C. Voice Comparisons

In addition to his translation and transcription duties, Mr. Tarasoff as a matter of routine attempted to identify the voices of the participants in a conversation.299/ This eventually led to Mr. Tarasoff's collecting voice samples from tapes of Russian officials whose voices he had identified.300/ Mr. Tarasoff also made comments about the personality and dispositions of the participants in conversations that he transcribed. Generally, these comments, or "personality assessments" were made on separate pieces of paper and not on the transcripts themselves.301/

III. Information About Lee Harvey Oswald's Stay in Mexico that was Known by the CIA Mexico City Station Prior to the Assassination of John Kennedy and the Sources of that Information

A. Information that was Available

In 1963 the Central Intelligence Agency's Mexico City Station surveilled both the Cuban and Soviet diplomatic compounds electronically and
photographically.

The Mexico City Station received daily transcriptions of the telephonic surveillance of the Embassies. The Station received twice, or three times, a week the photographic coverage of the Embassies and Consulates.

1. Information Available to the Mexico City Station from Electronic Surveillance Aimed at the Soviet Consulate and Military Attache's Office.

From the electronic surveillance of the Soviet Embassy, the CIA Mexico City Station learned of the following conversations that were subsequently linked by Station personnel to Lee Harvey Oswald:

a. September 27, 1963, Friday

(1) At or about 10:30 a.m. an unidentified man called the Soviet Military Attache looking for a visa to Odessa. He was referred to the Consulate. The man then asked for and was given directions to the Consulate office. The directions

Classification: [Redacted]

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(2) At 10:37 a.m. a man called the Soviet Consulate and asked for the Consul. He was told that the Consul was not in. The man outside stressed that it was necessary for him to get a visa to Odessa. He was told to call back at 11:30. This conversation was also transcribed in Spanish.\textsuperscript{305/}

(3) At 1:25 an unidentified man called the Soviet Consulate and asked for the Consul. The man was told that the Consul was not in. The man outside asked, "when tomorrow?" The Soviet official told him that on Mondays and Fridays the Consul was in between four and five. This conversation was also in the Spanish transcriptions.\textsuperscript{307/}

(4) At approximately 4:05 p.m. Silvia Duran called the Soviet Embassy. She told the person at the Embassy that an American citizen seeking a visa was at the Cuban Consulate. Silvia explained that the American citizen wanted to know the name
of the official he had dealt with at the Soviet Embassy. Silvia had sent the American to the Soviet Embassy, stating that his acquiring a Cuban visa was contingent on his previously acquiring a Soviet visa. Silvia explained to the Soviet official that the American had stated that he was assured that there would be no problem. At that point, the Soviet official put another official on the phone, causing Silvia to repeat the story. The official then asked Silvia to leave her name and number so he could call later. This conversation was also in Spanish.

(5) At 4:26 p.m. an unidentified Soviet official called Silvia Duran inquiring whether the American citizen had been to the Cuban consulate office. Silvia responded affirmatively, stating the American was at the office at that time. The Soviet official told Silvia that when the American visited the Soviet Consulate office he had displayed papers from the Soviet Consulate in Washington. He also had a letter stating that he was a member of an organization that favored Cuba. The American wanted to go to the U.S.S.R. with his Russian wife and remain there a
long time. The Soviet official had not received an answer from Washington to the American's problem. The problem traditionally took four to five months to resolve because Washington had to secure authorization from the U.S.S.R. The Soviet official added that the American's wife could get a visa in Washington very quickly and she could have it sent anywhere, but he felt that the American would not get a visa soon. Silvia said that the Cuban government could not give the American a visa because he had neither friends in Cuba nor authorization for a visa from the U.S.S.R. The Soviet official added that the Soviets could not give the American a letter of recommendation because they did not know him. This conversation was also in the Spanish transcripts.309/

b. September 28, 1963, Saturday

At 11:51 a.m. Silvia Duran called the Soviet Consulate. She said that there was an American citizen at the Cuban Consulate who had previously visited the Soviet Consulate. The Soviet asked Silvia to wait a minute. Upon his return to the
telephone, Silvia put the American on the line. At first the American spoke in Russian and the Soviet spoke English. The conversation then proceeded in English until the Russian discontinued it and put another Soviet on the line. The Soviet spoke in English, but the American, speaking in broken Russian, asked him to speak Russian. The conversation resumed in Russian at that point. It also became incoherent and is thus quoted in its entirety:

Russian: What else do you want?
American: I was just now at your Embassy and they took my address.
Russian: I know that.
American: /speaks terrible, hardly recognizable Russian/I did not know it then. I went to the Cuban Embassy to ask them for my address, because they have it.
Russian: Why don't you come again and leave your address with us; it is not far from the Cuban Embassy.
American: Well, I'll be there right away.310/
c. October 1, 1963, Tuesday

(1) At 10:31 a.m. an unidentified man called the Soviet Military Attaché and, in broken Russian, said that he had visited the Consulate the previous Saturday and had spoken to the Consul. The man wanted to know if the Soviets had received an answer from Washington. At that point, the Soviet official gave the man the Consulate phone number and asked him to call there. This conversation is in the English transcripts, indicating the man spoke in either Russian or English.311/

(2) At 10:45 a.m.312/ a man who, according to the translator's comment, had phoned a day or so before and had spoken in broken Russian, called the Consulate and spoke to an employee named Obyedkov. The man calling introduced himself as "Lee Oswald" and stated that he visited the Soviet Consulate the previous Saturday. He told Obyedkov that he spoke with the Consul on that day. Oswald added that the Consul had stated that they would send a telegram to Washington and he wanted to know if they
had received an answer. Oswald also said that he did not remember the name of the Consul with whom he had spoken. Obyedkov asked if it had been Kostikov and described him as "dark." The man outside replied affirmatively and repeated that his name was Oswald. Obyedkov asked Oswald to hold on a minute while he inquired. When Obyedkov resumed the conversation, he stated that the Soviet Consul had not yet received an answer but the request had been sent. Obyedkov then hung up the telephone as Oswald began another sentence with the words "and what." This conversation is in the English transcripts.313/

d. October 3, 1963, Thursday

An unidentified man called the Soviet Military Attache and spoke in broken Spanish and then in English. When the man inquired about a visa to Russia, he was given the Consulate phone number. The man then inquired if they issued visas at the Consulate. The Soviet stated that he was not certain but that the caller should call the Consul nonetheless.314/
2. Information Available to the Mexico City CIA Station from CIA Headquarters

