The reader should be advised at the outset that the first section following is technical in nature and may not appear directly relevant at first blush. But the report is cumulative in nature. The specific, detailed analyses of the standard operating procedures in the first section are necessary to, and form a partial basis for, the reconstruction of the Mexico City Station's handling of the Oswald case. There are many gaps left by the documentary and testimonial evidence concerning the manner in which the CIA's Mexico City Station and Headquarters reacted to Oswald's presence in Mexico City. A knowledge of the way in which the Mexico City Station operated and the procedures involved in those surveillance operations which detected Oswald is valuable in filling the gaps of the specific case which is the subject of this report.

II. Central Intelligence Agency Surveillance Operations in Mexico City in September and October 1963
A. Photographic Surveillance Operations Aimed at the Cuban Diplomatic Compound

1. Introduction

The Mexico City Station of the Central Intelligence Agency maintained photographic surveillance on the Cuban diplomatic compound during September and October of 1963. The purpose of this operation was to get identifiable photographs of all individuals who visited the Cuban diplomatic compound.

2. Physical Positioning of Surveillance Bases and Targets

The Cuban diplomatic compound covered one city block in Mexico City between Tacubaya, Francisco Marquez and Zamora Streets. The entrance to the Cuban Embassy was located on the corner of Tacubaya and Francisco Marquez. Next to this entrance on Francisco Marquez Street was another entrance for automobiles. The entrance to the Cuban Consulate,
which was in a separate building from the Embassy, was located on the corner of Francisco Marquez and Zamora.7/ The CIA surveillance post was located at 149 Francisco Marquez Street.8/ An agent photographed visitors to the Embassy from one window in the third floor apartment at 149 Francisco Marquez Street.9/ A pulse camera covered the entrance to the Consulate from a second window in the same third floor apartment.10/

3. Objectives of Operation and Scope of Coverage Provided

One CIA officer, who claimed to have had a marginal role in this surveillance operation, remembers that they had trouble covering both the Cuban Embassy entrance and the Consulate entrance.11/ "The Cuban Embassy coverage had more sophisticated equipment, using a pulse camera which frequently developed mechanical difficulties."12/ Two former CIA employees who were in Mexico City in 1963 remembered that there were two cameras covering the Cuban diplomatic compound.13/ Ms. Goodpasture, a case officer in the
Mexico City Station, testified that she could not remember the locations of the two cameras. David A. Phillips, Chief of the Cuban Section in the Mexico City Station, testified that the Consulate entrance was covered along with the Embassy entrance. Mr. Phillips was not absolutely sure of his recollection, but thought that it was possible that the Embassy entrance had been covered by a manned photographic base and the Consulate entrance was covered by a pulse camera.

The CIA staff technician who serviced the cameras and trained the agents at the CIA photographic base that covered the Cuban compound was interviewed by the House Select Committee on Assassinations. The technician stated that he had set up the cameras in the photographic base at the inception of an operation in the early 1960's designed to provide photographic surveillance of the Cuban compound. For a short time after the inception of the operation, the technician had been responsible for maintaining liaison between the agents inside the base and the Station. After the agent's training was completed,
the technician turned the liaison responsibilities over to a case officer.17/ He could not remember with certainty the identity of that case officer, but thought that it may have been Robert Shaw.18/ The technician remembered that the operation had originally covered the Cuban Embassy entrance with a manually operated Exacta or Leica camera. He said that this camera had been set up on a tripod and was equipped with a Bal-Scope.19/ Later, according to the technician, a pulse camera was installed in this base. The pulse camera was set up to cover the Consulate entrance, while the agents continued covering the Embassy entrance with the manual camera. The technician could not remember with certainty when the pulse camera was installed in the base. The technician told the House Select Committee on Assassinations that the exact time of installation could be checked by reviewing the project files maintained at CIA Headquarters.20/

The technician remembered quite a few details about how the pulse camera had been set up and how it worked. He remembered that the shutter was triggered by a device attached to a spotting scope.21/
triggering device was activated by changes in light intensity. The spotting scope was trained on a very narrow area of the door latch of the Cuban Consulate entrance. The camera itself covered a much broader field than the spotting scope. The camera was set up so as to make sure that a person triggering the camera by passing between the spotting scope and its target, the door latch, would be photographed from the waist up.22/

The technician stated that the agent in the photographic basehouse serviced his own cameras, and developed the film and made contact prints in the basehouse.23/ The agent covering the Embassy entrance kept a log corresponding to the photographs taken.24/

The project files for this operation bear out the technician's recollections. An examination of these files by the House Select Committee on Assassinations revealed several of the technician's monthly reports. An examination of the chronological file of dispatches passing between CIA Headquarters and the Mexico City Station turned up one additional monthly report that was not located in the project file. A third relevant
dispatch was made available to the Committee on 20 November 1978. The report in the dispatch chronology covers the period of 1 September to 30 September 1963. The dispatch reports that on 23 September 1963 the agent who ran the Cuban photographic basehouse called the technician into the basehouse to discuss the layout of the Cuban Consulate. The entrance to the Cuban Consulate had been closed in 1961 due to harassment and stink bombings. A few days prior to the 23rd, the Consulate had once again opened its door to the public. Prior to this reopening of the Consulate door, the photography agent had limited his coverage to the main Embassy gate. He used an Exacta camera with a Bal-Scope with a 30-power eyepiece. The dispatch reported, however, from the position he had to cover the main gate, he could not cover the newly reopened Consulate entrance. The base agent told the technician that at that time, approximately seventy percent of all the visitors to the Cuban compound were using the Embassy entrance and the remainder used the Consulate entrance.
The technician discussed this problem with the case officer for the project, Robert Shaw. Mr. Shaw asked the technician to add additional photographic coverage to the basehouse so as to cover the Consulate door. On 26 September the technician tested equipment for use in the basehouse. The dispatch goes on to say:

On the morning of 27 September, PARMUTH installed the VLS-2 Trigger Device at the LIERODE basehouse and used the 500 mm lens issued with this system, one 400 mm Telyt, one reflex housing to be used with the Telyt adapted to fit the Robot Star camera, one Robot Star Camera, one solenoid release for mounting and triggering the Robot Star Camera, one Kodak K-100 adapted for single or burst type exposure, one solenoid release to be used with the K-100... one 152 mm f/4 Cine Ektar Lens, and two additional tripods.

