one.

The testimony also corroborates that the photographs would have been checked for several days prior to the date of
Q: You checked the photosurveillance materials for approximately a four or five day period, is that correct?

A: Yes, I think it is.

Q: During that four or five day period... this man was the only non-Latin appearing man whose photograph you found, is that correct?

A: I think it was the only non-Latin appearing person's photograph that we found that we could not identify as somebody else. A lot of the people who went to the Soviet Embassy all the time, we came to know who they were. After they had been identified, they made frequent visits there. 551/

The review of the photoproduction from LIMITED the one base that has been made available to this Committee, makes the explanation of the mistake about the identity of the individual due to his being the only non-Latin implausible. The record reflects that unidentified American males were listed on the log sheet as "U A M" after the time was given. The photograph that was linked to Oswald was the only "U A M" that appeared on 2 October 1963. But on September 27, 1963 another "U A M" had appeared. The Committee has concluded from a review of a note that Ann Goodpasture wrote on the log sheet that this individual had not been identified by the time that
the 10/8 cable was written. The note says: "This is a Mexican named Gutierrez—license plate changed in Feb 64 to Mexican." 552/

This Committee cannot be certain that other "U A M"s did not turn up on the production from the LILYRIC base because that production has not been made available for review.

Ms. Goodpasture was asked about this and explained that the man, Gutierrez, was known in the station and that the base house agent was mistaken in identifying him as an American. 553/

This Committee finds the above quoted explanation hard to accept for other reasons. The October 1 transcript does not indicate that Oswald visited the Embassy on that day, however, it does indicate a visit on the previous Saturday. 554/ Even if he did visit the Embassy on the first of October, the photograph referred to in the cable was not taken until the second of October, 1963. 555/

The photographs from the one surveillance base for 1, 2 and 3 October were on one roll of film and one log sheet was prepared by the base. The text of
the log sheet is in black type. The separate days coverage is set off by a row of red typed percentage (%) marks. 556/

Ms. Goodpasture attempted to explain this mistake.

Q: Looking at the log, can you now explain to the Committee why the cable referred to a photograph taken on October 1st when actually it was taken on another day?

A: If you look at the log here you see at the top—it was just an oversight on the part of the person who was writing that cable. It looks as though the date is 1 October, but if you read it very closely you see there are only two frames that were shot on 1 October and 2 October, it starts up with frame number 3, et cetera, et cetera, and there the shots occur. That is the only explanation I can give.

Q: Is your explanation that whoever referred to the log simply looked at the date at the top of the page, the date being October 1st, and did not see any reference to the date October 2nd?

A: Right. 557/

This Committee finds it implausible that Ann Goodpasture, who had the specific duty of "processing for operational leads all Station photosurveillance info pertaining to the Soviet target" since 1960 and had received a rating of outstanding on her annual fitness reports,
would make such an oversight mistake and not discover it until 1976. 558/ This Committee thinks that the fact that the mistaken date of the photograph was not discovered for so long is especially suspect in light of the fact that on the day after the assassination CIA Headquarters sent a cable to Mexico which said:

"(FBI) says that photos of man entering Soviet Embassy which MEXI sent to Dallas were not of Oswald. Presume MEXI has double-checked dates of these photos and is also checking all pertinent other photos for possible shots of Oswald. 559/"

Headquarters' presumption was evidently mistaken. No record exists that would indicate a reply to this cable by the Mexico City Station.

The likelihood that a photograph of Oswald was indeed obtained makes the "explanation," proferred by Goodpasture, et al., even more implausible. 560/ At this time the Committee can not conclude why the original mistake was made even though it does find the explanation offered by Goodpasture, et al., to be highly implausible.

Regardless of why the mistake was made, Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy and the mistaken photographic identification of him were reported to Headquarters. The 10/8 cable was received at Headquarters on 9 October
1963. The cable, as was routine, went to the Mexico Desk for action. The person who handled the case for the Mexico Desk was Elsie Scaleti. Ms. Scaleti initially considered the information routine. She took the routine steps of requesting a name trace. From the name trace she learned that there was a 201 file on a Lee Henry Oswald but that it was restricted to a branch of the Agency known as "CI/SIG." The custodian of Oswald's file, in October 1963, was Ann Elizabeth Goldsborough Egerter of the Counter-Intelligence/Special Investigations Group. This group's purpose and interest in Oswald is detailed in another section of the final report dealing with whether or not Lee Oswald was an agent or asset of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Ms. Scaleti went to Ms. Egerter and asked to see Lee Oswald's file which was provided to her by Ms. Egerter. Once the information from the Oswald 201 and the information in the cable from Mexico City was combined, the Oswald contact took on more significance:

Q: Now, once the information...had been obtained by you, did that in any way increase the significance of Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy?
A: As I recall that is what I thought made it very significant.

Q: Can you explain why?

A: Any American who had tried to renounce his U.S. citizenship in the Soviet Union, now having again a relationship with the Soviet Embassy would lead one to wonder why he had tried to renounce his citizenship in the first place, and why he was still in contact with the Soviets, whether there was a possibility he really was working for the Soviets or what.

Ms. Egerter remembers that the cable from Mexico City caused a lot of excitement. She was shown the 10/9 cable.

Q: Is this the cable that cause the excitement?