On October 11, 1963, three days after the Mexico City Station made the initial report to Headquarters of Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy, the Mexico City Station received some information about Lee Oswald from CIA Headquarters. Headquarters informed Mexico that the Lee Oswald who visited the Soviet Embassy may be identical to Lee Henry (sic) Oswald.315/Mexico City received this cable on 11 October 1963.316/

This cable described Oswald as:

born 18 Oct. 1939, New Orleans, Louisiana, former radar operator in United States Marines who defected to USSR in Oct. 1959. Oswald is five feet ten inches, one hundred sixty five pounds, light brown wavy hair, blue eyes.317/

The cable reported Oswald's defection in 1959; his desire to return to the United States in 1962; his employment in Minsk; his marriage to a Russian citizen; the return of his passport; and the State Department's issuance of visas for Oswald and his family.318/
3. Information Available to the Mexico City Station from Electronic Surveillance Aimed at the Cuban Diplomatic Compound

An examination of the production from the electronic surveillance of the Cuban diplomatic compound's telephones failed to reveal any telephone conversation that directly mentioned Oswald or information that clearly and directly referred to him.319/

4. Information Available to the Mexico City Station from Photographic Surveillance of the Soviet and Cuban Diplomatic Compounds

An examination of the production from these operations failed to reveal a photograph of Oswald.320/ This Committee has not been able to rule out the possibility that a photograph of Oswald was obtained in Mexico City by these operations since the material made available for review was incomplete.321/ The possibility that such a photograph was obtained is discussed in Section III.A.6. below. The photograph that was mistakenly linked to Oswald by the Mexico City Station is discussed in Sections III.B.4.
Ms. Anna Tarasoff assisted her husband, Boris, in the transcription of tapes from the Russian Embassy. Ms. Tarasoff testified before this Committee on 12 April 1978. She was shown the transcripts from the conversations that were intercepted on 10/1/63 at 10:31 a.m. and 10:45 a.m.; 9/28/63 at 11:51; and 10/3/63. She recognized these transcripts as being her husband's work. She testified that she could identify his work by the style of his writing or typing and the use of slash marks.

In addition to these transcripts, Ms. Tarasoff testified that she remembered one more conversation that involved Lee Oswald.
According to my recollection, I myself, have made a transcript, an English transcript, of Lee Oswald talking to the Russian Consulate or whoever he was at that time, asking for financial aid.

Now, that particular transcript does not appear here and whatever happened to it, I do not know, but it was a lengthy transcript and I personally did that transcript. It was a lengthy conversation between him and someone at the Russian Embassy.327/

Ms. Tarasoff testified that the transcript that she remembered was approximately two pages long.328/ She testified that the caller identified himself as Lee Oswald.329/ She was certain that the 10/1/63, 10:45 a.m. conversation was not the one that she recalled.

This would not be the conversation that I would be recalling for the simple reason that this is my husband's work and at that time probably the name didn't mean much of anything. But this particular piece of work that I am talking about is something that came in and it was marked as urgent.330/

In the call that Ms. Tarasoff recalled, Oswald spoke only English.331/ Ms. Tarasoff testified that the 10/1/63, 10:45 conversation could not be the call she remembered because the transcript indicates that Oswald spoke in borken Russian as opposed to English; the transcript is shorter than the one she remembers; the transcript is in her husband's style as opposed
to her own; and there is no mention of Oswald's finances in the transcript.\textsuperscript{332/}

Ms. Tarasoff remembers the procedure for urgent tapes.\textsuperscript{333/} Her memory is confirmed in this narrow respect by the project files reviewed by House Select Committee on Assassinations staff members.\textsuperscript{334/} Ms. Tarasoff recalled that there would be a piece of paper enclosed with the reel which would indicate the footage number where the conversation occurred and ask for priority handling over the other conversations on the reel.\textsuperscript{335/} After the conversation was transcribed, the Tarasoffs would immediately notify their contact and then turn the transcript over to him on the same day that it had been delivered.\textsuperscript{336/}

Ms. Tarasoff was questioned about the details of the conversation which she remembered. She stated that Oswald definitely identified himself and that he was seeking financial aid from the Russians.
(H)e was persistent in asking for financial aid in order to leave the country. They were not about to give him any financial aid whatsoever. He had also mentioned that he tried the Cuban Embassy and they had also refused financial aid.337/

Mr. Boris Tarasoff also testified before this Committee on 12 April 1978. Mr. Tarasoff also recognized the four transcripts from September 28, 1963 and October 1st and 3rd as his work:338/ Mr. Tarasoff testified that he recognized the 10/1/63 conversation as his work because the name Lee Oswald was underlined.