The photography agent was instructed to test each camera for four days. The report says that the results of these test days will be forwarded to the Technical Services Division at Headquarters as soon as they become available.

On 7 November 1963 the Mexico City Station filed a report on the functioning of the pulse camera. This dispatch is referenced to
HMMA-22307, paragraph 5, p. 37/ It says that the VLS-2 triggering device had been performing well with little false triggering. The 500 mm lens was replaced with a 6-inch lens so as to obtain wider coverage of the Consulate door. 38/ During the first two weeks that the pulse camera was in operation, the VLS-2 triggered the camera anytime that anyone entered or left the Consulate door. This dual photography used an excessive amount of film, so the base agent adjusted the VLS-2 so that it only photographed people leaving the Cuban compound by the Consulate door. 39/ The base agent used "the K-100 camera with the 152 mm lens for one day and turned in 10 fee (sic) of 16 mm film." 40/ Samples of the photos taken "on that day" with the camera are enclosed with the dispatch. 41/ The Robot Star camera that was placed in the base on September 27 broke down after four days of operation and was replaced with a second Robot Star camera. 42/ This Robot Star broke down after five days of operation. At the time of this dispatch in November, a Robot Star camera was in operation. 43/ Samples of this camera's photographs
were also sent with this dispatch. Hence, between September 27, 1963 and November 7, 1963, at least three, and possibly four, cameras were used in the photo base with the VLS-2 automatic triggering device. On the 27th, the photo-technician installed two cameras, the K-100 and the first Robot Star, with the VLS-2 triggering device. The K-100 was used for one day. The first Robot Star worked for four days; a second Robot Star worked for five days. On 11/7/63 a Robot Star was in operation at the base. It is not clear whether the Robot Star which was working at the time of the November dispatch was a third camera or one of the earlier ones which could have been repaired. In any event, the Station asked that a new camera be sent to replace the Robot Star.

On June 1964 the CIA Mexico City Station sent a cable to Headquarters alerting them that they were sending up the negatives from the pulse camera coverage of the Cuban Embassy. All available negatives and five packages of undeveloped film were sent to Headquarters by transmittal manifest #252572.
The cable apologizes for the delay in sending the negatives caused by "consolidation and dating." The cable suggests that Headquarters retain possession of the negatives and informs Headquarters that the negatives will be forwarded to them on a regular basis.

A transmittal manifest is "unaccountable." That means that the document and the material it transmits is not made part of the record and is, therefore, unretrievable.

The CIA made the photo-technician's monthly report for December available to the Committee on 16 November 1978. On the morning of 17 December 1963, a 35 mm Sequence camera was installed in the base house with the VLS-2 trigger device. The installation of this Sequence camera was probably in response to the request for a replacement camera in HMMA-22433.

On 22 June 1965 the CIA Mexico City Station sent a dispatch to Headquarters to familiarize them with the details of the pulse camera operation.
This dispatch is intended to familiarize Headquarters with the details of the Pulse Camera operation in Mexico City, which was mounted in December 1963 and is targeted against the (Cuban) Embassy and Consulate.59/

The dispatch goes on to report that a technician from Headquarters brought a pulse camera to Mexico City in mid-December 1963, installed and tested it, and instructed the technician resident in Mexico City and the base agent in the use and maintenance of the camera.60/

On the basis of HMMA-22307, HMMA-22433 and MEXI 9940, the Committee believes that it is probable that the pulse camera was in operation on the days that Lee Harvey Oswald visited the Cuban Consulate. This Committee requested the photographs produced by the pulse camera by the project's cryptonym on 22 June 1978. The CIA informed a House Select Committee on Assassinations researcher on 7/20/78 that the cryptonym did not refer to a photographic project.61/ A more specific request for the photographs was made on 21 July 1978.62/

On 13 October 1978 the Committee, as a result of a review of materials taken by James Angleton from Win Scott's safe at the time of his death,63/ addressed another letter to the CIA on this matter.64/ This letter

Classification: TOP SECRET
Classified by derivation: 138
said, in part:

First, while admittedly there are contradictions in the Agency's written records, these records nevertheless suggest that an impulse camera was in operation when Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy. Such a camera would have automatically been triggered to photograph any person entering the Embassy. In addition, it has been determined by this Committee that Oswald entered and exited from the Cuban and Soviet compounds on at least five separate occasions, resulting in a total of ten opportunities during which Oswald could have been photographed by CIA surveillance cameras. The existence of an Agency photograph of Oswald has been further corroborated by CIA personnel both in Mexico City and at Agency headquarters who claim to have seen this material.

Finally, on October 6, 1978, a manuscript written by the late Win Scott, former Chief of Station of the CIA's Mexico City Station, was reviewed by a staff member of this Committee. While the criticism can be offered that Scott's manuscript has not yet been established as a true record, relevant portions of this manuscript do suggest that the contents are accurate and that photographs of Oswald were in fact obtained by the CIA's Mexico City surveillance operations. At page 273 of the manuscript, Scott wrote:

These visits and conversations are not heresay; for persons watching these embassies photographed Oswald as he entered and left each one; and clocked the time he spent on each visit. The conversations are also known to have taken place, including the one in which he told the Soviet to whom he was talking that he should have heard, received a message, from the Soviet Embassy in Washington, indicating...
obviously that a Soviet Embassy official in Washington had offered to help Oswald.

Scott's comments are a source of deep concern to this Committee, for they suggest your Agency's possible withholding of photographic materials highly relevant to this investigation.

Therefore, the Committee reiterates its request of May 2, including but not limited to any and all photographs in the CIA's possession of Lee Harvey Oswald resulting from CIA surveillance operations directed against the Soviet and Cuban Embassies and Consulates in Mexico City. In addition, the Committee requests a detailed explanation regarding the withholding of any and all photographs in the CIA's possession of Oswald resulting from CIA surveillance operations directed against the Soviet and Cuban Embassies and Consulates in Mexico City.

The CIA responded to this letter on 25 October 1978. The CIA informed the Committee that it was their belief that the pulse camera was not in operation during September of 1963.