A: Yes, one of them.

Q: Why was excitement caused by this cable?

A: "Contact with Kostikov."

Q: What is the significance of the contact with Kostikov?

A: I think we considered him a KGB man.

Q: Any other reason for the excitement?

A: He had to be up to something bad to be so anxious to go to the Soviet Union. At least that is the way I felt.

After reviewing Oswald's 201, which CI/SIG loaned to the Mexican Desk where it remained until the time of the assassination, Ms. Scaleti drafted a response to
the Mexico City 10/9 cable and also disseminated in-
formation about Oswald to other branches of the Ameri-
can intelligence community. These two documents
were drafted at the same time and were sent within several
hours of each other. Several aspects of these
two documents are interesting and illustrate various
points, as well as raise serious questions.

The cable which Ms. Scaleti sent to Mexico says,
in full:

1. Lee Harvey Oswald who called Sovemb 1
Oct probably identical Lee Henry Oswald
(201-289248) born 18 October 1939 New
Orleans, Louisiana, former radar opera-
tor in United States Marines who de-
ected to USSR in Oct. 1959. Oswald is
five feet ten inches, one hundred sixty
five pounds, light brown wavy hair, blue
eyes.

2. On 31 Oct 1959 he attempted to renounce
his United States citizenship to the
United States Embassy in Moscow, indicat-
ing he had applied for Soviet citizen-
ship. On 13 Feb the US emb Moscow re-
ceived an undated letter from Oswald
postmarked Minsk on 5 Feb 1961 in which
subj indicated he desired return of
his US ppt as wished to return to USA if
"we could come to some agreement concern-
ing the dropping of any legal proceedings
against me." On 8 July on his own ini-
tiative he appeared at the Emb with his
wife to see about his return to the States.
Sub stated that he actually had never ap-
piled for Soviet citizenship and that his

Classification: TOP SECRET

Authorized by derivation: ____________
application at that time had been to remain in USSR and for temporary extension of his Tourist visa pending outcome of his request. This application, according to Oswald, contained no ref to Soviet citizenship. Oswald stated that he had been employed since 13 Jan 1960 in Belorussian Radio and TV Factory in Minsk where worked as metal worker in research shop. Oswald was married on 30 April 1961 to Marina Nikolaevna Pusakova, a dental technician born July 1941 USSR. No HDQS traces. He attempted arrange for wife to join him in Moscow so she could appear at Emb for visa interview. His American ppt was returned to him. US Emb Moscow stated twenty months of realities of life in Soviet Union had clearly had maturing effect on Oswald.

3. Latest HDQS info was (State Department) report dated May 1962 saying (State) had determined Oswald is still US citizen and both he and his Soviet wife have exit permits and Dept State had given approval for their travel with their infant child to USA.

4. Station should pass info ref and para one to (U.S. Embassy, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Navy, and Immigration and Naturalization) locally. Info paras two and three originates with (State).

5. Ref and possible identification being disseminated to HDQS of (FBI, State, Navy and I&NS). Pls keep HDQS advised on any further contacts or positive identification of Oswald. 573/

Ms. Scalaeti wrote this cable. 574/ Ms. Egerter was one of the people who reviewed the cable for accuracy. 575/

The cable was released by the Assistant Deputy Director
of Plans, Thomas Karamessines. 576/

The teletype which Ms. Scalaeti wrote was sent to the Department of State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of the Navy. 577/ This teletype says:

1. On 1 October 1963 a reliable and sensitive source in Mexico reported that an American male, who identified himself as Lee Oswald, contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City inquiring whether the Embassy had received any news concerning a telegram which had been sent to Washington. The American was described as approximately 35 years old, with an athletic build, about six feet tall, with a receding hairline.

2. It is believed that Oswald may be identical to Lee Henry Oswald, born on 18 October 1939 in New Orleans, Louisiana, a former U.S. Marine who defected to the Soviet Union in October 1959 and later made arrangements through the United States Embassy in Moscow to return to the United States with his Russian wife, Marina Nikolaevna Pusakova, and their child.

3. The information in Paragraph One is being disseminated to your representative in Mexico City. Any further information received is being made available to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. 578/

The first substantive conflict between these two documents are the dissimilar descriptions of Oswald. The response sent to Mexico gave a fairly accurate description of Oswald while the dissemination to other government
agencies gave the description that had mistakenly been connected to Oswald by the 10/9 cable from Mexico City. 579/ Ms. Egerter testified that she could not explain why the description discrepancies occurred. 580/ When Ms. Scaleti was asked why this occurred she first responded that there was a rule that prevented the Agency from disseminating any information obtained from a third agency of the government. 581/ Hence, the accurate description of Oswald which was from information furnished to the Agency by the State Department could not be included in the dissemination. 582/ It was pointed out to Ms. Scaleti that the information in the second paragraph of the teletype was from the State Department sources and that the Mexico City Station had been instructed to disseminate the description locally which she claimed could not be disseminated due to a third agency rule. She was asked the question again and the following exchange occurred:

A. Let us start over again. The actual physical description on Lee Henry Oswald from (the 10/10 cable) was sent to the Station to assist them in further investigation to see if they knew of anybody or had anybody down there that really fitted what we thought was an accurate physical description of the Oswald that we had a
file on...When we came to...the teletype to State, FBI and Navy, we did not, and I would not normally even today, provide those investigative agencies with the physical description of Lee Henry Oswald as we thought it to be then.