We got a request from the station to see if we can pick up the name of this person because sometimes we had a so-called "defector" from the United States that wanted to go to Russia and we had to keep an eye on them. Not I -- the Station. Consequently they were very hot about the whole thing. They said, "If you can get the name, rush it over immediately." Therefore, it is very seldom that I underlined the name because I put them in capitals. In this case I did because it was so important to them.339/

Mr. Tarasoff testified that he did not know how Oswald had come to the Station's attention prior to this conversation or what led to the request to get his name.340/ He speculated that it was possible
that Oswald first came to the Station's attention through Oswald's contacts with the Cuban Embassy. 341/

Mr. Tarasoff did not confirm his wife's recollection of another conversation including Oswald. 342/ He said that he did not remember any other calls involving Lee Oswald or any details of Oswald's conversations that were not reflected in the transcripts. 343/

Although Ms. Tarasoff's memory was not confirmed by the House Select Committee on Assassinations review of the transcripts for the period while Oswald was in Mexico, there are several points of circumstantial corroboration for her story. There was a procedure by which tapes could be expedited in the manner in which Ms. Tarasoff recalls. 344/ There are also indications that this procedure may have been used when Oswald's conversation was intercepted. 345/ The first report that the Americans received regarding Silvia Duran made mention of the fact that Silvia claimed that she had told Oswald that the only aid they could give him was to refer him to the Soviet Consulate. 346/
This statement in the original Mexican report given to the CIA in Mexico after the assassination would tend to add credence to Ms. Tarasoff's recollection that Oswald mentioned to the Soviets that he had also tried to elicit aid from the Cubans.347/

At least one other CIA official who was in Mexico also remembers that Oswald indicated in his discussions with the Soviet Embassy that he hoped to receive assistance with the expenses of his trip.348/

Daniel Stanley Watson, a retired CIA employee who was Deputy Chief of the Mexico City Station from 1967 to 1969, told the House Select Committee on Assassinations staff that he had seen a file on Oswald in Mexico City that contained only one or two intercept transcripts and surveillance photographs of Oswald.349/

Mr. Watson also told HSCA staff investigators that Win Scott had a private personal safe in which he maintained especially sensitive materials.350/ According to Mr. Watson, these materials were removed from the safe
by James Angleton at the time of Scott's death.351/

This Committee requested access to any relevant materials from this safe on July 6, 1978.352/ Access was granted on October 6, 1978. Two statements by Mr. Scott contained in these materials lend circumstantial support for Ms. Tarasoff's testimony.

In 1970 Mr. Scott wrote:

I had many experiences, some of which I can write in detail. One of these pertains to Lee Harvey Oswald and what I know (emphasis in original) of his activities from the moment he arrived in Mexico, his contacts by telephone and his visits to both the Soviet and Cuban Embassies and his requests for assistance from these two Embassies in trying to get to the Crimea with his wife and baby. During his conversations he cited a promise from the Soviet Embassy in Washington that they would notify their Embassy in Mexico of Oswald's plan to ask them for assistance.353/

In his unpublished manuscript, Scott refers to a conversation in which Oswald gave the Soviet Embassy "his name very slowly and carefully."354/ Although the transcripts available do not bear out Scott's recollections, there are interesting parallels with the testimony of Anna Tarasoff and David Phillips.355/
There are indications also that there was one other additional call that may have been available to the Mexico City Station prior to the assassination of President Kennedy. In the first statement by Silvia Duran provided to the CIA by the Mexican government, Silvia says that the Cuban Consul called the Soviet Consular official who dealt with Oswald.356/ This statement is also missing from most subsequent reports of Ms. Duran's statements, with the notable exception of the first CIA report to the Warren Commission.357/ Ms. Duran's early statement was confirmed by Eusebio Azcue.358/ This conversation was not discovered by a review of the transcripts from the intercept operation. It is possible that the call made by Azcue was to a phone at the Russian Consulate that was not subject to electronic surveillance. It is known that two of the phones at the Soviet Consulate were subject to surveillance.359/ This Committee has not determined how many telephones were in the Soviet Consulate in Mexico City.
While this Committee has not been able to find any direct corroboration of Anna Tarasoff's claim, the circumstantial corroboration is such that the possibility that there was an additional transcript concerning Oswald that was available to the Mexico City Station in late 1963 cannot be dismissed. In all likelihood, the Azcue call to the Soviet Consulate concerning Oswald was probably made on telephones not subject to CIA surveillance and, hence, would not have been available to the CIA's Mexico City Station.

6. Possibility that the CIA Photosurveillance Obtained a Photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald

This Committee cannot state with certainty that a photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald was not obtained by the photosurveillance operations in Mexico City because of three reasons: (a) the photographs from LILYRIC, the "alternate" photographic base which covered the Soviet Embassy main gate, and the photographs from the pulse camera, which covered the Cuban Consulate entrance, with the exception of a
few samples were not made available for review by the CIA; (b) testimony from knowledgeable people that it would have been unlikely that the photosurveillance would have missed someone whom it had at least five chances of recording; and (c) reports that such a photo did, in fact, exist.

a. Missing Materials

The documentation and elaboration of the first reason can be found in Sections II.A. and B. preceding. Simply put, this Committee has not seen all of the photographs produced by the photosurveillance operations in Mexico City. Hence, it cannot conclude that a photograph of Oswald does not exist among those photographs it has not seen.

b. Likelihood that the Photosurveillance Operation would have Missed Oswald

CIA officers who were in Mexico in 1963 and their Headquarters counterparts generally agreed that it would have been unlikely for the photosurveillance operations to have missed ten opportunities to have photographed Oswald. The transcripts of
conversations about or involving Oswald intercepted at the Soviet Embassy reveal that a man later identified as Oswald was at the Cuban Consulate at least three times on Friday and Saturday, September 27 and 28. They also reveal that he was at the Soviet Embassy at least twice on those same days. The CIA technician who serviced the Cuban photographic installations said that it was possible that the operation missed Oswald if: (1) Oswald's visits were after dark; (2) Oswald's visits were on Saturday afternoons or Sundays; (3) the case officer had given the photographic basehouse agents the days off that Oswald visited; (4) the pulse camera was not working. It is known that Oswald's visits were on a weekday during daylight hours and a Saturday morning. This Committee has not been able to determine with certainty, because of the missing production, whether all of the basehouses were operating on the days of Oswald's visits. This Committee believes that the pulse camera was in operation on at least one of the days that Oswald visited (Friday, September 27, 1963) the Cuban
Consulate and that the LILYRIC base covering the
Soviet gate should have been operating at the time
of Oswald's visits to the Soviet Consulates on
September 27th and 28th.369/

c. Reports of Existence of a Photograph

(1) Phillip Agee Allegation

On 6 January 1978, Phillip Agee telephonically
contacted two House Select Committee on Assassinations
staff investigators at their office in Washington,
D.C. Mr. Agee informed the investigators that he
"would give the true story on the photograph
produced by the CIA which the CIA claimed was taken
of Oswald in Mexico City in 1963."370/ Phillip
Agee was interviewed by HSCA staff investigators on
11 and 12 January 1978.

