

# Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification

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AGENCY : HSCA  
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10110-10004  
RECORD SERIES : SECURITY CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 014718

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**February 18, 1997**

**Status of Document:** Postponed in Part

**Number of releases of previously postponed information: 0**

**Number of Postponements: 53**

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**Postponement # 1 (Page 8):**

**Reason for Board Action:** The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

**Substitute Language:** The information is the true name of the individual whose pseudonym is John Scelso. The postponed information will be opened in full on either May 1, 2001, or three months after the decease of the individual, whichever occurs first.

**Release Date:** 05/2001

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**Postponement # 2 (Page 9):**

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**Postponement # 3 (Page 9):**

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**Postponement # 4 (Page 9):**

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Release Date: 05/2001

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Postponement # 5 (Page 11):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

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Postponement # 6 (Page 11):

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Postponement # 7 (Page 11):

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Release Date: 05/2001

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Postponement # 8 (Page 11):

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Release Date: 05/2001

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Postponement # 9 (Page 12):

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Postponement # 10 (Page 12):

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Postponement # 11 (Page 15):

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Postponement # 12 (Page 16):

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Release Date: 05/2001

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Postponement # 13 (Page 29):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act. The Board is awaiting additional evidence from the CIA, at which time it will reconsider the postponement

Substitute Language: CIA Employee

Review Date: 05/1997

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Postponement # 14 (Page 30):

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Substitute Language: CIA Employee

Review Date: 05/1997

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Postponement # 15 (Page 31):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act. The Board is awaiting additional evidence from the CIA, at which time it will reconsider the postponement

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Review Date: 05/1997

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Postponement # 17 (Page 73):

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Postponement # 21 (Page 98):

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Postponement # 24 (Page 126):

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Postponement # 27 (Page 129):

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Substitute Language: CIA Employee

Review Date: 05/1997

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Postponement # 28 (Page 146):

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Substitute Language: CIA Employee

Review Date: 05/1997

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Postponement # 29 (Page 146):

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Review Date: 05/1997

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Postponement # 30 (Page 152):

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Substitute Language: CIA Employee

Review Date: 05/1997

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Postponement # 31 (Page 152):

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Substitute Language: CIA Employee

Review Date: 05/1997

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Postponement # 32 (Page 152):

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Substitute Language: CIA Employee

Review Date: 05/1997

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Postponement # 33 (Page 153):

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Substitute Language: CIA Employee

Review Date: 05/1997

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Postponement # 34 (Page 153):

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Substitute Language: CIA Employee

Review Date: 05/1997

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Postponement # 35 (Page 153):

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Review Date: 05/1997

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Postponement # 36 (Page 154):

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Substitute Language: CIA Employee

Review Date: 05/1997

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Postponement # 37 (Page 155):

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Substitute Language: CIA Employee

Review Date: 05/1997

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Postponement # 38 (Page 160):

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Substitute Language: CIA Employee

Review Date: 05/1997

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Postponement # 39 (Page 172-A):

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Postponement # 41 (Page 222):

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Substitute Language: CIA Employee

Review Date: 05/1997

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Postponement # 42 (Page 222):

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Substitute Language: CIA Employee

Review Date: 05/1997

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Postponement # 43 (Page 261):

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Substitute Language: CIA Employee

Review Date: 05/1997

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Postponement # 44 (Page 271):

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Release Date: 05/2001

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Postponement # 45 (Page 276):

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Release Date: 05/2001

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Postponement # 46 (Page 277):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it discusses sources and methods that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(B) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: Describes technical operation

Review Date: 10/2017

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Postponement # 47 (Page 278):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it discusses sources and methods that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(B) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: Describes technical operation

Review Date: 10/2017

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Postponement # 48 (Page 278):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it discusses sources and methods that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(B) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: Describes technical operation

Review Date: 10/2017

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Postponement # 49 (Page 278):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it discusses sources and methods that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(B) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: Describes technical operation

Review Date: 10/2017

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Postponement # 50 (Page 278):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it discusses sources and methods that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(B) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: Describes technical operation

Review Date: 10/2017

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Postponement # 51 (Page 278):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it discusses sources and methods that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(B) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: Source

Review Date: 10/2017

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Postponement # 52 (Page 278):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it discusses sources and methods that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(B) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: Describes source

Review Date: 10/2017

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Postponement # 53 (Page 278):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it discusses sources and methods that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(B) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: Describes source

Review Date: 10/2017

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**Board Review Completed: 09/27/96**



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA  
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10110-10004  
RECORDS SERIES : SECURITY CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 014718

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ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

WC

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CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED  
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DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/27/96  
OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Two duplicates follow and are included in Box 2 in four  
folders.  
Box 1.

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*Rocca Exhibit Number 1  
affidavit*

Washington, D.C. 20505

23 March 1978

NO ACTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT  
AS SANITIZED

098837

Honorable Louis Stokes, Chairman  
Select Committee on Assassinations  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I know that you are familiar with our practice of executing secrecy agreements with individuals (1) to whom we provide access to classified information and information of an intelligence sources and methods nature which I am charged by law to protect from unauthorized disclosure, or (2) otherwise perform services for or are engaged by the Agency. Such agreements are in force even after the relationship with this Agency has been terminated. As you are aware, the inhibitions created by these Agency secrecy agreements exist solely for the purpose of assuring that classified information is imparted only to authorized recipients.

As Admiral Turner has assured you previously, it is his desire to cooperate fully with your Committee. It is in this spirit that I am interested in assuring that such secrecy agreements do not impair access by your Committee to information within the scope of your charter. Therefore, I have determined that disclosure of otherwise protected information to the Select Committee or its designated staff members will constitute authorized provision of information within the meaning of such secrecy agreements. This letter may be used to indicate authorization to any individual who has executed a secrecy agreement with this Agency, or who may otherwise consider themselves bound by an obligation of secrecy to this Agency, to furnish to the Select Committee information within the scope and jurisdiction defined by H. Res. 222.

I appreciate the extra precautions taken by the Committee to assure against the inadvertent risk of disclosure of those few exceptionally sensitive matters involving the safety and well-being of individuals, and the protection of covert sources and operational methods not falling within the scope of



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
H. Res. 222. I understand that Committee staff members will be instructed to be circumspect in the conduct of their interviews and during hearings to avoid the risk of inadvertent disclosures and to provide the affected person with the opportunity to receive guidance from me or my designees on the applicability of this authorization to particular questions which are asked.

I believe these arrangements meet our mutual interests in assuring that all persons respond fully and truthfully in providing testimony to your Committee. Please indicate by your counter-signature on this letter if it is acceptable to you.

Sincerely,



Frank C. Carlucci  
Acting Director



Honorable Louis Stokes, Chairman  
Select Committee on Assassinations

Stenographic Transcript Of

HEARINGS

Before The

Subcommittee on the Assassination of John F. Kennedy

of the

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DEPOSITION OF RAYMOND G. ROCCA

Washington, D.C.

July 17, 1978

Alderson Reporting Company, Inc.

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554-2345 CONFIDENTIAL

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

Subcommittee on the Assassination of John F. Kennedy

Washington, D. C.

Monday, July 17, 1978

Deposition of

RAYMOND G. ROCCA

called for examination by counsel for the subcommittee, pursuant to notice, in the offices of the Select Committee on Assassinations, Room 3501, House Annex No. 2, Second and D Streets, S. W., Washington, D. C., beginning at 9:50 o'clock, a.m., when were present:

For the subcommittee:

Michael Goldsmith, Staff Counsel

Charles Berk, Staff Counsel,

Elizabeth Berning, Notary.

- - -

Ms. Berning. What is the witness' name?

Mr. Goldsmith. Raymond Rocca.

Ms. Berning. Mr. Rocca, would you stand please, and raise your right hand.

Do you swear that the testimony that you are about to give is true and correct?

Mr. Rocca. I do.

Ms. Berning. Thank you.

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300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-7245

C O N F I D E N T I A L

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you state your name and address  
2 for the record, sir?

3 Mr. Rocca. Raymond G. Rocca. R-O-C-C-A.

4 The address is 400 Linden -- L-I-N-D-E-N -- Lane,  
5 Falls Church, Virginia. The zip is 22042.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you here today voluntarily?

7 Mr. Rocca. I am, indeed.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you here without the need to resort  
9 to a subpoena on the part of the committee?

10 Mr. Rocca. That is correct.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Off the record.

12 (Discussion off the record)

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, do you understand that you  
14 have a right to have counsel present today?

15 Mr. Rocca. Yes, indeed.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. And do you waive that right?

17 Mr. Rocca. I waive that right.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. At least for now.

19 Mr. Rocca. Yep. I expect that I will be able to judge  
20 in terms of the caveats indicated here where to ask your  
21 indulgence and just set aside and proceed.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. No problem.

23 Have you received a copy of the committee rules and  
24 House Resolutions 222, 433, and 760?

25 Mr. Rocca. I have -- for retention.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Have you had an opportunity to read Rule Number 4.

Mr. Rocca. I have, indeed. I mean, I've read it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you understand it as well?

Mr. Rocca. I understand it to the extent that it's possible under these circumstances.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have any questions about it now?

Mr. Rocca. I have no questions about it now.

Mr. Goldsmith. Under the committee rules, Mr. Rocca, a witness has a right to receive a copy of a deposition transcript. In other words, whenever a witness gives a deposition statement, he has a right to receive a copy of the transcript.

However, the Central Intelligence Agency has asked the committee to request of present and former Agency employees to waive their right actually to receive a copy of the transcript. The Agency is concerned that the transcript has classified information in it and would not want the transcript to leave the committee's secure areas.

So, for that reason, I would like to ask you whether you are willing to waive your right to receive a copy of the transcript. By doing so, however, you would still have the full right to review the transcript for accuracy and to make any necessary corrections. So, all you are waiving is your right to receive a copy.

Mr. Rocca. I do.

1  
2 Let me say that membership in the Agency has long since  
3 comported the waiving of constitutional rights in various  
4 respects. This is simply another --

5 Mr. Goldsmith. I won't be asking you to waive any more  
6 rights, I hope.

7 I would like you to know that the Court Reporter will  
8 be asked to certify the transcript as a complete, accurate,  
9 and true record of all the testimony given.

10 Mr. Rocca. Will there be an opportunity to correct it?  
11 There are mis-speakings and that kind of thing, whatever that  
12 word means. It has just been coined in the last year or so,  
13 "I mis-spoke."

14 Mr. Goldsmith. You will be given an opportunity to review  
15 the transcript for accuracy. If, in your opinion, it is not  
16 accurate, there is a procedure for rectifying those types of  
17 problems.

18 Now, are you retired from the Central Intelligence Agency?

19 Mr. Rocca. I am.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Have you received a copy of Acting  
21 Director Carlucci's 23 March, 1978 letter which, for the  
22 record, corresponds with JFK exhibit number 94?

23 Mr. Rocca. 23 March, 1978 -- I have.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. That is the letter that specifically  
25 discusses the question of secrecy agreements and authorizes  
Agency employees to respond to relevant questions made by this



1 committee.

2 Mr. Rocca. Yes.

3 It also contains caveats which protect the continued  
4 interest in sources and in methods, which I regard as adequate  
5 under the circumstances, and therefore I accept this, and I  
6 understand.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. You understand that letter?

8 Mr. Rocca. Yes. He wants me to tell you all you need  
9 to know in order to get your job done.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

11 I believe the letter indicates that so long as questions  
12 relevant to the committee's mandate are addressed to the  
13 witness, the Agency is authorizing you to answer those questions

14 I would like to have this marked and offered as an  
15 exhibit.

16 (The document referred to was marked Rocca Exhibit  
17 Number 1.)

18 Mr. Rocca. I judge that this is the standard type  
19 of thing.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

21 Off the record.

22 (Discussion off the record.)

23 Mr. Goldsmith. I will indicate for the record that  
24 this exhibit is one that we have used for every witness  
25 that the committee either knew worked for the Central

1 Intelligence Agency or thought might have worked for the  
2 Central Intelligence Agency. We have, at times, given the  
3 letter to witnesses who had no connection with the Agency.

4 How many years were you employed with the CIA?

5 Mr. Rocca. From its inception in 1937 to the 31st of  
6 December, 1974.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. What position did you hold when you  
8 retired in 1974?

9 Mr. Rocca. I was Deputy Chief of the Counter Intelligence  
10 staff.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. What position did you hold in 1963, at  
12 the time of President Kennedy's assassination?

13 Mr. Rocca. I was Chief of the Research and Analysis  
14 Division of the CI staff, the Counter Intelligence staff.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Is that known as CI/R&A?

16 Mr. Rocca. That is. Correct.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. What responsibility, if any, did you  
18 have with regard to the CIA's investigation of the assassination  
19 in 1963?

20 Mr. Rocca. My responsibilities, in my own words, were  
21 to serve as the working level point of contact and facilitation  
22 to the Warren Commission staff, the working level point of  
23 contact and facilitation.

24 That was initiated some time in January. There is a  
25 memorandum of record which represented the results of

1 conversations at about that time, which informed me of this  
2 decision. In other words, it was not a thing that I sought.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Before we go into your responsibilities  
4 in more detail, would you describe for the record what the  
5 Counter Intelligence Research and Analysis staff did in 1963?  
6 In other words, what was the purpose of that unit?

7 Mr. Rocca. The unit was designed to bring to bear  
8 analytical intelligence, analytical brainpower, which meant  
9 all source, all overt source comprehension. a study of cases  
10 that had ceased to occupy operational significance, that is,  
11 closed cases; to maintain the ongoing record of overall  
12 quality and quantity of counter intelligence being performed  
13 by the entire DDP operational component; to -- operational  
14 component -- the Deputy Director for Plans.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. That's just in caps -- DDP.

16 Mr. Rocca. DDP -- I have listed now three functions,  
17 broadly speaking. To keep the community informed on the  
18 organization's structure and operational potential, that is,  
19 the threat of all intelligence services throughout the world,  
20 that is, by supervising the writing of an encyclopedic  
21 publication, which was called the NIS Section 56 at that time.  
22 This was a specific responsibility of the component.

23 In other words, it was a research support for operational  
24 components. The final major function, and this is important,  
25 is training. We were responsible for the supervision and

1 performance of CI training.

2 So, we kept the CI indicators, the overall record of  
3 CI organization throughout the world -- that is, the adversary  
4 services -- we worked on cases when they had ceased to be of  
5 direct concern to the operational components, and tried to make  
6 relationships between cases.

7 We were concerned, obviously, on the training side in  
8 working with other parts of the intelligence community, as  
9 well as training inside, and so forth.

10 I think that those five broad topics -- I could narrow  
11 them down --

12 Mr. Goldsmith. No, that's fine.

13 Mr. Rocca. I think this is sufficient to get us started.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Who was in charge of the CIA's investigation  
15 into the assassination of President Kennedy?

16 Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, there was no formal  
17 provision for investigation. The investigation was the FBI's --  
18 not CIA's responsibility.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Within CIA, isn't it fair to say that  
20 initially [John SCELSO] was given responsibility for conducting  
21 the investigation?

22 Mr. Rocca. I don't want to nit-pick your language, but  
23 that was not an investigative responsibility, as I understood  
24 it.

25 The GP Floor phase, which he headed up --

1 Mr. Goldsmith. The GP Floor?

2 Mr. Rocca. Floor phase.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you define for the record what  
4 GP Floor is?

5 Mr. Rocca. GP Floor was the code name assigned by the  
6 DDP, by Mr. Helms and Mr. Karamissines and the desks, to  
7 characterize cable traffic during the initial phase of the  
8 Agency's relationship with the various authorities and with  
9 its own organizations or components overseas. This is a  
10 code facilitation, a telegram or telegraphic consideration.  
11 And, during that phase, it was indeed Mr. [SCELSO] respon-  
12 sibility. I think he did an extremely good job.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. So, GP Floor was a code name which was  
14 assigned to cable traffic pertaining to the Kennedy assassinati  
15 is that correct?

16 Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, during the period of  
17 November through January, and then it was phased out.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. And Mr. [SCELSO] initially had  
19 responsibility for --

20 Mr. Rocca. Coordinating traffic, for working with the  
21 DDP with respect to what was being done over the whole world,  
22 as far as I know. This was before I got into it.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. After Mr. [SCELSO] no longer had  
24 responsibility in that area, who took over the responsibility  
25 for coordinating the Agency's investigation?

1 Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, there was no further  
2 cryptonym assigned to it.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Nevertheless, without a cryptonym being  
4 assigned to it--

5 Mr. Rocca. And therefore cables would go to the DDP,  
6 would go to Mr. Helms or Mr. Karamissines, the various desks.  
7 In other words, it became a decentralized responsibility.

8 In other words, there wasn't, as far as I can make  
9 out, a formal placement of an investigative responsibility.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Informally, who --

11 Mr. Rocca. I became -- or the CI staff and I for the  
12 staff became then -- because by that time a commission had  
13 been formed -- had become the point of contact for the  
14 commission.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. So, informally, the CI staff was  
16 responsible for coordinating the CIA's investigation?

17 Mr. Rocca. This is where I wonder about the use of the  
18 term -- that is, whatever we had done, whatever we were to do  
19 or did to assist the Warren Commission focused in the staff.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. In the CI staff.

21 Mr. Rocca. In the CI staff.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. At the time, who was in charge of the  
23 CI staff?

24 Mr. Rocca. Mr. Angleton, and Mr. Hunt was his deputy.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Was that Mr. E. Howard Hunt?

1 Mr. Rocca. No.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, who is Mr. Hunt?

3 Mr. Rocca. Mr. Hunt was Mr. James Hunt, a totally  
4 different person.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why the responsibility for  
6 providing information to the Warren Commission was given to  
7 the CI staff as opposed to Mr. [SCELSO]?

8 Mr. Rocca. I do not.

9 I would judge -- and I am guessing now, this is purely  
10 a guess -- I never discussed it with him -- that as Chief of  
11 the Mexican Desk, which was his former job, the whole parameter  
12 of the case had shifted from its initial phase of October and  
13 November, where traces came up involving his files and his  
14 handling of the initial leads that developed out of the  
15 Mexican resources, and that he no longer regarded it as  
16 really his primary responsibility.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Was there any conflict between  
18 Mr. Angleton and Mr. [SCELSO] regarding the manner in which the  
19 investigation was to be conducted?

20 Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, there was none, and I  
21 did not hear of any at the time -- or since.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Is it true that initially Mr. [SCELSO]  
23 was given responsibility for the investigation and that  
24 Mr. Angleton in some manner interceded in the investigation  
25 being conducted by Mr. [SCELSO] ?

1 Mr. Rocca. If so, I do not know this and cannot  
2 sustain that allegation, by any information direct or indirect.  
3 I have never heard it even as hearsay.

4 By the whole line of questioning, I judge that you  
5 have your own interests.

6 Really, Mr. [SCELSO] sat here (indicating) in a small  
7 desk in WH for the Mexican area. He was in a position  
8 to develop through the assets of the Mexico station extremely  
9 interesting material, which at the time was not recognized,  
10 obviously, as pertaining to anything like what came out of it  
11 in October or late September, and that was entirely appropriate  
12 to the WH division and area, and functional division.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. WH stands for Western Hemisphere?

14 Mr. Rocca. Western Hemisphere -- not White House --  
15 underline that, please, because this is another of the canards.

16 As I say, it was entirely appropriate in the GP Floor  
17 phase that he would have that. But the minute you had a  
18 commission set up outside the line obviously had to be the  
19 Director, and from the Director to his Chief of Operations  
20 overseas, because the spread involved then all of the divisions  
21 Here you had Mr. [SCELSO] being asked to sign off on cables  
22 that had to do with Netherlands, with U.K., with Australia,  
23 and it would have seemed to me utterly administratively simply  
24 hybrid monster.

25 So, in effect, the concentration of supervisory



1 authority on the assistance being given the Warren Commission  
2 once they got underway was something, as I understand it,  
3 negotiated between the Commission itself and Mr. Helms.  
4 Mr. Angleton was present. I may have been present at the  
5 meeting which decided that R & A would be the point of reference.  
6 I cannot recall.

7 But there is a memorandum -- off the record -- there  
8 and you should have it.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. There is a memorandum for the record  
10 which indicates --

11 Mr. Rocca. In January, which indicates how that thing  
12 got off. And it dispells, I think, any idea that there was  
13 some kind of internal machination.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Where would that memorandum for the  
15 record be found -- because we have reviewed many files and  
16 have not come across that particular memorandum?

17 Mr. Rocca. Well, it should be found in the file.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Would it be in the Oswald file?

19 Mr. Rocca. It would be in the Oswald file, and it  
20 should be around January.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Who is the author of that memorandum?

22 Mr. Rocca. The author of that memorandum must have  
23 been Mr. Helms himself, or Mr. Karamissines. It reflected  
24 conversations that tookplace with Mr. Rankin. It may be a  
25 Warren Commission memorandum.

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1 But that memorandum exists. And, as I say, the  
2 memorandum, to me, represented a logical evolution of what  
3 had gone on in the development of the case.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you be able to locate that  
5 memorandum for the committee?

6 In other words, do you still have a relationship with  
7 the Agency which would permit you to obtain that memorandum?

8 Mr. Rocca. Well, if you could arrange it for me to go  
9 out there, I would.

10 Can we have a little bit of a diversion now and perhaps  
11 go off the record? I want to ask about a number of other  
12 people who helped, who would know this.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. Let's go off the record for a  
14 moment. But I don't want to go off the record a whole lot  
15 in this deposition.

16 (Discussion off the record.)

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Let's go back on the record.

18 Mr. Rocca. I have no formal knowledge of it by  
19 direction or indirection, or hearsay.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. By "it" you are referring to --

21 Mr. Rocca. Of such a thing having happened.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. You have to understand, Mr. Rocca, that  
23 we went off the record. So, for the record, by "it," what  
24 are you referring to?

25 Mr. Rocca. The shift of the responsibility for overall

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1 coordination of what the Agency was doing, from WH, Mr. **SCELSO**  
2 to the staff. This was an utterly logical and completely  
3 what I would call inevitable in terms of cost effectiveness as  
4 everything else.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Did the shift take place right at the  
6 time that the Warren Commission was established?

7 Mr. Rocca. I have in memory the date 12 January, and  
8 this is something that just comes now right out of my head.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

10 Mr. Rocca. So, it was pursuant to that.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Why was the responsibility for the  
12 investigation -- I am using that now in an informal sense,  
13 because I think you feel more comfortable with that -- why was  
14 the responsibility given to CI staff as opposed to some other  
15 staff within the DDP?

16 Mr. Rocca. Because that's our business. CI has  
17 the business of dealing with activity involving espionage,  
18 sabotage, subversion, terrorism, and the whole works. It is  
19 spelled out in 1-1, Chapter 5. You will find that absolute  
20 stated formally.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. So, of all the units within the CIA  
22 in 1963, the CI staff, you are saying, was best suited to be  
23 responsible for this?

24 Mr. Rocca. That's right, yes, because, in addition  
25 staff had the responsibility for the DDP, for maintaining

1 relations, the liaison relations, with the office of security  
2 within the Agency itself, the office of security, and with the  
3 FBI and other agencies. This was by directive 1-1, Chapter 5.  
4 I underline the importance of 1-1, Chapter 5.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. That is the CI staff charter?