We provided them only with our intelligence, not with State Department intelligence which gave the stuff out about the audio and the possible physical description. The wording here in paragraph 1 on our teletype...is worded that the American was described. As I told your man from your Committee earlier, it possibly would have been better, although it did not occur to me at the time and this is the way those things were written in those times, to say that an American described as this could possibly be identifiable and qualified but the normal procedure in 1963 was to provide to the other government agencies information and intelligence from our sources...

Q: Were you aware when you sent out the cable and the teletype that you were giving different descriptions?

A: Yes. I assume I was. I don't remember now. This is some time...

Q: Was there any intention of your part to deceive any other agencies by giving a description contained in that paragraph in the teletype?

A: None at all. 503/

Ms. Scaleti was interviewed by Committee staff members on 3/30/78. She was questioned, as she indicates in the above quote, at that time about the description.
discrepancy. When Ms. Scaletti was shown the 10/9
cable on that occasion she stated that she would not have
taken the description of the individual in paragraph two
to be a description of Oswald. 584/ The description
discrepancy was specifically pointed out to Ms. Bustos
and she was specifically questioned on that point. The
report of that interview says:

We next pointed out to Ms. Scaletti the
fact that the response to Mexico had a
correct description of Oswald and the dis-
semination had an incorrect one. She said
that the info in the first paragraph of the
dissemination came from MEXI 6453 and that
explained the incorrect description. We
pointed out to her the fact that she had the
correct description and that had already
told us that she did not associate the de-
scription in 6453 with Oswald, and that she
had said that the cable and teletype had been
prepared simultaneously by three knowledgable
people. She said, first, that the correct
description would not have been put in the
dissemination because it came from the file
review. I pointed out that all of the infor-
mation in the second paragraph of the dissemina-
tion was from the file review. She responded
that they had not been sure that the "Lee Os-
wald" referred to in 6453 was the same as "Lee
Henry Oswald" on whom they had a file, hence
they would not have had included a description
from 6453 that she did not think was connected
to Oswald. She said that it had obviously
been a mistake that doesn't matter now, but
if she had it to do over again, she would not
put any description in the dissemination be-
cause she was not sure that either applied to
the man who identified himself as Lee Oswald at the Embassy in Mexico. 585/

The second point of interest that is illustrated by the 10/10 cable and teletype is the inference that can be made from reviewing paragraph 3 of the teletype, paragraph 5 of the cable, and Thomas Karamessines signing off on the cable, that the CIA was asking for, and promising, a further investigation of Oswald without a specific request from any other government agency who might have had, as the '77 IGR says, "investigative responsibility."

The Chief of the Soviet Section in Mexico City recognized such a routine investigative responsibility as part of the normal course of his duties.

One of our responsibilities was to assist the FBI in identifying people who might become Soviet agents, particularly in America. 586/

As a matter of fact, the Chief of the Branch of the CIA responsible for the Mexican operations at Headquarters thought this was one of the Mexico City Station's strongest and most successful areas of endeavor.

They (Americans) were detected enough so that J. Edgar Hoover used to glow every time that he thought of the Mexico City Station. This was one of our outstanding areas of cooperation with the FBI. 587/
The request for further investigation and dissemination contained in paragraph 5 of the 10/10 cable to Mexico was the reason that the cable was sent to the Assistant Deputy Director of Plans for release. 588/
The Chief of the Mexico Branch was questioned extensively on this point:

A: Well, it went up to Mr. Karamessines because it involved disseminating information on an American citizen to the U.S. government agencies, you see. At that time—probably still—the CIA did not investigate or pass around information on American citizens unless it were requested to by another government agency, either in that particular case or by some standard operating procedure. In other words, the CIA, seeing an American abroad, observing an American abroad, observing an American abroad engaging in some skullduggery, would inform the responsible U.S. agency here and sit and wait for instructions before doing anything further. In this case, we were passing on information to other U.S. government agencies in Mexico City and this probably went to other places in Washington as well.

Q: This particular information was disseminated to other agencies without a request of any such agency. Is that correct?

A: Yes.

Q: This fit into the other category of cases where disseminations were made?

A: Disseminations would be made to other interested agencies, and any information we came across had action taken to follow up to take investi-
gative steps. Dissemination would only be taken if another agency requested it, either specifically in that case, or unless it were a part of standard operating procedure, which would have been agreed upon with another agency.

Q: Was any follow-up action contemplated by (the 10/10) cable?
A: Yes. "Please keep Headquarters advised of any further contacts or for positive identification of Oswald."

Q: That would be considered follow-up?
A: Yes. They were instructed to stay alert and report any further evidence of this man's presence. Therefore, Mr. Karamessines had to sign off on it.

Q: Mr. Karamessines had to sign off on it because follow-up action was contemplated?
A: With regard to a U.S. citizen abroad.

Q: For purposes of clarification, I think you said that there were two situations where Mr. Karamessines would have to sign off. One would be where another agency requested the dissemination?
A: Yes. No—not the question of the dissemination. It is a question of operational action being taken.