Mr. Agee told the investigators that he had
been assigned to the Mexico Branch of the Western
Hemisphere Division of the CIA's Clandestine Services
in September of 1966.371/ Mr. Agee was assigned to
work on the Headquarters support for the Agency's
operations in Mexico City that were aimed at the
Soviet Union and other Socialist countries, excluding Cuba. At the time that he assumed this job, a woman named Elsie Scaletti was in charge of the operational support projects for Mexico.

She was the officer in Washington in charge of all of the paperwork and other administrative matters relating to the support in Washington to these operations which were underway in Mexico City.

Ms. Scaletti trained Mr. Agee for his new position. Mr. Agee characterized Ms. Scaletti as "the key figure in the Mexico Branch in Headquarters, because she had been there for so long."

After his transfer to the Mexico Branch, Mr. Agee heard a story about photographs of Oswald. Mr. Agee could not remember with certainty who it had been that told him the story, but thought that it may have been Ms. Scaletti. Mr. Agee's recollection of the story he had heard was that on the day of the assassination Ms. Scaletti was working in the Mexico Branch in much the same position that she occupied in 1966. When the news about Oswald's arrest reached Ms. Scaletti, she recalled seeing his name and a photograph taken by an observation post in Mexico.
City.378 Within an hour or two, Ms. Scaletti had located the photograph of Oswald visiting the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.379 Mr. Agee went on to say:

I don't know, don't recall in fact how she had been able to reconcile or how they were able to reconcile in Mexico City the photograph with the name, unless someone had known the face. Because the problem with these observation posts is that you can get a lot of photographs from them, but to find out the exact identity of the people is not always an easy thing to do. And it may be that as they were listening to the telephones of the Soviet Embassy, and also the Cuban Embassy, that she remembered the name Oswald, or Lee Harvey Oswald from the telephone tap, if in fact he had identified himself over the telephone, and tried to make an appointment with the consul or whoever. And then they were able somehow to reconcile the telephone conversation with the photograph that was taken from the observation post the same day or more or less whenever the appointment was made. On the other hand it may be that this photograph had not been identified until the time of the assassination but that she had heard or recalled perhaps either reading the transcript from the telephone tapping or getting a condensed report perhaps a weekly report or something of the take from the telephone tap that she remembered the name Lee Harvey Oswald and then went back into the files of all the photographs and looked through all the photographs until eventually she found a photograph that was similar to all the photographs of Oswald that immediately began to come over the television and the news services. So those details I don't remember.
exactly, but I do recall that it was considered a coup of some sort for her to act so fast in digging out the photograph and the information on Oswald's visit to Mexico City.380/

Mr. Agee could not remember whether he had actually seen the photograph that Ms. Scaleti allegedly found.381/ When Mr. Agee was told that the photograph that the CIA produced from the Mexico photosurveillance operations did not look anything at all like Lee Harvey Oswald, Mr. Agee said that that was the first time he had ever heard that.

I was led to believe all along that it in fact was Oswald's photograph...I had been led to believe that that was considered a very significant achievement on the part of the Agency and Elsie in particular for having done that so fast. And so accurately. But now there seems to be some doubt. And it wasn't anything that was particularly secret around the Branch. It was just one of those shop-talk stories that persist over the years.382/

Mr. Agee speculated that the production from the photosurveillance was routinely sent to CIA Headquarters and that Ms. Scaleti would have had access to the file at Headquarters.383/
(2) Daniel Stanley Watson Allegation

On June 4, 1978, the House Select Committee on Assassinations interviewed Mr. Daniel Stanley Watson in Mexico. Mr. Watson served as a CIA officer in Mexico City from approximately 1965 to 1969. Mr. Watson was the Chief of Covert Action (propaganda) from 1965 to 1967. He was the Deputy Chief of the Mexico City Station from 1967 to 1969.

Mr. Watson told the HSCA staff members that sometime between 1965 and 1967 he had occasion to request Lee Harvey Oswald's Mexico City Station personality file. When this file was delivered to him, it contained only one or two photographs and intercept transcripts. Mr. Watson stated that the file was very thin and that the photo(s) was a 3/4 shot from behind -- "basically an ear and back shot." Mr. Watson said that he did not think that there was anyone else in the photograph and he thought that it was a photograph of Oswald.
Mr. Watson said that he could not recall why he had requested to see Lee Oswald's file in 1965 or 1966. Mr. Watson said that it was his understanding that the file was the complete Mexico City personality file on Oswald. Mr. Watson said that he would be surprised if Oswald's Mexico City personality file was seven volumes long.

Mr. Watson was asked whether or not Winston Scott, the Chief of the CIA Station in Mexico, would have destroyed files or photographs. Mr. Watson said that that would not surprise him.

At that point, Mr. Watson volunteered that Mr. Scott often kept highly sensitive information in a personal safe in his office. He said that this information would not have been filed or indexed in the usual manner.