6 Mr. Rocca. Charter -- and this shift was precisely  
7 directly in line with the implications of that charter. This  
8 is my reading now in retrospect.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. What was the line of reporting within  
10 the CIA with regard to information that was relevant to the  
11 assassination? By line of reporting I mean once information  
12 was received, who did it go to?

13 I am talking now about the time the CI staff was  
14 responsible for the investigation.

15 Mr. Rocca. There were -- this is where you are going  
16 off, because the CI staff never displaced Mr. Helms in his  
17 direct relations with the Commission. The CI staff never  
18 displaced the direct relations between the Soviet Division,  
19 Mr. Murphy, Mr. Bagley, with the Commission. The CI staff  
20 never displaced the direct relations between Mr. [SCELSO]--  
21 even after it had taken over. In other words, it was a  
22 decentralized approach.

23 Now the material that did come through of a substantive  
24 nature developed by these components, and particularly the  
25 Soviet division, were brought down in the normal flow of day

1 to day work. They were reviewed by me or by the assistants  
2 I had, and they were Mr. Tom Hall, Mr. Thomas Hall, Ph.D.,  
3 University of Chicago, in Slavic Studies, and our Russian  
4 expert: Mr. Paul Hartman, who was a general research and search  
5 man for the whole of the community and its resources and  
6 Mr. Arthur Dooley -- D-O-O-L-E-Y -- a former member of the  
7 FBI who had transferred to the Agency many years before.

8 Now these people actually were dealing with the actual  
9 working level in the various divisions, or the various  
10 divisional elements, particularly in SB, would be working  
11 with me.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. Let's see if we can clarify this for  
13 a moment.

14 Overall responsibility was in the hands of Mr. Helms.

15 Mr. Rocca. That's correct. Now you're talking -- and  
16 that never changed.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. That never changed from the very beginning

18 Mr. Rocca. As far as I am concerned, Mr. Helms was in  
19 charge, and Mr. Karamissines, his deputy, when he was not there.  
20 For sensitive aspects, Mr. Angleton and these two were in  
21 charge, or the division people.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Was Mr. Angleton heavily involved in  
23 the investigation, other than occasional sensitive matters  
24 that arose?

25 Mr. Rocca. I think not. I think this is a correct

1 appraisal of his role at that time. He attended the general  
2 meetings.

3 Let me give you an example of what I have in mind.

4 Though I was the working level point of contact  
5 with the committee, that is, I knew Mr. Slawson in particular,  
6 and worked, I believe, closely and profitably with him, and  
7 without reservation, there was another historian. In any  
8 event, I was not cleared for the Nosenko case. So, I did not  
9 attend any of the discussions that took place on that matter,  
10 and that, too, is a matter of formal record.

11 You should find that record to back that up -- if you  
12 have not found it.

13 In other words, if you are looking for a fixed point of  
14 investigation here, you have to keep in mind that again, you  
15 had access to sources and methods and compartmentation was  
16 observed, notwithstanding the fact that I was the working  
17 level point of contact.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. So, the Nosenko case would be an  
19 example of a situation where Mr. Angleton would have been  
20 involved.

21 Mr. Rocca. It was Mr. Murphy.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Was Mr. Angleton involved as well?

23 Mr. Rocca. I don't think he was at the meeting that  
24 concerned it over at the Warren Commission, because I had the  
25 delicious experience of being asked to leave at a certain

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1 stage. I know he wasn't there.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. What would be an example of a sensitive  
3 situation that would prompt Mr. Angleton to have been involved  
4 in the investigation?

5 Mr. Rocca. Oh, he would have known all of that.  
6 Whatever else, I have no similar story to tell about him.  
7 I have the one to tell about myself and the Nosenko case, which  
8 I was not cleared for.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. But earlier you said that other than  
10 sensitive matters, Mr. Angleton basically was not involved  
11 in the investigation. I am wondering if you can give an  
12 example of a sensitive matter.

13 Mr. Rocca. Well, I would imagine all of the matters  
14 involving the intercept of correspondence, of Oswald's  
15 correspondence -- which I saw in 1975.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. So, in 1963, when you were working on  
17 this case, you did not see the correspondence, the cable traffic  
18 from Mexico City to CIA headquarters reporting Oswald's  
19 contact?

20 Mr. Rocca. Very definitely that is not the case and  
21 that is not what I said.

22 I'm talking about the correspondence intercepted.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Which intercept are you talking about?

24 Mr. Rocca. I am talking about the intercepted mail  
25 correspondence.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Okay.

2 You are talking about the HDLINGUAL program?

3 Mr. Rocca. I'm talking about that material. He would  
4 have handled that.

5 And indeed, when I read it in 1975, it was clear that  
6 Mr. Papich had come over on Saturday morning and had taken  
7 all of the material on that file. But that was the first time  
8 I knew that that part of -- in other words, there was very  
9 strict compartmentation utilized within the whole group in  
10 order to protect sources and methods at the time that we were  
11 attempting to help this body. That's the point that I'm  
12 trying to make.

13 Mr. Angleton's role would have been, I would have  
14 imagined, in that connection.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Was Mr. Angleton's role peripheral or  
16 central to the investigation?

17 Mr. Rocca. How can you say with an asset like that  
18 that it could be peripheral? I don't know, because I was not  
19 privy to the materials. But I could guess that it must have  
20 been important for him to put that material of Papich's to use  
21 immediately.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Well, how much material was generated  
23 by the HDLINGUAL program?

24 Mr. Rocca. I have no way of really recalling. It was  
25 a substantial file and I see no reason why you shouldn't have it.

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1 Then you can answer the question yourself.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. I want to explain to you, Mr. Rocca,  
3 that the mere fact that --

4 Mr. Rocca. I don't mean to be impertinent.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. -- files and documents are made available  
6 to us doesn't necessarily mean that the files and documents  
7 are accurate. One of the reason for taking deposition statements  
8 is because files and statements are not always accurate. In  
9 fact, one of the purposes of this committee is to verify the  
10 accuracy of the Agency's own files.

11 Mr. Rocca. I take your point on that. Let me say that  
12 in one respect, for that reason, the Oswald file, which was  
13 the file that R & A kept, that is, the material pertaining  
14 to the 201 file -- you can be sure is the file because it  
15 was computerized, and you can't change the computer order  
16 without leaving a record. Therefore you can be sure that  
17 everything that went into it is still in it.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. With regard to the HDLINGUAL file, you  
19 indicated before, I believe, that the file was a thick one.  
20 Is that true?

21 Mr. Rocca. No, not thick. It must have contained  
22 seven or eight letters or so. But the man who would know  
23 exactly is Mr. Birch O'Neill. He headed the project.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. We've spoken to Mr. Birch O'Neill.

25 Mr. Rocca. I mean, he must know this exactly, then.

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1 He must know this exactly.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Again, the fact that we have talked to  
3 other people does not mean that we do not want information from  
4 you, if you have that information.

5 Mr. Rocca. Of course not.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. To the best of your recollection, how  
7 many Oswald intercepts were there in the HDLINGUAL program?

8 Mr. Rocca. Oh, this would be -- if you have to --  
9 as I say, I read it in 1975 at the moment the Rockefeller  
10 Commission was coming in. I'm sure they looked at the whole  
11 thing -- Mr. Ford, or whatever is the name of the individual  
12 who was concerned. I went through it cursorily with Mrs. Watson  
13 She is the person who handed me the file. There must have  
14 been five, or six, or seven. But this is pure guess. There may  
15 be twelve, there may be three -- I can't say.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Was there more than one?

17 Mr. Rocca. Oh, there was more than one.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

19 Getting back to the question of organization, I think  
20 I understand from your testimony --

21 Mr. Rocca. When I say more than one, it involves both  
22 ends, that is, materials going out from Mrs. Oswald and material  
23 coming in from him. I don't know what the proportion is or  
24 even if there were things coming in, or if it was confined  
25 solely to things going out. As I say, this is something

1 not a part of my bag.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. I understand.

3 Getting back to the question of organization, I think  
4 you have indicated --

5 Mr. Rocca. So, you have very clearly in mind now that  
6 in two areas that were of significance, I was completely cut  
7 out.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

9 Mr. Rocca, I'm sorry to have to ask you this again, but  
10 you are going to have to listen to my questions, and please try  
11 not to interrupt me.

12 Finally, getting back to the question of organization,  
13 for purposes of clarification, now, I think you've indicated  
14 very clearly that in terms of overall responsibility, it was  
15 in the hands of Mr. Helms.

16 Is that correct?

17 Mr. Rocca. That is correct.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Other than that, I think you have  
19 indicated that the investigation was decentralized to some  
20 extent in that different area divisions, primarily Western  
21 Hemisphere and Soviet Europe were sending information upstream  
22 to headquarters -- and there may have been other divisions  
23 as well sending information, but primarily it was Western  
24 Hemisphere and Soviet Russia -- is that correct?

25 Mr. Rocca. Yes.

1 Mr. Helms held weekly meetings at which these  
2 generalizations were spread and which division chiefs complied  
3 with.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Now, all of the information that the  
5 division chiefs were sending upstream at one time or another,  
6 I believe, went through the CI/R&A staff, is that correct?

7 Mr. Rocca. I can't say that all of them did. Those  
8 that are marked plainly on the record as having been were -- if  
9 they are all, I don't know.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. I realize that you can't state  
11 that all were. But, as a matter of your best recollection now --

12 Mr. Rocca. Mr. Helms indicated that all material  
13 bearing on anything that could be of assistance to the  
14 Warren Commission should be seen by CI staff and R & A and  
15 marked for us. He issued very, very strictly worded  
16 indications -- they were verbal insofar as I know -- that we  
17 were to leave no stone unturned.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. And were Mr. Helms' orders generally  
19 followed?

20 Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, they were followed to the  
21 letter, by all that I know of.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. So, if you were asking different  
23 divisions to send to CI/R & A information pertinent to the  
24 investigation, can we assume safely that most of that  
25 information did, in fact, go to CI/R&A?

1 Mr. Rocca. Your question turns on most of it. There  
2 is no way that I can judge whether most of it did or not.  
3 That which struck some division chief or his assistant  
4 would have come forward, and much did.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Assuming that Mr. Helms' orders were  
6 followed?

7 Mr. Rocca. Yes, assuming that they were followed.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

9 Could you indicate for the record how the overall  
10 responsibility for the investigation was divided between the  
11 FBI and the CIA?

12 I understand that both organizations have different  
13 charters and different purposes. What was your understanding  
14 of the CIA's responsibilities for the investigation, as opposed  
15 to the FBI's?

16 Mr. Rocca. Well, as you have already detected, I  
17 object, I think, in principle to the use of the word  
18 "investigation," to apply to the CIA.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Well, how would you like me to phrase  
20 the question? I would be glad to do that.

21 Mr. Rocca. CIA made its entire worldwide resources  
22 available to the Commission to assist it in gathering all  
23 information within the powers of its operatives and its  
24 operations.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you saying, then, that the CIA

1 provided information but it did not conduct an investigation?

2 Mr. Rocca. But at times it made use of investigative  
3 techniques. But I have read enough Bureau reports to know  
4 that on a matter of this kind, the primary investigative  
5 responsibilities were in the domestic authorities, and that  
6 investigations done abroad, even those, were repeated by  
7 the Bureau.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. So, the Bureau, in effect, was  
9 conducting an investigation overseas?

10 Mr. Rocca. The Bureau was the primary investigative  
11 authority.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. In light of that point -- which is  
13 exactly the point I was trying to make in terms of trying  
14 to determine what the different areas of responsibilities  
15 were between the Bureau and CIA -- in light of that point,  
16 what was the responsibility of the CIA?

17 Mr. Rocca. The CIA was to turn over and to develop  
18 any information bearing on the assassination that could be  
19 of assistance to the Warren Commission.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Was that information given directly  
21 to the Warren Commission or directly to the Bureau?

22 Mr. Rocca. It was given to both in many cases.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Now, even though the FBI isn't  
24 technically authorized to conduct investigations overseas,  
25 are you saying that in effect the Bureau was the agency

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1 primarily responsible for overseas investigations pertaining  
2 to the assassination?

3 Mr. Rocca. On matters that were of substantive  
4 interest, I think that is accurate. That is certainly the  
5 case in Mexico, where your statement that they are not  
6 technically --

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Authorized.

8 Mr. Rocca -- authorized, I think is in a grey area,  
9 and where it was never contested that they had primary  
10 responsibility -- and therefore they repeated investigations.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. What was the role of Mr. McGone?

12 Mr. Rocca. I had no meetings with him during that  
13 period that I can recall, at all.

14 I have nothing to say that would bear on this.

15 I am sure he authorized complete support.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. But in terms of actual involvement  
17 in the CIA's work in this area, do you know what his  
18 responsibilities were?

19 Mr. Rocca. No. I can't speak to that.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. I would like now for you to refer  
21 to a document which I will call CIA number 1876. For  
22 the record I will indicate that the Agency has provided  
23 documents to the committee. The Agency, for security reasons,  
24 has numbered those documents so that the Agency can insure  
25 later on that all of the documents have been returned.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

1 For my purposes I refer to these numbers so that they  
2 can be used for the record. So, the Agency's number, that  
3 they use for security purposes, we use for reference purposes  
4 here.

5 I would like to refer you to CIA number 1876 and ask  
6 you to read the first question and the answer to yourself.

7 (Pause)

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Have you done so?

9 Mr. Rocca. Yes. I wrote it after talking with (Don.)

10 Mr. Goldsmith. This is a memo for the record dated  
11 1 April, 1975, which I believe you say that you wrote.

12 Is that correct?

13 Mr. Rocca. That is correct. Yes.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. I only have a few questions concerning  
15 that first paragraph.

16 Mr. Rocca. Well, the multilevel -- you see, I used  
17 the word "multilevel" there -- that is the word that I now  
18 here refer to as decentralized.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. I understand.

20 Mr. Rocca. I am glad there is some concordance.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. The question that I have for you -- in  
22 this first paragraph you say that CI had own defector input.  
23 What did you mean by that, if you remember?

24 Mr. Rocca. Oh, I remember it exactly, because I  
25 handled it.



1 This was Golitzin.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. In other words, Golitzin giving  
3 information to the CIA which --

4 Mr. Rocca. Giving it to me.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Giving it to you.

6 Mr. Rocca. Yes.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Which you would then forward on to  
8 the proper authorities.

9 Mr. Rocca. Yes. It is the basis of the report -- it  
10 is the basis of the report which you must have, I'm sure,  
11 because it's been released. I have gotten a copy and I use  
12 it over in the DIS course that I am giving, the seminar,  
13 on Soviet intelligence. It is called the "Uses of Assassination  
14 and Executive Action by Soviet Intelligence."

15 It's a memo, it's a combined memo, done by Mr. Wigren a  
16 SB -- Mr. Wigren was Mr. Murphy's research and analysis person  
17 so we worked very closely together. Mr. Wigren actually was  
18 the supervisor of Mr. [ ] who was the person who found  
19 the Minsk photograph, which is the only substantively new  
20 thing that was produced in the whole case. And, in his memo,  
21 this material of Golitzin was incorporated on the basis of  
22 my debriefing.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, how do you spell  
24 Golitzin?

25 Mr. Rocca. G-O-L-I-T-Z-I-N.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Now, earlier you referred in this paragraph and in your testimony to the Minsk photograph.

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, which photograph are you referring to now?

Mr. Rocca. Ah.

This is the photograph that shows Oswald in the checkered shirt, and it had been either found down in that lady, that Quaker lady's materials, or whatever it is. SB division assigned an individual, [ ] to look over every photograph in the DDI file in another part of the agency for here, and that man, working lunch hours -- and I say this with some heat because I still think this is one of the significant contributions that has been unrecognized -- by looking at photographs submitted by the Los Angeles office of CIA, done by two ladies --

Mr. Goldsmith. Cramer and Naman.

Mr. Rocca. -- he saw that shirt, that's all he saw. It was an incredible shirt of houndstooth checks. That was it. Here we had positive proof that he was in Minsk and we didn't have to go on any kind of -- I personally -- that was one of the working level things that I handed over to him.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is that the photograph that shows Oswald with a group of other Russians?

1 Mr. Rocca. And a car.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. In a car or and a car?

3 Mr. Rocca. And a car -- because anywhere an American  
4 car went --- well, this I think may have been a Volkswagen,  
5 it may have been a German car --there were groups, and this  
6 was right in the plaza at Minsk, the main plaza.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. This is the photograph that was  
8 provided by two American tourists?

9 Mr. Rocca. That's right. But if you notice, the  
10 Bureau redid the whole investigation and there is no  
11 indication in the report that it came from CIA.

12 But that's how it did it, and Mr. [ ] deserves  
13 highest praise.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, would you spell his  
15 name now?

16 Mr. Rocca. [ ]

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why that photograph would  
18 have been taken by the domestic contacts division people, or  
19 whomever contacted those two women who took the photograph  
20 in the first place?

21 Mr. Rocca. Sure.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. In other words, the photograph was  
23 obtained prior to the assassination.

24 Mr. Rocca. Many years.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Many years prior to the assassination --

1 well, a year or so prior to the assassination.

2 Mr. Rocca. A year or two.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. And at that time there was no particular  
4 interest in Oswald. I take it.

5 So, do you know how that -- rather why that photograph  
6 was taken by the CIA officials involved?

7 Mr. Rocca. Yes.

8 It was one of a series of pictures turned in by these  
9 two ladies in the normal course of what is the authorized  
10 mission of contacts division, at that time located in the DDI,  
11 of turning up useful foreign intelligence on -- by Americans,  
12 who volunteer. That picture, on the extreme left, had a  
13 crane in it, an industrial item, in which we were specifically  
14 interested. That was the way the photograph had been selected.  
15 That crane was cropped out when the picture was published.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you.

17 That clarifies an important issue for us.

18 Did the CIA's effort to support the Warren Commission  
19 by providing the Commission with relevant information reflect  
20 any working hypotheses? In other words, did the Agency say  
21 that certain areas were to receive primary emphasis?

22 Mr. Rocca. I can't speak for all of these other  
23 authorities that were in touch. I can speak only for what  
24 came across.

25 Our primary interest was in following up Soviet leads



1 on the assumption that a person who spends four years in the  
 2 Soviet Union, under his circumstances, had to be of specific  
 3 interest to Soviet state security and their collateral authorities.  
 4 As a consequence, we favored very strongly that the questions  
 5 that were to be delivered to the Soviet Union for response  
 6 should include very specific inquiries with respect to what  
 7 he did -- not just this hospital record, as it turned out,  
 8 135 pages of it -- but just exactly what he did. And, as far  
 9 as I know, these were excellent questions. They, too, have  
 10 been released. I have not reviewed them. They would still  
 11 be useful questions to answer.

12 The Reporter. Excuse me, but did you say they have  
 13 or have not been released?

14 Mr. Rocca. They have been released, so far as I know.  
 15 I am not sure of that.

16 There were three pages.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Okay, let's not talk about those questions.

18 My question is a general one.

19 Which areas received emphasis?

20 Mr. Rocca. The areas that we concentrated or tended  
 21 to concentrate on were the Soviet areas because the people he  
 22 was in touch with in Mexico had traces, prior traces, as  
 23 KGB people. They were there under consular cover and obviously  
 24 could have been doing and were undoubtedly doing a consular  
 25 job in those earlier contacts.



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But the whole picture read in the context of that portion of KGB use of assassination, particularly the Golitzin part, which was not specifically indicated to him, but which is the part stating that all U.S. military defectors are reviewed specifically by Department 13, which is now Department B -- that part is Golitzin. He spoke from knowledge. I got it from him and I put it in the paper and we delivered it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was Department 13 the assassinations branch?

Mr. Rocca. That is correct; but it has other things to do, too, including sabotage and the preparation for sabotage. So, the assassination thing should not be highlighted.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand.

Mr. Rocca. I mean, I think this is, of course, when you get off the beam, when you start assuming that it has to be --

Mr. Goldsmith. You made the point very clear and we understand.

What other areas, if any, received emphasis?

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Other defectors that had gone to the Soviet Union and had been processed in particular ways, his documentation, his ability to travel and avoid internal controls which were exceptional under the circumstances, reviews of books that were coming out.

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Mr. Goldsmith. But again, the overall focus was on the Soviet connection?

Mr. Rocca. I would say, on balance, that was, as it came out on our side of it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

I have another question, before I forget to ask you it, in reference to CIA number 1875.

That first paragraph says, "In addition, on sensitive matters of concern to the investigation, Dick Helms and Murphy also dealt directly with the Commission."

Mr. Rocca. Which was, of course, in the central.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Were there any other sensitive matters that you can think of?

Mr. Rocca. That's the only one that I know of. No. Let me say that this was a very hastily put together memorandum and I did it really in order to have something on the record. I am delighted I did, too. I have no regrets. But it could have been more ample.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Warren Commission give the Agency input as to what kind of information it wanted, what types of leads should be pursued?

Mr. Rocca. Oh, yes.

That was what I was coming to when you asked the other things that were done.

1 For example, they wanted detailed information with  
2 respect to how he could have travelled. This was worked out  
3 by SB division. There must have been other questions of that  
4 kind that others at this stage -- if I had had comprehension  
5 of what you were going to ask me, I could have done some of  
6 my own homework. But it is right off the top of my head now.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. There is no need for specifics at  
8 this point.

9 Mr. Rocca. I'm embarrassed that I can't think of many  
10 other things that we did.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Would the Warren Commission go to  
12 Mr. Helms requesting the information, or would they go directly  
13 to you?

14 Mr. Rocca. In some instances Mr. Rankin would go  
15 directly to Mr. Helms. In other instances, Mr. Slawson would  
16 come right in on the horn and he was authorized to talk with  
17 Mr. Hall or anybody in R & A about these matters.

18 There were other people -- there were other people in  
19 the staff that had the same privilege. I can't remember whether  
20 Liebler was one.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Did Mr. Helms, as a matter of routine,  
22 pass on to you the Warren Commission requests for information?

23 Mr. Rocca. Where it concerned us, I'm sure he did.  
24 The record should reflect it, because these things were  
25 invited in pieces of paper.



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2 For example, the whole matter of records and record  
3 keeping regarding assassination suspects was something that  
4 was arranged at the Helms level, and which then I received,  
5 either by telephone call or by memorandum. And we were able  
6 to set them up for an entire review of how the Oswald file  
7 had been machined, recorded, and how intelligence pertaining  
8 to operations was being computerized and how literally this  
9 should be the way the rest of the community should function.  
10 So that, a whole portion of that report which reflects  
11 recommendations regarding the mechanization of records, really  
12 came out of what they saw over there.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Which report are you referring to now?

14 Mr. Rocca. The Warren Commission report, over here  
15 (indicating).

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. I understand what you are pointing  
17 to, but the record needs to know.

18 Do you feel that you were given by your superiors at  
19 the CIA all relevant information concerning the assassination  
20 which would have insured that the CIA could provide the  
21 Warren Commission with all the necessary information that it,  
22 in turn, needed?