First, there was no pulse camera...opposite the entrance to the Cuban Consulate until December 1963...In fact, there had been no photographic coverage of the Consulate entrance prior to the visit of Lee Harvey Oswald to Mexico City...The Consulate entrance had been closed for some time, and after it was reopened the 27th of September was scheduled as the day for installation of photographic equipment for its coverage. Difficulty was experienced in the installation and the technicians had to machine a part for...
the equipment...The technicians probably had to make the part in question. On that date, or at some date not long afterwards, there was test photography of the entrance... Various difficulties were experienced with the equipment, which seems eventually to have been resolved by installation of the pulse camera in December 1963. There is no question about the sequence set forth above.68/

HMMA-22307 definitely reports the installation of the two cameras and a VLS-2 trigger device on 27 September 1963.69/ But the cameras did not function smoothly.70/ HMMA-22433 reported that the K-100 camera broke down after one day's operation.71/ It was replaced with the first Robot Star, which had also been installed on September 27. The first Robot Star broke down four days after its installation.72/ A second Robot Star broke down after five days of operation.73/ A Robot Star was working on 7 November 1963, when HMMA-22433 requested that Headquarters send a replacement camera to Mexico.74/ In all likelihood, that request was filled with the installation of the Sequence camera on 17 December 1963 detailed in HMMA-22726.75/ Under this interpretation of the documents, the operation would have gone into continuous
operation in mid-December 1963 as claimed by the CIA. But the first pulse camera was set up on Friday, September 27, 1963. The documents do not specify the days that the original cameras functioned. HMMA-22307 says:

(The base agent) was requested to test the Robot Star Camera for four days and the K-100 for another four days. 76/

HMMA-22433 says:

(The base agent) used the K-100 with a 152 mm lens for one day, turning in 10 feet (sic) of 16 mm film...The Robot Star and the Telyt 400 mm lens are now being used with the VLS-2 on this project...The Robot Star camera which was given to (the base agent) with the VLS-2 broke down after four days of photographing. (The technician) replaced this with another Robot. Five days later the second camera failed to advance properly. 77/

This Committee believes that it is reasonable to assume that the base agent started using the equipment immediately after it was installed. 78/ Hence, the one day that the K-100 was used would have been either the 27th (the day it was installed), the 28th (a Saturday) or the 30th (the following Monday). It is also reasonable to assume that the Robot Star was put into action the day of, or the day following, the breakdown of the K-100. This camera worked for four
days. So the Consulate was probably the subject of photographic surveillance from 27 September to 1 October, assuming that the five days of coverage from the original cameras started on the day of installation and ran continuously, except for Sunday, September 30th.

The base agent developed the film from the pulse camera and turned it over in negative form to his contact. The film was probably routinely sent to Headquarters.

The technician who set up the cameras in the base house said that the objective of the operation was to get identifiable photographs of all visitors to the Cuban compound. The goals of the operation were spelled out in the 1966 Project Renewal request.

Its original objectives, still current, include furnishing photographic coverage during daylight hours of the Embassy and Consulate entrances.

Even though this was the stated objective, Ann Goodpasture testified that she was not sure, but thought that the coverage of the Cuban Consulate and Embassy would have been continuous only during office hours. This was also the recollection of David
Phillips. During September, October and November of 1963, the Cuban Consulate was open to the public from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.; the Embassy was open to the public from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.

A blind memo, dated 11/27/64, entitled "Memo passed to Mr. Papich of FBI with info on photo coverage of Embassies and info on Kostikov," implies that the coverage on the Cuban Embassy was of a continuous nature during daylight hours. This memo also implies that there was a coverage of the Cuban Consulate. The technician who serviced this operation in Mexico City remembers that he tried to get full daylight coverage of the compound but that it was very difficult. He said that the manual coverage was usually good but that human error had to be taken into account when considering the manual coverage. He pointed out that it was hard for a person to maintain constant attention in such a sedentary job and, hence, some visitors would get by the manual operation. The technician also remembered that he had set up the pulse camera to provide constant daylight coverage. By 1965 the pulse camera was
only working for six hours a day. The House Select Committee on Assassinations has not been able to determine the scope of the pulse camera coverage during September and October 1963 by examination of the production because that production, if it exists, has not been made available for review.

The CIA has made the photographic production and logs from the manual coverage of the Embassy entrance available for House Select Committee on Assassinations review. All production from the manual camera coverage of the Cuban Embassy for the months of September, October and November was examined. This examination revealed that the coverage of the Embassy was fairly consistent between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. on weekdays. There was coverage, with a few exceptions, on every weekday. There was no coverage on weekends. During the three-month period examined by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, only four weekdays were not covered by the photographic surveillance operation aimed at the Cuban Embassy. There was no evidence in the files of serious technical difficulties or camera
problems in the manual operation during these three months.99/

4. Disposition of Production from the Operation

The photographs from the manual camera were maintained in a chronological file at the CIA station in Mexico City.100/ These photographs were routinely shown to a penetration agent in the Cuban Embassy for identification purposes.101/ After this agent left the employment of the Cuban Embassy in 1965, the photographs were sent to the JM WAVE Station in Miami, Florida for review by Cuban defectors such as AMMUG/1.102/

The disposition of the pulse camera photographs in general, beyond the fact that as of 1965, and possibly earlier, the production was routinely sent to Headquarters, is unknown.103/ The CIA denies that the pulse camera was functioning during the time Oswald was in Mexico.104/ If the Committee's belief that the pulse camera was functioning on the days that Oswald visited the Cuban Consulate is correct, then the ultimate disposition of the photographs produced on those days remains a mystery.
B. Photographic Surveillance Operations Aimed at the Soviet Diplomatic Compound

1. Introduction

The Mexico City CIA Station maintained photographic surveillance on the Soviet diplomatic compound in Mexico City in 1963. Three photographic sites, or bases, were used in this operation. The primary objective of the operation was to photograph people who visited the Soviet Embassy. The operation, generally, covered the main gate of the Soviet compound between 900 and 1800 (or dark) on weekdays and from 900 to 1430 on Saturdays.

There were three bases which provided photographic surveillance of the Soviet diplomatic compound in 1963. One of the bases overlooked the enclosed garden or "backyard" area of the Soviet Embassy. The other two bases, of primary concern to this Committee, covered the entrance to the Soviet compound. The primary base, LIMITED, was directly across the street intersection from the main Soviet Embassy gate; the secondary, or "back-up," LILYRIC base was across the street and down a little way from the main Embassy gate.

3. Objectives of Operation and Scope of Coverage Provided

The purpose of this operation has also been described as being to obtain photographs of Soviet officials and their families; all foreigners (non-Latin) who visited the Embassy; and cars with foreign license plates. One of the main purposes of the photographic bases that covered the Embassy gate was to obtain a photograph of every "foreigner," or non-Latin, in contact with the Soviet Embassy.
This was done in an attempt to identify possible Soviet espionage agents.

