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Tuesday, August 15, 1978

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U.S. House of Representatives,
Select Committee on Assassinations,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 5:17 o'clock p.m.
in Room H-328, the Capitol, the Honorable Louis Stokes (Chairman
of the Committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Stokes (presiding), Preyer,
Ford, Burke, Dodd, Fauntroy, Fithian, Edgar, Devine, McKinney and
Sawyer.

Also present: G. Robert Blakey, G. Cornwell, J. Wolf,
P. Beeson, E. Evans, A. Hausman, W. Collins, W. H. Cross and
I. C. Mathews, Professional Staff Members.

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The Chairman. A quorum being present for the meeting, the
meeting is now called to order.

Mr. Blakey?

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, a number of the issues involved
in the investigations on both the Kennedy and King sides will be
presented to the Committee this afternoon. It will be appropriate,
therefore, to go into executive session.

Mr. Sawyer. So move.
The Chairman. It has been properly moved that the Committee, for reasons stated, now go into executive session.

The Clerk will call the roll.

The Clerk. Mr. Stokes.

The Chairman. Aye.

The Clerk. Mr. Devine.

Mr. Devine. Aye.

The Clerk. Mr. Preyer.

Mr. Preyer. Aye.

The Clerk. Mr. McKinney.

(No response.)

The Clerk. Mr. Fauntroy.

(No response.)

The Clerk. Mr. Thone.

(No response.)

The Clerk. Mrs. Burke.

(No response.)

The Clerk. Mr. Sawyer.

Mr. Sawyer. Aye.

The Clerk. Mr. Dodd.

Mr. Dodd. Aye.

The Clerk. Mr. Ford.

Mr. Ford. Yea.

The Clerk. Mr. Fithian.

Mr. Fithian. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Edgar.

Mr. Edgar. Aye.

The Clerk. Seven ayes, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Seven members having voted in the affirmative, this meeting is now declared to be in executive session. All members of the public are asked to remove themselves from the room.

Mr. Blakey.

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, the first item of business is a matter that has occupied the attention of the Kennedy Subcommittee. The Subcommittee has attempted through a subpoena to secure the gun that Jack Ruby used in shooting Lee Harvey Oswald in order that it might be examined by the ballistics panel. Congressman James Maddox has dealt with one of his constituents who had the gun, and I understand he is present today to turn the gun over to the Committee in compliance with that subpoena.

The Chairman. Mr. Maddox, you have heard the statement of Mr. Blakey. Is there a response you have to that?

Mr. Maddox. Mr. Chairman, I have the gun with me today. I frankly, it is the opinion of Mr. Mayer, Jules Mayer, the independent executor of the estate of Jack Ruby, that he was never properly served with subpoena and that he is not under actual subpoena because it was not adequate and legal, but he has agreed to voluntarily tender the weapon through me to the Committee, and his principal concern and his lack of cooperation
thus far has been based on the continuing fear that he has at this point and probably will have in the future that this Committee and through the government, might take possession of the weapon and not return it to him, and he would not be able to carry out the rest of his functions of closing out the estate. He has been offered $125,000 for it in a cashier's check which he rejected, and he thinks that the weapon will ultimately sell for $200,000 to $250,000.

And he is prepared to turn it over. The one thing he would like to have on the record is the assurance of this Committee, the assurance of the Chairman, that this weapon will be returned to me or to him as soon as tests have been completed on it, and that it will not be maintained in the government's possession unless there be some further justifiable reason indicating something should develop that is beyond what would be our recognition at this time.

The Chairman. Mr. Blakey, do you have a further response to Congressman Maddox?

Mr. Blakey. I would only add, Mr. Chairman, that the staff has made every effort to make it clear to Mr. Mayer that there is no intent to seize the gun. It is only necessary to make it available for a relatively short period of time to the ballistics panel, and the intent always was to return it to him, and that intent has been so stated to both Congressman Maddox and to Mr. Mayer.
The Chairman. So that the record is clear, firstly, and
that there be no problem in examining this gun, under circumstances
where it will not be in any way injured or caused to be in
disrepair, and you will attempt to have the work done by the
ballistics panel as soon as possible and returned expeditiously
to either Mr. Mayer or Mr. Maddox.

Mr. Blakey. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Maddox. Mr. Chairman, I think that would be adequate
if that is the statement and intent of the Committee.