Q: A request for operational action. What is the second example?
A: Well—

Q: Would the Agency itself decide to take operational action?
A: Ordinarily, operational action in an ordinary case would not require Mr. Karamessines approval at all. It was only because an American citizen was involved. That interest in an American citizen might come about because of a specific statement of interest about
Classification:

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

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this individual from another U.S. government agency or it might come about because of a standard operating procedure.

For example, we had an agreement with the FBI that we would follow up leads on any American citizen in Mexico City who appeared around the Soviet Embassies, and so on, or anybody who was there appearing to defect, which we might learn through our telephone intercepts.

We could just as well have sent this cable out without Mr. Karmessines releasing it. I do not know why we did it.

Q: In fact, you pointed to something which I was going to ask you about. I was wondering why somebody as high up in the Agency as Mr. Karmessines was the releasing officer.

A: I would have been because of the U.S. citizen aspect, because so many other U.S. Government agencies were involved, State Department, FBI and the Navy. I suppose one of these things is the Navy. One of them could be the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Q: Let me attempt to summarize again. Karmessines would be responsible for signing off on this because operational action pertaining to an American was taken?

A: Yes.

Q: Either pursuant to the request of another government agency or pursuant to some standard operating procedure of the Agency itself.

A: Yes.

Q: Any other reason that you can think of?

A: No.

Q: I believe you indicated that there was an arrangement,

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or an agreement with the FBI that any activities by Americans around the Soviet or Cuban Embassy would be reported and followed up on by the Agency. Was that agreement in writing?

A: I do not know. It probably was in writing somewhere. It antedated my tenure, and the agreement was not in the files. It would have been in the files of the DDP or of the CI Staff.

The Chief of the Mexico Branch hence believes that further investigation of Oswald was requested by CIA Headquarters without the prior expression of interest from another government agency with "investigative responsibility." This request for "operational activity" concerning an American abroad is advanced as the reason for the Assistant Deputy Director of Plans signing off on the cable. Even though the cable was brought to Karamessines' attention and he did sign off on it, Mr. Scelso told this Committee that that was not necessary due to a standing agreement with the FBI under which the CIA had agreed to investigate Americans in Mexico in contact with the Soviet Embassy without any specific request from another agency.

This recollection is corroborated by other testimony and documents. Elsie Scaleti also recalled that it would not have been necessary, in 1963, to bring such a request for operational action to the ADDP's attention. She suggested that the reason for bringing it to the ADDP's
attention did not have to do with the request for operational action, but because Oswald's contact was considered important enough to merit his attention:

Q: Why would someone as high up in the organization as Karamessines ask to be the releasing officer of this particular cable?

A: I can only surmise now that I might have thought or what several of us might have thought at the time, that since it involved somebody of this nature who had tried to renounce his citizenship, who was in the Soviet Union, married to a Soviet, got out with a Soviet wife presumably, which is very strange, and now the contact with the Soviets, we could have a security, a major security problem. This was one way of informing him and getting attention at the higher level. 593/

Even though the CIA denies such an agreement (if it was in writing) that covered the CIA's investigation of American citizens in Mexico, this Committee is certain, on the basis of the above detailed evidence, that such an agreement existed, either formally or informally. 594/ Hence, the assertion in the 1977 IG report that "Oswald was not an investigative responsibility of the CIA" 595/ is seemingly inaccurate and misleading.

This Committee has attempted to determine what actions, if any, were taken by the CIA's Mexico City Station after Headquarters responded to the initial report of Oswald's contacts with the Soviet Embassy. In this
respect, two assertions of the '77 IGR are important: 1) that it was not discovered that Oswald was seeking a visa to Russia and that he had also been in contact with the Cuban Embassy until November 22, 1963; and 2) that the Station did "nothing other than ask Headquarters on 15 October for a photograph of Oswald" because no other government agency had made an official request for further information. It has already been shown that the "official request" that the Agency claims was not forthcoming was, in fact, not necessary and that, as a matter of fairly routine operating procedure, the CIA Headquarters requested a follow-up on the information already reported about Oswald. It has also been shown that the Oswald matter, after the name trace was done at Headquarters, was considered to be fairly significant by the Headquarters officials involved. In this regard, it should be pointed out that Headquarters communicated its concern to Mexico by requesting in paragraph 5 of DIR 74830 more information on Oswald. It should also be noted that the CIA Headquarters also, by notifying the interested government agencies that "Any further information received on this subject will be furnished to you" belied the necessity of one of the agencies.
making an official request for further action. Hence, the excuse offered for the claimed lack of action by the Mexico Station is invalid and the question becomes 1) whether or not that Station did any follow-up; 2) whether they did discover additional information about Oswald prior to the assassination; 3) whether that information, if any, was reported in an accurate and expeditious manner; and 4) if it was not reported, what was the reason for the failure to report.

The Mexico City Station received DIR 74830 on 11 October 1963. The Mexico City copy of this cable is in Lee Harvey Oswald's Mexico City "P" file along with the Station routing slip. There are several interesting aspects to this copy of the cable and there is evidence that provides indications of the Stations' actions and the timing of those actions.