My understanding of that was that it was to be used to identify those people who might be working for the Soviets as espionage agents who were U.S. citizens who went down there driving a car with a U.S. license plate on it, or people we did not know but could identify. The same procedure was also used for trying to identify people other than U.S. citizens. 115/

It is reported that the Mexican nationals who manned the photographic bases and actually took the photographs had an "uncanny ability" to pick out foreigners. 116/

The House Select Committee on Assassinations next attempted to determine the scope of the photographic coverage on the main gate of the Soviet Embassy. At a minimum, the Embassy was probably covered by the photographic operations during office hours. "The instructions were to cover the entire work day (office hours)..." 117/ "Instructions were to cover office hours, photograph each new Soviet and family, all foreigners and foreign license plates." 118/ The normal work hours of the Soviet Embassy during September and October of 1963 were from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.
There are some indications that the photographic coverage was more extensive than just office hours. Even though the Embassy was not open past 6:00 p.m., visitors could still gain entrance by ringing the gate bell. "Russian speakers can get in any time."120/ One CIA officer who was in Mexico City remembers "that the photo surveillance was constant except for instances where it would be down for security reasons or equipment malfunction."121/ A blind memorandum, dated 11/27/63, entitled "Memo passed to Mr. Papich of FBI with info on photo coverage of embassies and info on Kostikov," says, in part, We have photographic coverage during daylight hours on the USSR, Cuban, Czechoslovak and Polish Embassies. Their consulates are located in the embassies and therefore the coverage of the embassies would include coverage of the consulates. The photographic coverage is of a continuous nature during daylight hours. However, weather conditions and other factors affecting any photographic efforts require that the coverage not be considered as total or complete.122/ Ann Goodpasture was questioned about the scope of the photographic coverage on the Soviet compound. She said:

I cannot give you the exact time (of coverage). I can guess, and my guess is that they were
open most of the time when the Consulate was opened for business hours. But the person who would have that information, the only person who would know, is the case officer who was handling the project at that time.123/

Ms. Goodpasture explained the discrepancy between the time of coverage as stated in her notes and testimony and that in the 11/27/63 memorandum by saying that the memorandum referred to the coverage instituted after the assassination of John Kennedy.124/ An examination of the photographic production from the LIMITED base shows that the coverage from that base prior to the assassination was fairly uneven.125/ The log sheets for this operation show that, if anything, coverage decreased after the assassination.126/

The House Select Committee on Assassinations reviewed production and log materials from one base, LIMITED, which covered the gate of the Soviet diplomatic compound.127/ The LIMITED base was referred to as the "primary" base because it began operation before the LILYRIC base opened.128/
LILYRIC was planned as an alternate base to LIMITED. It was in an upper story on the same side of the street as LIMITED but in the middle of the block South. It had a slanted view of the front gate of the Soviet Embassy.129/

The following chart lists the production from the LIMITED base which was made available to the House Select Committee on Assassinations.130/

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<td>24</td>
<td>1000-1600</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
+Not Available.
Given the somewhat uneven nature of the coverage maintained by LIMITED,131/ the House Select Committee on Assassinations staff asked whether the two bases were run in conjunction so as to provide more comprehensive coverage. [CIA B] the project's case officer, did not remember that this was the case. He did remember that both bases operated at the same time so as to get the most complete coverage possible.132/ [CIA B] was not sure whether there was routine coverage of the Soviet Embassy on weekends.133/ He said that it was possible that there was routine coverage on Saturday mornings.134/

An examination of the project file maintained by the CIA on the photographic coverage of the Soviet Embassy does not bear out [CIA B] assertion that the two bases duplicated efforts. In fact, the project file confirmed that the bases complemented each other rather than duplicated efforts. This was the case in 1960 when a project review stated:
LIMITED - This base compiles daily logs indicating all arrivals, departures and where possible, identities of every person visiting or working at the LIMERICK target. LIMITED's photographic coverage is still concentrated on visitors, as opposed to employees, to the LIMERICK installation. LILYRIC photographs also are concentrated on visitors to the target, as opposed to employees. It should be noted that LILYRIC operates for photographic coverage during the hours from daylight to 1400 hours each day of the week except Sunday. The LIMITED base maintains photographic coverage from 1400 hours to darkness each day except Sunday.135/

In 1961 the project review said:

1. To collect operational information pertaining to LIMERICK personnel and physical facilities through use of photographic base houses. Three photographic bases, LIMITED, LILYRIC...contribute to this objective. To avoid repetition, the Station is omitting the usual description of the functions of these three bases and how they contribute to the above objective. There has been no change in the coverage as described in the 1960 Request for Project Renewal.136/

Similar statements are included in the project reviews for 1962 and 1963.137/ At one point a move was made at Headquarters to close the LILYRIC base:
FI/OPS recommends strongly that the photo coverage be reviewed from the standpoint of value and usefulness with a view to determining whether the LILYRIC activity could not be safely eliminated and the additional photographic coverage conducted on a more selective basis, without materially affecting overall usefulness.138/

The Mexico City Station took exception to this recommendation:

While HMMA 14093 correctly referred to LIMITED, LILYRIC... as "photographic base-houses," the Station would like to emphasize that photographic coverage is only one of their functions. LIMITED is used as a radio dispatch base for automobile surveillance teams in addition to physical surveillance of persons entering the front gate. Their photography is negligible compared to their other duties. The LILYRIC base performs the best photography of persons visiting the front gate, perhaps because the vantage point for taking the pictures is from the second floor and above the street traffic which partially blocks LIMITED photographs. LILYRIC also does individual reports on LIMERICK personnel entering and leaving the main gate...139/

In 1964 the Mexico City Station restated the operating procedures of the two bases in a dispatch referenced to the above paragraph from HMMA-14793:
The Station feels that it would be helpful to summarize at this time information previously reported to Headquarters (see paragraph 3, reference B) concerning the photo basehouses under this project and thereby give Headquarters an updated frame of reference in which to view the roles of the various basehouses.