One thing I would point out, the subpoena asked for
cartridges to also be brought to the Committee. There were car-
tridges with the gun at one time, of course, when Mr. Ruby
actually committed the murder. Those cartridges are not in the
possession of the estate, and I suspect that the Dallas police
or somebody else has taken them as souvenirs or something, but
they are not now in that possession.

I would tender the gun to the Committee with the expectation
again that as soon as the Committee could get it back to me,
hopefully it would be back by the time that the recess is over,
and perhaps it could be that quick because I feel rather uneasy
about it. I had to give the man my word that I would give it back
to him, because I am going to tell you, he was in the mood, because
of the concern about the future of this Committee and also past
actions of the government, he was in the mood to defy this
Committee's subpoena, and I think that there may have been adequate
grounds for him to do so because I don't think it was served adequately.

But his particular concern is the same problem that has existed in trying to obtain possession of the rifle that is now in the Archives that was part of the estate of Lee Harvey Oswald which the Government has, I think, in a summary type fashion grabbed on to, and now despite the fact that they have spent $75,000 trying to get it back, have not been able to do so, and he really can't afford to deliberate this matter that long.

So I would deliver this now.

(Whereupon, Mr. Maddox tendered the pistol to Mr. Edgar.)

The Chairman. All right. We certainly want to thank you for having interceded in this matter and having taken the time to help the Committee acquire the acquisition of the gun, and I assure you we will do everything in terms of returning it to you as necessary.

Mr. Fithian.

Mr. Fithian. At the proper time, I would like to inquire of Congressman Maddox what assurance we have that this is in fact the gun, before we proceed?

Mr. Maddox. Mr. Chairman, if I might respond to that, that gun bears the serial numbers of the gun that was suggested on the subpoena. There has been some conflict as to the exact serial numbers, but I think that these are very close and very similar. There is a dispute as to whether the initials on it
are WL or WI or something else, but I think it is pretty evident now.

Also, the initials that you will find that are scratched in the gun, and the dates that are scratched on it, you will note that there are quite a number of dates and quite a number of initials scratched on it. Those were part of the chain of evidence that were scratched into the gun by the officers that picked the gun up, took it into their possession, and ran it through the court processes, the normal chain of evidence procedure that is used, particularly in the criminal courts, in Texas, and that is basically what they are. I have no doubt in my mind that that is the gun.

I will point out to you also, there was some question, I think at one time, about where Jack Ruby got the gun, and the gun, the best I can tell, was purchased as Ray's Sporting Goods on Singleton Avenue in Dallas in January 1960, and the one thing I would tell the Committee, though I'm not sure if it has any real merit to it, but at the time the gun was purchased, Jack Ruby was in the presence of a lieutenant on the Dallas Police Department, and the Dallas Police officer took Jack Ruby in there to get the gun. The police knew very well that Jack Ruby habitually carried the gun in his possession. There was never any doubt about that, that he did.

And one other thing that I think that is interesting, too, is that Jules Mayer, the independent executor of the estate, was
the first individual that Jack Ruby called after committing the murder, and I don't believe that the Warren Commission -- and although he visited Jack Ruby and several other people, I don't believe the Warren Commission ever talked to Mr. Mayer about his feelings concerning the gun or -- and he was a very close friend of Jack Ruby and had been his personal attorney the entire time that he was in Dallas.

And so it may be something that somebody might want -- I don't know that he has anything to offer. I quizzed him to see if there was anything to offer there, but I don't think that there is anything in particular.

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Congressman Maddox.

Mr. Maddox. I will be expecting to hear from you.

The Chairman. Is that a vote that is on now?

All right, we have an immunity order next before us, a resolution for immunity.

Can we have a resolution?

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, you have before you a draft resolution authorizing the staff to apply for orders of immunity for a number of individuals, all of whom are involved in continuing efforts on the King side. I would be glad to answer any questions about it.

Mr. Devine. Who are they? Who is to gain? You have got ten people?

Mr. Blakey. Burns has refused to be interviewed by the
ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation

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From

To  pp. 9, 25-42

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☐ Security-Classified Information
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MLK material withdrawn

HSCA Authority

8/22/93 Date

Withdrawn by NSCA

(No response.)

The Clerk. Mrs. Burke.

Mrs. Burke. Aye.

The Clerk. Mr. Sawyer.

Mr. Sawyer. Aye.

The Clerk. Mr. Dodd.