There are several marginal notations on this document. Perhaps the most interesting is the notation "Sic" with an arrow drawn to the "Henry" in the name "Lee Harvey Oswald." That notation was made by Win Scott when he read the cable on the day it was received in Mexico. 598/ This notation struck Committee investigators as very strange because it was a possible indication that Win
Scott knew, at the time the cable was received, that Lee Oswald's middle name was not "Henry." David Phillips was questioned about that possibility:

Q: Do you have any reason to believe that when this cable was received in October of 1963 Mr. Scott knew that cable's reference to Lee Harvey Oswald was incorrect?

A: No, I don't recall that, but reading this obviously at whatever time he wrote that "sic" on there he felt it was incorrect or he would not have spotlighted it that way. But I don't have any recollection. I don't have any recollection that we know before this cable came back down that it was Lee Harvey Oswald.

The explanation most often advanced was that Mr. Scott often used the symbols "Sic" and "aka" interchangeably and that all he was indicating here was that the "Lee Oswald" from the taps was also to be indexed and filed under the additional name "Lee Henry Oswald."

Mr. Phillips was also asked about this explanation:

Q: Was he the kind of individual that would have interchanged or used interchangeably the words, the letters "aka" and "sic" interchangeably as having the same meaning? Do you appreciate that?

A: Yes. I don't think so. He was an intellectual. His great secret was that he wrote poetry. He didn't want anyone else to know that. He was very well educated, extremely well read, and no, he is not the kind of man--

Q: He would appreciate the distinction?
A: He would appreciate the distinction between the two. 

If Mr. Scott did in fact make this notation prior to the assassination of John Kennedy, this Committee has not been able to determine why "sic" was used.

The description of Oswald is marked on this cable with a double black line, a check mark and the notation "24 years old" in Ann Goodpasture's hand-writing. At this point at least Ms. Goodpasture and Allan White, the DCOS, realized that the photograph they had described in MEXI 6453 was not of Oswald. But this realization was evidently not shared by all the officers in the station. Ms. Goodpasture remembers that there was some controversy in the station about whether the man described in the 10/11 cable was the same man who had been picked up by the Station's photographic surveillance. Ms. Goodpasture remembers that she believed, based on the cable, that the photograph reported in MEXI 6453 was not of Oswald. She said that she argued over the identification with Win Scott and that he said, "Oh, that may be incorrect and so forth. But there was some quibbling over it."

The routing slip on the 10/11 cable indicates some of
the dates when subsequent Mexico City Station actions occurred. Ms. Goodpasture noted that "We should ask HQ for photo. No?" [czia cz] noted that the dissemination requested by Paragraph 4 of the cable was done on 15 October 1963. Win Scott wrote, "Please set up "P" file on Lee Henry OSWALD and put all data we have into it. Photos?" 606/ The document was sent to the files on 15 October 1963. 607/ Hence, we know that Oswald's Mexico "P" file was opened on or about 15 October 1963 and that Win Scott asked that "all" information be included in the file. There is substantial reason to believe that most, if not all, of the information available to the Station was incorporated into the file at that time. 608/

The 10/11 cable greatly increased the significance of Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy in the eyes of the Mexico City Station just as the name trace results reported by that cable had made the matter more significant to the officers involved at Headquarters. 609/ This cable aroused the Station's operational interest in Oswald.

Q: To your knowledge did that (the 10/11 cable) in any way enhance the importance of Oswald's
contact with the Soviet Embassy?

A: Oh, yes, sure, it did. The fact that he had that kind of background. Sure, he became someone of considerable operational interest. Again, there was nothing other than operational interest.

Q: In all likelihood that cable would have prompted the people at the station to go back and look at the earlier transcripts?

A: Yes, I would think so. 610/

This Committee believes that Station personnel did, between October 11 and October 15, go back and recheck the transcripts and connect the important substantive calls to Oswald. Under normal operating procedures a tape of Oswald's calls to the Soviet Embassy should not have been erased until 16 October, 4 to 5 days after the case took on added significance. 611/ The one transcript of the call on 10/1/63 that had definitely been linked to Oswald prior to receipt of the 10/11 cable bore a reference to an earlier conversation by a man who spoke broken Russian, the text of the 10/1 call allowed that the prior call had probably occurred on September 28, 1963. 612/ It should have been possible at that point to compare the tapes to see if they were in fact the same caller. Indeed, a notation made by Ann Goodpasture on a newspaper article in 1964 suggests that this was the case.
The notes says:

The caller from the Cuban Embassy was unidentified until HQ sent traces on Oswald and voices compared by (Tarasoff.) 613/

The cable traffic after the assassination confuses this point rather than clarifies it. This will be dealt with in more detail in a subsequent section. An examination of documents in Lee Harvey Oswald's Mexico City Station P file and the cable traffic from Mexico City to Headquarters after the assassination, raised a possibility that at least one tape of Oswald's voice existed as late as 16 October 1963. 614/

Assuming that the 10/1/63 call in which an individual identifies himself as "Lee Oswald" was handled in an expedited manner, the tape and the transcript would have been in the Station by the following day at the latest. 615/ If the tape had been held for the normal two-week retention period, it would have been erased on or about 16 October. The tape from the 9/28/63 conversation would have probably been in the station by the first or second of October at the latest. 616/ It would not have normally been erased until on or about 16 October also. It seems clear that the tapes, under normal procedures would have been retained until at least the middle...
October. An examination of the documents does not clarify this question but rather adds confusion to the issue.