The LIMITED and LILYRIC basehouses provide coverage of front of the LIMERICK installation. Although on the surface it may appear that these two basehouses provide duplicate take, this is not the case. It has been the Station's experience in running the unilateral LIEMPTY operation that a 0900 to evening workday, which would be required of a single basehouse in order to cover the LIMERICK target effectively, is just too long for any pair of agents to remain effective. This is especially true when it is considered that these basehouse operators are essentially unsupervised during their workday. It would also be impossible for a single base-house to provide the kind of coverage this station needs on the target installation, especially during the peak hours of activity, namely late morning and early afternoon. For these reasons, the LILYRIC basehouse generally operates from 0900 to 1400 or 1500 weekdays. LIMITED operates from 1200 to 1800 or dark (as the daily situation dictates) on weekdays, and 0900 to 1400 on Saturdays. (These hours are subject to change to fit Station needs.) Special coverage for Sunday is arranged on a need basis; however, past experience has shown regular coverage of Saturday afternoons and Sundays is not rewarding. This schedule provides for both basehouses to be in action
during the peak activity hours of the LIMERICK target. Although even this arrangement is not completely airtight, anything less than this would present unacceptable gaps in the coverage. It must also be considered that without two basehouses covering the front of the target installation, any illness, personal problem or vacation for operators of one basehouse would terminate Station coverage.

It must also be considered that without two basehouses covering the front of the target installation, any illness, personal problem or vacation for operators of one basehouse would terminate Station coverage...

It is the Station's opinion that as long as the LIMERICK installation is a prime target of the Station, it will be necessary to maintain the present three basehouses. To eliminate any one of the three would create a gap in the Station's coverage that would not be compatible with the emphasis placed on this target.140/

But the information in the preceding chart does not correlate with the statement of the coverage in HMMA-23343. The above chart, on pages 37-38, refers to the coverage of the Soviet compound by the base that the review of HMMA-23343 reveals covered the compound from 1200 to 1800 or dark. The chart shows that while 1200 to 1800 coverage is sometimes the case, the base's coverage of the Embassy, at least during the months of September and October, on days when the base operated at all, was not always in that time period. This is the base that the dispatch also states covered Saturday morning. Out of the nine Saturdays covered by the above chart, this base...
was in operation on only four of those days. This Committee has not been able to establish or disprove the possible inference that LILYRIC covered those days when there was no coverage from LIMITED because the production and logs from the LILYRIC base were not made available for review. That material was requested but has not been made available.141/ An explanation of why this material is missing was requested on 7/25/78.142/ The CIA's explanation stated that the photographs and logs "may have been destroyed in a purge of Mexico City Station files and that the folders for the destroyed material were reused to forward more recent photographic material to Headquarters for retention."143/ The folders which once contained the production were located at the National Archives' Records Center but, according to the CIA's explanation, the folders contained production material from 1967.144/ Because the CIA has not provided the photographic production and logs from the LILYRIC for examination, no precise determination detailing the effectiveness of the coverage of the Soviet compound can be made.
Regardless of the scope and effectiveness of the two bases, a question that may never be resolved due to the conflicting evidence and missing production, the surveillance was considered adequate:

Q: How thorough was the coverage?
A: They covered the categories that we asked them for on a routine basis, which was to identify any people who appeared to be non-Latin and any Soviets.

Q: I understand that was the purpose. Given that purpose, how thorough was the coverage?
A: I think it was accurate.

Q: Was Win Scott satisfied with the performance of the photo operation at the Soviet Embassy?
A: To the best of my knowledge he was.

4. Procedure and Timing Involved in Processing Production from the Operation

The CIA photographic bases were manned by at least one agent who took photographs and kept a log sheet of people entering and leaving the Embassy and of the photographs that he took. The film remained in the camera until the whole role was exposed, which often took two or three days.
After the assassination of John Kennedy, this procedure was changed and the film was cleared from the camera on a daily basis. 148/

The CIA contract agent outside of the United States Embassy who was in charge of the photographic bases was[ CIA G ] 149/ [ CIA G ] picked up the film, prior to the assassination, from the photo bases three times a week. 150/[ CIA G ] then took the film to his brother-in-law, who worked at night, to develop it. The brother-in-law also printed the film into eight-by-ten contact prints. 151/

After the film was developed and printed, [ CIA G ] turned over the negatives and contact prints to [ CIA B ]. 152/

Ms. Ann Goodpasture picked up the photo production if [ CIA B ] was not available. 153/[ CIA B ] or Ms. Goodpasture, would then bring the photographic production back to the Mexico City Station in the American Embassy. 154/[ CIA B ] did not remember with certainty to whom he turned over the material, but believed it was either Ms. Goodpasture or [ CIA C ] 155/

Classification: 162/
5. Responsibility for the Operation

There is some controversy as to who had overall responsibility for this project. Ms. Goodpasture testified that the responsibility was according to Ms. Goodpasture, made all the decisions and had all the responsibility involved in the operation.

was the most junior Operations Officer in the Mexico City Station in 1963, and claims that his role in the operation was largely limited to legwork. Ms. Goodpasture testified that her role in the operation was limited to acting as an alternate Case Officer, internal routing of the production, and review of the photographs to insure the maintenance of technical quality in the operation.

Goodpasture's annual Fitness-Report for the period 1 January 1963 to 31 December 1963 specifies her duties in regard to this operation. The fitness report says, working with (regular contact and case officer), supervises work of three photo bases operating against Soviet Embassy; processes take; identifies Soviets and intelligence function. Alternate contact with
Staff Agent.160/

Ms. Goodpasture denied that she had any supervisory role in relation to this operation.161/ The House Select Committee on Assassinations redepossed Ms. Goodpasture in November 1978 and asked her about this apparent inconsistency between her Fitness Report and her testimony:

Q: Now, having read your Fitness Report for 1963, are there any portions of your prior testimony that you wish to modify?

A: No, not really. Now, this LIEMPTY project, this is a case of where I cannot seem to make it clear how our functions were. Now, the case officer had responsibility for the operation of the project. He decided how much to pay the agents, what hours they worked, where the meetings were held. He hired them; he fired them and he knew the identities; he met with all of them.

He brought in the photographs, the product. He dumped it on my desk and he was finished with it. I took the product film and prints and the contact file and distributed those.

I could levy any requirements of him or other people in the Station which as he remembered it it might have been for supervision, but when he was out of town I met with one agent with his so-called cut-out...162/

Q: This (Fitness Report) is not accurate?
A: It is not precise the way the work was divided...163/

Q: Now, I don't understand why, if you knew this description was inaccurate, you let this document go to Headquarters?