23 Mr. Rocca. I think so -- to the limit that they were  
24 informed and to the limit of my need to know.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Were you informed --

26 Mr. Rocca. Incidentally -- if I may break in -- another

point directly involved in the Commission was the question of the eighth man -- you know, this photograph of the man --

Mr. Goldsmith. The Mexico mystery man?

Mr. Rocca. Yes, the Mexico mystery man.

Mr. Goldsmith. We will get into that photograph later on.

Mr. Rocca. That was handled directly, too, and I arranged it, I think, with WH people present.

Mr. Goldsmith. We'll get into that issue in a little while.

Were you ever told during the time that you were working as the Agency's point of contact with the Warren Commission about the Agency's anti-Castro assassination plots?

Mr. Rocca. Never.

Mr. Goldsmith. A moment ago I asked you whether you had been provided with all relevant information by your superiors and I believe you indicated that you thought that you had.

In your opinion, was the fact that the Agency had conducted anti-Castro assassination plots relevant to the Agency's -- relevant to the Warren Commission's investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy?

Mr. Rocca. This certainly was not staff responsibility. This was a responsibility of another part of the staff -- of

1 another part of the DDP. I was not even aware of the Harker  
2 article having come out until much later.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. By this you're saying the anti-Castro  
4 assassination plots had nothing to do with CI staff?

5 Mr. Rocca. Yes. How can I judge my superiors on the  
6 basis of information that I had no need to know?

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Well, the question really is, did you  
8 have a need to know that information?

9 Mr. Rocca. Well, I was not investigating the thing.  
10 I was a point of contact for the committee on matters that  
11 would facilitate their investigation. You can argue, therefore,  
12 that I should have known everything. But that's --

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, please don't misunderstand  
14 me. I'm not suggesting that you should have known.

15 Mr. Rocca. But you were pointing out that I had  
16 contradicted myself. I don't think I had.

17 Within my limitations and need to know, I think I had  
18 what I had.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, I didn't even mean to  
20 suggest that you had contradicted yourself.

21 Mr. Rocca. I withdraw that, then.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. I am only trying to clarify the record  
23 here.

24 Mr. Rocca. Yes.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. After you indicated that you said you

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had received all the relevant information, my question was do you think that the anti-Castro assassination plots were relevant to the Warren Commission's investigation?

Mr. Rocca. My feeling is -- my answer to that question is that this is a political diversion and that no political action -- I am now speaking with 20-20 hindsight -- that no political action undertaken of the kind that has been described and it has been described in various ways -- in any case would have justified action against the President. That I have to regard, therefore, as a totally different set of facts.

If the Warren Commission had had it, I don't know what they could have done with it beyond what they did, and they may have known about it. There is indication, at least press references, that Warren did indeed know and had been told about these things.

I can never say that Mr. Dulles, who was aboard when the Cuban thing started but had left it, didn't talk about it on a personal basis. But in any case, I consider it a political diversion.

In other words, attempting -- anything that was being attempted against Castro through low level agents and all the rest doesn't justify this kind of activity of --

Mr. Goldsmith. Assassinating President Kennedy.

Mr. Rocca. -- assassinating President Kennedy. I think the whole thought is outrageous.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. So, your position, then, is that even  
2 though the Agency may have been attempting to assassinate  
3 Premier Castro through low level agents, that would not justify  
4 a retaliation attempt?

5 Mr. Rocca. Retaliation -- absolutely, absolutely,  
6 absolutely .

7 Now, mind you, the Harker interview is a very clear  
8 indication -- there is no question about it --

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Indication of what, sir?

10 Mr. Rocca. That there were political -- that there  
11 were terminal risks involved in persisting in attempts to  
12 use Cuban exiles. My understanding is, though, that that  
13 interview was considered by those people who were engaged in  
14 this kind of activity in the Agency and in the community.  
15 But I was not privy to it.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Had you known about the anti-Castro  
17 assassination plots, would you have given more focus, more  
18 emphasis, to the possibility of a Cuban responsibility for  
19 the assassination of President Kennedy?

20 Mr. Rocca. I would have done it anyway, in view of  
21 the fact that he was in touch with the Cubans.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. However, earlier when we asked you --

23 Mr. Rocca. It would have simply intensified that  
24 interest. The answer to your question is yes.

25 But certainly there was all kinds of interest in the

Cuban possibility.

Mr. Goldsmith. Earlier, when I asked you which areas of the case received emphasis, I believe that you indicated that on balance the primary area of emphasis was the Soviet connection.

Mr. Rocca. That was certainly the one that I would say dominated -- looking at it from my point of view.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, had you known about the anti-Castro assassination plots on the part of the CIA, would you have given more priority, more emphasis, to the possibility of a Castro conspiracy to kill the President?

Mr. Rocca. Again, I say that it would have simply intensified it, that there was attention given to it, not particularly by the staff. I had no capabilities on the Cuban side.

The organization of their service and their operation in Mexico was something entirely entirely within -- it was an enigma at the time. They were just getting started. This was WE's area. This was Win Scott's area of proficiency. So the defectors had only begun to come out and they came out later, the Cuban defectors.

So, I can't -- I really can't say that (a) the Cuban connection was ignored, because it wasn't. The press was filled with it at the time.

The Harker interview should have been undoubtedly given

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greater attention in a generalized sense; but it was given specific attention, I was told at the time of the Rockefeller thing.

Mr. Goldsmith. In what way was the Cuban connection investigated?

Mr. Rocca. I don't know. I don't know this. That side of the report strikes me as being inadequate.

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, when I said to what extent was the Cuban connection investigated, I don't mean by the Warren Commission. I mean to what extent did the Agency provide --

Mr. Rocca. That I can't answer. I certainly didn't do it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Pardon me?

Mr. Rocca. We certainly didn't, in R & A.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, CI/R & A did not --

Mr. Rocca. Go into the Cuban side of it at all.

This was something left to the people who were concerned specifically with Cuban intelligence and security operation.

Mr. Goldsmith. But I believe earlier we established that Mr. Helms gave orders that information pertinent to the assassination was to go through your office, correct?

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. And once information pertinent to the assassination went through your office, I take you or Mr.



1 Helms would decide what information would be relevant for  
2 the Warren Commission to see.

3 Is that correct?

4 Mr. Rocca. Well --

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Based upon what you knew?

6 Mr. Rocca. Well, everything would go, yes.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Therefore, you were in the position,  
8 it would seem, to know what information was being generated  
9 in the field that was going to the Warren Commission.

10 Earlier I asked you which area received emphasis and  
11 I believe you indicated that the Soviet area.

12 Mr. Rocca. Primarily, primarily. But I didn't mean  
13 by that that it excluded the Cuban, because there was a lot  
14 of material that came through and went to the Commission  
15 that concerned the Cubans.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Let's go off the record.

17 (Discussion off the record.)

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Let's continue.

19 Mr. Rocca. My recollection is that at the time the  
20 great press manifestation was that Cuban exiles who were in  
21 touch with CIA had been somehow involved in this. This was  
22 the great concern.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. That's another possibility. There  
24 are different --

25 Mr. Rocca. Questions went down to WH: do you have

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1 anybody who could possibly have gotten involved in this  
2 kind of thing.

3 There was extraordinary diligence, I thought, exercised  
4 to try to clarify that side.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think that the possibility of  
6 an assassination plot by Castro against the President was  
7 adequately investigated?

8 (Pause)

9 Mr. Rocca. With the advantages of 20-20 hindsight, I  
10 could say probably not. But at the time it seems to me that  
11 they gave due attention to it -- within the information that  
12 I had at my disposal.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, I also think that you indicate  
14 that had you known about the anti-Castro assassination plots,  
15 the effort would have been intensified.

16 Is that a fair statement?

17 Mr. Rocca. Well, I would have -- certainly I think  
18 it would have been intensified. Everything would have been  
19 intensified.

20 I think in the light of what has happened, a completely  
21 different procedural approach probably would and should have  
22 been taken. I mean, there are any number of things that you  
23 can say in the light of history.

24 What I can't accept is that leads were deliberately  
25 or otherwise ignored.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. When did you first learn of the  
2 anti-Castro assassination plots?

3 Mr. Rocca. There were rumors of these activities  
4 in the mid and late '60's.

5 The first significant indication that I had that there  
6 was Castro appreciation of an actual plot was the reference  
7 to the Harker article in the Mexico City case log, which we  
8 had accessioned for the file sometime in the late '60's, after  
9 Win Scott's death, when Mexico City shipped its documentation  
10 up here.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you familiar with Book 5 of the  
12 Senate Report?

13 Mr. Rocca. No.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Of the assassination plots?

15 Mr. Rocca. No.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. We will defer that till later  
17 on, then.

18 Mr. Rocca. I got the Harker report myself and studied  
19 it at the Library of Congress in the course of the work that  
20 I did for the Rockefeller Commission.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, again, for the record, I  
22 would like to be clear on this.

23 Is it your position that the Agency itself did not  
24 conduct an investigation, per se, into the assassination of  
25 President Kennedy, but simply was providing information to the



1 Warren Commission?

2 Mr. Rocca. I think our role was basically the provision  
3 of intelligence information, not an investigation. Yes.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you able to be more specific at all  
5 as to what effort was made to examine the question of Castro's  
6 possible responsibility for the assassination?

7 Mr. Rocca. No, I am not.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. I would like you to read CIA numbers  
9 1904 and 1905, which is a letter dated April 15, 1975 to Mr.  
10 E. Henry Knoche -- K-N-O-C-H-E -- from David W. Belin, Executive  
11 Director of the Rockefeller Commission.

12 (Pause)

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, do you know whether this  
14 letter was ever referred to you for action? By action, I mean  
15 for response.

16 Mr. Rocca. I do not, though I know I responded to it  
17 directly to Mr. Belin in conversation -- that is, the substance  
18 of it.

19 There was some other kind of letter which Mr. Belin  
20 wrote that was referred to me. It is much shorter than this.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you now review CIA number 1934.

22 (Pause)

23 Mr. Rocca. Now you're talking here.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. So, according to CIA number 1934,  
25 which you have just read, I believe it indicates that you,

1 in fact, responded to the letter of April 15, 1975.

2 Mr. Rocca. I indeed remember responding to this.

3 But this thing seemed utterly --

4 Mr. Goldsmith. But you weren't sure if you had done  
5 so orally or in writing?

6 Mr. Rocca. Oh, no. This is -- if I wrote this (indi-  
7 cating), I must have had this (indicating).

8 So, I accept. I withdraw my previous statement.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

10 In light of having read CIA number 1934.

11 Mr. Rocca. This is what I recall.

12 But there is still another memo. You see, I wrote  
13 two memos for him. Are you aware of that?

14 (Pause)

15 Mr. Rocca. I wrote two memos for Mr. Belin. Each  
16 had a letter which enjoined me, actually, to do it. They were  
17 from him.

18 (Pause)

19 Mr. Rocca. I know there was a second memo.  
20 The memos are complementary, but concern different  
21 aspects of the subject.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Were they written at the same time?

23 Mr. Rocca. They were written in succession and  
24 grew out of his interest in the Cuban connection.

25 So, my vagueness about this probably grows out of the

1 fact that there was a succession of memos. This one seems  
2 longer than the one that I had. But if I refer to it, I  
3 accept it, obviously.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Drawing your attention to paragraph  
5 number two, would you respond to the questions that are raised  
6 in that paragraph?

7 Mr. Rocca. I would say that as far as I know, the  
8 answers are negative. I certainly didn't -- because I didn't  
9 know.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. In other words, because you didn't know  
11 of the anti-Castro assassination plots.

12 Mr. Rocca. I couldn't have told them. I couldn't have  
13 told them.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Is it your position that the questions  
15 posed in paragraph number two are answered in the negative?

16 Mr. Rocca. These have to be answered by others who  
17 were in the chain of command and who would have had the  
18 information.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Now let's take a look at 1934, CIA  
20 number 1934.

21 According to that document, it indicates that you  
22 are responding to the questions raised in paragraph number three  
23 of the Belin letter dated April 15, 1975.

24 Do you recall ever being asked to respond to the  
25 questions in paragraphs number two and four?



(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. No, nor one.

The only one that I had any possibility of responding to on the basis of my knowledge or the possibilities that I had in research was this: and this is where the -- of course, this is the Harker followup of the public speech.

Mr. Goldsmith. When did you first learn from an Agency source, if ever, that the Agency had been involved in anti-Castro assassination plots?

Mr. Rocca. Very late. I can't attach an exact date to it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you know of the anti-Castro assassination plots at the time that this letter was reviewed by you -- in other words, in April of 1975?

Mr. Rocca. No. No. I still don't know of them.

I read, as I recall, Des Fitzgerald's report of his visit to Paris when I delivered the report.

Mr. Goldsmith. When you delivered which report?

Mr. Rocca. One of the two that I am talking about now.

Mr. Goldsmith. The memos?

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Now, that had just been found at the time.

Mr. Goldsmith. When did you say you retired from the Agency?

Mr. Rocca. In 1974. I was on contract at this time.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. So, during the time that you were working  
2 with the Rockefeller Commission for the Agency, you were on  
3 contract?

4 Mr. Rocca. Yes.

5 Are we clear on that?

6 Mr. Goldsmith. And at that time --

7 Mr. Rocca. Des Fitzgerald's letter, which is the key --  
8 I went to Paris, I talked with --

9 Mr. Goldsmith. AMLASH.

10 Mr. Rocca. AMLASH, exactly. AMLASH.

11 This letter turned up. It was found by a WH researcher,  
12 a WH man at that time. This was 1975.

13 And so you were asking me earlier how could I be sure  
14 that everything had been delivered to the staff. You see, I  
15 mean, it's just not possible to take the responsibility.. Of  
16 course it wasn't. That letter had never been seen by me.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. That was just another example of  
18 anti-Castro plot information that was not brought to your  
19 attention?

20 Mr. Rocca. Des Fitzgerald, it is well known, very  
21 closely associated with the Kennedys in political action and  
22 there is no question but that he had total legitimacy in  
23 undertaking what he was doing.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. I am not questioning the legitimacy.  
25 I am only questioning whether you had the information.

1 Mr. Rocca. I am using "legitimacy" in quotes, too.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Is it your position that --

3 Mr. Rocca. I remember this little detail, which is  
4 important. So I am able to respond. I think it was after the  
5 15th.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. In light of the information available  
7 to you today, are you able to respond to the questions posed  
8 in paragraphs two and four?

9 Mr. Rocca. Not for myself.

10 For myself, I can say no to all of them.

11 Well, let me read them first. I think that would be a  
12 good idea.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. You are referring, for the record, to  
14 CIA 1904.

15 Mr. Rocca. Did anyone with the CIA tell any member of  
16 the --

17 Mr. Goldsmith. No. Read paragraph two only.

18 Mr. Rocca. "There is evidence that Castro, prior  
19 to 22nd February, '63, knew about the existence of such plans  
20 and the possible involvement of the U.S. Government, and that  
21 the CIA at any time prior to the completion of the Warren" --  
22 "have any documents or other information indicating that Castro  
23 may have known about such plans. If the answer is yes, would  
24 you please furnish us with copies of all such documents and  
25 details of any such information."



1 I would have to answer negatively. I do not know  
2 this.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. And now, paragraph number four.

4 Mr. Rocca. "Prior to November 22, 1963, several months  
5 prior to the assassination" --

6 Mr. Goldsmith. No. Mr. Rocca, please read paragraph  
7 number four now. You are on three.

8 Mr. Rocca. "Would you please advise us if there is  
9 any information that would seem to indicate that at any time  
10 prior to November any foreign governments or any foreign group  
11 was considering the possible assassination of any American  
12 leaders. If so, would you please advise us of all the details."

13 I would answer no. I know nothing about that.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, you have indicated that this  
15 letter was given to you to respond to -- I take it in 1975.  
16 And, in fact, a memo was prepared by you responding to --

17 Mr. Rocca. One paragraph.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. One paragraph.

19 Mr. Rocca. But, as I say, I have the impression  
20 that these topics were outside of my area of knowledge.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Agency respond to the questions  
22 that were posed by Mr. Belin?

23 Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, I cannot -- as far as I  
24 know. I did not. They may have.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. So, you think that you --

1 Mr. Rocca. Belin was in touch with everybody, so he  
2 could have.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. So, do you think that you were given a  
4 letter and asked to respond just to one paragraph in it?

5 Mr. Rocca. Or to respond more generally to the question  
6 of the background of Cuban knowledge. They were not so specific  
7 as this, because if I had received this as a basis, as a brief,  
8 I would have had to research it. You see, I would have had to  
9 go, then, and ask people. This would have been not only  
10 presumptuous, but it would have taken years.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. That problem now that appears in the  
12 record is that there was a letter that was given to you to  
13 respond to, and we have the responses to paragraph number three  
14 of that letter. It would appear that you were asked to  
15 respond to a letter that you did not have all of the complete  
16 information with which to make a proper response as to the  
17 entire letter.

18 Mr. Rocca. Yes. But my answer doesn't say that I  
19 had the original letter. It says that it responds to a paragraph  
20 of it. I may have been shown it and used it as a point of  
21 reference.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

23 Mr. Rocca. With Mr. Belin, I had hours of conversations  
24 across the desk in the most amicable fashion in which he  
25 understood precisely my feelings and how they had matured over

1 the years with respect to these needs. And the first thing  
2 I would have told him would have been that to answer those  
3 questions would have taken original research, and the people he  
4 had to go to were the people who were in it.

5 Anyway, that is the best of my recollection at this  
6 moment.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Please refer to CIA number 1940 and  
8 read Section B, which continues to the next page.

9 (Pause)

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you like to identify the entire  
11 document that you are looking at, starting with CIA number 1936?

12 Mr. Rocca. Ah, yes.

13 This is the response that I wrote for him.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Now, there again, just a moment, in  
15 CIA number 1936, the reference is to the Belin letter dated  
16 15 April, 1975. Again, that suggested, in fact, that you saw  
17 the letter, does it not?

18 Mr. Rocca. Well, it would be in the file out there  
19 if it is. But certainly the letter consists of much more than  
20 I could respond to. Thank God I am still talking about  
21 paragraph three -- right?

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. Let's take a look --

23 Mr. Rocca. In other words, I'm sticking pretty closely  
24 to what I know, or to what I think I know.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Let's look at CIA number 1940, the page



1 that I referred you to earlier, Section B, on page CIA number 1941

2 You indicate that --

3 Mr. Rocca. This is the nuances.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. You indicate that the Warren Commission  
5 Report should have left a wider window for this contingency,  
6 and I believe you were making reference to --

7 Mr. Rocca. Foreign conspiracy.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

9 Mr. Rocca. Foreign conspiracy.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. I understand.

11 What did you mean by that, and why?

12 Mr. Rocca. It would take literally a whole day to go  
13 into this.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Why don't you try to summarize it,  
15 if possible.

16 Mr. Rocca. Well, I don't want to appear impertinent,  
17 but as Mr. Helms said in his deposition, the case will never  
18 be closed, and I regard that as really being the key, the logic.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you be willing to prepare for the  
20 committee a statement as to what you meant by that sentence  
21 in CIA number 1941?

22 Mr. Rocca. Well, I would prefer to tell you, to talk  
23 to you about it, rather than to prepare a document.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. I would prefer to listen to you discuss  
25 it now. But if it is going to take an entire day, we can't do

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1 that right now.

2 Mr. Rocca. Well, it would take longer than that to write  
3 it, so I think we ought to just discuss it -- though I'm not  
4 adverse to the other, it would really require the preparation  
5 of a monograph.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

7 Please, as best you can, realizing the time constraints,  
8 briefly summarize what you meant by that sentence.

9 Mr. Rocca. First of all, let me say that to Mr. Belin  
10 personally in the talks I made it perfectly clear that I  
11 regarded the theory that Oswald was a mandated assassin by  
12 any foreign intelligence or any other intelligence service to  
13 be false and that there was no credible evidence to sustain  
14 that view that he was a mandated assassin, that this could not  
15 be done on the basis of the available evidence, or as I refer  
16 to it here, credible evidence. Indeed, I regarded it as very  
17 dangerous and counterproductive -- if I can use that term -- to  
18 indulge in public conversation along those lines, because it  
19 leads inevitably to political consequences which are absolutely  
20 impossible to control.

21 So, I don't believe, in other words, in my personal  
22 view of the case, in the position that I held in which I  
23 operated with the Commission that he was sent to kill Kennedy.  
24 However, I do believe that he had contacts with the Soviet  
25 intelligence, or I think the evidence is stronger and certainly

worth following up, that he had contacts with the KGB, both inside and probably outside. I'm not saying in the United States, necessarily, but before his arrival, with the KGB, first.

Second, that the Soviets did not furnish us all of the relevant documentation pertaining to his stay in the Soviet Union and that the contradictions, therefore, between what they served up through the Swiss and what we have derived from people who have come out of the KGB, who are experts on this -- I don't care whether you call them, whether they are Nosenko, or Deriabin or Golitzin, whoever -- the people in the other service there -- there is a manifest contradiction between the amount of material that they furnished and what would have been normally his experience in that country in respect to that service, and in particular with regard to the element of contract and debriefing by the "Spetsotdel", but the 13th Department, by the Special Department.

The questions that were furnished the Commission along those lines were not delivered by the State Department, or whatever happened. Therefore, we got no answers. And, they served to deepen, therefore, the importance and the occasions of what I've just said.

In the third place, the people, fortunately or unfortunately, casually or otherwise, that he was in touch with in Mexico City during his trip, were KGB, according to

1 the traces held by us and by the FBI and other services.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall which people these were?

3 Mr. Rocca. I can't -- I could probably get them  
4 out of my mind.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Please proceed.

6 Mr. Rocca. It is absolutely patent that these people  
7 could have been dealing with him and possibly were dealing with  
8 him. I give, in other words, full faith and credit to all  
9 these theories, and I'm talking now in a counter intelligence  
10 laboratory sense, not in a public sense. His whole comportment  
11 as an individual in the United States after his arrival I find  
12 very peculiar for its implicit and explicit evidences of  
13 clandestinity.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you give examples.

15 Mr. Rocca. The utilization of aliases in boarding  
16 houses, incomplete details to his own wife, the whole matter  
17 of the "Walker" and what she says, and Marina is a whole other  
18 story that has to be, I think, readjusted to this scenario.

19 On the other hand, I see flaws in his clandestine,  
20 in his trade craft, let's put it that way. It makes me  
21 believe that he may not have been at the time that he was  
22 operating in Dallas and in the other area an actual, even  
23 in touch with them, because I regard not giving his wife his  
24 alias at the boarding house so that when she phoned she blew  
25 him as just one of those things.

1 But I have gone over all of this in great detail with  
2 Belin. So, I see these things, I see these things as building  
3 a picture of much more detailed knowledge about him, and  
4 evaluation, and, of course, debriefing, because there is no  
5 question in my mind that he had U-2 information on exact type  
6 of flight.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. What about on the Cuban side of the  
8 picture?

9 Mr. Rocca. And, on the Cuban side, from Delgado we  
10 know he was a pro-Cuban from the beginning, and the Delgado  
11 information is critical -- I think quite undeveloped in its  
12 implications.