Mr. Watson said that when Winston Scott retired he had taken the contents of this personal safe with him and stored them in a safe in his home. When Mr. Scott died, James Angleton flew to Mexico and removed the contents of this safe before Mr. Scott's funeral. Mr. Watson said he did not know what had been in Mr. Scott's safe or what happened to the
things that Mr. Angleton removed at the time of Scott's death. Mr. Watson said that his source for this allegation was Winston Scott's widow, Janet.396/

Mr. Watson stated that he thought the CIA Mexico City Station had given the Warren Commission all the material in its possession but, he added, he also knew that Winston Scott was capable of "phonying a photo if asked to produce one. I never believed Win Scott the first time he told me something."397/

(3) Joseph Burkholder Smith Allegation

Mr. Joseph Smith, a retired CIA officer, was interviewed by the House Select Committee on Assassinations on 19 October 1977. At this interview Mr. Smith mentioned that the Mexico City Station had been very proud of finding "the picture of Oswald."398/ He mentioned this in connection with a woman who worked for Winston Scott in Mexico.399/ Mr. Smith was reluctant to speak about this at the time and the topic was not pursued.400/
Mr. Smith was reinterviewed by the House Select Committee on Assassinations on 20 April 1978. Mr. Smith was shown the omnibus CIA release letter and fully cooperated in answering the staff investigator's questions at this interview. At this time, Mr. Smith recalled hearing a story that someone, at the time of the assassination, had remembered seeing Lee Harvey Oswald's face somewhere in the photographic coverage of the Cuban or Russian Embassies. This person went back through the files and found the picture. Mr. Smith said that he does recall that the discovery of the picture had greatly pleased President Lyndon Johnson and that it had made Winston Scott his "number one boy."

Mr. Smith said that he could not recall when he had first heard this story about the photograph, but he said he was certain, however, that he had heard the story more than once. He said that the earliest that he could have possibly heard the story was in 1964 while he was stationed in Argentina. He said that not long after the assassination he may have heard the story from someone "coming through"
Argentina.407/

Des (Fitzgerald) might have even mentioned it when he came through, which was in early '64, or Gerry Droller might have mentioned it when he came through, talking about how the Mexico City Station was helping out during the investigation.408/

Mr. Smith stated that he did know Elsie Scaleti. He described her as a "very severe person and very diligent and very much the Counter-Intelligence mentality."409/ Mr. Smith stated that he also knew Ann Goodpasture. He said:

Annie was another one of Win Scott's case officers. She was in Mexico City for about 14 years. Annie was what we called the "resource person." Annie knew everything.410/

Mr. Smith said that Win Scott also had another very knowledgeable woman who worked with Ann Goodpasture in the Mexico City Station whose name he recalled as Leach or Lynch.411/ Mr. Smith's recollection associated Ms. Leach (or Lynch) with the discovery of the photograph of Oswald, but Mr. Smith was not at all sure of this recollection.412/ When asked if he had any recollection of Ms. Scaleti finding the photograph, he said:

Classification: TOP SECRET

Classified by derivation:
It could very well have been, and Annie, too. But I thought it was this other girl, Lynch. But no, I don't think I ever heard specifically who found the damn picture. I guess...I didn't care.413/

(4) Joseph Piccolo, Jr. Allegation

Mr. Joseph Piccolo, Jr. was interviewed by the House Select Committee on Assassinations on 11 August 1978. Mr. Piccolo is an operations officer in the CIA. He was stationed in Mexico City from December 1957 to January 1960 and again from August 1965 to January 1968. Mr. Piccolo was involved in anti-Cuban operations from 1962 to 1968.414/

During this interview, Mr. Piccolo told the HSCA that sometime after the assassination of John Kennedy he had seen photographs of Lee Harvey Oswald.415/ Mr. Piccolo said that he had been shown these photographs by an individual who told him that they were photographs of Lee Harvey Oswald that were obtained from the CIA's Mexico City surveillance of the Cuban diplomatic compound.416/ Mr. Piccolo could not remember the identity of the person who showed him the photographs, nor when nor where he saw the
photographs.  

The first picture shown was a three-quarter full shot of Oswald, exposing a left profile as Oswald looked downward. The second photograph which Mr. Piccolo remembered seeing was a back of the head view of Oswald. Mr. Piccolo remembered that both of these photographs were taken from above Oswald and to his left. Mr. Piccolo was shown a copy of Warren Commission Exhibit #237, the famous Mexico Mystery Man photograph. He stated that this was definitely not the man in the photographs exhibited to him. Mr. Piccolo correctly identified an unlabeled frontal photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald shown to him by the HSCA.  

Mr. Piccolo was also asked whether he knew anything about the circumstances surrounding the Agency's initial discovery of the photographs he claims to have seen. He stated that he did not have any first-hand knowledge of their discovery, but that it was the type of thing, "a coup," that would have traveled through the Agency "grapevine."
Mr. Piccolo stated that he had heard stories about a surveillance photograph of Oswald being found both in Mexico City and at CIA Headquarters in Langley.423/

He stated that Ann Goodpasture may have been the person who found a photograph of Oswald in Mexico City.424/

Mr. Piccolo said that he has heard several times that Elsie Scaleti found a photograph of Oswald.425/

The last time that he heard this story was two weeks prior to his interview by the House Select Committee on Assassinations.426/

Mr. Piccolo stated that he currently shares an office at CIA Headquarters with a man who worked on the Oswald case during a recent CIA "in-house" investigation.427/ Mr. Piccolo said that they were discussing Oswald's case because of the House Select Committee on Assassinations' release of several unidentified photographs. Mr. Piccolo stated that during the course of this discussion his office-mate, stated that Elsie Scaleti, "the gal at the Mexico desk," had found the surveillance photographs of Oswald.428/ Mr. Piccolo stated that he assumed had become aware of Ms. Scaleti's coup through his research into the Oswald case.
case. Mr. Piccolo was not certain as to when he first heard the story that Ms. Scaleti had found the photograph, but he was certain that he had heard it prior to hearing it from Mr. Piccolo speculated that the Mexico City Station may have routinely sent photographs of unidentified Americans who visited Communist Embassies to Headquarters for possible identification.

Mr. Piccolo also told the House Select Committee on Assassinations interviewers that he was aware, when he was in Mexico, that Win Scott had a personal safe in his office. He said that "restricted materials" were held in Mr. Scott's safe. "Restricted materials" were defined as very sensitive materials that did not find their way into the routine files and indexes.