A: I think it was made on the basis of trying to get a promotion for me.164/

Alan White, who was Deputy Chief of Station in Mexico City in 1963, testified that Ann Goodpasture was "a Special Assistant" to the Chief of Station and that "her main responsibilities were to handle the surveillance operations."165/ Mr. White stated that this included both the photographic and electronic surveillance.166/ Mr. White remembered that I did help Annie with some of the pickup (of production)" but that his main responsibilities were with another operation.167/ Mr. White also testified that:

(Ann Goodpasture) carried with her a lot of invisible authority that devolved upon her because of her operational relationship with the Chief of Station, who had absolute confidence in her. She had a marvelous memory. She was meticulous in detail. I think he had every reason to put that kind of trust in her.
She reported directly to him. While she may not have been invested with any command authority by virtue of her position at the Station, certainly she was a kind of unofficial deputy for the purposes of the operations that she was involved in.168/

Ms. Goodpasture was asked about Mr. White's statements as well as similar statements by other people associated with the CIA's Mexican operations.169/

Ms. Goodpasture: Well, I made more of those statements as those people saw it in their relationship with Mr. Scott's projects. They are true the way they saw it but I had no responsibility outside the projects that we worked on, but the projects and the telephone tapping project touched every operation in the Mexico Station...I just didn't think I was as important as other people seemed to imply that I was.170/

Ms. Goodpasture also testified that her relationship with Mr. Scott could be termed special in that she was responsible for the day-to-day handling of the telephone tapping operation of which Mr. Scott was the case officer.171/

[CIA B] recollection that he turned the photographic production over to [CIA C] or Ms. Goodpasture was confirmed by Ms. Goodpasture.172/ Ms. Goodpasture also testified that the primary responsibility for the photographs after they were in
the Station was that of Ms. Goodpasture. 173/ Ms. Goodpasture testified that she was responsible for routing the photographs and that the complete production went to the before it was filed.174/
Copies of the important photographs were given to the for them to retain for routine use in the course of their work.175/

The recollection of their role in this operation is very different from that of Ms. Goodpasture.176/ Her recollection was confirmed by her husband.177/ stated that they did not routinely review or see all of the production from the Soviet Embassy photographic surveillance operation.178/
The claim they only saw the photographs that Ms. Goodpasture thought were important enough to bring to their attention.179/ According to access to this file was tightly controlled by Ms. Goodpasture.180/
6. Coordination of Photographic and Electronic Surveillance Operations

The Mexico City Station employed an operating procedure whereby the functioning of the photographic base and the electronic intercept base could be coordinated. If the listening post monitor heard something that would lead him to believe that there was someone at one of the Embassies that should be photographed, he would alert the CIA technician in the listening post who would then alert Ann Goodpasture. Ms. Goodpasture could then alert the CIA B who would then notify the photographic base. The reporting to Headquarters of information generated by the photographic surveillance operation and the electronic operation was also coordinated. The Station was able to go back to the photographic chronological file to check for photographs of people that were picked up on the tap operation when the transcripts were reviewed. It was a matter of routine to check the photographic production when reporting information developed from the tap operation.
that indicated a contact with an Embassy that was subject to photosurveillance.185/

A name trace could have been requested on the basis of the name alone but that wasn't the way Win Scott ran that Station. He wanted the photographic coverage tied in with the telephone coverage...sometimes there was a U.S. automobile license number. It was also part of the "numbers game" of justifying a project by the number of dispatches, cables or reports produced.186/

C. Electronic Surveillance of Telephones at the Soviet and Cuban Diplomatic Compounds in 1963

1. Existence

The Soviet and Cuban compounds were, in 1963, the targets of a multiple line telephone intercept operation.187/ [ describes technical operation ]188/

2. Responsibility

a. General

Win Scott, the Chief of the Mexico City Station, was, nominally, the case officer for the telephone
surveillance project. Even though Mr. Scott was the nominal case officer, the "routine case officer functions" were performed by Ms. Ann Goodpasture. An American technician was stationed in the listening post to maintain the equipment and to protect the Station's interests there. Ms. Goodpasture's duties in this operation ranged from meeting with the technician/officer inside the base for the purposes of daily supervision of the operation to handling the collection and distribution of the tapes and transcripts. Ms. Goodpasture worked in this capacity until 1968. With the exception of the technician, the listening post and the transcription room of this base describes technical operation. This listening post covered up to thirty lines at one time.

b. Analysis and Reporting of Information Obtained

was responsible for the analysis, processing, and daily review of the Soviet transcripts. The transcripts were reviewed on a daily basis by would

Classification: 170
bring conversations of interest or importance to
\[ \text{CIA C1} \] attention.197/
\[ \text{CIA C1} \] was also responsible for reporting
the information developed from the Soviet wiretaps.
He indicated that the reports were usually written
by himself or \[ \text{CIA C2} \].198/ These reports were
usually in the form of cables or dispatches to CIA
Headquarters.199/ \[ \text{CIA C1/C2} \] also usually handled
the notification of representatives of various other
United States government organizations in Mexico City
when the information warranted such notification.200/

David A. Phillips, a CIA officer who was
stationed in Mexico City in 1963, testified that
information from the taps would be reported if the
information was important, if it was useful to another
Agency component, or if it was something that should
"go in the record."201/ Mr. Phillips said that only
a small amount of the information developed from the
taps would be formally reported to CIA Headquarters
and that the information that was reported was
generally something more important than the usual
conversations that were routinely intercepted.202/
It should be noted, though, that an examination of the project files shows that Americans in contact with Communist diplomatic institutions were routinely reported to Headquarters for name traces and dissemination to the intelligence community.203/

3. Telephone Lines Covered

This Committee has made an attempt to determine which telephone lines at the Soviet and Cuban diplomatic compounds were subject to this electronic intercept operation in September and October of 1963. The monthly operational report of this project for the month of September lists the following phones as targets of the operation:204/

14-42-37 Cuban Embassy
14-92-14 Cuban Embassy
25-07-95 Cuban Embassy
14-13-26 Cuban Embassy
15-60-55 Soviet Embassy (Chancery)
15-61-55 Soviet Embassy (Chancery)
15-69-87 Soviet Embassy (Military Attache)
15-61-07 Soviet Embassy (Commercial Office)
15-12-64 Soviet Embassy (Film Representative)

The report notes that lines 14-92-14 and 25-07-95 at the Cuban Embassy were disconnected on 23 September 1963.205/ The monthly report for October says that
there has not been any change in the lines covered since September.206/