13 So, it is this kind of thing that lies behind leaving  
14 the window open. In other words, there would be information  
15 relevant to an assessment of this man's motives as a self  
16 activated killer in an incredible conjunction which finds him  
17 in a building which is going to be passed by by Connally,  
18 against whom he has a personal quarrel, going back to the whole  
19 matter of his Navy career, and this whole business of what  
20 he could have read in the "Times Picayune" about the Harker  
21 interview, the warning, and so forth.

22 I regard this, in other words, this man, as a self  
23 generated killer, who could very well have done this. But  
24 that doesn't mean that there isn't information, not only in  
25 Moscow, but also in Havana. But, as I said, this is a thing



1 that I would have loved to have known more about in 1963  
 2 in the way that I know, or was beginning to know -- even at  
 3 that time I was no expert. I don't say I am now, but the KGB,  
 4 we would certainly have had that Rezidentura down in Mexico,  
 5 or Cuba, the DGI Rezidentura, better (pegged) and have been  
 6 in the position to have perhaps gotten Silvia Duran in a  
 7 situation where she would have had to answer.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. I'm sorry. I didn't understand  
 9 exactly what you said.

10 Mr. Rocca. But these --

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, if I may interrupt you for a  
 12 minute, what did you say you would have tried to have had  
 13 better pegged in Havana?

14 Mr. Rocca. The organization of Cuban intelligence --

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

16 Mr. Rocca. -- as a personal matter. I mean, after  
 17 all, these are matters of personal expertise. In this paper  
 18 I am speaking entirely as an independent expert.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. By this paper you are referring to  
 20 CIA number 1934?

21 Mr. Rocca. Yes, what you are talking about.

22 And in the transmission memo, the Agency makes that  
 23 very clear.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

25 Mr. Rocca. So please, let's make this point.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Were Oswald's contacts --

2 Mr. Rocca. You know, in other words, this is right  
3 off the top of my head.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. In other words, the Agency gave you a,  
5 asked you to respond to Mr. Pelin's letter which requested  
6 certain information and the Agency's position was that your  
7 response was off the top of your head?

8 Mr. Rocca. They said that this did not necessarily  
9 reflect the Agency's views. There is another piece of paper  
10 that says that, and I'm sorry, I don't think that that is a  
11 proper qualification of it.

12 There is a transmission memo which says that we don't  
13 necessary -- it's been released, I think.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. The Agency put you on contract to  
15 work with the Rockefeller Commission.

16 Is that correct?

17 Mr. Rocca. No, they didn't. I was under contract as  
18 a part of my normal phasing out and this came up as a  
19 part of that.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. What were your responsibilities with  
21 the Rockefeller Commission?

22 Mr. Rocca. Simply to make myself useful, I suppose.  
23 But this was not the specific reason that the contract was  
24 given.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. I understand.

C O N F I D E N T I A L



1 Mr. Rocca. This is what I'm trying to clarify.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Were you the Agency's point of contact  
3 with the Rockefeller Commission?

4 Mr. Rocca. No, no.

5 As far as I know I wasn't. They were in touch  
6 with the legal (counsel)-- I mean, the Inspector General.  
7 They sat there. They came to the staff to get the material.  
8 They had the entire file.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know if Oswald had any  
10 contacts with the DGI element in Mexico City?

11 Mr. Rocca. Well, you see, these are questions that  
12 you should ask the WH experts.

13 My answer, completely uninformed, is that he was in,  
14 his argument with the consul took place in the very offices  
15 that the DGI occupied and that the DGI chief of the component  
16 must have been within hearing range. I have forgotten his  
17 name. But that area, in other words, was a part of it.

18 Azcue -- is that --

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

20 Mr. Rocca. -- the consul. Now I will think -- the  
21 DGI chief at that time, he later went -- well --

22 Mr. Goldsmith. We'll defer that line of inquiry  
23 until later.

24 Mr. Rocca. Well, I am trying to clarify what I meant  
25 here. It is that I felt, and still feel, that many answers

1 with respect to Oswald's motivation, his background, his  
2 techniques will be found in Moscow and Cuba and not here.  
3 That's all. That's what I had in mind when I said the window  
4 should have been left open, a wider window.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Were you given information in 1963  
6 pertaining to Oswald's possible contacts with DGI?

7 Mr. Rocca. No. Not as far as I know.

8 Not as far as I can remember.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you have any dealing at all with  
10 the Nosenko case in 1964?

11 Mr. Rocca. No.

12 I was excluded from the case.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. So, in 1964, you didn't know what  
14 information Nosenko had given on the Oswald case?

15 Mr. Rocca. I knew it -- I knew it by hearsay, by  
16 simply listening to accounts and meetings that were very  
17 limited and designed to satisfy need to know and so forth.  
18 So I knew it only in very general terms.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what Nosenko has said  
20 about the KGB's contact or lack of contact with Oswald?

21 Mr. Rocca. In general.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. And what is that?

23 Mr. Rocca. In general, his story was that he had had  
24 the file in his hands sometime between the first and the  
25 second contacts, that is, between '62 and '64, when he

1 defected; that the file did not exist in Moscow at the time  
2 of the assassination; it had to be sent up ; it has to be  
3 sent for to Minsk, where Oswald had been resettled; and that  
4 he had not been a recruited KGB source.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Did Nosenko indicate --

6 Mr. Rocca. I mean, I don't know whether this is a  
7 true reflection.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. You had no direct knowledge one way  
9 or the other?

10 Mr. Rocca. Yes, I had no direct knowledge.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. Then let's not get into that  
12 area.

13 Mr. Rocca. I mean, these are things that obviously  
14 work out.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever talk to Mr. Angleton about  
16 the Nosenko case?

17 Mr. Rocca. Oh, we talked about it many times, but  
18 always, it's always the generalization and not the specific  
19 thing. I mean, there is a difference between reading what  
20 the man says and what he said on a polygraph. A polygraph  
21 is critical and I have not read that material because he had  
22 a number of them and these tend to be very important.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Has Mr. Angleton ever indicated to  
24 you what his opinion was regarding the validity of what  
25 Nosenko said about Oswald?

1  
2 Mr. Rocca. I hesitate to speak for him, but I judge  
3 that he regards Nosenko's statement about Oswald to be  
4 unreliable, to be truthful about it. I may be wrong.

5 I may say in that connection, if it doesn't again  
6 interrupt this -- I am trying to help --

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Please do.

8 Mr. Rocca. -- that the people who made the determination  
9 at that time were principally in the division, not in the staff.  
10 In other words, they were Mr. Murphy and Mr. Bagley, and  
11 the superiors.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether all information  
13 pertinent to the Warren Commission's work was promptly  
14 communicated to the Warren Commission?

15 Mr. Rocca. All of the material that I had, as far as  
16 or that came within my camp, and that included the prime  
17 version, was given.

18 I know of none on the outside that did not go to them  
19 in one form or the other.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. So, any information that went through  
21 your desk, through your staff --

22 Mr. Rocca. Yes.

23 Mr. Goldsmith -- would have gone to the Warren  
24 Commission.

25 Mr. Rocca. Would have gone to the Warren Commission.

Mr. Goldsmith. And how long did it usually take

1  
2 for such information to get from your desk to the Warren  
3 Commission?

4 Mr. Rocca. Less than a week, I would say.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Was there any information touching  
6 upon sensitive sources and methods that was not promptly  
7 given to the Warren Commission?

8 Mr. Rocca. None that I know of, in one form or other.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. What do you mean by "one form or  
10 other?"

11 Mr. Rocca. Well, you see, when I read it in 1975,  
12 the LINGUAL materials, they did not go through me. They went  
13 directly to the FBI. So, I mean, this is what I have to  
14 exclude. I mean, I can't take on my back the total  
15 responsibility.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. But other than the HDLINGUAL program,  
17 everything else that went through your office --

18 Mr. Rocca. To the best of my knowledge, there was  
19 nothing that my office handled that was backstopped, that was  
20 shortstopped or not given, as far as I know.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Did Allen Dulles play any special  
22 role on the Warren Commission, insofar as the CIA was  
23 concerned?

24 Mr. Rocca. If so, I don't know.

25 I was in no position to really be -- I was not in a  
position to really have that degree of intimacy.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether he in any way  
2 attempted to represent the interest of the Agency?  
3

4 Mr. Rocca. It would have been unusual for him to  
5 have done that, although he was certainly used as a channel  
6 by the Chief Justice on matters--

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Could you give us some examples?

8 Mr. Rocca.--of specific interest to the Commission,  
9 growing out of their own discussions. I would say that there  
10 is in the file a memorandum written by Mr. Murphy, Chief  
11 SB, reflecting conversation at Mr. Dulles' house on some  
12 matter that Mr. Dulles had been asked to probe or to get  
13 information on. I recall that and it should be available in  
14 the record.

15 Well, the executive sessions of the Commission show  
16 that they used Mr. Dulles as a kind of backboard for all kinds  
17 of extraordinary hypothetical, I think.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, are you able to give  
19 any examples of those types of situations, to your personal  
20 knowledge?

21 Mr. Rocca. From my personal knowledge, no. I mean,  
22 I have read the executive session records and they are  
23 pertinent. But not to my personal knowledge. In other words,  
24 Mr. Dulles never discussed this with me nor was I ever  
25 present at any of those discussions on such points.

Mr. Goldsmith. It has been alleged in the press that



1 President Ford, former President Ford, in a sense "leaked  
2 information to the FBI."

3 The same allegation has been made of Mr. Dulles leaking  
4 information to the CIA.

5 Are you able to make any comment upon that?

6 Mr. Rocca. No.

7 Again, I may make the collateral comment, that a  
8 review of the record -- this looks the record assembled  
9 after the Rockefeller Commission, the material that you have  
10 on this desk. I am talking about the actual record in the  
11 Oswald file from January to February and to March, piece by  
12 piece.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

14 Mr. Rocca. That is what should be looked at.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. That file has been examined. Mr.  
16 Rocca.

17 Mr. Rocca. Well, then that answers my point.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. How frequently were, rather was the  
19 Agency in contact with Mr. Dulles during this period?

20 Mr. Rocca. I can't -- I have no way of judging that.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever have personal contact  
22 with him during the period?

23 Mr. Rocca. On matters of the Warren -- during the  
24 Warren Commission, on Warren Commission matters -- I must  
25 have had contact with him on one occasion, which is the one

1 that Mr. Murphy went down to see him on. I was present on  
2 another matter, unrelated entirely, and must have bumped into  
3 him.

4 But I have no recollection of talking with Mr. Dulles  
5 about any matters relating to the Warren Commission at that  
6 time of a substantive nature. I can't simply -- I would have  
7 to say I really can't remember.

8 If I did, incidentally, there would be a memorandum  
9 of record, so you can refresh my memory.

10 (Pause)

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you please review CIA number  
12 2071.

13 (Pause)

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you identify that document?

15 Mr. Rocca. Surely. It's mine. I sent it to Mr.  
16 Helms for his information.

17 The purpose that I went down there for was entirely  
18 different.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. First, let's identify the document.

20 Mr. Rocca. Yes. It's just an informal notation to  
21 my Chief of a thing that I thought was significant at the time.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Did it pertain to a meeting with Mr.  
23 Dulles?

24 (Pause)

25 Mr. Rocca. This is my memorandum and it stands on the

1 record. I accept full responsibility for it. It bears out,  
2 I think, in essence, what I said earlier.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that.

4 What I am asking you now is --

5 Mr. Rocca. I am delighted I wrote it.

6 Mr. Goldsmith -- does it pertain to a meeting that  
7 you had with Mr. Dulles?

8 Mr. Rocca. Indeed. But it was not on the purpose  
9 of the memorandum. It was on the purpose of a totally  
10 different -- of a TV presentation of a defector, and inasmuch  
11 as the question was how the defector should be photographed,  
12 all the rest, this was the topic now entirely collaterally --  
13 and incidentally, this other thing came up which, of course,  
14 was one of Mr. Dulles' things. He had these and he called  
15 this to my attention.

16 He wrote the answer, declining, and I reported it.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. By this other thing, we are now talking  
18 about the question of the Warren Commission being concerned  
19 with the issue of Oswald having been a CIA agent.

20 Mr. Rocca. The press, the press had had it.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. The Warren Commission wanted to resolve  
22 that issue. They had asked Dulles to serve as a contact with  
23 the Agency as a means of expediting the resolution of this  
24 issue.

25 Is that correct?

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
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Mr. Rocca. I couldn't imagine. I would not attach great granitic quality to this prose. I mean, the thing to do is to get the letter from Rankin which bears on it. That will tell you precisely what it was.

Mr. Goldsmith. Again, you should not assume that we have not necessarily done that.

Mr. Rocca. Ask for it. I mean, my God, this is a lead.

I'm sorry.

Mr. Goldsmith. All I'm saying is that you should not assume that that has not been done as yet.

We will return to this document later.

What role, if any, did the Mexico City station have in providing CIA headquarters with information relevant to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Rocca. It had a key role. It produced information before the fact and it conducted a whole series of followup activities on the material that it had provided, plus other material that came in in the course of dealing with people who were in touch with the embassy and facilitating the FBI. So, they were important. They were one of the most significant parts.

Mr. Goldsmith. That was my next question.

Relative to other stations, was the role played by the Mexico City station a major one?

1 Mr. Rocca. I would say it was, yes.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. And that is because Oswald spent time  
3 in Mexico City prior to the assassination?

4 Mr. Rocca. Yes, uh-huh.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you have occasion to review the  
6 cable and dispatch traffic that flowed between the Mexico  
7 City station and headquarters that was relevant to the  
8 assassination?

9 Mr. Rocca. I reviewed -- this is another body of  
10 information that I reviewed for Mr. Belin, in which I commented  
11 on these cables.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. And in 1963, did you have occasion to  
13 review all of the cable traffic?

14 Mr. Rocca. In 1963, these cables just came across  
15 one at a time. Mr. [SCELSO] handled them at the moment. I  
16 did not see them until later on, when R & A came into the  
17 case.

18 So, the original action --

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, I understand. I didn't mean  
20 to suggest that when the cables were actually sent, certainly  
21 prior to and immediately after the assassination. You  
22 wouldn't have seen them because you weren't involved in the  
23 case at that point.

24 However, when CI/R&A came into the picture, did you  
25 have occasion to review the cable traffic that flowed between

the Mexico City station and headquarters?

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

I think it was among the material we facilitated in passing to the Warren Commission and also we facilitated their direct examination of the materials in the Agency itself. They came out to verify it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Mexico City station have any surveillance operations in effect in 1963 against the Cuban and Soviet Embassy and Consulates?

Mr. Rocca. They did, as far as these cables indicate.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall, generally, what types of surveillance operations there were?

Mr. Rocca. They must have been telephone and photographic.

Mr. Goldsmith. As a result of these surveillance operations, was information pertaining to Oswald obtained?

Mr. Rocca. Information pertaining to an unidentified American was obtained and subsequently it was ascertained that that unidentified American was Oswald. And, eventually, it became associated with the body of the assassination case.

Mr. Goldsmith. That information was obtained as a result of which surveillance operation?

Mr. Rocca. It was obtained only through the telephone taps.

Mr. Goldsmith. And, in fact, the telephone --

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Mr. Rocca. There was no photographic coverage, as far as I know.

Mr. Goldsmith. That picked up Oswald?

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. The telephone tap operation in fact did identify that someone who identified himself as Oswald had been involved in a telephone call.

Do you recall that?

Mr. Rocca. Well, you are now going well beyond my capacity to remember.

Mr. Goldsmith. The only reason I raise that question is because you indicated that the information simply referred to an unidentified American, and our record indicates that, in fact, at least one of the transcripts contain Oswald identifying himself, or whomever was in on the conversation identified himself as Oswald.

Mr. Rocca. That was a subsequent telegram.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why don't I just show you the transcript to refresh your memory, if I can find it.

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Please review CIA number 1863, which is a copy of a transcript of a telephone conversation that took place on 1 October, 1963 at approximately 9:55 or 10:00 o'clock in the morning.

1 (Pause)

2 Mr. Rocca. Ah, Kostikov, that's one of the names.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had a chance to read that  
4 page?

5 Mr. Rocca. Yes.

6 This is the one where he identified himself.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. So, in other words, the surveillance  
8 operation picked up more than just an unidentified American.  
9 At least at some point it picked up a reference to Lee Oswald.

10 Mr. Rocca. Indeed.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know when specifically the  
12 Warren Commission was told about the fact that Oswald had  
13 made telephonic contact with the Soviet embassy and, in fact,  
14 that the calls came from the Cuban embassy?

15 Mr. Rocca. I have no idea of the time. They must have  
16 been told very early because the whole community was told on  
17 October 10, or October 3, or whatever.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Well, that's when the community was  
19 told. However, the community was not necessarily told that  
20 there was a telephone tap operation. They were just told about  
21 the contact.

22 Mr. Rocca. Yes.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. My impression is a very narrow one.

24 When was the Warren Commission specifically told that  
25 Oswald had been in telephonic contact?



1 Mr. Rocca. Oh, I think they were told that immediately  
2 that the material went over in such a form that this could not  
3 be disguised, and it had to be.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. So, you are saying that the Warren  
5 Commission was told about the telephone surveillance operation?  
6

7 Mr. Rocca. They were given the transcripts.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know when they were given the  
9 transcripts?  
10

11 Mr. Rocca. It must have been in January or before  
12 Mr. [SCELSO] ended his tenure. There was no question of  
13 disguising that fact. It could not be hidden. And, of course,  
14 as you know, they literally went down and observed and  
15 surveyed the place.

16 I mean, this was a part of -- obviously the sources  
17 and methods were supposed to be protected. But my feeling is  
18 that they had to know this from the start.

19 (Pause)

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Was Oswald ever observed by the CIA  
21 to have been in contact with the Soviet officials in Mexico  
22 City?  
23

24 Mr. Rocca. You mean, actually seen?

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Observed. Seen.

Mr. Rocca. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like you now to read  
CIA number 1979, which is a member from Coleman - Slawson

1 of the Warren Commission staff.

2 Please skim very quickly through the first two pages  
3 until you get to paragraph number three. Read paragraph  
4 number three carefully and stop there.

5 (Pause)

6 Mr. Rocca. I have read this.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. If you want to place this here  
8 (indicating), we can both look at it.

9 Mr. Rocca. It is, of course, totally erroneous.

10 This statement is erroneous.

11 I can't account for it or undersand why he did not --

12 Mr. Goldsmith. This memo is dated 1 April, 1964.

13 The statement in the memo indicates that the CIA has reported  
14 to the Commission that Oswald was observed in mid-morning  
15 in the office of the Soviet military attache in Mexico City.

16 I'm not suggesting that the statement is accurate.  
17 But the reason that we are concerned about it is because in  
18 fact it appears to suggest that this is what the Commission  
19 staff was told.

20 Do you know anything about that?

21 Mr. Rocca. No.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Well, is it possible that the  
23 Commission staff was given the information about Mexico City,  
24 the Oswald contact, without being specifically told about  
25 the telephonic surveillance operation?

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

1 Mr. Rocca. I think not. I don't think so at all.

2 I mean, Mr. Slawson was given the actual text of that  
3 earlier telegram. The intercept, as I recall, was from the  
4 Cuban Embassy to the Soviet Embassy. Oswald -- this was a  
5 Saturday -- Oswald had gone over and so forth.

6 So, this word, this is a mis-speaking again --  
7 "observed." "Observed" is the wrong word. He had been  
8 reported by, to have been in the office.

9 This is a conclusion from the intercept. No one can  
10 draw any conclusion further than that.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. If we go and study this paragraph  
12 carefully, it is apparent that the information that they are  
13 relying upon here is the information that came directly from  
14 the telephonic intercept.

15 Mr. Rocca. Which was rendered in its entirety --

16 Mr. Goldsmith. To the Commission staff?

17 Mr. Rocca. -- to the Commission staff.

18 That's my best recollection.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. You can tell from the way that the  
20 author approaches this issue that he is talking about visual  
21 observation. Here he is concerned, in the rest of the paragraph  
22 he is concerned about the possibility that this agency may  
23 have picked Oswald up under photographic surveillance.

24 Is it clear to you that he is referring to visual  
25 observation?

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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1 Mr. Rocca. I think what Mr. Slawson has done, what  
2 David has done, is just mixed up the eight man stuff and the  
3 photographs and the intercept on the telephone, and it came  
4 out that way. It was simply a mistake.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. I understand your opinion as to  
6 what he may have done.

7 But, is it clear to you, nevertheless, that his  
8 impression was that Oswald had been visually observed?

9 Mr. Rocca. That's what he says here.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Okay.

11 Mr. Rocca. To be observed would be to be visually  
12 observed.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Excuse me for a moment.

14 (Pause)

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you like to break for lunch or  
16 continue for a moment longer. We will be here effectively  
17 all day, I think.

18 Mr. Rocca. I think we can continue for another hour  
19 and eat later.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. It is no problem to us.

21 (Pause)

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Was there any concern about disclosing  
23 a sensitive telephonic surveillance operation to the Warren  
24 Commission staff?

25 Mr. Rocca. I think there was inevitably, under the



1 sources and methods concepts that prevailed at the time. But  
2 the nature of the evidence precluded absolutely disguising it  
3 in any way.

4 As far as I know, there was never any attempt to  
5 mislead with respect to the nature of the access, and in  
6 dealing with Slawson, or with Belin, or with Lieber, it  
7 was perfectly clear that they understood that this was an  
8 intercept on a telephone, on a camera, and, moreover, they  
9 went down and actually saw the installations-- this is my  
10 conclusion -- and reviewed them.

11 And, we eventually ended up by doing the translation  
12 from Spanish, or from whatever language was involved, in some  
13 of them for them. So, they had to have the exact knowledge  
14 of that aspect.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Please refer now to CIA number 177.

16 (Pause)

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you identify for the record  
18 what that document is?

19 Mr. Rocca. It is a telegram from the Mexico City  
20 station which refers to an earlier telegram. It uses the  
21 cryptonym, I guess for the operation that produced the materia

22 Mr. Goldsmith. LIENVOY.

23 Mr. Rocca. -- LIENVOY.

24 And, I think we've already seen it.

25 It says that they have photographic coverage which



1 they believe may be the man.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Now, you say that this refers to an  
3 earlier cable.

4 Which cable is the earlier one that's being referred  
5 to?

6 Mr. Rocca. Well, I assume that Kostikov and Byedikov  
7 are the same two people that we saw earlier.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. That was in the transcript.

9 Mr. Rocca. In the transcript, yes.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. We saw a transcript earlier. But we  
11 didn't see a cable earlier, did we?

12 Mr. Rocca. Well, my impression is that that thing  
13 came in earlier. I would have to reproduce the materials  
14 here in order.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you like to --

16 Mr. Rocca. Is it important?

17 Mr. Goldsmith. No, it's not. But you just raised a  
18 question on the record and I would like to clarify it. I  
19 don't see a reference in this cable to an earlier cable.