Several documents and cables deal with the tapes and a voice comparison of the recorded conversations. In Oswald's "P" file there is a newspaper clipping of an article from the 21 October 1964 Washington Post. The article, by Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott, is entitled "CIA Withheld Vital Intelligence from Warren Commission."

One paragraph from that article says:

The investigators also are trying to determine why the CIA in its preassassination report to the State Department on Oswald's trip to Mexico City gave details only of the defector's visit to the Russian Embassy and not the Cuban Embassy. The CIA did not report the latter visit until after Kennedy's assassination in Dallas.

Next to that paragraph Ann Goodpasture wrote:

The caller from the Cuban Embassy was unidentified until HQ sent traces on Oswald and voices compared by (Tarasoff). 617/

That statement is very clear in saying that a voice comparison was made. The cable traffic that went from Mexico to CIA Headquarters after the assassination is not so clear.
On 23 November, the CIA Headquarters asked the Mexico City Station to send the full transcripts of Oswald's conversations and "original tapes if available" to Headquarters as soon as possible by a special courier. 618/ On that same day, Ann Goodpasture sent a cable to Headquarters reporting the 9/28/63 conversation. That cable said, in part, "Station unable compare voice as first tape erased prior receipt of second call." 619/ Later that same day Ms. Goodpasture wrote another cable which said:

(Tarasoff) who did transcriptions says Oswald identical with person para one speaking broken Russian who called from Cuban Embassy 28 September to Soviet Embassy. 620/

The next day the Mexico City Station informed Headquarters that it had been unable to locate any tape of Oswald's voice. "Regret complete recheck shows tapes for this period already erased." 621/

The statement in MEXL 7023 that a voice comparison was not possible because of the first tape being erased prior to the second tape being received is inconsistent with the statements made in testimony and in other cables 622/ and with the procedure then in effect at the station at that time. 623/ It is, therefore, considered highly
unlikely that a tape would be held only one or two days, the situation that is implied by the statement in MEXI 7023.

The other statements by Ms. Goodpasture in the cables and on the newspaper articles clearly indicate that a voice comparison was made. Ms. Goodpasture was questioned about this.

Q: To your knowledge, was a voice comparison ever made between the tapes to determine whether the same person was speaking in each one?

A: I do not know. I did not make one. I do not know whether someone else made one or not. There is a transcript, a cable here, in which the transcriber of the Soviet tape says that it is the same voice, which would lead one to believe that he made a voice comparison, but it just may have been that he, from his memory, came to that conclusion. 624/

Q: On the lower righthand corner of the newspaper article that is contained there, marked off with a dark line is a paragraph. Kindly read that paragraph, starting with the words "The investigators..."

(Pause.)

A: This would suggest--

Q: One moment.

A: --Tarasoff compared the voices on a tape of October.

Q: Whose handwriting appears?

A: That is mine.
Q: That indicates that the caller—could you please read that to us. Read what you wrote that day.

A: "The caller from the Cuban Embassy was unidentified until Headquarters sent traces on Oswald." Now, that would have been in answer to the cable that was dated 8th October. I believe their cable was 18th October, "and voices compared by Feinglass." Feinglass was the pseudonym used by Tarasoff.

Q: In fact, that indicates—

A: He compared the Cuban Embassy voices with the others, with Oswald's call, in which he used his name.

Q: When would that have happened?

A: I said 18th October because I thought that was the date of the cable. 10th October. 625/

Boris Tarasoff testified that he had not been queried at all about Oswald in 1963 and that he had not done a voice comparison. 626/ CIA testifies that Tarasoff did not do a voice comparison but connected the two conversations in his marginal comments in the transcripts on the basis of memory. 627/

Whether or not Mr. Tarasoff or someone else did a voice comparison of the tapes, it is likely that the tapes did exist until at least the 16th of October and would have been available for such a comparison. It is possible that the connection between the 10/1/63 call and the 9/28/63 call was made on the basis of Mr. Tarasoff's
memory. In any event the record clearly indicates that the tapes should have been available, and probably were available, as late as 16 October 1963. This is significant because it was after receipt of the 10/10 cable from Headquarters that the Oswald case took on a more than routine coloring.

The increased significance that the Oswald visit took on during the period from October 11 to October 16, 1963, could have provided the station with reason to retain the Oswald tapes.

Ms. Goodpasture was asked what became of the Oswald tapes.

Q: What happened to that tape containing Oswald’s voice?
A: What happened?
Q: What happened to that tape, yes?
A: I do not know.
Q: Do those tapes exist today?
A: What?
Q: Do those tapes exist today?
A: If they do, I do not know where they are.
Q: Are you aware of the fact that, after the assassination, it has been alleged that some tapes were given to the FBI to listen to and that it was said that these tapes contained Oswald's voice on them?

A: Someone asked me about that, but I do not think that I had those tapes. I do not remember if I did, and I was not aware that we gave any to the FBI. I do not know whether CIA got tapes from Mr. Tarasoff and passed them to the FBI, or if the Chief of Station or Deputy passed anything to the FBI. I just do not know. 630/

On the whole, most CIA officers who testified stated that, if a tape of Oswald's voice existed at the time of the assassination, they did not know anything at all about it. 631/ One CIA officer, the Chief of the Branch responsible for Mexico, testified that he believed the tapes did exist at the time of the assassination:

Q: Were they able to locate the original tapes?
A: I think so.