A review of the transcripts produced by this operation revealed that the CIA has transcripts on file from the two-month period of interest to this Committee from three Cuban lines: 14-42-37, 14-13-26, and 25-09-14.207/ It is noted that the last telephone line was not listed in the monthly reports.208/ A review of the Soviet transcripts revealed that the five lines listed in the monthly reports were tapped on 27, 28 and 30 September.209/ Only two of these lines, 15-61-55 and 15-60-55, were covered on Sunday, 29 September.210/

The House Select Committee on Assassinations has found some indications in testimony given before this Committee and CIA documents that more Cuban lines were tapped at that time.211/ This Committee has not been able to determine with certainty whether three lines (the number of lines on file in the transcripts), two lines (the number given by the contemporaneous monthly report), or five lines (the number given by some witnesses and documents) were
subject to the intercept operation. It should be noted, though, that there were five lines tapped in the Cuban compound in 1964. They were:

- 14-42-37 The Ambassador's private telephone
- 25-07-95 The Chancery
- 14-13-26 The Chancery
- 25-09-14 The Commercial Office
- 11-28-47 The Consulate

One CIA employee who was involved in Cuban operations in Mexico City remembered that there were taps on the telephone of the Cuban Consulate. It is possible that the employee, Mr. Phillips, who was stationed in Mexico City from 1961 to 1966, was incorrect, after a fifteen-year hiatus, in placing this tap in 1963. As the above notes, an examination of the project files fails to support Mr. Phillips' memory, although those files do show that the Consulate telephone was tapped in 1964.

4. Production from Operation

The intercept listening post operated from approximately 7:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. every day.
Thirty recording machines that were impulse activated every time a tapped telephone was used taped the surveilled conversations.\footnote{216} In addition, the intercepted conversations were monitored by personnel in the listening post.\footnote{217}

a. Types

The production from this listening post was broken down into three categories for the purposes of handling the tapes and transcripts: (1) intercepts of interest to the\footnote{describe organization} these included such groups as the Movimento de Liberacion Nacional, individual Communists, the\footnote{describe organization} (2) Cuban intercepts; and (3) Soviet and bloc country intercepts.\footnote{218}

b. Handling Procedures

(1) Resuma

A summary of the conversations deemed of sufficient interest by the listening post monitors was prepared as they were monitored.\footnote{219} These summaries were called "resuma."\footnote{220} The resuma were given to

\footnote{175}
Ann Goodpasture by the technician early in the morning the day after they were prepared. Ms. Goodpasture had the previous day's resuma on Win Scott's desk by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of the day after they were prepared. Win Scott marked these resuma for action by his case officers before routing them through the Station. This Committee has requested copies of these resuma from the CIA but they have not been made available for review.

The resuma covered all thirty lines that were covered by the intercept operation. Only important conversations were included in the resuma. The monitors made the decision as to which conversations were important. After the resuma were prepared, the tapes from the lines were held for approximately ten days and were then reused. The resuma were maintained in a chronological file at the listening post.

(2) Cuban Tapes

The Cuban tapes (tapes produced by taps on the Cuban telephones) were left on the machines until

Classification: 176

Classified by derivation:
the reel was used up.230/ When the reels were full, they were removed and transcribed in the listening post.231/ The transcripts would be turned over to Ms. Goodpasture at the same time as the resuma.232/ The tapes produced by the Cuban taps were maintained in the listening post.233/ There was a special rack for those tapes in the technician's workshop, which was situated on the floor above the room in which the listening post was located.234/ This rack had thirty slots in it. The tapes from each day's production went into a separate slot, with the oldest tapes going back into use in the monitor room; i.e., the tapes from the Cuban intercept were held for thirty days prior to reuse.235/ The tapes were not turned over to Ms. Goodpasture unless she requested a specific tape.236/

(3) Soviet Tapes

(a) General Handling

The Soviet tapes were removed daily from the machines.237/ The Spanish language portions of the tapes would then be transcribed in the listening
post.238/ The transcripts and tapes from the Soviet lines were then routinely turned over to Ann Goodpasture along with the resuma and Cuban transcripts.239/ Ms. Goodpasture then turned the tapes over to who then delivered them to Boris Tarasoff for translation and transcription of the Russian language portions of the tape.240/

(b) Retention and Reuse of Tapes

There is some question about how long the Soviet tapes were retained before reuse. There are indications that the tapes were routinely held for two weeks and then reused.241/ The technician who ran the listening post could not state with certainty what the practice regarding retention and reuse of the Soviet tapes was. He said that he did not hold the tapes at all once they were returned to him by Ms. Goodpasture.242/ He stated that he assumed that some of the tapes were retained by either the station or the Russian translator because his supply of tapes for the Russian taps kept dwindling.243/ The tapes were not retained by the translator.244/ It is possible
that the tapes were held for two weeks in the station before they were erased and sent back to Arehart for reuse.245/ CIA F remembers that CIA B spent a lot of time in the Station erasing tapes on a special machine for that purpose.246/ One of the main sources for the two-week period being ascribed to retention of the Soviet tapes is DIR-88680, which says:

Upon receipt you may resume usual practice of keeping Cuban and Soviet tapes two weeks and then erasing.247/

This Committee has not found any evidence that would contradict the above-quoted statement in regard to the Soviet tapes.

There was a procedure whereby the tapes could be held for longer than two weeks if someone thought that the tape should be preserved as well as the transcript.248/ The interested officer could make a note on the transcript or he could notify Ann Goodpasture, orally or by note, that he wanted the tape preserved.249/ There were no written rules or regulations governing this procedure.250/
(c) English Language Conversations

There are some indications that English language conversations were transcribed at the listening post. The Tab F Draft says:

Reels which contained Russian or a language other than Spanish or English were taken to another location (other than the listening post) for translation and typing.251/

Goodpasture's notes say:

Those transcripts which had Russian or another language besides Spanish or English went out of the listening post the day after the transcript (of the conversations on the reel) was typed. These reels were taken to another location where they were translated and typed.252/

But, in her testimony before the House Select Committee on Assassinations in executive session on 4/13/78, Ms. Goodpasture said:

The transcribers, or the transcription that I picked up, the transcribers were working at the same place with the Spanish text. If the language were other than Spanish, it would have to be taken to another location to be transcribed. The material that was picked up the day after the date on which it occurred was in the Spanish language normally.253/

It is clear that the reels of tape with conversations in the Russian language were delivered to Mr. Boris Tarasoff for translation and transcription.254/
Mr. Tarasoff has testified that he was also responsible for the transcription of the English language conversations although his wife, Anna Tarasoff, usually did the actual transcribing. 255/ This testimony is confirmed by the testimony of Anna Tarasoff. 256/