Mr. Dodd. Aye.

The Clerk. Mr. Ford.

(No response.)

The Clerk. Mr. Fithian.

Mr. Fithian. Aye.

The Clerk. Mr. Edgar.

Mr. Edgar. Aye.

The Clerk. Ten ayes, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Ten members having voted in the affirmative, the resolution is adopted.

Those are the second bells. Shall we go vote and come back?

(A brief recess was taken.)

The Chairman. A quorum is present. The Committee will come to order.

Mr. Blakey?

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, the next item of business requires some preface. As a number of members of the Committee are aware, on the Kennedy side, the staff and a number of members of the
City attempting to make a determination of how well the Agency performed in Mexico City.

I am sure you will recall that Oswald was down there, that a photograph was sent back up to the United States shortly after the assassination that was not Lee Harvey Oswald, although identified as such by the Agency people, and there has been a great deal of controversy over how well the Agency performed in Mexico City. Indeed, the Cuban government has recently challenged the Agency, suggesting they had foreknowledge of the assassination and made an effort to pin it on the Cuban government.

What has happened with us is that we finally had a breakdown of communications and negotiations, and there are several items that the Agency has simply finally refused to give us access to in an unsanitized form, and we have before you this afternoon a suggested subpoena to Admiral Turner asking for those materials.

They are a three-volume history of the CIA Mexico City Station prepared by one of the witnesses that has appeared before the Committee, a Miss Annie Goodpasture. It covers the period 1969-1970, but it takes up all of the key figures and the surveillance and other operations in Mexico City.

The second is all filco and file references to Maria Teresa Parenza, who was an employee of the Cuban consulate who we have reason to believe was called back to Cuba by the Cuban government because of her contacts with Lee Harvey Oswald. It is essential that we have an opportunity to read this file prior to
the upcoming trip to Cuba being undertaken by Chairman Preyer.

In addition, it calls for or would call for a debriefing memorandum obtained from a Cuban defector known as AMMUG 1. This Cuban defector apparently was in a position to know what was going on in the Cuban consulate at the time, and some of the debriefings should cover that material.

Next is photographic mug books shown to AMMUG 1. His ability to identify various key people in the embassy and consulate down there seems to us to be very relevant to our work.

And finally, all files and file references to a man named William Harvey. Harvey is the Agency employee who was basically in charge of the executive action program which included the assassination attempts on Mr. Castro. Harvey is a central figure in the Senate's investigation, and for the same or similar reasons has been a central figure in our investigation. And they have declined to allow us to see his personnel and security files. These would include, for example, his Agency performance ratings, a description of his job and job performance.

We have had a number of conversations with Agency people over this, most recently on Friday Gary talked to Scott Breckinridge, and in fact, the Chairman and some of the Agency people met on a different issue, but this matter was discussed on Friday. On Monday Gary finally sat down and discussed with the Agency people this material, and from our perspective on the staff, what they want to do is discuss and discuss, and we simply are not
getting the kind of performance in terms of turning the material over to us, that had been promised all along. And since the Committee will not be in session or be available to us from the end of this week through virtually the beginning of our hearings, this is kind of the failsafe point. Either we subpoena them now, returnable this week, so that we can continue to examine them between now and September, and particularly have the benefit of it before the Cuban trip, or the Agency in effect has denied us access to them. If they are going to deny us access to them, it is the staff's recommendation to the Committee that that be done in the teeth of a subpoena and not in further negotiations.

So we brought the issue to you and are making the recommendation to you that as a Committee, you vote to subpoena Admiral Turner and he produce these documents by Friday, the subpoena to be executed tomorrow.

I would be glad to answer any questions. Gary Cornwell is here to respond to any questions.

Mr. Dodd. Do you have any idea why they have taken this attitude all of a sudden? Is there any reason for it other than the materials? Is there some reason, some problem with the Committee?

Mr. Blakey. No. What we have observed is a response by the Agency that is varying depending on the material we have asked for. They have been very free in turning the material over
in the basic Oswald file. Two areas have been very sensitive with them. One is the defector issue. That we have been able to negotiate.