20 Mr. Rocca. In other words, this is the first cable  
21 that came in?

22 Mr. Goldsmith. This is the first cable, according to  
23 the record, reporting Oswald's contact.

24 Mr. Rocca. You see, in that other, in the report I  
25 did for Belin, I had set them out in actual order, the cables,



1 so that we knew what came in at what date. So this is, then,  
2 the first cable reporting what they had heard, presumably.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. The date of this cable is --

4 Mr. Rocca. 9 October.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. 1963.

6 Mr. Rocca. It is my impression that there were  
7 earlier cables, that there was an earlier cable. But I can't,  
8 from this documentation --

9 Mr. Goldsmith. And what was the substance of that  
10 earlier cable?

11 Mr. Rocca -- I can't -- that there was someone down  
12 there who wanted to go to Cuba. I can't -- without having  
13 the entire run of that traffic, I can't reproduce it here.  
14 I can't reproduce it without getting into more need for  
15 explanation. It simply utilizes time.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Well, Mr. Rocca --

17 Mr. Rocca. What's the point here?

18 Mr. Goldsmith. --it would become important to  
19 the committee if your memory is that there was an earlier  
20 cable and we haven't seen it. It would become important  
21 to resolve that question.

22 So, to the best of your recollection, was there an  
23 earlier cable?

24 Mr. Rocca. I -- well, if this is the first cable,  
25 this is it.



1  
2 Mr. Goldsmith. Well, this is the first that we were  
3 informed of.

4 It is possible that there was an earlier cable that  
5 you saw and that we didn't, and that's my question.

6 Was there an earlier cable to your knowledge?

7 Mr. Rocca. Probably not, if this is the only one  
8 that you've got on the record. I can't conceive that there  
9 would be any question of fuzzing up the record on cables.

10 You see, it's a question of getting the dates.  
11 The 27th to the 2nd -- I'm sorry.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. That was my first question.

13 If Oswald contacted the Soviet Embassy telephonically  
14 on 1 October, why would it have taken eight days for the cable  
15 reporting that contact to be sent to headquarters?

16 (Pause)

17 Mr. Rocca. An American male who spoke broken Russian --  
18 well, the answer to the question is not difficult to comprehend.  
19 There is a lead time in the processing of material. There are  
20 a lot of leads coming in that have to be selected -- spotted,  
21 selected, translated, evaluated, and then cabled. But what  
22 disturbs me here is the time.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. What specifically about the time  
24 disturbs you?

25 Mr. Rocca. Well, it seems to me too late, that  
26 communication began earlier from Mexico City. But I can't





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prove it. I don't have these materials. And yet, I know in this thing I did, I had every one of these things laid out from beginning to end. And at the same time I am conscious of the fact that here I am raising a thing that could cause embarrassment. I am obviously in the middle here.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Rocca. And unintentionally. Obviously no one wants under the Marcucci thing to create problems.

Could I ask you a question?

Do you have the outgoing cable to the community, the date of the outgoing cable?

Mr. Goldsmith. The dissemination cable.

Mr. Rocca. The dissemination cable.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. I have that for you to review.

Mr. Rocca. You see, [John SCELSO] handled this. He handled it by the book, as I see it. I think he did an excellent job in doing it, so that this would remove the -- that would clarify it.

Mr. Goldsmith. You asked for the dissemination cable. I am going to show it to you now.

It is CIA document number 2140.

Here it is.

Mr. Rocca. Well, this must be the first one, then. What I see in here really reflects what is in this, plus --

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you be more specific for the

1 record as to why you think that the cable, that is, CIA number  
2 177, must have been the first one reporting an Oswald  
3 contact?

4 Mr. Rocca. Because it uses identical language here,  
5 "American male."

6 Mr. Goldsmith. But that doesn't mean that a cable  
7 couldn't have been sent up earlier reporting the contact  
8 of Oswald with the embassy on 1 October.

9 Mr. Rocca. Well, responding to that, I can't say  
10 that it doesn't -- of course it doesn't. But I've not seen  
11 it. That's the point.

12 My impression was that there was a shorter gap here  
13 between the two. Here is the ninth. I think this was on the  
14 eighth, sent on the eighth (indicating).

15 Mr. Goldsmith. This was sent on the eighth, that's  
16 correct.

17 Mr. Rocca. That's correct. So, that's narrowing it.  
18 This went out on the tenth. This is [SCELSO] immediately  
19 acting.

20 So, this is the first cable, yes.

21 The reason that it has taken so long is essentially  
22 the reason that is associated with the mechanics and the  
23 handling of mechanics.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. For example, would it have taken  
25 some time to translate the tape from Russian into English?

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1 Mr. Rocca. Well, it would have to have been screened.  
2 It would have then to have been reviewed and spotted. It  
3 would have had to have been prepared as a suggestion for the  
4 chief of station, who reviewed all of these, as I understand  
5 it, to send up.

6 So, that would take about three or four days, five  
7 days maybe, depending on the amount of traffic that is involved.

8 So, this is correct. It's this date (indicating)  
9 that is really important, not that one (indicating.)

10 That's when they really started to work on it  
11 down there.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. By this date, for the record, which  
13 date are you referring to?

14 Mr. Rocca. The seventh of October.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. And that is written in in script on  
16 the bottom of CIA number 177, is that correct?

17 Mr. Rocca. That's right, yes.

18 So, that gives the point of reference to the Mexican  
19 thing.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Getting away from CIA number 177 for  
21 a moment, please read CIA number 2007 through paragraph one,  
22 ending on -- paragraph two, ending on CIA number 2009.

23 (Pause)

24 (Discussion off the record.)

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had a chance to review that?

1 Mr. Rocca. I've forgotten where I was supposed to  
2 stop.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Paragraph two on page 2009. Read  
4 through there, please.

5 (Pause)

6 Mr. Rocca. Yes.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you identify what CIA number  
8 2007 is?

9 Mr. Rocca. This was one of the -- this was, I guess,  
10 the grand-daddy piece that we sent over at the very outset  
11 of the relationship, which summarized the information.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. What's the date on that?

13 Mr. Rocca. It's the 31st, January.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. 1964.

15 Mr. Rocca. I think it was prepared by me in CI/R&A  
16 presumably. I've forgotten who actually worked on it. It may  
17 have been Mr. Hall, and I certainly reviewed it. It  
18 summarized the initial information in some of the cables,  
19 or in the cables.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Does this document make specific  
21 reference to any telephonic intercept of an Oswald  
22 conversation?  
23

24 For example, on page CIA number 2008, it reports the  
25 Oswald contact, but does not give the nature of the contact,  
does it?

1 Mr. Rocca. No.

2 I think that this, again, was something that Mr. Helms  
3 covered in his cover note. "The compromise of the material  
4 in its present form would lead directly to the destruction of  
5 current sources and methods of this agency in Mexico and  
6 elsewhere," and that it was considered to be therefore "within  
7 the legitimate interest in protecting those sources  
8 not to state what the reliable and proven source was."

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Well, earlier we referred to a memo  
10 that had been written by Slawson in which he apparently was  
11 confused and thought that Oswald had been observed at the --

12 Mr. Rocca. He wrote that in March or April. This  
13 was in January. Between January and April they had been over  
14 and had actually seen the intercepts.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. No. The trip to Mexico City was in  
16 the middle of April.

17 Mr. Rocca. Yes, but they had been over to the Agency.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Oh, they had been to the Agency and  
19 had seen the intercepts.

20 Mr. Rocca. Yes, yes.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. So, sometime after January 31 --

22 Mr. Rocca. They were actually shown.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. -- they were told.

24 Mr. Rocca. I think they were told at the very time  
25 that this was written, what we were talking about. Reliable

1 and proven sources --- this was telephonic.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. So, is your testimony then that  
3 despite the fact that the document itself makes no reference  
4 to a telephonic intercept, orally this information was  
5 communicated.

6 Mr. Rocca. That this was communicated without possibility  
7 of misunderstanding.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. And who made that communication?

9 Mr. Rocca. I have no idea.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you do it personally?

11 Mr. Rocca. I'm sure that I referred to it in my own  
12 talks with Slawson, but whether it was on January or later,  
13 I don't know. But it's perfectly clear from the start that  
14 this material had to be from a very sensitive direct source.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to point out also an error  
16 here. It indicates that in 9 October --

17 Mr. Rocca. I take your point. I take your point.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. For the record I will have to  
19 finish making the point, which is that according to this, the  
20 document indicates that Oswald's contact was on October 9,  
21 his contact with the Soviet Embassy. In fact, we know that it  
22 was October first, and several other times around that as well,  
23 but not as late as October 9.

24 Is that correct?

25 Mr. Rocca. I think that the mistake here was that

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on 9th of October, CIA headquarters was informed, was what was intended, rather than Mexico City, and it just didn't come out.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. I wanted to clear that up for the record.

Mr. Rocca. I noted that when I read it.

These are the terrible gaps that come out.

Mr. Goldsmith. Getting back to CIA number 177, which you had occasion to review, paragraph one, I believe, reports a contact between Oswald and the Soviet Embassy. I take it that by referring to the crypt LIENVOY, the person receiving the cable would know that this was a telephonic intercept.

Mr. Rocca. Exactly.

Mr. Goldsmith. In the second paragraph it indicates "Have a photo."

I will read it.

"Have photos. Male appears be American entering Soviet Embassy twelve- sixteen hours, leaving twelve-twenty-two on 1 October. Apparently age 35, athletic build, circa six feet. Receding hairline. Balding top. Wore khakhis and sports shirt. Source, LIEMPTY. "

Mr. Rocca. That's the photographic operation, presumably.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Do you know why this cable contains an incorrect

1 description of Lee Harvey Oswald?  
2

3 Mr. Rocca. It doesn't, I would say.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Please clarify.

5 It doesn't contain an incorrect description of Oswald?  
6

7 Mr. Rocca. No. It contains a correct description of  
8 a totally different person.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

10 Then my question is why did the description of a  
11 totally different person get linked to the information contained  
12 in the first paragraph on Oswald?

13 Mr. Rocca. I think that this, of course, lies in the  
14 whole area of zeal, investigative zeal that involves simply  
15 taking assets that you have and attempting to make matches.  
16 The question is one that I would address to, if he were alive,  
17 I would address to Win Scott, because it was his, this was  
18 his particular bias at the time, and not only did he state it  
19 here, but he repeated it in one of the later telegrams,  
20 even after he had been told the correct description.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Scott repeated it in a later telegram.

22 Mr. Rocca. in a later telegram.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall when that was?

24 Was it pre-assassination?  
25

26 Mr. Rocca. He didn't repeat the description. He  
27 repeated the reference to it, and then he sent the photo.

28 Mr. Goldsmith. Okay.



1 Mr. Rocca. So, that -- correct that. I mean, he did  
2 not repeat in a telegram. But he was given -- my recollection  
3 was that he was given a correct description in about the middle  
4 of the month, though the Navy never did respond with a photograph.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

6 Do you know how the incorrect description, or the  
7 description of one person was tied in to Oswald?

8 Mr. Rocca. You see, this was simply the analyst's  
9 this was simply Win Scott, the FBI senior official, running  
10 the case, and he was making a match, and it was wrong.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Well, Mr. Scott wasn't the person who  
12 selected the photograph. Someone else presumably selected  
13 the photograph.

14 Mr. Rocca. Well, someone showed it to him. And he  
15 felt that there was enough of a -- I judge, this is totally a  
16 hypothetical: I never discussed it with him, as far as I can  
17 recall, nor did he ever write it up in a memorandum or  
18 record -- but this was a mixing up of two totally unrelated  
19 things.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. You see, the first paragraph makes  
21 reference to a telephonic contact on 1 October --

22 Mr. Rocca. A telephonic contact?

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Between Oswald and the Soviet Embassy.

24 Mr. Rocca. Which had taken a number of days to  
25 process.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. That telephonic contact makes  
2 no reference to Oswald going to the Soviet Embassy. So, in  
3 light of the absence of any reference by Oswald that he was  
4 going to be at the Embassy that day, why would Scott or anyone  
5 else at the Mexico City station have selected a photograph  
6 of someone who was at the Embassy on 1 October?

7 Mr. Rocca. Well, you don't raise the question as  
8 to why they were selecting 1 October for scanning?

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Well, I presume that they --

10 Mr. Rocca. They're using 1 October as a baseline, and  
11 anything that came through that looked like an American was  
12 a viable lead, he thought or would have thought. And this  
13 was the only one, and he jammed it.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know for a fact that this was  
15 the only one?

16 Mr. Rocca. As far as I know it is. The rest of the  
17 coverage shows no one else that was even an American. They  
18 were all Latins.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Have you reviewed the coverage?

20 Mr. Rocca. Only what came out during the course of  
21 the Rockefeller thing. There were a series of photographs  
22 take in front of -- what -- the Cuban Embassy, was it,  
23 or the Cuban and Soviet Embassies. And none of them appeared  
24 to be Americans. I think that was what he was using as his  
25 baseline. There were others that were Latins.

1 But you can look at all the photos yourself.

2 I think you have to put yourself in his position,  
3 trying to find any kind of --

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Excuse me, Mr. Rocca.

5 (Pause)

6 Mr. Rocca. You have to put yourself in his position  
7 and consider the problem of trying to find any lead, and  
8 that's what he did.

9 I think, of course, it is unmercifully --

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Pardon me?

11 Mr. Rocca. It has unmercifully complicated the case  
12 because it introduced a whole new lead --

13 Mr. Goldsmith. The possibility of someone --

14 Mr. Rocca. -- as far as I'm concerned. This is my  
15 reading of it.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. For example, one lead that it introduces  
17 is the possibility of someone else impersonating Oswald.

18 Mr. Rocca. Oh, I mean -- it's totally open-ended,  
19 totally open-ended. It could be quite the reverse. It  
20 could be just some ordinary person who was there on personal  
21 business. It's impossible to discuss it rationally, it seems  
22 to me.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Agency ever learn the identity  
24 of the person who was described in paragraph two?

25 Mr. Rocca. Not as far as I know. Not up to the time

1 I left.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. When was the Warren Commission first  
3 told about this picture?

4 Mr. Rocca. I think they were told in the whole  
5 span of time between January and March, when they were  
6 working on it. They actually came over and viewed them.

7 I think the first time they had, they got the --

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Isn't it true that the Warren Commission

9 Mr. Rocca -- they got a cropped photograph. That  
10 was the thing that had started it. It started down in  
11 Dallas and worked its way up.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. Isn't it true that the Warren Commission  
13 did not know about this photograph until Marguerite Oswald  
14 testified before the Commission in February and made reference  
15 to a photograph that she had been shown which she alleged  
16 depicted Jack Ruby, and that prior to that time, the Warren  
17 Commission had not been told about this photograph?

18 Mr. Rocca. Well, they were told about it when this  
19 thing went over to them -- did it not? Was it omitted at  
20 that time?

21 I cannot answer that. I can't say one way or the  
22 other whether they did or not.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Was there a desire on the part of  
24 anyone at the CIA to wait out the Commission on the question  
25 of this photograph -- in other words, not tell the Commission

1 about the surveillance operation and not tell them about this  
2 photograph?

3 Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, there was no such  
4 conscious desire.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. When was the Warren Commission  
6 specifically told about the connection between this picture  
7 and the Oswald contact?

8 By that I mean when was the Warren Commission specificall  
9 told about Oswald having contacted the Soviet Embassy on  
10 1 October and this photograph mistakenly being linked to him?

11 Mr. Rocca. They must have gotten it in its original  
12 form when they read the cables.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. And when were they given the cables?

14 Mr. Rocca. Those cables must have been given to them  
15 some time after that January memo.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Would there be a record at the Agency  
17 as to when they would have been shown these specific cables?

18 Mr. Rocca. I don't know. I would hope so, but I  
19 couldn't be sure.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Were you the person that showed them  
21 the cables?

22 Mr. Rocca. No.

23 I can't say that I was, though I may have been. But  
24 I have an impression that they were so important that they  
25 would have been handled by someone higher up.

1 But this is simply a matter of conjecture at this  
2 time. In other words, it is possible.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. This is the photograph that had  
4 gotten into the hands of the Secret Service; shortly after  
5 the assassination it was sent up to Dallas from Mexico City.  
6 Do you recall that?

7 Mr. Rocca. The photograph had gotten into the hands  
8 of the FBI office in Dallas as a consequence of Mr. Scott's  
9 feeling the afternoon that the assassination took place  
10 that this photograph, though it had been impeached already by a  
11 cable from [SCELSO] as not being Oswald, and he had seen  
12 Oswald's photograph on TV, he still persisted in believing  
13 that this could have had some relationship. As far as I know,  
14 there is no reason to believe that. It simply came up in his  
15 photographic coverage. He had the Air Attache or the Naval  
16 Attache -- the Naval Attache -- fly it up to Dallas. And I  
17 think the Bureau -- this was done in coordination with the  
18 Bureau representative in Mexico City, and there was a  
19 transmission to the Bureau office in Dallas. It was at that  
20 point that the photo was taken by the Bureau and shown to  
21 Mrs. Oswald. They cropped it in a particular way, and when  
22 later on the picture was shown to her, it had been cropped  
23 in a different fashion by the Bureau office here. This was  
24 the basis of her objection, in part, I judge, and so that  
25 started it.

1 But my impression is that the Warren Commission  
2 certainly knew about that photograph before her testimony --  
3 going back to your question.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. That is not consistent with the  
5 Warren Commission records.

6 Mr. Rocca. Well, it may well be.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Let me show you CIA number 2139.  
8 Would you please read that.

9 (Pause)

10 Mr. Rocca. Is there an internal memorandum?  
11 Is there a memorandum that went to the Warren Commission?

12 Mr. Goldsmith. I'm sorry, Mr. Rocca.

13 Mr. Rocca. Is there a memorandum that actually went  
14 to the Warren Commission on the basis of this? This undoubtedly  
15 this reflects conversation with regard to the handling of  
16 material which had gotten into the hands of the Secret Service.  
17 But the Secret Service is not --

18 Mr. Goldsmith. The second paragraph refers to the  
19 Oswald photographs.

20 Mr. Rocca. It refers to the photograph. It says,  
21 "We are going to pass the material in substance in response" --  
22 "or the items refer to aborted leads."

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

24 Mr. Rocca. Now, for example, the famous six photograph:  
25 which were not of Oswald -- in other words, these were not

1 considered pertinent.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. I understand.

3 It is fair to say, however, that according to some  
4 of the language in CIA number 2139 there was a desire on the  
5 part of Agency officials to wait out the Warren Commission  
6 specifically with regard to showing the Commission these  
7 photographs?

8 Mr. Rocca. Well, you're using exactly the language  
9 here that I used in this memo and which I simply had not  
10 recollected, which is on the record.

11 I can't see that these photographs are what they were  
12 talking about up here.

13 "The levy of our material which had gotten into the  
14 hands of the Secret Service since 23rd of November" referred  
15 probably to the whole file, not just to these people, these  
16 photographs.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Okay. We'll get back to that point  
18 later on.

19 Mr. Rocca. I can't decide or really ascertain at the  
20 moment.

21 I think the point behind it was that they should go  
22 to the Secret Service and get it, ask them for it.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. It appears that the Agency there again  
24 is concerned about revealing to the Warren Commission a  
25 sensitive source of method of operation.



1 Mr. Rocca. I can't see that in the second paragraph,  
2 where it says these are all things that have been given to them  
3 or are redundant, as far as the investigation is concerned.  
4 At least at the time it seemed that way.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. The fact that material may have been  
6 given to the Warren Commission in substance is something  
7 (a) first of all that was determined by the CIA, not by the  
8 Warren Commission; and secondly, if it was given in substance  
9 and not verbatim, that reflects a desire, does it not, on  
10 the part of the Agency to withhold sensitive source or method  
11 of operation from the Warren Commission?

12 Is that a fair statement?

13 Mr. Rocca. Well, I think this was the general  
14 preoccupation that prevailed.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. So then, if there was information that  
16 touched upon sensitive sources and methods, the Agency, in  
17 fact, was very concerned about it.

18 Mr. Rocca. It was concerned about it, but certainly  
19 not so concerned that it would not either at that time give  
20 the substance of the information or eventually give the entire  
21 technique.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. We will return to this question in a  
23 little while, after we obtain Mr. Rankin's letter which,  
24 after you've seen it, I think you will realize that he was  
25 concerned about the photographs in particular. Perhaps

1 we can clarify that issue at that time.

2 Excuse me for a moment.

3 (Pause)

4 Mr. Rocca. With respect to the photographs, I  
5 recall the Commission coming over, Slawson coming over and  
6 actually looking at them.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall when he did that?

8 Mr. Rocca. I don't remember the date of it. But he  
9 made a trip over and he brought somebody with him. There was  
10 certainly more than one of them. They actually looked at it.  
11 These were the ones that showed the background of the  
12 gate, of the iron gate, and so forth. So there was, at that  
13 stage anyway, certainly no question of not showing him the  
14 actual photographic evidence so that he could examine for  
15 himself whether or not this man was Oswald and determine  
16 whether or not it was relevant to the case.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. I think the record is clear that, in  
18 fact, the Warren Commission was allowed to view the photograph,  
19 or photographs.

20 However, the question that I am focusing on right now  
21 is when the Commission staff was given access to this material,  
22 and, in fact, if that material was made promptly available.

23 Mr. Rocca. Is there any record as to when they  
24 came over? I mean, that would give at least a time, a point  
25 of reference. These small memoranda really reflect the kind

1 of day to day ephemeral flow.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. We'll have to check into that  
3 record. I don't have any record of their visits to the  
4 Agency with me now.

5 Mr. Rocca. A large determination has to be based on  
6 the whole rather than a reading of a small part.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you please read now CIA number  
8 2033.

9 (Pause)

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Before we discuss 2033, I would like  
11 to go back for a moment to 2007 and establish for the record  
12 that 2007 was a memorandum that you prepared on January 31,  
13 1964.

14 Is that true?

15 Mr. Rocca. Uh-huh.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

17 Let's get back now to 2033.

18 Mr. Rocca. Pardon me while I look this over.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Certainly.

20 (Pause)

21 Mr. Rocca. This memorandum was prepared by Mr.  
22 Dooley.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. What is the date of the memorandum?

24 Mr. Rocca. 23rd of July.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. 1964.

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Mr. Rocca. This was at the point where the Commission was preparing for their report, and it was a question of what should be included and what should not be.

Mr. Goldsmith. Understood.

Now, from the text of this memorandum, which, although it was prepared by Mr. Dooley, I believe it is signed by Mr. Helms, and it's a memo to Mr. Rankin -- from the text of this memorandum, is it fair to say that the Agency was extremely concerned about the sensitive nature of the photosurveillance operation?

Mr. Rocca. Without a question. I mean, this was a statutory responsibility.

Mr. Goldsmith. No one is questioning the legitimacy of that concern.

I want to be very clear about that. The fact that the Agency was concerned about sensitive sources and methods is not something that I am questioning the validity of.

You look puzzled. Are you?

Mr. Rocca. I will reserve. I will reserve on this point.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am just trying to establish for the record that there was that concern.

Mr. Rocca. Basically, I think Win just -- if we could go off for a minute --

Mr. Goldsmith. I prefer not to go off.