Arehart, the technician in the listening post, could not clearly remember whether or not any of his Mexican transcribers did the English language conversations. 257/ He remembered that these tapes were usually sent to the Station. 258/ He said that he did remember that monitors would often come to his workshop and ask him to come downstairs to listen to a conversation in English. 259/

All of the conversations in the Spanish transcripts are in Spanish. 260/ All of the conversations in Spanish were transcribed in Spanish. 261/ It is doubtful that the listening post transcribers, who were Mexican nationals, would have translated an English conversation into Spanish and then transcribed it. In light of this, Tarasoff's recollection and Arehart's recollection, it is probable that all the English language conversations were sent to the Station.
(d) Handling by Tarasoffs

Along with the reels of tape that contained Russian language conversations (and probably English language conversations), Mr. Tarasoff received a copy of the Spanish transcripts. When the Tarasoffs received the tapes, they transcribed only those conversations that were denoted on the Spanish transcript as being in Russian.

Mr. Tarasoff routinely received the tapes the day after they were made. Mr. Tarasoff testified that he would then immediately transcribe the tapes and turn over the completed tapes and transcripts to his contact the next morning.

Mr. Tarasoff said that the volume of work he had to do at any given time fluctuated, but the transcripts were always finished in one day.

"Sometimes there was so little work in transcribing the Russian portion of the tape that I was just hanging around doing nothing." Ann Goodpasture, at one time, put the time lag for completion of the...
Russian transcription at approximately one week.268/
In her testimony before this Committee, Ms. Goodpasture stated that it generally took Mr. Tarasoff one or two days to complete the translations and transcriptions.269/

(e) Expedited Procedure for English Language Conversations or other Conversations of Special Interest

There was a procedure whereby Mr. Tarasoff's transcription could be expedited if there was a special interest in a particular conversation.270/
When the monitor in the listening post encountered something he considered important enough to require expedited transcription, it was possible for him to bring this quickly to the Station's attention.271/
Although Arnold Arehart was not the Tarasoffs' contact in September or October of 1963, he did serve as such at one time.272/ When he was interviewed by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, Mr. Arehart was asked whether there was a process whereby transcription of important conversations in English
or Russian could be expedited. Arehart did say that there was such a procedure for English language conversations. When one of the Mexican monitors encountered a conversation in English, he would ask Arehart to listen to that conversation. After listening to the conversation, Arehart would decide whether or not it warranted special attention. If he deemed that it was important enough, he would mark the tape "Urgent," put it in a box, and deliver it to Ms. Goodpasture.

Mr. Arehart's recollection was confirmed by an examination of the project files for this operation. One of the monthly project reports explains this procedure and its purpose:
Headquarters (is) not well informed on the way the Mexico Station exploits operational leads from (this operation). The outside staff agent, Arnold Arehart has instructions to alert the Station immediately if a U.S. citizen or English speaking person tries to contact any of the target installations. This is done by a telephone call from outside the tap center at a pay phone to (Ann Goodpasture) inside the Station. Emergency meetings are arranged in double talk... (Goodpasture) meets Arehart within fifteen minutes at a pre-arranged downtown location and receives the reel with an extract of the pertinent conversation. The reel is then taken to the Station and given to the case officer responsible for the target the person was trying to contact. Headquarters is notified by cable of the action taken. Only in rare cases is information on a U.S. citizen passed without prior Headquarters approval.279/

If the tape was from a Soviet installation, the tape would have been delivered the same day to the Tarasoffs by [ ]280/ Along with the tape, the Tarasoffs would receive a note indicating which conversation was to be transcribed on a priority basis. The Tarasoffs would then immediately transcribe that conversation and return it to their regular contact that same day.281/ It should be noted that the monthly report says that the Soviet transcripts would be delivered to the case officer responsible for the target installation.282/ In the case of the
Soviet target, that case officer would have been

he had nothing to do with transporting the transcripts
to or from the Tarasoffs except in rare instances
when no one else was available to do the job.284/ Mrs.
Tarasoff testified that the "urgent" tapes were
delivered and picked up by their regular contact.285/

(f) Handling in the Station

All of the transcripts were brought into the
Station to Ms. Goodpasture.286/ Ms. Goodpasture
routed the copies of the transcripts and retained
one copy for her own file.287/ One copy of all of
the Soviet transcripts was put on
desk by Ann Goodpasture the morning they were
received.288/ Ms. Goodpasture routed the Cuban
transcripts to either Robert Shaw or David Phillips.289/
One copy of all the transcripts eventually went into
a chronological file.290/ One copy of the Soviet
transcripts was cut and pasted onto separate sheets
of paper and filed in appropriate subject or
personality files.291/ The resumé were also maintained
in a chronological file. One copy of the Cuban transcripts was routinely sent to Headquarters on a weekly basis.

(g) Format of Transcripts

The format of the transcripts that Mr. Tarasoff produced was much the same as those of the Spanish language transcripts described above. Mr. Tarasoff's transcripts were from Russian into English. Many of Mr. Tarasoff's transcriptions bear the notation "(previously transcribed)" after the meter number referring to the reel footage location of a conversation. Mr. Tarasoff indicated that this notation meant that the conversation had already been transcribed from a tap on another embassy phone:

"Previously transcribed" means, for instance, I went to the embassy first and the embassy number was 605055. Now this number 501264 belonged to the film's office. So consequently if that particular call went out of the main building to the film's office and it had been transcribed before, that is exactly what I would do, put down "previously transcribed". So there was no question of doing it twice.
C. Voice Comparisons

In addition to his translation and transcription duties, Mr. Tarasoff as a matter of routine attempted to identify the voices of the participants in a conversation. This eventually led to Mr. Tarasoff's collecting voice samples from tapes of Russian officials whose voices he had identified.

Mr. Tarasoff also made comments about the personality and dispositions of the participants in conversations that he transcribed. Generally, these comments, or "personality assessments" were made on separate pieces of paper and not on the transcripts themselves.

III. Information About Lee Harvey Oswald's Stay in Mexico that was Known by the CIA Mexico City Station Prior to the Assassination of John Kennedy and the Sources of that Information

A. Information that was Available

In 1963 the Central Intelligence Agency's Mexico City Station surveilled both the Cuban and Soviet diplomatic compounds electronically and