(5) Statements of

stated that he had never been involved in any of the CIA's "in-house" investigations of the Kennedy assassination or Oswald. He did state, though, that he had once worked on an
"Oswald Task Force." He said that this occurred in late September or October of 1975. At that time, there were two or three FOIA suits brought against the Agency concerning the Agency's files on Oswald. These files had to be processed and the task was delegated to the Counter-Intelligence Staff and he was assigned to the task force.

Stated that he was also one of the primary contacts with two investigators from the Senate Select Committee who were looking into the Agency's files on Oswald at approximately the same time. The task force that he was part of conducted no research and analysis of which he was aware.

Stated that the only photograph he remembers seeing is the Mexico Mystery Man photo. He said that he did not recognize the name "Elsie Scaleti." He stated that he did not recall ever being told that there was a photo of Oswald from the Mexico City surveillance operations. He denied ever telling anyone that such a photo was found. He did admit, however, to discussing the assassination with Joseph Piccolo.
(1) Introduction

This Committee has conducted a general investigation into the CIA's photographic surveillance operations in Mexico City in 1963 as well as a specific investigation into the allegations mentioned above. In an attempt to determine whether the CIA's Mexico City photographic bases did, in fact, photograph Oswald, this Committee requested the CIA to make available to the HSCA the production of these bases. The CIA has in part responded to this request. However, the production from LILYRIC, the second base that covered the Soviet Embassy entrance, and the pulse camera that covered the Cuban Consulate entrance, has not been made available for review. The Agency's withholding of certain production materials from the photographic bases has prevented the Committee from determining whether a photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald was taken by these photosurveillance operations.

Also in the course of its general investigation into the CIA's surveillance operations in Mexico City

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and Oswald's visit to that city, the Committee has interviewed many CIA officers who were stationed in Mexico City, or worked in 1963 at CIA Headquarters in support of Mexican operations. They uniformly testified that the Station had not obtained a photograph of Oswald from the photosurveillance operations in Mexico City. 448/

(2) Investigation of the Allegations

Ms. Elsie Scaleti worked on the Mexico Desk in 1963. 449/ Ms. Scaleti could not recall her particular responsibilities while she was assigned to the Mexico Desk. 450/ She told the HSCA that she would have been doing routine case officer work which would have involved name traces, projects, budgets, et cetera. 451/ She could not recall any specific projects that she worked on and she stated that the case officers on the desk would not have had specific titles such as "Chief of Support Operations." 452/ She stated that the work of the Desk was assigned to the case officers by project and that work that was levied that was not part of an assigned project would have been done by anyone on the desk who happened to be available. 453/

One of Ms. Scaleti's supervisors, Mr. John
Scelso, Chief of the Mexico Branch in 1963, remembers that:

(Elsie Scaleti)...was the, sort of the Major Domino of the Branch. She managed all the records, handled all of the cables from Mexico that dealt with security suspects, or asked for traces on security suspects. 454/

Ms. Scaleti was in the position that Mr. Agee said she was in 1963. 455/

A major part of the allegations is dependent upon whether or not the CIA Mexico Station sent the photoproduction to Headquarters. HSCA review of CIA files has revealed no evidence that the photoproduction was routinely sent to Headquarters in 1963. 456/

HMMA-22307 detailed the installation of a pulse camera to cover the Cuban Consulate on September 27, 1963. 457/ The dispatch states that the results of the testing would be sent to Headquarters as soon as they were available. 458/ This Committee did not find any indication that photographs from this camera were sent to Headquarters prior to 6/19/64, when Headquarters was notified that some production was being sent by unaccountable transmittal manifest,459/ with the exception of HMMA-22433, 11/7/63 which sent samples of the photographic production from the camera. 460/ These
six samples when reviewed by the HSCA did not include a photograph.

Ms. Scaletti was asked about the allegations, however, her memory of 22 November 1963 is not good:

Q: When was the next time after you sent a cable to Mexico City Station and you teletyped those other agencies, when was the next time you heard of Lee Harvey Oswald?

A: I don't remember. The only thing I can say is that based on what is in the file that I must have heard about it when the Station came in and asked—well, if there was nothing else in the file the name popped up again, I just don't remember about the assassination or whenever.

Q: Would the testimony be that to the best of your recollection the next time you heard the name was when you heard about the assassination?

A: Probably.

Q: At that time did the name Oswald ring a bell? Did you remember the earlier cable traffic about him?

A: I just don't know. When he was assassinated, I don't even remember how long it was before they got the name of Oswald.

Q: Oswald was picked up within two hours after the assassination and the name was made public.

A: Immediately?

Q: Yes.

A: If I were in the office unless I had the radio on—we didn't have a radio in the office necess-
sarilly—I would not have heard the name Oswald until the next day probably. I would assume this was a little bit unusual, I might have tied it in. I am sure the first thing they would have done is make a name trace when they came up with that name and they would come up with a 201 file all over again.

Q: Do you recall where you were on Friday, November 22, 1963?

A: The only thing I remember about it is going home and finding my husband sitting in front of the TV and talking about it. I probably was at the office but I don't remember anything. I blanked out. I must have been at the office.

Q: Do you remember bringing John Scelso the Oswald file on that day?

A: I wouldn't remember that. If he had asked for it I probably did. It would have been natural for me to if I did. I just don't know.

Q: Did you ever find a photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald at CIA Headquarters?

A: I don't remember ever finding an Oswald photograph.

Q: Right around the time of the assassination?

A: I don't remember it.

Q: Did you find a photograph of someone whom you thought to be Lee Harvey Oswald?

A: I don't remember that either.

Q: Do you know Philip Agee?