1  
2 Mr. Rocca. All right, forget it, then. We can  
3 talk at lunch.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Now, the second paragraph of this  
5 letter, or this memo, indicates that the Agency recommends  
6 that the photograph not be reproduced in the Commission's  
7 report because it would jeopardize a most confidential and  
8 productive operation. In addition, it could be embarrassing  
9 to the individual involved, who, as far as the Agency is  
10 aware, had no connection with Lee Harvey Oswald or the  
11 assassination of President Kennedy.

12 Does that language suggest to you that in fact the  
13 Agency knew who the individual involved was?

14 Mr. Rocca. No, no.

15 It simply suggests the total hypothesis that has to  
16 be taken into account when you are dealing with anybody's  
17 rights in a matter of this kind. I'm sure that he had no  
18 knowledge of it. It was just a possibility.

19 As far as I know, that individual has never been  
20 identified in any fashion, nor was he ever connected in any  
21 way with any operation of interest of any kind.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether he made more than  
23 one visit to the Soviet Embassy?

24 Mr. Rocca. I cannot answer that. I don't know.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Please review CIA number 179.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. This is our friend Henry.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Now, this is Mexico. This is [John  
SCIELSO's ] outgoing --

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you identify what this able  
is?

Mr. Rocca. This is a response to Mexico's cable,  
which we had already considered, incorporating the traces  
that had been developed on the basis of the available file  
materials.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is the date of this response?

Mr. Rocca. The eleventh -- or the tenth of October.  
I'm sorry, I mis-spoke. It's the tenth.

Mr. Goldsmith. Before discussing this cable in  
further detail, at the time of Oswald's contact with the  
Soviet Embassy in October, 1963 -- in other words, prior  
to the assassination -- was any particular significance  
attached to the fact of this contact?

Mr. Rocca. No. Not as far as I know.

The ultimate of the significance could only have  
been that he was a defector who was about to redefect, or  
intended to, or was somehow or other involved in that.  
I can't say that there was even that conclusion drawn  
in the earlier material.

Mr. Goldsmith. When the Mexico City station first

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1 learned of the Oswald contact, was any significance attached  
2 to that in particular?

3 Mr. Rocca. I would say not.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Even though a cable was used to  
5 communicate this information to headquarters, rather than a  
6 dispatch, for example?

7 Mr. Rocca. Oh, I think you would find many other --  
8 I think you would find examples to show that this was a  
9 standard order of procedure in connection with Americans.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Did Mexico City routinely notify  
11 headquarters of every American whom it identified as having  
12 been in contact with a Soviet or Cuban Embassy?

13 Mr. Rocca. Well, you used the word "routinely."  
14 I can't answer on that. It did notify headquarters with  
15 respect to Americans, as all stations do. I don't know, in  
16 other words, what prompted Win Scott in this instance. But  
17 it would be a part of the function of the station.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. To report the contact by an American  
19 with a foreign embassy?

20 Mr. Rocca. Yes, to report that. And, it would be  
21 by cable.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Now, I note in the first paragraph  
23 of CIA number 179, which you have correctly identified as  
24 the headquarters response to the Mexico City station cable,  
25 that there is a correct description of Oswald, or a more

1 accurate description of Oswald contained in that paragraph.

2 Mr. Rocca. That is the correct description of Oswald,  
3 as I know it.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Where would that information have  
5 been obtained?

6 Mr. Rocca. I have no knowledge of that.

7 Does that strike you as being difficult?

8 Mr. Goldsmith. No. It does not necessarily strike  
9 me as being difficult just because I asked the question.

10 Mr. Rocca. You see, the file had been opened on him  
11 by Mrs. Edgerter.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. So, you would have obtained the  
13 information from the 201 file?

14 Mr. Rocca. She had the original State Department  
15 list which named the defectors, and this kind of thing is  
16 really information that you could probably have gotten over  
17 a telephone -- I don't know. They would be in a position to  
18 say exactly where they got it.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. In fact, the first paragraph refers  
20 to Oswald's 201 file and it is likely that she received  
21 that description from this file or from information contained  
22 in this file.

23 Mr. Rocca. Well, the file would have been fairly  
24 slim at that stage, though. You know, it would have been  
25 really the opening action. Indeed, it contained



1 this incredible error.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Which incredible error are you  
3 referring to?

4 Mr. Rocca. Henry.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Why would the file have been opened  
6 under the name "Lee Henry Oswald?"

7 Mr. Rocca. This I have never been able satisfactorily  
8 to explain. Betty had retired well before I got into this  
9 thing, when I noted it myself -- I hadn't at the time -- in  
10 dealing with Belin. But there was some cause for this, that  
11 had to do with the opening action.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. I'm not sure that I understand that.

13 You say that there was some cause. What do you mean?

14 Mr. Rocca. There was some analytical error that cause  
15 this, either on her part or on the part of the copyist who  
16 actually opened the file.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Miss Edgerter actually opened the file.

18 Mr. Rocca. You mean, her action?

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Her signature appears on it.

20 Mr. Rocca. Well, then, she made the error. But she  
21 could have gotten it from the original source of information  
22 which was the State Department list.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Let's take a look at that list right  
24 now.

25 Mr. Rocca. Whatever it is, I mean, this. of course,

1 is one of the warts that you have to live with.

2 I mean, it is (straight.) And then, the thing I  
3 prepared for Belin, I wonder why you haven't seen that, because  
4 it is the one that I argued fairly hotly about. Again,  
5 quite personally, off the top of my head --

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Which list are you referring to now,  
7 that you prepared for Belin?

8 Mr. Rocca. This is a survey of all of the materials  
9 that had come in since the case had, since the Warren  
10 Commission had pronounced, had issued its report, that on the  
11 file seemed to have possible interest to a continuing  
12 investigation. It's broken down into large sections. It  
13 has had a documentary appendix in which each telegram in order,  
14 each intercept was listed.

15 I pointed out a number of these errors at that time  
16 and said these are the inevitable results of people working  
17 under large stress and short time. I remember I used this --  
18 you have to take them, with warts and all, in discussing this.  
19 But I have no real explanation for this. In fact, I was not  
20 aware of it myself until fairly late.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. I wanted to establish for the record  
22 that according to CIA number 824, which was a list of American  
23 defectors that was given to the Agency, Oswald's name appears  
24 with the correct middle name, so that the source of the  
25 information would not have been responsible for the incorrect

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1 middle name.

2 Mr. Rocca. Yes. So, it is not my impression that  
3 the actual opening, file opening was done by her. She could  
4 have instructed it to have been done.

5 Did she write Henry?

6 Mr. Goldsmith. We'll look at that document later.

7 Mr. Rocca. Because that would then, then she would  
8 be in a position to explain it.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Actually, I have the document right  
10 in front of me so we will look at it very briefly. It is  
11 CIA number 788.

12 (Pause)

13 Mr. Rocca. This is my comment here (indicating.)

14 Mr. Goldsmith. So, you wrote in a notation that  
15 the middle name is "Harvey," and that was done --

16 Mr. Rocca. 34-75.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. -- April, 1975.

18 Mr. Rocca. So, she did it. She is going to have to--  
19 well, they have to live with it.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. I should point out for your information  
21 that Mrs. Edgerter has reviewed this document and she has  
22 testified -- at least that is my recollection anyway -- that  
23 "Henry" was not written in by her, but by someone else.

24 Mr. Rocca. That, to me, makes sense. That is, it  
25 seems to me that in the process there is a gap between Mrs.

1 Edgerter and the actual opening, which is down somewhere in  
2 the RI section, and that this is an error at that level, which  
3 then was never picked up and corrected. It just got done  
4 that way.

5 Now I've talked at length with Mr. Hartman about it,  
6 his suggestion was that that's the way it happened, that it  
7 was the opening, the actual formal opening was not done by  
8 Mrs. Edgerter, who was an extremely careful analyst.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Why wouldn't she have written in the  
10 middle name at the time that she opened the file?

11 Mr. Rocca. Why?

12 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. She had that information.

13 Mr. Rocca. It's right here on the form.

14 Well, you showed it to me a little while ago.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Why wouldn't she have written it  
16 in?

17 Mr. Rocca. You're going to have to ask the people  
18 in RI on this. There is an actual book that says how these  
19 things happen, and there could have been a slippage at that  
20 point in time.

21 In any case, I think her handwriting, which is this  
22 handwriting, I would judge (indicating), is not this  
23 handwriting (indicating.)

24 This is printing, and it's not hers.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. So, you think that someone wrote

1 in the entire name "Lee Henry Oswald?"

2 Mr. Rocca. That's right.

3 I think that this was done by another person who made  
4 a mistake.

5 So her testimony, in other words, is probably right.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Returning to CIA number 179, which  
7 contains a correct description of Oswald and the incorrect  
8 middle name, this cable also gives background information  
9 on Oswald having been a defector to the Soviet Union. Would  
10 that in any way have escalated the importance of Oswald's  
11 contact with the Soviet Embassy?

12 Mr. Rocca. Only in the sense that it would suggest  
13 that he was considering redefection, which we later determined  
14 he was.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. And would that have made the contact  
16 a significant one?

17 Mr. Rocca. I think so. I think so. For Mexico  
18 it would have. It would have given it meaning.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you refer to the last paragraph  
20 of this cable.

21 Mr. Rocca. Yes.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Does that request additional information  
23 if such information becomes available?

24 Mr. Rocca. It does.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Had the Mexico City station prior

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to the assassination known of Oswald's contacts with the Cuban Embassy, should the Mexico City station have communicated that information to headquarters?

Mr. Rocca. It may not have processed it by that time. It was a different set of materials.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that.

Mr. Rocca. I understand the thrust of what you are getting at.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that you wouldn't have the information as to whether they, in fact, knew. But I'm saying that if, in fact, they knew and had processed that information, should it have been sent to headquarters?

Mr. Rocca. Indeed -- if it had been processed.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. I understand.

Mr. Rocca. My impression is that they simply went back over a lot of tapes and gathered that information then. In other words, there was so much of it that it didn't just sort of come up automatically, and therefore that they sent what they had or what they recognized. But they were certainly in no position to immediately correlate inasmuch as everything had to be based on manual observation and translation and selection at that time.

So, I would not hold them at fault in this at all. In other words, you cannot credit them with handling more than --

1  
2 Mr. Goldsmith. Well, my question was phrased very  
3 narrowly.

4 I am saying assuming that the Mexico City station had,  
5 in fact, known of Oswald's contact with the Cuban Embassy and  
6 that prior to the assassination this information had been  
7 processed, should that information have been sent to headquarters

8 Mr. Rocca. And it would have been. Yes. The answer  
9 to your question is yes, and I think it would have been.

10 My personal impression is that they processed it later,  
11 and therefore the flow of information was not as direct.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever ask anyone in the Mexico  
13 City station whether they had that information prior to the  
14 assassination?

15 Mr. Rocca. Prior to the assassination?

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

17 I am asking you whether --

18 Mr. Rocca. I had no knowledge of any of this prior  
19 to the assassination.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. I am not asking you whether you asked  
21 the question prior to the assassination. I'm asking you whether  
22 at some time you asked anyone at the Mexico City station  
23 whether the Mexico City station prior to the assassination  
24 knew that Oswald had been in contact with the Cuban Embassy  
25 and Consulate.

Mr. Rocca. No, I had not. I would assume that that

1 had been reported.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. But you never asked anyone?

3 Mr. Rocca. No.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

5 Now turning to CIA number 181, which is the last page  
6 of this cable, I note that Thomas Karamissines is the  
7 releasing officer.

8 What does the releasing officer to a cable do?  
9 What is the function of the releasing officer?

10 Mr. Rocca. He was simply substituting for Mr. Helms,  
11 whose signature would have been there as releasing officer  
12 on this matter, as it has been on others.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Why would someone as high up in the  
14 organization as Mr. Karamissines or Mr. Helms be a releasing  
15 officer to a cable?

16 Mr. Rocca. I think that you are coming now to the  
17 whole matter of defection and redefection. You are beginning  
18 to get people -- (not) J.C. Kane actually, but a division  
19 chief here now -- this is no longer a [SCELSO] -- the whole  
20 matter of the American and what his former relationships to  
21 the armed forces were are coming through. This makes it a  
22 matter of considerable concern. You have also people in  
23 CI concerned. The matter has become a little bit more  
24 important.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.



1 I don't think you answered the question I posed just  
2 a bit earlier.

3 What is the function of a releasing officer, for  
4 the record.

5 Mr. Rocca. Well, you know, you have to have a releasing  
6 officer on cable. Presumably they represent the final review  
7 authority with respect to what is being said in the cable.  
8 He is the ultimate bureaucratic end of the line on a cable,  
9 according to the procedure which is established in the manual.

10 He doesn't have to be the DDP.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Excuse me a minute.

12 (Pause)

13 Mr. Rocca. The releasing officer doesn't have  
14 to be the DDP or the ADDP. That's all I'm getting at.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you now refer to CIA number  
16 2140.

17 Mr. Rocca. You see, it's quite clear. You have  
18 four other authorities involved.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. I'm sorry, you were just making a  
20 point?

21 Mr. Rocca. I mean, the content. I think the answer  
22 to your question is implicit in the content.

23 You have four other authorities involved that are  
24 outside of the Agency. These are all other agencies (indicating  
25 DNS was the FBI.

Mr. Goldsmith. One was the State Department.

Mr. Rocca. One was probably Secret Service and the other would be something. Under those circumstances you would want to go to the boss.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why would Secret Service have been contacted?

Mr. Rocca. As a defector -- I don't know whether he is or not. This is -- my God, why did I say this. I don't know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's slow down and just move back for a moment.

You are referring now to CIA number 181, fifth paragraph which indicates that this information was disseminated to other agencies. My recollection is that they were State, FBI, Immigration, and I don't know what the other crypt stands for. I don't think it's Secret Service.

Mr. Rocca. That's where I bow out.

Mr. Goldsmith. That's why I wanted to clarify that.

Mr. Rocca. I will bow out of that.

I don't recognize it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you saying that because this information --

Mr. Rocca. Yes. Looking it over I can see very definitely why Mr. Kane would want his superior to know. After all, he is the division chief and normally he would

be the releasing officer for anything. But if you have this kind of interdepartmental concern, very definitely you want the DDP or his assistant to know. It seems to me that this is -- now the answer is still to why the releasing officer and what are his functions. He has to be sufficiently high up the channel of command to be able to take care of whatever emerges now as a consequence and be informed of it so that if something happens, one of these could call him up and ask.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would the fact that Karamissines signed off on this as releasing officer indicate that the contact of Oswald with the embassy at this time was considered to be significant?

Mr. Rocca. Not per se, but in an interdepartmental sense it would be, and he would have to know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please refer to CIA number 2140.

Mr. Rocca. By george, you guys are beautifully thorough.

2121.

Mr. Goldsmith. It's 2140.

Mr. Rocca. That was the one I already had.

Mr. Goldsmith. Oh, okay.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. It is a different copy of it, though, and it has a margin note which I don't understand.

Mr. Goldsmith. Can you identify this document?

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. This document goes to the community.

I would have to look at the earlier documents, the earlier dissemination to the community to distinguish what this does that the other didn't. It seems to go over the same ground.

Mr. Goldsmith. In other words, you think that there was another dissemination cable to the community?

Mr. Rocca. Well, maybe I'm just mixing that up with the one that --

Mr. Goldsmith. There was a dissemination cable that was sent by --

Mr. Rocca. Mexico.

Mr. Goldsmith -- Mexico City station locally. That could be what you are confusing it with.

Mr. Rocca. That's what I'm probably remembering.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is the date of this cable?

Mr. Rocca. This is the tenth.

Mr. Goldsmith. This is the cable that was sent, I believe, to the rest of the intelligence community.

Mr. Rocca. This was the first one, yes. It must be the first one.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, this cable reports the contact on 1 October by Lee Oswald. Do you know why this cable contained an incorrect description of Oswald?

Mr. Rocca. Because it reproduced the incorrect

1 material that had been previously sent.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. However, the same person who sent  
3 the cable to Mexico City that gave the correct description  
4 of Oswald sent this cable.

5 Mr. Rocca. But the correct description went out at a  
6 different time, did it not?

7 Mr. Goldsmith. They went out effectively simultaneously.

8 Mr. Rocca. My impression is that there is a time  
9 difference which showed some degree of appreciation.

10 (Pause)

11 Mr. Rocca. Yes, this incorporates that incorrect  
12 information.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. This time is given in "zed" on CIA  
14 number 179. I'm not sure that you'll be able to correlate  
15 the time.

16 (Pause)

17 Mr. Rocca. Well, we will have to find out what the  
18 times are.

19 This is 12 "zed" (indicating) and what is this?

20 (Pause)

21 Mr. Rocca. I associate this with being a later  
22 dissemination than this. It is very important. It is important  
23 I would say in looking back at it to know who did the  
24 actual drafting.

25 These were among the errors made. As I say, they

1 have to be marked as such and I think they were.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. In this case the drafts were prepared  
3 by Edgerter and Charlotte Bustos.

4 Mr. Rocca. Yes. My impression is that it was Miss  
5 Bustos -- whom I don't know, but the name I remember now that  
6 you mention it -- but they were obviously not tracking.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, do you have an explanation  
8 for why the --

9 Mr. Rocca. I think that they wrote these in total  
10 good faith on the basis of what they had before them.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Even though one cable went back to  
12 the Mexico City station that gave a correct description?

13 Mr. Rocca. Not if that went later.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Not if that, referring to CIA number  
15 179?

16 Mr. Rocca. Yes. If that went later, then it means  
17 that somewhere in between the two perception, true perception  
18 developed, and that is my assumption.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. We can easily check the record to  
20 see the time.

21 Mr. Rocca. I have never really pursued it, but I  
22 recall that this came up when I went through this exercise  
23 for Belin, and it was as clear as -- you know -- there were  
24 errors made in the way these things were sent. But they are  
25 minor. They are minor things, though.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

I would like to say for the record that because of the quality of the Xerox, which in general is good, you cannot make out the time with reliable accuracy. For that reason, what we will do is simply check the Agency's records to see the time sequence with which these cables were sent.

Mr. Rocca. The "Z" time sequence can be compared. In any case, the two ladies can be -- well, I'm not going to tell you how to do your work.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why don't we take a break for lunch now.

(Whereupon, at 1:21 o'clock, p.m., the deposition recessed, to resume at 2:15 o'clock, p.m., the same day.)

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(Whereupon, at 2:30 o'clock, p.m., the taking of the deposition of Raymond G. Rocca continued.)

Mr. Goldsmith. I believe that this morning we discussed the question of whether the Agency was giving the Warren Commission the complete information on the telephone tap operation of the Mexico City station. I believe that your testimony was that that information was made available to the Commission.

Mr. Rocca. The substance, as far as I know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was your testimony also to the effect that the Warren Commission specifically was told about the telephone tap operation?

Mr. Rocca. At what time? At any time during the whole thing?

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, when, to the best of your recollection, were they told about that?

Mr. Rocca. In my opinion, it could not have sat very long without Mr. Dulles having told them himself as a member of the Commission. I don't know the exact date that they were informed of the materials.

It had to be very early because everyone understood that this material was of a highly sensitive nature which had to be protected. It originated with a telephone tap. You could just talk with Slawson and your eyes would be bugging out as he understood everything.



1 So, whether it's in January or March -- at a certain  
2 stage certainly there was no question because they did the  
3 actual taps, and they were asking them where are the originals  
4 and stuff of that kind. We had to explain why there were  
5 no originals, that they had been erased, and that kind of thing.  
6 But as far as I know, this was not done in writing. It was  
7 done verbally, in conversations.

8 But what the exact date was I cannot pin down.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. We saw, for example, the Slawson-Coleman  
10 memo that you examined this morning which suggested that  
11 as of 1 April, 1964 Slawson and Coleman did not know of the  
12 telephone operation; either that or they were affirmatively  
13 misinformed about the Agency having "observed Oswald."

14 I would like to show you CIA number 2144.

15 Please examine this document.

16 (Pause)

17 Mr. Rocca. This is one of the very early pieces.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Let me ask you the question and you  
19 will get a chance to explain that.

20 Mr. Rocca. Well, I can't explain it, obviously.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Can you identify this document for  
22 the record? Simply, what is it?

23 Mr. Rocca. This is an outgoing cable in the GP Floor  
24 phase. At the time the Western Hemisphere Division was  
25 responsible for the general coordination, outgoing materials.

1 I judge that it was prepared by Mr. [SCELISO] The  
 2 date of it is 20 December, 1963. And Mr. [SCELISO] signed it,  
 3 presumably by authority of Mr. Helms, who was the DDP.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. What's the date on this? 20 December,  
 5 1963?

6 Mr. Rocca. That's correct.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. According to the first paragraph, it  
 8 indicates that the Agency's present plan in passing information  
 9 to Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of telephone  
 10 taps in order to protect their continuing operations.

11 "Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran," et cetera,  
 12 et cetera.

13 Can you explain this first paragraph in any way?

14 Mr. Rocca. Well, Mr. [SCELISO] has to explain it.  
 15 It is certainly, in any case, by the time January came around  
 16 and the Warren Commission began to operate, this had long  
 17 since been superseded.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. So, this was not the operating policy  
 19 by the time the Warren Commission was in full gear?

20 Mr. Rocca. As far as I'm concerned, this was not.  
 21 This was one of those early representations of sources and  
 22 methods and their protection, which was simply unrealistic.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Is it fair to say that this document  
 24 is another example of the Agency's concern to protect sources  
 25 and methods as authorized by -- well, not necessarily as

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authorized by law, but in the Agency's interpretation of how it was authorized by law?

Mr. Rocca. As it was interpreted in those times. I think that the interpretation has changed, probably as a result of this episode.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Did the CIA ever obtain a tape recording of Lee Harvey Oswald's voice?

Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, there was no tape record ever preserved.

It was erased, in other words, the telephone taps.

Mr. Goldsmith. The question is did the Agency ever obtain a tape recording of Oswald's voice?

Mr. Rocca. The answer to the question is yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Now you anticipated me quite correctly.

At the time of the assassination, did the Agency have in existence a tape recording of Oswald's voice?

Mr. Rocca. To the best of my knowledge, no.

Mr. Goldsmith. When had the tape recording of Oswald's voice been obtained?

Mr. Goldsmith. Some time in the earlier period which we have reviewed this morning.

Mr. Goldsmith. Between September 27, 1963 and October first or second, roughly?

Mr. Rocca. Yes, yes.

And, it had been erased sometime during the period -- during the subsequent period, and before the whole episode generated.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why the tape recording was erased?

Mr. Rocca. This was by standard order of procedure, according to the people on the spot and in charge of the operation, who are in a better position to testify to this matter than I am.

In particular, the man who has written a book --

Mr. Goldsmith. David Phillips.

Mr. Rocca. -- David Phillips. When I was working on behalf of Mr. Belin's interest in compiling those two papers, let me add that the whole matter of the time lapse did come up in my discussion with Phillips in trying to account for why did it take until the seventh -- did we discuss this this morning? I recalled at lunch that this was a matter that I had seized on myself. And therefore, he was division chief at that time -- strike the therefore -- when I talked with him in '75. I had a number of discussions with him on points relative to the technique that was used in the handling of the tapes, because he was there at the time.