Q: Do you recall what was done with those tapes?
A: No.

Q: Did you ever--
A: I never heard them.

A: You never heard them?
A: No.

Q: On what basis do you say the original tapes were found?
A: I had the impression that after the assassination they did a lot of transcribing. I may be wrong...

Q: Let us look at (MEXI 7025.) Paragraph four there, which indicates that the person who did the transcript and says, "Oswald is identical with the person in an earlier paragraph who spoke broken Russian and called on 28 September." That indicates that some sort of a voice comparison was made.

A: Yes. Tapes were probably still in existence. 632/

The Tarasoffs do not remember ever doing, or being asked to do, a voice comparison of the Oswald tapes. 633/

But the evidence, albeit circumstantial, seems to indicate that the tapes were in existence and that the voices were compared by someone. 634/ CIA suggested that Tarasoff may have confirmed the fact that the two calls were made by the same person by memory after receipt of the 10/11 cable. 635/

However, the Station made the connections, whether by voice comparison and/or by comparison of the substantive information in the 10/11 cable to the substantive information in the transcripts, the conversations were linked to Oswald prior to the assassination and probably by the time that the "P" file was opened on or about 16 October 1963. 636/ Ms. Goodpasture was also asked about this:

Q: On October 1st, you found out that Oswald had been at the Russian Embassy the preceding

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Saturday. Was any effort made to check your materials from the surveillance operation, the photographic surveillance operation, or from the telephonic surveillance operation to get additional information on this?

A: I do not know whether I checked it immediately or not at this stage. I do know that they were checked thoroughly after the assassination. In fact, I think they were checked thoroughly after the information came back from Washington identifying a Lee Oswald. 637/

On October 15, 1963, a "P" file was opened on Oswald. 638/ That same day the CIA Mexico City Station requested that Headquarters send them a photograph of Oswald. 639/ On that date also [CIA C2] drafted a local dissemination memo regarding Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy. 640/ By this date at least the 10/1/10:45 call, the 9/28/11:51 call, the 9/27/4:05 call, and the 9/27/4:26 call had been linked to Oswald. 641/

On 16 October 1963 the memorandum drafted by [CIA C2] was circulated at the U. S. Embassy. It said:

1. The following information was received from a usually reliable and extremely sensitive source: On 1 October 1963, an American male contacted the Soviet Embassy and identified himself as Lee OSWALD. This officer (sic) determined that OSWALD had been at the Soviet Embassy on 28 September 1963 and had talked with Valeriy Valdimirivoch KOSTIKOV, a member of the Consular Section, in order to learn if the Soviet Embassy had received a reply from Washington concerning his request. We
have no clarifying information with regard to this request.

2. Our Headquarters has informed us that the OSWALD above is probably identical with Lee Henry OSWALD, born on 18 October 1939, in New Orleans, Louisiana, a former radar operator in the U. S. Marine Corps who defected to the Soviet Union in October 1959.

3. This office will advise you if additional information on this matter is received. 642/

When was asked why she had stated that it had been "determined" that Oswald had been in contact with the Soviet Embassy on 28 September she said that it must have been because she had rechecked the transcripts by this time as otherwise she would not have used such certain language. 643/ When asked why the 10/16 memo said that there was no clarifying information on Oswald's "request" when it was known by this time that he was seeking a visa, said that "they had no need to know all those other details." 644/

There are no indications that any other actions were taken by the Mexico City Station prior to the assassination. 645/

Even though the Station's actions after the 10/11 cable were not highly extensive, it is inaccurate and misleading to say that those actions were limited to re-
questing a photograph of Oswald from Headquarters. Other actions included rechecking the transcripts and discovering the substantive ones that concerned Oswald and reporting the information in MEXI 6453 and DIR, 74830 to various components in the U. S. Embassy in Mexico City in a misleading manner. Hence, the fact that Oswald was seeking a visa and had been in contact with the Cubans as well as the Russians was known prior to the assassination, and the Station's actions prior to the assassination were more comprehensive than merely requesting a photograph; although if any action other than a file check was taken, no record of that action has been made available to this Committee.

It is unlikely, but possible, that this information that was developed by the Mexico City Station after 10/11/63 was reported to Headquarters. Elsie Scaleti pointed out that a report of this additional information on Oswald's activities in Mexico "would have been expected." Ms. Scaleti's belief that the information should have been reported to Headquarters is shared for identical reasons by her superior at Headquarters.

The testimony from the people involved, both at head-

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quarters and in Mexico, while often uncertain, is generally, that they do not remember that such a cable was sent. Ms. Scaleti said that she could not recall that Mexico had sent any other information to Headquarters prior to the assassination, but added, I "could not swear to that." 648/ The head of the Mexico Branch at Headquarters was certain that this information was reported but he could not recall the form of the report or whether it occurred before or after the assassination. 649/ Robert Shaw first testified that, to his knowledge, the information was not reported prior to the assassination and then added "but I would have no way of knowing."

650/ The Deputy Chief of Station in Mexico, Mr. Allan White, was also unsure on this point:

Q: Did they ever indicate to Headquarters that Oswald had been to the Cuban Embassy as well as to the Soviet Embassy and that he wanted a visa?