But the deeper we have gotten into the Agency's performance in Mexico City, the more difficult they have gotten in dealing with us, the more they have insisted on relevance, the more they have gone back, in effect, on their agreement to give us access to unsanitized files. For a while we had general and free access to unsanitized files. That is increasingly not true in the Mexico City area, and this is just the point at which push comes to shove. They have not given us access to this material in such a way that we can use it to finish our work, and I think it goes to -- well, Congressman, I would have to say there's two ways to view it. One way is they are terribly concerned that we are looking into something and will find something wrong, and they are therefore attempting to protect themselves by building the fences of relevancy and other good arguments.

A second way of looking at it is that we are touching on very sensitive issues of Agency performance and sensitive sources and methods, and therefore, the kind of change in administration that has most recently occurred out there with Scott Breckinridge in charge, and there have been a number of people who have come and gone as they have dealt with us. This Breckinridge is just drawing the line at this point.

The Chairman. It is an area that we have spent an awful
lot of time in areas of negotiation, and I have sat there with Admiral Turner, and we have sat there with three of his other top people, including Scott Breckinridge. On another occasion he sent Barbara Watson over to my office on one occasion to talk about it. They put in an awful lot of time.

This is an area in which they have suddenly become resistant and extremely sensitive, for what reason we do not know, but we have spent an awful lot of time, and we can try to negotiate. The only area -- and we tried there to indicate that we were not trying to ask for something that we really don't need to see. The raised the question about personnel files having a lot of raw data in there about a person that is unsubstantiated, uncorroborate and so forth, and we explained that we are not looking for that kind of thing, that we are not interested in that, but we do have to be able to ascertain double agent situations that relate to employment and so forth, and they have just been totally and positive there.

So there is something in this area that they are extremely sensitive to.

Mr. Devine. Mr. Chairman, have you been able to approach it on the basis of a one-on-one off the record? I am not sure our desire is to see these things based on that it is absolutely essential or that we are curious to find out what they won't tell us because their history has been total cooperation up to this point.
Now, I don't know whose word you are willing to take, but
if Admiral Turner were to talk to you personally and only to you,
of the record, and tell you what is and what isn't in there, it
might satisfy you that it is not essential to the conduct of
our investigation.

The Chairman. Well, a part of their objection is this. It
is just like with reference to some Mexico City agents, that we
feel it is necessary for us to personally talk with. And we know
who the agents are, we know their names, so they are not really
withholding anything in terms of that. We know and can identify
the agents.

Mr. Devine. Do they know that we know?

The Chairman. And what we have said is we want to personally
talk with them, and their position is this: this establishes
a precedent, when it becomes known worldwide that they have
permitted their agents to sit and talk with us, foreign agents
to sit and talk with us. So we tried to compromise the situation.
We said, okay, we are willing for an intermediary type situation,
provided we can select someone whom we have faith and confidence in
their integrity, and we will let them be the intermediary.

Well, they came back with a counter proposition, that they
would utilize two retired admirals who are now part of the
CIA in another capacity who would be the intermediaries between
the Committee and the agents, and the agents would be in another
room and we wouldn't be able to see what happened in the other
room. We would just get a reply when they came back into our
room with an answer. And we said no, let's take, and Bob named a
man who has impeccable credentials in terms of integrity, who is
a part of the National Security Agency that has supervision over
them, and they rejected him, and he is on the Commission that has
supervision over them. So that gives you some idea of how sensitive
they are about this situation.

Mr. Dodd. Well, also Sam, if you would yield on it, you know,
Mr. Chairman, if you would end up in a private discussion -- and
I appreciate your idea, Sam, but I just worry about at that time
you become then, in a sense, a part of that information and
whether or not you uphold it or not, that puts an awful lot of
burden on you.

The Chairman. Well, that's what happened to the Warren
Commission.

Mr. Dodd. I think that is a fatal flaw.

Mr. McKinney. It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, Counsel and
staff feel we really need this material, and it sounds from the
description that we really do. You know, I am getting a little
concerned that we are going to have our own critics on this, and
they are not only going to be critics of what we come up with, but
they are going to be critics of Congress and Congress's ability
to do anything, and we have spent $4 million of the public treasury
already, and it seems to me that we should go ahead and get this
because I don't think we want to come out with a report that has
a great gaping spot in it, which we would have to admit to, at
least I would have to admit. I mean, I would feel in my views
that I would have to state the total lack of cooperation on the
part of the CIA over events in Mexico limited this Committee
from following through to the end a course of action. It is
really sort of the basic principle. I guess here, you don't
want to destroy the security of the country, but at the same time
I think this Committee has been pretty damned good. It is
only the room that we are sitting in that has been pretty bad
to us since we have started, and that we have to go ahead, that
we are mandated to go ahead. To me it comes down basically
as to who runs the damned government. The way I read the
Constitution, this House passes the laws and makes the determina-
tion. Other people execute those laws, and I think when you
turn around to non-elected executive officials and turn around
and say that they can override the law and the will of the
Congress, you are in bad shape.