Now whether he was in a position to give testimony of his own knowledge or whether it was his belief, I cannot say.

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1 But his statement to me, at the time, as I asked him  
2 the specific question, what happened to the voices -- it was  
3 erased and it was normal that that be done within a cycle of  
4 five to six days. That is my recollection.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Would the purpose of erasing the tape  
6 simply be so that the tape could be reused?

7 Mr. Rocca. Exactly. They had a large traffic which  
8 they had to accommodate.

9 There is in addition to Mr. Phillips his chief of  
10 office at that time who also was there and who would know the  
11 answer to that question.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. That would be [ ]

13 Mr. Rocca. No. It's a fellow with a Latin name.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. In charge of which operation in  
15 Mexico City?

16 Mr. Rocca. He was Chief of Ops when Mr. Phillips  
17 was chief of WE in 1975.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Oh, in 1975.

19 Mr. Rocca. He later went out to become chief of  
20 station. Well, you can create the entire order of that.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Let me show you another document  
22 dated November 23, 1983, addressed to James J. Rowley,  
23 who was Chief of the U.S. Secret Service at that time, from  
24 J. Edgar Hoover.

25 The document deals with the assassination of President

John F. Kennedy in Dallas, Texas, November 22, 1963.

I will have this marked as an exhibit.

(The document referred to was marked Rocca Exhibit number 2.)

Mr. Goldsmith. If I wanted to substitute a better copy of that at some later time, is there any problem in doing that?

The Reporter. Not that I know of, so long as they are identical.

Mr. Goldsmith. Okay.

Turning to page 4 of this document, I would like to ask you to read the paragraph that starts at the bottom of the page and continues on to the next page.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had a chance to read that paragraph?

Mr. Rocca. Uh-huh.

Mr. Goldsmith. That paragraph, I believe, makes reference to a tape recording that was provided to the FBI by the CIA and Mr. Hoover is indicating that some agents of the FBI had reviewed that tape recording which, although it was purported to contain a recording of Oswald's voice, the agents were of the opinion that it was not, in fact, Oswald.

Do you know anything about that tape recording?

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Mr. Rocca. I regard this as a total mixup of various leads, inaccurate, and reflecting at the moment -- 23rd November -- no one had sorted out anything. I think this collapses of its own weight on the basis of the evidence.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Agency ever have a tape recording of someone whom it thought to be Oswald, and it turned out that the tape recording was, in fact, not of Oswald?

Mr. Rocca. Not to my knowledge. Not to my knowledge.

Not to my knowledge directly or indirectly. I have never heard of such, because this was one of the things that I tried very hard to establish -- that is, was there any corpus of evidence that could be associated directly with Oswald in the original things. I always drew a blank.

Mr. Goldsmith. What did you do to try to establish this?

Mr. Rocca. Asking people about it, whether it existed or not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you talk to Win Scott about that in Mexico City?

Mr. Rocca. No, no. I never talked to Win Scott during the period at all. He was down there. After all, I was not in a position to, and I have no recollection of having done it later on when he visited. But it may very well have come up in the '65 or later visits that he had.

But in any event, in my opinion, this is simply a mixup

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Again, it's the photograph -- I would say you are going to have to sort this kind of thing out very carefully before giving it evidential value.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please review CIA number 197, specifically paragraph number two.

For the record, this is a cable dated 23 November, 1963 to headquarters from Mexico City.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had a chance to review that paragraph?

Mr. Rocca. Paragraph three?

Mr. Goldsmith. No, two.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

It bears out what I was saying earlier.

Mr. Goldsmith. The paragraph indicates in relevant part that the station was unable to compare voice, Oswald's voice, as the first tape had been erased prior to the receipt of the second call.

My question is as follows. Is it reasonable to infer from that that in fact, on November 23, 1963, one of the tapes was still in existence because the author of the cable doesn't say "station unable to compare voice as tapes have been erased." Rather, he indicates, "Unable to compare voice as first tape had been erased prior to receipt of second call,"

C O N F I D E N T I A L



1 suggesting that in fact one of the tapes was still in  
2 existence.

3 Mr. Rocca. Well, I think that is a strained  
4 construction. It could be that both had been erased, and  
5 that's what the meaning was, as far as I can see.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Have you ever reviewed this cable  
7 before?

8 Mr. Rocca. This was one of the cables that I included  
9 in a batch of materials that I assembled in going over the  
10 thing for Mr. Belin. I come back to my statement that all of  
11 the efforts that I made to try to pin down extant tapes  
12 produced nothing with respect to Oswald, and it was possible  
13 only to get the tapes after the 23rd preserved. And, to my  
14 knowledge, they are still preserved, but I am not certain of it.

15 But I did not draw the inference you did, let's put it  
16 that way.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. When you read this paragraph, did it  
18 occur to you possibly that that would be a reasonable inference  
19 to draw?

20 Mr. Rocca. No, no.

21 I certainly don't want to get into any kind of personal  
22 difference here on it. I would not have drawn that inference.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

24 Mr. Rocca. In the light of what I'd been assured.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. I want you to understand that I



1 don't intend to force any inference upon you and I purposely  
 2 phrased the question in the sense that is it a reasonable  
 3 inference, and you have given your answer.

4 Let's take a look at CIA --

5 Mr. Rocca. Let me look at it again. I mean, after  
 6 all, it's been a while.

7 Again, this goes back to the people on the spot and  
 8 what they remember, not what I feel or think about it, though  
 9 I recognize that if I should have spotted it, I should have.  
 10 But basically the people engaged at the time can answer, and  
 11 their statement is that these things were scratched, were  
 12 rubbed, were removed, and they were not extant. And it was  
 13 only after the 23rd, after the assassination, you will  
 14 preserve all the material. I think that went out in a cable  
 15 that came out of headquarters.

16 "In view Oswald in Soviet Union, in fact he claimed on  
 17 1 October, LIENVOY to have visited" -- "station unable to  
 18 compare voice" --

19 Frankly, I think that this is again a very -- my  
 20 feeling is that this is again an example of the kind of loose  
 21 language that is written and that you see on other parts of  
 22 the record.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

24 Mr. Rocca. This, while it is possible that what you  
 25 say is so, my feeling is that this, in effect, says that they

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1 were unable to make any comparison.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Let's review now CIA number 205, which  
3 is a cable from Mexico City to the director, also dated  
4 23 November, 1963.

5 Would you please read paragraph number four.

6 (Pause)

7 Mr. Rocca. Yes.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Now paragraph number four indicates  
9 that the transcriber of the conversations involved stated  
10 that Oswald was identical with the person who had called  
11 from the Cuban Embassy to the Soviet Embassy prior to October  
12 first.

13 Is it reasonable to infer from paragraph number four  
14 on CIA number 205 that the transcriber made a voice comparison?

15 Mr. Rocca. Out of his head.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you indicating that --

17 Mr. Rocca. And they are good. I would have no question  
18 that he is right. But he didn't make any comparison. I don't  
19 know him. I don't know his talent. But that would be my  
20 statement operationally.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Now, someone reading this paragraph  
22 who does not have knowledge of Agency operating procedures  
23 or the manner in which transcribers operate or are trained  
24 might, reading this in a straightforward manner, think that  
25 a voice comparison had been made.

Is that correct? Are you shaking your head yes?

We'll go ahead and let you verify it.

Mr. Rocca. If I answer yes, this is a purely hypothetical case.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that.

Mr. Rocca. As I say, it is like many other things that occur in the record which can be interpreted hypothetically as indicating intent or knowledge.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am purposely qualifying the question to say that if someone doesn't have any knowledge of Agency procedures or the talent and training that goes into the making of a good transcriber, he might think that a voice comparison has been made from reading paragraph number four.

Do you have an explanation for this paragraph?

I think you gave one but I would like to hear it again.

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

The explanation is that this represents the typical function of a transcriber in recalling what you would call "eyeballing", but this is "earballing"; what he hears.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, effectively, seven weeks after Oswald had contacted the embassy, the Cuban Embassy and the Soviet Embassy, without having a chance to listen to the tape and compare voices, you are indicating that the transcriber could still have memory of that and make a valid comparison?

Mr. Rocca. Yes, and he would probably be able to do it

today.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Did the Agency station in Mexico City ever obtain a photograph of Oswald as a result of its photosurveillance operations against the Soviet and Cuban Embassy and Consulate?

Mr. Rocca. To my knowledge, it did not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's examine CIA number 248.

Would you please read this memo.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, this is a memo that was passed to Mr. Papich of the FBI with information on the photo coverage of the embassies in Mexico City. The memo is dated 27 November, 1963.

Is it accurate to say that according to this memo, the photographic coverage during daylight hours of the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City was continuous in nature?

Mr. Rocca. No, it is not accurate.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is your interpretation of the memo, Mr. Rocca?

Mr. Rocca. Well, in the first place, I have no competence to judge this memo because I have had no service in Mexico City and must therefore rely on what has been given to me in the course of experience over the years by people who were.

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1 One of the points that I explored, again in that thing  
2 that I did for Mr. Belin, was why there was no photographic  
3 coverage on Friday.

4 Mr. Phillip told me that the machine was down on  
5 Friday, therefore this is not right. But I don't know whether  
6 it is or not. You see. I am in a bind here. I am telling  
7 you what I do know.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that.

9 Nevertheless, according to your answer on the record

10 Mr. Rocca. On the record it's wrong.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. I didn't ask you about the accuracy  
12 of what the memo says. I only asked you if according to the  
13 memo the coverage was continuous in nature. I am not asking  
14 you whether the memo was right or wrong. I am simply asking  
15 you whether according to the memo the coverage was continuous  
16 in nature.

17 Mr. Rocca. That's what the memo says.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

19 I will also indicate for the record that the memo  
20 continues to say, "However, weather conditions and other  
21 factors affecting any photographic efforts required of the  
22 coverage not be considered as total or complete."

23 Mr. Rocca. Again, my researches in 1975 showed  
24 that there were large lapses and very grave difficulties  
25 because of the operational situations that prevailed in the

1 various quarters.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. What was the reason that you discovered  
3 for why the photosurveillance unit did not obtain a photograph  
4 of Oswald?

5 Mr. Rocca. Because -- I think the question was directly  
6 raised by Mr. Belin. How come you didn't get a picture of him?

7 Mr. Goldsmith. What was the reason that you gave  
8 Mr. Belin?

9 Mr. Rocca. That the machine was down.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. For how many days was the machine  
11 down?

12 Mr. Rocca. I cannot answer that. It was down on  
13 Friday, and perhaps on Saturday.

14 As I say, this is noted in the memo that I wrote in  
15 '75 and it's based on a conversation with Mr. Phillips and  
16 with his people.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall when that memo was  
18 written?

19 (Pause)

20 Mr. Rocca. I don't know whether I have a note on the  
21 date.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you retain a copy of the memo?

23 Mr. Rocca. I did not retain a copy of the memo. I  
24 do not have a copy.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. So, the reason that was.

given by Mr. Phillips or Mexico City station was that, at least according to your knowledge, the photo mechanism was not working on that day.

Is that correct?

Mr. Rocca. That's right, and that doesn't assume that there might not have been some other reason for not getting the coverage.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, if we were to reconstruct Oswald's visits to the Cuban and Russian Embassies --

Mr. Rocca. That's what I did in that memo.

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, we're going to get a hold of that memo, I assure you. The Agency, at this time, for some reason, has not made it available to us.

But if we were to reconstruct his visits, we would see that he made visits not only to the Soviet Embassy, but to the Cuban Embassy as well. So, did Mr. Phillips or whoever gave you the explanation indicate that both cameras were down?

Mr. Rocca. I cannot recall that detail. But that, too would be taken care of -- and bear in mind that these were different implantments; these were different, and they had different problems in management. As I say, I am telling you only what I know by hearsay. The people who were there are the ones who will have to explain.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did it strike you as unusual that



1 Oswald was able to visit the Embassies a total of at least  
2 five to six times without ever being photographed?

3 Mr. Rocca. No, not one bit. Not one bit.

4 I have been in the field -- I was in the field 20  
5 years, and anyone who trusts machines and machine coverage  
6 is just placing his reliance on a false device.

7 Let me say another thing. Saturday coverage was not  
8 undertaken. So this was another thing.

9 You see, there are a number of things here, there are  
10 a number of substantive details that you don't have.

11 Saturday, now I recall-- and this was recorded in the  
12 memo -- Saturday coverage was not -- the coverage was stopped  
13 because the embassy was closed presumably on that day.

14 So, it would be, generally speaking, beneficial to get  
15 a hold of that, because I tried to go over some of these  
16 points as best as I could.

17 I must say that I don't have the information I thought  
18 I did.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Agency ever consider it to be  
20 unusual that Oswald was able to gain admittance to the Cuban  
21 Embassy on a Saturday when the embassy was closed?

22 Mr. Rocca. No. All you had to do was press a button  
23 and there was a guard, and he let you in. But inasmuch as it  
24 was a closed day, coverage was not extended to that period  
25 at that time. They did it afterward. As I recall, that was

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1 started.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. If the Agency's records indicate  
3 that by the entrance to the Cuban Consulate there was an  
4 impulse camera that was activated automatically and that that  
5 camera was in operation on September 27, which was the first  
6 day that Oswald made a visit to the Cuban Embassy, would you  
7 think that a photograph of Oswald would have been obtained?

8 Mr. Rocca. There are two many hypotheses. This is  
9 a cascade of hypotheses, and I would really, before answering  
10 in any way that would affect your questions to others, want  
11 to know very, very clearly what the mechanics were, which  
12 is something that I don't know now.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. I'm not in a position by virtue of my  
14 agreement with the Agency to go into detail with you now on  
15 the nature of the photo coverage. So, I will withdraw the  
16 question.

17 Mr. Rocca. Again, let me say that these lapses  
18 in coverage are absolutely a built-in part of the hazards of  
19 the business.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Mexico City station ever  
21 criticized for failing to obtain a photograph of Oswald?

22 Mr. Rocca. Not as far as I know.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Critized -- was the Mexico City  
24 station criticized?

25 Mr. Rocca. No. I saw nothing to that effect in any

of the outgoing material or in any of the discussions.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, even though Oswald visited the embassies, you are not surprised by the absence of a photograph

Mr. Rocca. I was not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the FBI had any independent telephonic surveillance of the Soviet and Cuban Embassy and Consulate?

Mr. Rocca. No, I do not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you familiar with the cryptonym AMMUG?

Mr. Rocca. I am.

This is a cryptonym for a Cuban defector, who is unknown to me, but who at a certain stage provided material that was given to the Warren Commission by the staff, or directly, or both.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever meet with AMMUG?

Mr. Rocca. No, no.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it fair to say that AMMUG provided the CIA with information relevant to the assassination sometime in 1964?

Mr. Rocca. I can't judge that. I do not know. I can't really appreciate the thrust of his material.

Mr. Goldsmith. When did you have occasion to review the material that AMMUG had provided to the CIA?

Mr. Rocca. I actually never went over it, except to

1 the extent that it's in the Oswald file. I am not trying to  
2 be evasive. I simply cannot remember what the thrust of this  
3 information was.

4 My impression was that he provided the first really  
5 significant, hard information on the DGI chief. Now his name,  
6 I was struggling for it this morning, it must have been  
7 ("Rodriguez.")

8 Mr. Goldsmith. R-O-G-E-L-I-O Lopez?

9 Mr. Rocca. That's the man.

10 As a consequence, this was of significance. But it  
11 came in later, after, 1964 or some time. Is that correct?  
12 Well, I'm asking you.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. I will show you some documents which  
14 will refresh your memory in a moment.

15 Mr. Rocca. Anyway, this was considered very sensitive  
16 and was being handled by a case officer, appropriately  
17 equipped with AMMUG. I had no direct cognizance of that,  
18 for example, as I had with the Golitzin material on the Russi  
19 side.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you know about AMMUG in 1964?

21 Mr. Rocca. The name and that he had information I  
22 had heard, yes.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you know that he was a former  
24 DGI agent or case officer?

25 Mr. Rocca. The question is where.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Pardon me?

2 Mr. Rocca. Where he was. I mean, he was not in  
3 Mexico, as I recall, was he?

4 I think he was somewhere else.

5 Yes. The answer to your question is yes. He was a  
6 DGI defector. But I thought he came out of Paris or London  
7 or something like that.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. We'll show you some documents that  
9 will refresh your memory on him in a moment.

10 Mr. Rocca. This is, again, a part that I am not  
11 really expert on in any way. But I am perfectly willing to  
12 be used as a backboard for anything.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Did Mr. Helms or Mr. Angleton ever  
14 express any concern about AMMUG being disclosed to the Warren  
15 Commission?

16 Mr. Rocca. Not as far as I know. As far as I know,  
17 they disclosed him to the Warren Commission.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission told about  
19 AMMUG being a DGI employee?

20 Mr. Rocca. That's my impression. I may be totally  
21 wrong about this.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall what information, if  
23 any, AMMUG provided to the CIA in reference to the Kennedy  
24 assassination?

25 Mr. Rocca. As I said, I think he provided the



1 first inside information on the DGI's aspect of the Rezydentur.  
 2 in Mexico City. But precisely what he said with respect to  
 3 who was where in Mexico City at the time I cannot say at  
 4 this moment because I don't have it in my memory.

5 Just a second, now. Let me try to work it out.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, for your sake and the  
 7 purpose of refreshing your memory somewhat, I would like to  
 8 show you some CIA documents pertaining to AMMUG which, I think  
 9 after they are reviewed, you may have a somewhat better  
 10 recollection of this particular individual.

11 I am going to give you CIA number 1879 and would like  
 12 to ask you to skim that through CIA 1892 -- no, CIA 1894.  
 13 That would probably take you ten minutes or so.

14 (Pause)

15 Mr. Rocca. Well, I haven't read it in detail, but  
 16 certainly I recall this. The case officer was [ ] and  
 17 we did provide the questions that he was able to elaborate.  
 18 What can we talk about?

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Was there another case officer who  
 20 debriefed AMMUG?

21 Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, no. I mean, [ ]  
 22 was the individual who was in charge.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether a CIA case  
 24 officer, whose last name was Langash or Langosh ever debriefed  
 25 AMMUG?

1 Mr. Rocca. No. "Langash" -- I remember no such name.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. According to a memo dated 5 May, 1964,  
3 CIA number 1879, the first paragraph indicates that prior  
4 to October, 1963, Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico  
5 City on two or three occasions. Before, during, and after  
6 these visits, Oswald was in contact with DGI, specifically  
7 with Luisa Calderon, Manuel (Dega) Perez, and Rogelio  
8 Rodriguez Lopez.

9 Mr. Rocca. Who was the chief.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Rodriguez was the chief?

11 Mr. Rocca. My recollection is that he was the chief.  
12 That's why AMMUG gave us the first real information on the  
13 organization of this Rezydentura.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. What followup was done on Oswald's  
15 apparent contact with DGI?

16 Mr. Rocca. Well, there was no followup, quite  
17 apart from just this information. I mean, these are the  
18 people -- there was nothing to be done. Luisa Calderon  
19 was one of the people that we had gotten a telephone tap on.  
20 She is one of the persons who made a very peculiar comment  
21 in the course of it, as I recall. These other people are simp  
22 on the spot. It is not possible to get any additional  
23 information if the station doesn't develop the assets.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. Did AMMUG give any information as to  
25 whether Silvia Duran was a DGI employee or agent?

Mr. Rocca. I do not know, unless it's stated here. She was the receptionist, serving a mixed bag, there, of people.

So I don't know that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Luisa Calderon was a DGI agent?

Mr. Rocca. No, not except for this, which says that she is.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was this information all given to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Rocca. As far as I know -- all of the AMMUG information was given.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Luisa Calderon was ever employed in any capacity by the CIA?

Mr. Rocca. No. I do not know that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please refer to CIA number 1892 and 1893, starting with this paragraph (indicating). Just read this paragraph through to here (indicating.)

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. I have no comment on this.

As far as I know, there were no traces that sustain this allegation.

Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, the allegation in that document is that Calderon was or may have been connected to the CIA.

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1 Is that correct?

2 When I say "is that correct," I'm saying is that  
3 what the allegation is.

4 Mr. Rocca. Yes, that is the allegation. But this  
5 involves almost three levels of hearsay.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

7 I don't want you to infer anything as to the committee  
8 view on this particular issue.

9 Mr. Rocca. I'm not going to underwrite that at all.  
10 I just don't believe it.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. We're not asking you to underwrite it.  
12 We're simply asking you whether you have any information that  
13 would either rebut or verify that allegation.

14 Mr. Rocca. I understand that. Ultimately the question  
15 really ought to go to the people in WH division, Mexico-Cuban,  
16 who have the records and are in a position to verify this.  
17 They forwarded no information bearing on such a thing. I  
18 assume, therefore, that the thing is not so.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. When you read this memo at the time that  
20 you were working on this issue for the Rockefeller Commission,  
21 were you concerned by the allegation that Calderon was a  
22 CIA agent?

23 Mr. Rocca. No, no, no. It didn't come to my mind  
24 at that time. I don't remember where in that memo I gave it  
25 any attention, either.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Apart now from that allegation which I understand to be hearsay --

Mr. Rocca. Well, Piniero, the head of the CIA, did not agree. Piniero is the chief of the service.

Mr. Goldsmith. He is head of the DGI service?

Mr. Rocca. Yes. I mean, he is a very important man.

You know, this is -- we are really spinning things out here. If there is no factual support for this, then we shouldn't tarry and try to give it evidential or factual significance.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, no one is attempting to attach evidential significance to these documents. The purpose of this session is to address questions to you that would help us shed light on the documents. I don't want you to think that we infer from the documents that everything contained in the documents is accurate.

In fact, that's the reason we are going over the documents. The record does not speak for itself.

Mr. Rocca. That's very good. As I said, I don't want to get into a position of hostility here, because that is not my purpose.

On the other hand, as you stated yourself, certain of these paragraphs read in completely legalistic fashion by individuals who really have not been exposed to the operational vicissitudes -- let's put it that way -- will draw

conclusions that simply aren't correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. The reason that I am deposing you today and have deposed many other Agency employees is to attempt to clarify questions that are raised by the record. That perhaps gets back to one of the first points that was made earlier in the deposition, where you made reference to the record and I indicated that the record needs to be examined and we can't rely exclusively upon it.

Mr. Rocca. She's a mysterious character anyway. As far as I know, that has never been clarified. There are subsequent reports about her, as I recall, travelling around and being set up by the DGI. So, you can just keep that in the back of your head. You are going to have a continual problem with her.

Mr. Goldsmith. These memos also mention that as well.

Mr. Rocca. There is a whole stage of receding mirrors that you can't really ever get to the bottom of, without ever getting her into this kind of proceeding, settling down and questioning her.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, CIA number 1900 is a memo dated 5 May, 1974, which basically consists of the results of the debriefing of AMMUG. It lists a series of questions that were presented to AMMUG and the answers to it.

I show you that only for reference purposes now.