A: I would have to assume that they did. I realize that "assume" is a bad word.

Q: You don't have personal knowledge one way or another?

A: No, prior to the assassination I would not. 651/

Ann Goodpasture was also unsure of her recollection in this area:
Q: But Headquarters was never appraised of that voice comparison?
A: I think they were in a cable.
A: Prior to the assassination?
A: No, I do not think they were prior to the assassination...

Q: It is determined that the same person was talking on each tape and there is no follow-up to Headquarters, even though Headquarters clearly considered this to be significant?
A: The follow-up was made by disseminating this information from the traces locally and trying to identify Oswald, trying to locate the man. That is the way the follow-up was made. We thought that he may still be in Mexico.

Q: The point is, however, that upon the making of a voice comparison, if, in fact, that was done, that information was not communicated to anyone.
A: I do not know if it was or not. You would have to check the file completely, the cable traffic, to see if it was. To the best of my knowledge, it was not until after the assassination...

Q: In fact, headquarters did not know that he had also been to the Cuban Embassy?
A: At that point, no.

Q: At least, according to your recollection, it was not until after the assassination that Headquarters was informed of that fact?
A: That is probably right. 552/

Only one person who was interviewed by this Committee was certain of her recollection. [CIA C2] was
certain that a second cable reporting Oswald's contacts with the Cuban Embassy had been sent to Headquarters prior to the assassination.

Q: It does not strike you as more significant that the American contacts the Soviet Embassy and he also contacts the Cuban Embassy? To me that would make him seem more significant and therefore, if you found out about this after the time the (first) cable was sent you would have sent another cable.

A: I did not send another cable but I know another cable was sent. I didn't send it.

Q: Another cable concerning Oswald was sent?

A: I think so. Where is the whole file? Wasn't there a cable saying he was in touch with the Cuban Embassy?

Q: We have not seen one.

A: I am pretty such there was.

Q: Did you send that cable?

A: No, I did not send the cable. When I found out about it I remember this, I said how come?

Q: Who did? Do you know?

A: I don't know who sent it. I think Ann (Goodpasture) might have. She might have sent a follow-up one with this information.

The staff of this Committee suggested that Mr. Phillip's clear recollection of involvement in reporting Oswald's visit to the Cuban Embassy and that he was seeking
a visa along with the fact that Mr. Phillips was not in Mexico at the time that the first cable was sent, could possibly be an indication that he is recalling a second cable. When asked about this, Mr. Phillips stated that he had no knowledge of a second cable sent prior to the assassination.

Some corroboration of [CIA C2] assertions were found in the materials from Win Scott’s safe.

"(0)n page 777 of (the Warren) report the erroneous statement was made that it was not known that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy until after the assassination! Every piece of information concerning Lee Harvey Oswald was reported immediately after it was received to: U.S. Ambassador Thomas C. Mann, by memorandum; the FBI Chief in Mexico, by Memorandum; and to my headquarters by cable; and included in each and every one of these reports was the conversation Oswald had, so far as it was known. These reports were made on all his contacts with both the Cuban Consulate and with the Soviets. 656/

If the cable was sent it is not in the files made available to the HSCA by the CIA.

The head of the Mexico Branch admitted that the information should have been reported and that, if it had been, the Oswald case would have been handled differently, at least as far as the dissemination of information about him was concerned.

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Q: Had the information concerning Oswald's visit to the Cuban Embassy in addition to the Soviet one, that Oswald had been requesting a visa, if it had been sent to CIA headquarters, would his case prior to the assassination have been handled in any different manner?

A: It would have been in the case of dissemination of information about him, but I do not think that any operational action would have been taken to apprehend him or to contact him or to try to force him back to the United States.

Q: ...how would the dissemination have been treated differently?

A: Well, it simply means that we would have disseminated any additional information that we got.

It cannot be determined with exactitude whether or not this additional information about Oswald was reported to Headquarters. In all likelihood it was not. The Chief of the Mexico Desk was asked whether or not the Station was ever criticized for this failure to report in the face of a specific request to do so by CIA Headquarters. He said:

No. That was not because we were trying to go easy on them, it is simply because it is in the nature of the business. What you are trying to do is engage, as I used to say, in important illegal manipulations of society, secretly.

We were running, at that time, a vast[...

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I do not know whether you informed yourself about the magnitude of our political action program at the time--absolutely enormous.

We were trying to follow the Soviets and all the satellites and the Cubans. At the same time, the main thrust of the Station's effort was to attempt to recruit Russians, Cubans and satellite people. 658/

Perhaps the nature of the CIA Mexico City Station's handling of the Oswald case prior to the assassination can best be summed up in Dave Phillips' response when he was asked how he would characterize that handling:

"At the very best, it is not professional, at the best." 659/

V. Mexico City Station Reporting of Information Concerning Oswald After the Assassination

A. Reporting of information concerning the photograph of the Mexico Mystery Man

Even though some people in the Station clearly dis-associated the photograph that was described in MEXI 6453 from Oswald after receiving the 10/11 cable, 656/ it is clear that some people still considered it possible for some reason that the photograph was of Oswald. In October, Ann Goodpasture had argued this very point with Winston Scott. 657/ On the day of the assassination, the Mexico City Station cabled Headquarters that it was sending as soon as possible "copies of only visitor to