A: Yes...
Q: Did you ever tell Joe Smith or Phillip Agee that you had found a photograph of Oswald or someone you thought to be Oswald?
A: I did not know Joseph Smith in Mexico City. I had never seen Joe except at the station in Mexico City and Phil I only saw when I was in Mexico.
Q: So your answer to the question is no?
A: I don't recall it and I don't see that I would have any reason.
Q: I guess for the purpose of clarification I would like to ask the question one more time. Did you ever tell Phillip Agee or Joseph Smith that you found a picture of Oswald or someone whom you thought to be Oswald?
A: Not that I can recall.

At the time of the assassination the CIA's 201 personality file on Lee Harvey Oswald was in the possession of the Mexico City Desk. That desk had possession of the file from 10 October 1963 when it had received a report that a man claiming to be Lee Oswald had been in contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.

Fortunately, Ms. Scaleti's supervisor had a better memory of the events that transpired at CIA Headquarters on the day that President Kennedy was assassinated. He said:

A: ...I do not know how long after the actual shooting it was that Oswald's name became
known, perhaps an hour, hour and a half. Within minutes after that, they were out with the cables in their hands.

Q: Within minutes of the name Oswald being on the radio, an officer came in with Oswald cables?
A: Yes.

Q: Who was that officer?
A: I believe it was Mrs. (Elsie Scaleti) who was the sort of the Major Domo of the Branch. She managed all the records, handled all of the cables from Mexico that dealt with security suspects, or asked for traces on security suspects.

Q: Did you ask her how she was able to obtain the Oswald cables so quickly?
A: No, I know where she would have gotten them. We have copies of them right in our Branch.

Q: At that time, did she also have a photograph of Oswald?
A: No, I do not think so.

Q: Do you know whether Elsie Scaleti ever discovered a photograph of Oswald at CIA Headquarters?
A: I do not think so...I do not remember any photograph of Oswald at that time, the day of the assassination, or even later. I do remember our asking -- we had to ask ONI for a photo, and so on. As far as I recall, they never sent us one. It could be that later on she found one, but I don't recall.
The chief of the Mexico Branch quoted above was also responsible for the initial CIA investigation into the assassination of John Kennedy.466/

Mr. Scelso also testified that, at the time of the assassination, the name of Lee Harvey Oswald did not ring a bell with him because "thousands of names were crossing my desk every month."467/ He was asked why Ms. Scaleti, who came across as many names as he did, would have remembered Oswald when he had not.

She was concerned only with Mexico and I had five or six other countries to work with as well. She has a fantastic memory...(Elsie Scaleti) in her job as the manager of records, traces and files, in this Mexico desk, was an outstanding officer to whom I gave, in one of her fitness reports, the highest evaluation, outstanding, number 6 and so on, that can be given, that was very rarely given at that time. Her work was pretty near flawless and she also was an outstanding trainer of new employees.468/

Material removed from Win Scott's safe now in possession of the CIA provides critically important circumstantial evidence that the CIA photo-surveillance operations obtained photographs of Oswald:

"(Oswald's) visits and conversations are not hearsay; for persons watching these embassies photographed Oswald as he entered and left each one; and clocked the time he spent on each visit." 469/

This Committee believes that a photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald was probably obtained by CIA photosurveillance in...
Mexico. There are allegations that such a photo was found; there is testimony that such a photo should have been obtained; the CIA's withholding of materials; Ms. Scaleti's strange lapse of memory regarding the events of 11/22/63; and Mr. Scott's manuscript; these things, in the Committee's view, would tend to indicate that a photo of Lee Harvey Oswald was obtained. On the other hand the consistent testimony that a photo was not obtained in Mexico; the absence of any record of transmittal of the photo to Headquarters (The weight of this consideration is mitigated by the fact that there were methods of communication available that were not incorporated into the CIA's record keeping systems.); and the testimony of Ms. Scaleti and Mr. Scelso that a photo was not discovered would tend to indicate that, in fact, the allegations that Ms. Scaleti found a photo of LHO are false.

III. B. Information Connected to Lee Harvey Oswald by the Mexico City Station Prior to the Assassination.

1. Introduction

This study has demonstrated that the information from the Soviet Embassy taps and from Headquarters was available to the Mexico City Station prior to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. In addition to the Agency acknowledged information, there is a distinct possibility that
the Station had available to it one additional telephonic intercept transcript, and one or more surveillance photographs.

This Committee has made an attempt to determine when the available information was linked to Lee Harvey Oswald. The Committee has also made an attempt to determine whether all the intercepted telephone calls were in fact connected with Oswald or involved Oswald. It should be pointed out, however, that this analysis can only be directed at that information now known to have been available to the Mexico City Station. This information will be discussed briefly in the following section. In addition, the question of whether Oswald or an Oswald imposter visited the Embassies and made the phone calls, along with the possibility that Oswald was not alone in Mexico City, will be dealt with in greater detail in the final section of this report.

2. Information Available from the Soviet Wiretaps that was Connected with or involved Lee Harvey Oswald.

The Mexico City Station possessed nine intercepted telephone conversations that may have dealt with Oswald. The conversations are summarized below for easy reference.\footnote{470/} In the following discussion the conversations will be referred to by date and time of occurrence.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>SUMMARY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9/27/63</td>
<td>10:30 AM</td>
<td>Man calls Soviet Military Attache regarding a visa for Odessa. (Spanish)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/27/63</td>
<td>10:37 AM</td>
<td>Man calls Soviet Consulate regarding a visa for Odessa. (Spanish)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/27/63</td>
<td>1:25 PM</td>
<td>Man calls the Soviet Consulate and asks for the Consul. (Spanish)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/27/63</td>
<td>4:05PM</td>
<td>Silvia Duran calls the Soviet Consulate. (Spanish)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/27/63</td>
<td>4:26PM</td>
<td>Soviet Consulate calls Duran (Spanish)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/28/63</td>
<td>11:51AM</td>
<td>Duran calls Soviet Consulate and puts a man on the phone. (Spanish Russian and English.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/1/63</td>
<td>10:31AM</td>
<td>Man calls Soviet Military Attache. (Russian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/1/63</td>
<td>10:45 AM</td>
<td>Man calls Soviet Consulate identifying himself as Lee Oswald. (Russian and English)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/3/63</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Man calls the Soviet Military Attache. (Spanish and English)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
After the assassination the CIA's Mexico City Station passed copies of seven of the above listed conversations to the U.S. Embassy Legal Attache. The 9/27/10:30 and the 9/27 1:25 calls listed above are not included in this dissemination. The cover memorandum states:

Attached are photostatic copies of transcripts of all conversations from technical operations of this office which are possibly pertinent in this case.