And for this Committee to condone it to me is almost an
impossibility.

The Chairman. I would be willing to say that the Chairman is
disposed to take the action, but prior to having the staff actually
get service on it, I would call Admiral Turner one more time
to know the action has been taken by the Committee in case they
want to avoid, you know, this type of public confrontation.

Mr. Fithian?
Mr. Fithian. Mr. Chairman, two questions. If we vote the subpoena, what are the prospects of keeping it nonpublic?

Mr. Blakey. Nobody in this room will let it out, and I am sure the Agency won't.

Mr. Fithian. So it really wouldn't be a public confrontation?

Mr. Blakey. If they fail to produce on Friday, then the issue is what does the Committee do in light of contempt on the part of the Admiral.

Mr. Fithian. Second, if they comply, who among the Committee or the staff really needs to see this?

Mr. Blakey. Very limited. It would be on a need to know basis. I would say the number of people who have had access to the Mexico City stuff, less than five.

Mr. Cornwell. That is the number that is working on it. One factor, in light of your question, is much of the material on the face of the subpoena is still classified. The fact that the CIA has a station in Mexico City is not public and they feel very sensitive about it. The cryptonym of the Cuban defector is classified information.

Mr. Blakey. It is suggested that they classify the subpoena.

Mr. Devine. Is the life of the informant going to be endangered here? I think that is a very serious risk we talk about if we go talk to their informants every time public knowledge, or it is learned by someone outside the CIA.

Mr. Blakey. No, correct me if I am wrong, Gary, but I do
not believe this involves our -- this does not involve our
effort to get access to the informant. This involves their file.

Mr. Devine. I thought you said there were informants we
wanted to talk to.

Mr. Blakey. That is an issue we have recently faced, Mr.
Devine.

Mr. McKinney. We already know who the informants are, right?

Mr. Blakey. We know most of the informants in this area,
yes.

Mr. Dodd. What happens on Friday if they don't comply with
the subpoena? What are the steps that have to be taken?

Mr. Blakey. The next step would be to bring it back to
the Committee for a recommendation on the floor for contempt. I
take it there would be negotiations with the Agency, but basically
we would have taken the first step toward insisting that they
live up to the subpoena.

Mr. McKinney. Nothing needs to be mentioned on the floor as
to what we were after.

Mr. Fithian. One other question, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Mr. Fithian.

Mr. Fithian. If this all kind of flares up here on Friday
on the heels of what we are doing this week and in the light
of the September business that we have to tend to as a
Committee, how big a gamble is this?

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Fithian, I have to really to say to you is
that it is mostly that we may or may not get our money in September.

Mr. Fithian. I am not talking about that.

Mr. Blakey. The same thing is I think we either do this now or we don't do it, and if we don't do it, in effect, we concede to them the right to tell us what files we can look at.

Mr. Fithian. I understand the principles, Bob. My question is a practical one and that is what is your judgment or the Chairman's judgment or anyone else's here?

Mr. Blakey. I think they'll fold.

Mr. Fithian. As to what it does in terms of what we are presenting and will present now and ultimately in the King case, for example, or in the Kennedy case.

Mr. Preyer. You are speaking of if it becomes public knowledge.

Mr. Fithian. If it becomes public knowledge, if we have to go to the floor of the House, if we get into a real donnybrook, do we run a chance of ending this Committee as we began, in which case, all the intervening time might have been so much --

Mr. McKinney. If the gentleman would yield a moment, I mean, aren't you going to have to have a clear conscience? I mean now that you know this. I mean, I didn't know this. Aren't you going to have to put in your views of this, that information was withheld from you and therefore this Committee has not done a complete job? We have invalidated our work for two years by
that very statement.

Mr. Fithian. Well, of course, I would join you in the dissenting view of whatever is written, that we did not carry out and we were prevented from carrying out the full mandate of the Congress. I don't know how I should vote on this. I suspect I'll support Chief Counsel, but my concern is whether or not we have looked at the high risk of the roll of the dice as we are now ready to throw them, and if we are, or if I am not mistaken, you know, we have a very tenuous acceptance in the world anyway, and more people remember our first month than our last 16, and if we add to that one final month of embroglio, does that kind of nullify everything we have done?