The HSCA has not been able to determine why the 9/27 10:30 and 9/27 1:25 calls were not included in this memorandum. While the 1:25 call could be considered unrelated, it is unlikely that the same would apply to the 10:30 call since the 9/27 10:37 call is included in the memorandum.

At the bottom of each attachment page to the Scott memorandum, a summary of the conversation is provided. The Station questioned the relevancy of only one of the seven calls presented in the memorandum. The summary of the 10/3 call says:

By the context of other conversations by Oswald and the fact that this called (sic) spoke in broken Spanish and English rather than Russian which he used previously, it is probable that this caller is not Oswald.

(Ibid., p.9.)

A judgement that this call did not pertain to Lee Harvey Oswald could be based on the following facts:
1) the caller spoke broken Spanish; 2) the caller did not have the number of the Consulate; 3) the caller did not know that visas were issued at the Consulate; and 4) the caller states that he is seeking a visa, not that he is checking on an application already made. The majority of the evidence indicates that Lee Harvey Oswald could not speak Spanish.\textsuperscript{476}

In light of Delgado's assertions, it is possible that Oswald had at least a limited knowledge of Spanish. It should be noted that the 10/3 transcript listed above indicates that the caller spoke in broken Spanish.\textsuperscript{477} The fact that this conversation was in Spanish, should not by itself rule out the possibility that Oswald made the phone call. This is especially true in light of Delgado's allegations and the 9/27 10:30, 9/27 10:37 and 9/27 1:25 calls which were also in Spanish.\textsuperscript{478}

The record reflects that Oswald had the phone numbers of both the Soviet Consulate and the Soviet Military Attache in his notebook.\textsuperscript{479} It can not be determined when Oswald entered the numbers in the notebook. Since Oswald had previously called the Consulate it is likely that he had the number prior to 3 October. It is also clear that Oswald knew that the Consulate was responsible for issuing visas due to his prior dealings with the Soviet and Cuban Consulates. Thus, it is probable that the 10/3 conversation did not pertain to Oswald.
The 10/1 10:45 call is clearly relevant because the caller identifies himself as "Lee Oswald." The 10/1 10:31 conversation is probably relevant due to the similarity with the 10/1 10:45 call and the marginal notations about the quality of the Russian spoken by the caller. The 9/28 11:51 call is clearly relevant, again due to the marginal notations and the involvement of Silvia Duran. Duran's calls on 9/27 clearly related to Oswald due to the substantive information discussed in those calls.

In summary, the above listed calls contain the substance of the information available to the CIA MCS prior to the assassination from the Soviet electronic intercept operation. The first three calls on 9/27/63 and the one on 10/3/63, if they were indeed Oswald, add little of substance to the information that was available from the other calls.

3. When were the Intercepted Conversations Linked to Lee Harvey Oswald.

HSCA staff researchers reviewed the transcripts on the Soviet Embassy. The chronological production from this operation is on microfilm at CIA Headquarters. In addition to the chronological file, numerous copies of the transcripts that pertain to Oswald were found throughout the CIA's files on Lee Harvey Oswald.

It is obvious that the Mexico City Station linked the.
10/1 10:45 call to Lee Harvey Oswald because Oswald identified himself in the call and the Mexico City Station reported Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy to Headquarters on 10/8/63. On this transcript the translator added the notation:

The same person who phoned a day or so ago and spoke in broken Russian.

The transcript from the 9/28 11:51 call also bears marginal notations from the translator. "MO (man outside) takes the phone and says in broken Russian... speaks terrible, hardly recognizable Russian." The first copy of this transcript in Oswald's Mexico City "P" file also bears routing indications that show that the transcript was sent to Win Scott, Ann Goodpasture and Robert Shaw. These routing indications were made by [CIA C2] and testified that these routing indications would have been made when she first saw the transcript. [CIA C2] also wrote an instruction on this transcript to file it in the "Soviet Contacts" file at the same time. The 9/27 4:05 transcript also bears [CIA C2] routing and file instructions.

The 9/27 4:26 transcript also bears [CIA C2] routing and filing instructions. In addition, this transcript also bears a notation from Win Scott which says "Is it possible to identify?" [CIA C1] wrote an instruction on this transcript to file it in Oswald's "P" file.

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Classified by derivation.
The above four conversations which occurred on 9/27 and 9/28 contain almost all of the substantive information that was available to the Mexico City station on Oswald from the Soviet electronic intercept operation. These conversations were not linked to Oswald prior to 8 October 1963 when MEXI 6453 was sent to Headquarters reporting Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy on 1 October, 1963.\textsuperscript{494/}

The conversations discussed above were linked to Lee Harvey Oswald by 16 October 1963, the date that the Mexico City station opened its "P" file on Oswald.\textsuperscript{495/} The process by which, and the events leading up to, the linkage of Oswald to the intercepted calls will be discussed in the following section on the Mexico City Station's actions regarding the Oswald case prior to the assassination.

4. The Photograph of the Mexico Mystery Man.

A photograph of an unidentified individual who visited the Soviet Embassy was incorrectly linked to Oswald prior to the assassination.\textsuperscript{496/} The manner in which this mistake was made and the consequences of that mistake will be discussed in the following sections on the Mexico City Station's actions prior and subsequent to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.