Mr. Preyer. Mr. Chairman, we can, if we make it returnable Friday we don't have to make a decision -- do we have to make a decision on whether to go to the floor on it?

Mr. Blakey. No, that can be postponed.

Mr. Preyer. The problem you are talking about can be postponed.

Mr. Blakey. It can be postponed. An effort to enforce the subpoena can be postponed until after we have got our money or not got our money, in which case it won't make any difference anyway.

The Chairman. You know, someone expressed a concern here about possible danger to someone. Let me just read this part of the subpoena and what it says. "And to bring with him the three-
volume history of the CIA Mexico City Station operation prepared
by Ann Goodpasture in 1969-1970; all files and file references
to Maria Teresa Parenza pertaining to events and transactions
involving her between September 1, 1963 and January 31, 1964; all
debriefing memoranda which reflect or relate to information sought:
or obtained from the Cuban defector known by the crytonym
AMMUG-1, and copies of all photographic mug books shown to AMMUG-1;
and all files and file references to William Harvey, including
but not limited to personnel and security office files for the
period '59 through '66.

And who is William Harvey, Gary?

Mr. Cornwell. He was a CIA agent who was, among other
things, in charge of the Agency's attempts to assassinate Castro
in what the Church Committee has called the second phase of
that operation.

The Chairman. Is there any further discussion?

Mr. Fauntroy. Mr. Chairman, may I move we serve the subpoena?

The Chairman. It has been properly moved that the subpoena
be served.

Mr. Fauntroy. Issued.

Let me be proper.

The Chairman. The subpoena issued.

Okay, it has been properly moved.

The Clerk will call the roll.

The Clerk. Mr. Stokes.
Mr. Stokes. Aye.

The Clerk. Mr. Devine.

Mr. Devine. No.

The Clerk. Mr. Preyer.

Mr. Preyer. Aye.

The Clerk. Mr. McKinney.

Mr. McKinney. Aye.

The Clerk. Mr. Fauntroy.

Mr. Fauntroy. Aye.

The Clerk. Mr. Thone.

(No response.)

The Clerk. Mrs. Burke.

(No response.)

The Clerk. Mr. Sawyer.

Mr. Sawyer. Aye.

The Clerk. Mr. Dodd.

Mr. Dodd. Aye.

The Clerk. Mr. Ford.

Mr. Ford. Aye.

The Clerk. Mr. Fithian.

Mr. Fithian. Aye.

The Clerk. Mr. Edgar.

(No response.)

The Clerk. Eight ayes and one no, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Eight members having voted in the affirmative,
Mr. McKinney. I want to tell you, Bob, seriously, I watched an antiwar protest in front of the Waldorf-Astoria in New York, in fact, I was part of the damned thing. It was the most peaceful antiwar protest I have ever been involved in in my life. There were 30 kids up the street about two blocks away raising hell and they broke one window, and that is all I saw on television all night, and if he is planning his little games, he will have a portable camera standing out there in the hallway watching them.

Mr. Dodd. Well, there is nothing we can do about that. If he is going to do that, he can do that. I mean, that will go on all week.

Mr. Edgar. Can I make a suggestion before we break up? Does it make sense for us to be there at 8:30 tomorrow as opposed to 9:00 o'clock, just to be there in our place, or should we come right at 9:00 o'clock?

Mr. Devine. I think the marshals and the security are all scheduled on a time basis.

Mr. Edgar. Not that we should start the hearings, but just in terms of presence.

The Chairman: Do we need anything more from the members?

Mr. Dodd. Before we break, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make one short comment, and that is that we are beginning tomorrow what may be the toughest three days we have of the hearing, and I know, without even saying it to anyone else, the other Committee
members, I know I speak for everyone in this room when I say you have done a marvelous job, Bob has, throughout this entire process, over the last 16 months, and we are going to win this thing. We are going to come out on top, and you have got ten other people standing behind you tomorrow, and we'll beat the son of a bitch, and you can quote me on that.

The Chairman. All right, thank you.

(Whereupon, at 7:10 o'clock p.m., the Committee recessed, to reconvene Wednesday, August 16, 1978.)