Mr. Rocca. My recollection is that these questions

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1  
2 were very carefully thought out by members of the staff,  
3 members of my group, and that we made the thing fully available  
4 to the Warren Commission, which is really the thing that  
5 concerned me more than anything else.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

7 Please listen to the question that I have for you  
8 now.

9 I just showed you a document that was dated May 5, 1964.  
10 On May 6, 1964, according to document number 1898, some  
11 followup questions were presented for the purpose of having  
12 them be addressed to AMMUG. So, we have a second set of  
13 questions.

14 Now, the memo dated 8 May, 1964, which is CIA number  
15 1891, was prepared by case officer [ ] That  
16 is the one I would like you to examine now in a bit more detail.

17 It appears that what Mr. [ ] did, unlike his earlier  
18 report where he specifically mentioned or listed the question  
19 that was addressed and gave AMMUG's response, here he simply  
20 summarized the briefing session.

21 I am wondering if you noticed that when you examined  
22 this document for the first time?

23 Furthermore, why did Mr. [ ] depart from the  
24 earlier procedure?

25 Mr. Rocca. Well, it gave us relevant information.  
I think that is what probably what we were primarily concerned

1 with.

2 Frankly, I would not have held to this format.

3 This is the format you were referring to in the earlier questi

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

5 Mr. Rocca. The sixth of May.

6 Coming back on the eighth, he is giving us the result  
7 really in capsule, I would judge, rather than setting them  
8 down, and that would anticipate that this thing would simply  
9 be written up more formally somewhere.

10 Is there such a sort of wrap-up report where the  
11 things are?

12 Mr. Goldsmith. No.

13 Mr. Rocca. Well, this may be all he did, then, on  
14 the thing.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. So, you don't have an explanation,  
16 then, on the departure from the form that was given to Mr.

17 [ ] to address to AMMUG?

18 Mr. Rocca. Here again, it would be a question of  
19 consulting with Mr. Dooley or Mr. Pratt-- I think that Mr.  
20 Pratt had joined us by this time -- to find out exactly  
21 what had transpired between them and [ ] -- one or the  
22 other or both -- to determine whether there was any kind of --  
23

24 Mr. Goldsmith. What was [ ] position at that  
25 time?

1 Mr. Rocca. He was the case officer for AMMUG.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. He was simply a case officer?

3 Mr. Rocca. Yes. He was handling him. Presumably  
4 he was very keen, as the memo reflects, on keeping the man  
5 safe and out of the public eye.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Were you satisfied with the completeness  
7 of [ ] report?

8 Mr. Rocca. I certainly didn't raise anything at the  
9 time. It seemed to me to tell us a lot of new information that  
10 bore directly on the question on the Cuban side of it for the  
11 first time, which, you remember, as I said this morning, was  
12 a part of the whole situation there, from the CI point of  
13 view, that I know least about. The KGB Rezidentura was clear  
14 but what we really didn't understand was the Cuban setup.  
15 For the first time we were beginning to get information.

16 But mind you, this man did not have direct information  
17 about it. He had heard it from people.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. When you say "this man", you are  
19 referring to AMMUG?

20 Mr. Rocca. AMMUG.

21 In other words, he is not a Golitzin or a Deriabin  
22 or that kind; that is, who can tell you directly.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, would you indicate  
24 who Golitzin and Deriabin were?

25 Mr. Rocca. These were Soviet defectors who had come out

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1 Deriabin is a Soviet defector who defected in Vienna  
2 in 1953-1954, and Mr. Golitzin defected in 1961. They are  
3 KGB officers.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Was all of the information contained  
5 in the AMMUG memos prepared by Mr. [ ] given to the  
6 Warren Commission?

7 Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, it was.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know in what form --

9 Mr. Rocca. That's what I don't know at the present  
10 moment.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Was it given in memorandum form or in  
12 briefing form?

13 Mr. Rocca. I would judge that it should have been --  
14 I have actually -- I have almost the conviction or feeling  
15 that we promoted a meeting between members of the staff of the  
16 Warren Commission and the case officer. In other words, they  
17 were allowed to confabulate. They were encouraged to.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. So, you think there was a conference  
19 between the case officer and --

20 Mr. Rocca. And the Warren Commission staff.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Which staff members were involved?

22 Mr. Rocca. That I couldn't say.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Certainly there would have to be a  
24 record of that meeting at the Agency.

25 Mr. Rocca. There would have to be a record at the

Warren Commission, too, if it happened. Now I am not saying that it did happen. I have the impression, however, that there was certainly no intent to deny the Commission full access to the information.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the Warren Commission was given the information that AMMUG provided with reference to Luisa Calderon?

Mr. Rocca. I'm almost certain they had to have it because there was an intercept on it, and this bound down one aspect of the intercept, which was a very peculiar phrase that she used -- "He got what he deserved" -- or something like that.

Mr. Goldsmith. We will get to that intercept momentarily.

Mr. Rocca. So, I must say that this Calderon thing must have gone to them.

Is there not a memo by Mr. Dooley there which says that the information went to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Goldsmith. I am going to show you now what the Agency has indicated to us was made available to the Warren Commission.

In response to your question, there is no particular memo from Mr. Dooley indicating what went to the Warren Commission.

I would like you to examine CIA number 1929 through

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CIA number 1933.

This is a document that was made available to Mr. Rankin on May 15, 1964 in reference to the information that had been provided to the Agency by AMMUG.

I would like you to review the document and then specifically to review the actual information that was made available to the Warren Commission.

Mr. Rocca. Do you mean that Mr. Rankin is not a member of the Warren Commission?

Mr. Goldsmith. I didn't mean to differentiate between Mr. Rankin and the Warren Commission.

Basically, what I was saying is that the document number 1929-1930 is the memorandum, the transmittal memorandum that indicates what information is going to be provided, and the source of the information. And then, what you'll see in pages CIA number 1932 and 1933 is the actual information that was made available.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had a chance to review those materials?

Mr. Rocca. Uh-huh.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do those materials make any reference to Luisa Calderon?

Mr. Rocca. I see it -- and I say that they do not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, AMMUG provided information on --

1 Mr. Rocca. I don't see it -- here, anyway.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Now, AMMUG provided information on  
3 Manuel (Vega) Perez and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez and Luisa  
4 Calderon and the memo that you're studying now refers only  
5 to (Vega) Perez and Rodriguez Lopez.

6 Is that correct?

7 Mr. Rocca. And Duran.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. And Duran, yes. But there is no  
9 reference to Luisa Calderon, is that correct?

10 Mr. Rocca. There is none.

11 But, as I say, I cannot explain -- Mr. Hall, who did  
12 this, certainly did not include that on it. But I cannot  
13 accept that that material did not get to the Commission  
14 somehow in some way.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Let me review another document  
16 with you.

17 Mr. Rocca. That is, my impression is that Mr. Dooley  
18 passed all of the information to them.

19 There certainly would have been no reason to omit  
20 her.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. I would ask you at this point to review  
22 CIA number 1907, which is a brief for presentation to the  
23 President's Commission on the Assassination of President  
24 Kennedy dated May 14, 1964.

25 I would like to ask you to review specifically CIA

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number 1927 and indicate to me whether there is any reference to Calderon specifically or any of the other DGI individuals.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. There are no specifics worked out. There is simply the generalization that a source is being debriefed and the Commission staff is in the course of being briefed on it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who actually gave this briefing?

Mr. Rocca. I have no idea.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would that have been Mr. Helms or Mr. McCone?

Mr. Rocca. I judge Mr. Helms, but I can't be certain. I would rather imagine Mr. Helms.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please review CIA number 1906.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. My question pertains to this document right now. Let's identify it first.

Would you identify for the record what this is?

Mr. Rocca. It's an internal memorandum from Mr. Angleton to me indicating that the DDP, Mr. Helms, has been scheduled to go before the Commission and he wants a short, but comprehensive, memorandum which highlights the basic issues or positions entered into by the Agency and its dealing with the Commissions.

In other words, that's presumably what came out of it.

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1 Mr. Goldsmith. Now, this is dated 12 May, 1964,  
2 is that correct?

3 Mr. Rocca. That is correct.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. The memo for you from Mr. Angleton  
5 is dated 12 May, 1964.

6 Mr. Rocca. Yes.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Is it fair to say from the text of this  
8 memo that the Agency was extremely concerned about the  
9 sensitive source, AMMUG? In other words, here was an example  
10 of the Agency being concerned about a sensitive source?

11 Mr. Rocca. Well, there is always this sensitivity.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. I'm asking you to look only at CIA 190

13 Mr. Rocca. But you've already shown me the brief.  
14 That's what I was looking at.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Okay. You'd like to look through  
16 the brief again?

17 Mr. Rocca. No.

18 I was only going to point out that the very first  
19 paragraph of the brief refers to the sensitive source, which  
20 is AMMUG -- somewhere along here -- it's one of the tabs,  
21 Tab E, I guess.

22 So, there was within the limits of the prescription  
23 comprehensive and at the same time extensive information,  
24 Mexican and Cuban phases. In other words, is the point that  
25 we weren't mentioning it -- because we did mention it?

1 Mr. Goldsmith. There are a variety of points and I  
2 really am not able to indicate to you right now what all the  
3 points are, Mr. Rocca.

4 My concern here with document number 1906 simply is  
5 whether the Agency was concerned about the sensitivity of  
6 AMMUG and therefore wanted to protect him as a sensitive  
7 source.

8 Mr. Rocca. My recollection is that it wasn't any greater  
9 than anything else that was coming along.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. The AMMUG defection was no greater  
11 than anything else that was coming along?

12 Mr. Rocca. Than any of the other techniques, sources,  
13 and methods that we had been concerned with.

14 In other words, I'm trying to -- you were asking me  
15 whether this qualitatively was of greater significance than  
16 anything else that we were engaged in protecting, and I can't  
17 remember that it was.

18 Mr. [ ] considered it as very important from the  
19 standpoint of his own security and the security of his agent.  
20 But I don't recall any draconian impositions, "Don't say anything  
21 about AMMUG."

22 Mr. Goldsmith. What did Mr. Angleton have in mind  
23 when he said the following to you in the memo: "I informed  
24 him" -- that is, Mr. Helms -- "that in your view this would  
25 raise a number of new factors with the Commission; that it

1 should not go to the Commission prior to the Director's  
2 appearance unless we have first had some preliminary reaction  
3 or made sure that the Director is fully aware of its implicatio  
4 since it could well serve as the basis for detailed questioning

5 Mr. Rocca. (Nods negatively)

6 I haven't the faintest notion at this time of what  
7 was involved in that.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. You'll have to speak up a bit, Mr.  
9 Rocca.

10 Mr. Rocca. I mean, it doesn't bring to mind a par-  
11 ticular series of considerations unless they would relate  
12 directly to the handling of the individual, who he was, what  
13 position he had, and all the rest -- in other words, involve  
14 the actual surfacing of the source.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. According to this memo, it also  
16 indicates that the DDP, Mr. Helms, stated that he would review  
17 this carefully and make a decision as to the question of timing

18 Was the Agency concerned about the question of timing  
19 in terms of when material would be made available to the  
20 Warren Commission?

21 Mr. Rocca. I think it refers to timing with respect  
22 to this particular matter, in view of the fact that AMMUG  
23 had just come out.

24 Overall I would say that they were not concerned with  
25 the question of timing.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Please review CIA number 1950 through  
2 1954. This is an excerpt from a memo that was prepared by  
3 you on 23 May 1975 in response to the letter of April 15,  
4 1975, from Mr. Belin.

5 (Pause)

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had occasion to review those  
7 pages now, Mr. Rocca?

8 Mr. Rocca. Yes.

9 This is the memo I wrote for Mr. Belin.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. For purposes of clarification, were  
11 there any other memos that you prepared for the Rockefeller  
12 Commission?

13 I believe, for example, you indicated earlier that  
14 you --

15 Mr. Rocca. Yes, there was another memo. There were  
16 two memos that I prepared.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Then there is one other one.

18 Mr. Rocca. There is another one, and it had a  
19 total documentary appendix which won't tell you anything  
20 you don't know. But it simply sets it out in what I consider  
21 to be the necessary way to try to make any sense about anything.

22 This is not that memo.

23 Now it's very clear here that I have evolved in my  
24 views with respect to the importance of Calderon.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you tell us for the record

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

1 what the subject matter of CIA number 1950 to 1954 is?

2 In other words, you've just reviewed several pages.  
3 They've pertained to Luisa Calderon.

4 What is the nature of the relevance of Luisa Calderon  
5 to this case?

6 Mr. Rocca. The relevance is that if she is a DGI  
7 agent, then the intercept becomes important. But this was  
8 not something that I recognized in 1963. I recognized it  
9 in 1975, because at that time I read the whole case.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. For purposes of clarification, what  
11 is the substance of the telephone intercept that you are  
12 referring to?

13 What does Luisa Calderon say?

14 Mr. Rocca. She doesn't say a thing. That's why it  
15 is totally nuance, and I would never go public on a matter  
16 of this kind.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. What is the nuance to which you are  
18 referring?

19 Mr. Rocca. The nuance is that she is -- she phrases  
20 what possibly had happened to Kennedy as "what barbarians."  
21 I mean, it indicates an emotional setup, an emotional  
22 attitude toward what had happened.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. More fundamentally, doesn't her  
24 statement suggest the possibility of foreknowledge on her  
25 part?

C O N F I D E N T I A L





C O N F I D E N T I A L

1 Mr. Rocca. I used the word. I used that word and  
2 you used it just now. But I'm not going to go into a court  
3 and say that it does because I have no evidence that that  
4 indicates foreknowledge. In and of itself it could indicate  
5 anything, because we don't know enough from the intercept  
6 about it. That's why I said this was nuance.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Right.

8 Now, at first glance, on reading that transcription,  
9 it would not necessarily take on any particular significance  
10 standing alone. I believe the way you refer to it is possible  
11 boastful self-indulgence or hyperbole on the part of an  
12 individual.

13 However, does it not to you take on added significance  
14 in light of Luisa Calderon's alleged connection with DGI?

15 Mr. Rocca. If we could prove it. All the evidence  
16 is against it.

17 Piniero denies it.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. No, no, no.

19 Piniero denies that she was CIA. He does not deny  
20 that she was DGI.

21 We can refer back to that memo if you would like  
22 to clarify that.

23 Mr. Rocca. No. I think you're right, yes.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. We have AMMUG making a statement  
25 that --

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Mr. Rocca. I mean, AMMUG is our source, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. And AMMUG says she is DGI.

Mr. Rocca. I'm obviously going under here. I'm beginning to lose the track.

Well, you're at the very point I was, to be utterly frank with you, in compiling that memo.

Mr. Goldsmith. The point I am trying to make is if she were DGI, that statement would take on added significance.

Is that a fair statement?

Mr. Rocca. That was the reason I put it in. But I would, in any event, make it a cause for state intervention or that kind of thing. It's another one of these things -- it's what I call the laboratory level of counter intelligence where you consider evidence, really, the way you consider it, say, at a moot court, in a law school, that kind of thing.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission ever given a transcription of the conversation involving Luisa --

Mr. Rocca. Without question I would say that.

Without question.

They had the Calderon followup. They had the Dorticos followup. They had the whole works. Not only did they have it here, but they had it also when they were down at the station.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me show you CIA number 1928.

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Mr. Rocca. It just becomes incredible to see these formalistic indications that they were not informed about these things because I know they were.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please read that document.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. It is just one page.

Mr. Rocca. The fact that there is no reference to Calderon doesn't mean that there was no transmission. It means that this simply covered other materials.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would there be another record of the Calderon transcription having been given to the Warren Commission, and if so, where would it be?

Mr. Rocca. It has to be in this very record. This is the first I have heard which even suggested that the Calderon intercept had not been passed on.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me just go back and review this document with you briefly.

Mr. Rocca. As I say, this is not an exclusionary document. This simply covers what it covers.

Mr. Goldsmith. Okay.

This is CIA document number 1928. This document is dated 10 April, 1964. It has the heading, "Material from P-8593, Station Oswald File Shown to Warren Commission."

I take it that's the Mexico City station's Oswald file. Then the document lists the translations of calls

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made by Oswald that were given to the Commission. It also refers to two other conversations that were given to the Commission.

Mr. Rocca. But they already had had it in Washington. This only refers to presumably what happened in Mexico City. It may not be the full record of what they gave them down there.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Mexico City station make the Calderon transcript, at least according to this memo, available to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Rocca. I can't say that, not from this memo. It doesn't state that.

Mr. Goldsmith. The memo makes no reference at all to Calderon, is that correct?

Mr. Rocca. It does not.

That does not affect the Commission's knowledge because it simply doesn't make any sense that they wouldn't know of the Calderon aspect, in my opinion, at this stage.

Mr. Goldsmith. Where would we be able to find a formal record of the transcriptions that had been made available to the Warren Commission staff?

Mr. Rocca. They should be in the formal record of the material transmitted to the Warren Commission and in their own records and logs.

(Pause)



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Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, assuming that the committee would be able to get clearance for you with the Agency, do you think that you might be able to find the record of this transcription having been given to the Warren Commission?

I think you can understand the importance of the issue.

Mr. Rocca. Of course.

Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you.

We will attempt to arrange that to see if you can help us on this point.

Mr. Rocca. That would include, obviously, going to WH area?

Mr. Goldsmith. Whatever is necessary for you to help us verify this particular issue or resolve this particular issue.

Mr. Rocca. The thing that would be of greatest use would be if you could get the other memo.

Mr. Goldsmith. We will also make an effort to obtain that memo, I assure you.

Mr. Rocca. Because, it had, as I say, a selection of documents which represented in a sense the only education that the Inspector General had had on the case, and they kept it in their file.

I had intended it to be used as a basis for the selection of materials to be given to the Rockefeller



Commission.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

We will make an effort to obtain these materials and to review them.

Do you know whether --

Mr. Rocca. That is absolutely -- I find it absolutely impossible to believe that this was not among the papers that were given to you, and I would want to assemble my troops and damn well ask them about it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the Agency had any penetration agents in the Cuban Embassy in 1963?

Mr. Rocca. In Mexico City?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Rocca. I do not know that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's refer to CIA number 1977. Please read paragraph number 5.

Mr. Rocca. Uh-huh.

This is Ambassador Mann.

Mr. Goldsmith. That's Ambassador Thomas Mann?

Mr. Rocca. Uh-huh.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, CIA number 1977 is part of a cable that was written, in effect, by Ambassador Mann.

Paragraph five indicates that Ambassador Mann wanted Luisa Calderon arrested.

Do you know why Ambassador Mann wanted Luisa Calderon

1 arrested?

2 Mr. Rocca. Because of the implications of her  
3 involvement, possible involvement, as a consequence of the  
4 intercept, I would assume. It's 27 November. The intercept  
5 had taken place on the 23rd, the afternoon of the 23rd.  
6 The Dorticos thing had been on the 24th or the 25th. So, the  
7 only basis that they would have had for any such action  
8 would have been those materials. They had them in the field.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. What about Azcue?

10 Mr. Rocca. He was presumably present and had the  
11 altercation.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. Why would that be a basis for arrest  
13 the man?

14 Mr. Rocca. To find out what he knew about it.  
15 The general tenor of this suggestion was pretty much  
16 (scarehead) anyway, so you immediately arrest anybody that  
17 had any possible relationship to the man who did the killing,  
18 is the way I would have interpreted it.

19 So, they are all related -- in other words, co-related  
20 in the documentary materials which had been assembled by  
21 that time.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Let's take a recess briefly.

23 Would you like a 10 minute break or so?

24 (A brief recess was taken.)

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, are you generally familiar



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with the allegations that were made after the assassination by the Nicaraguan named Alverado?

Mr. Rocca. It's one of the cases that I wrote up in the memorandum I think I gave to Belin.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you summarize generally for the record what the allegation was?

Mr. Rocca. I think my summary probably wouldn't be worth the paper it's written on.

But, in essence, Alverado walked in the Embassy on Christmas Day or something and said that he had been in the Cuban Embassy or in the courtyard and had seen a red-headed Negro pass money to a young man he identified or who in his view was Oswald.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

The gist of the allegation was essentially that Alverado saw --

Mr. Rocca. The money was \$5,000 or something.

Mr. Goldsmith. -- a Cuban, a red-headed Latin American pass money to Oswald at the Cuban Consulate and that there was some discussion which could have pertained to a possible assassination.

Does that strike you as a fair summary of the gist of the allegation, without going through the entire record?

Mr. Rocca. Well, yes.

He was discredited, of course, as a source, eventually



1 by the polygraph.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

3 When were these allegations by Alverado resolved by  
4 the Agency?

5 Mr. Rocca. I judge some time in February, March,  
6 or April. I cannot recall exactly when, but they are a part  
7 of the record, certainly.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Were the allegations by Alverado  
9 resolved at such time as he took the polygraph and failed it?

10 Mr. Rocca. My feeling was that everyone regarded this  
11 as the best thing since Pepsi Cola until that happened.  
12 And then it just went down the drain.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Let me give you a document, CIA number  
14 2099, dated 10 December, 1963, which is the summary of the  
15 Alverado polygraph test that had been given to him.

16 Would you please briefly skim through these three  
17 pages.

18 Mr. Rocca. Please recall that I have not read this  
19 document at all, earlier.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. This is the first time you are  
21 seeing it?

22 Mr. Rocca. This will be my first reading.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

24 (Pause)

25 Mr. Rocca. Yes?



Mr. Goldsmith. According to that polygraph result, Alverado did not pass the polygraph, and after being told that he did not pass the exam, he essentially said, "The machine doesn't lie."

Is that a fair statement?

Mr. Rocca. That's correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it fair to say or appropriate to say that based upon that, the Alverado allegation had been resolved, so far as the Agency was concerned -- if you know?

Mr. Rocca. I do not know.

Mr. Goldsmith. At the time that you were involved in the Agency's investigation for the Warren Commission, at the time that you were involved in providing information to the Warren Commission for the Agency, was the Alverado issue still a live one?

Mr. Rocca. I believe so -- and it continued alive until sometime after this date. That is my recollection. That is, into January of 1964.

I can't account for this thing here (indicating) because it is definitive, and that time lapse that I recall. But it certainly continued and there were people on the Commission who were interested in the Alverado who were dealing with people in Mr. [ ] group on the details of the case, is my recollection, and continued.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, even though Alverado had failed

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to pass the polygraph prior to December 10, the issue was still a live one at the time you became involved in the investigation?

Mr. Rocca. It was still being mooted, yes, discussed. It was still being discussed.

I would say that it had come to its end, though, sometime around the end of January, or that time. But these are just terribly impressionistic judgments.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

I believe you discussed this this morning, but again, for my purposes, when did you become involved in the CIA's relationship with the Warren Commission?

Mr. Rocca. On or about the twelfth of January, from that point on. You get the evidence of it, I think, by the 31st, very clearly.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, in CIA number 2100, it indicates that he, Alverado, stated that he wanted to protest his unjust treatment and the fact that he was given money, since he does not believe in negotiating over death.

Do you know anything about this allegation --

Mr. Rocca. I do not.

Mr. Goldsmith -- by Alverado that he was given money?

Mr. Rocca. No.

He was an informer, of course, of the Nicaraguan

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service and had been for some time. They had busted him out, or he had been blown, or something, and was moved to Mexico City and this thing developed. So, he could well have been referring to that kind of termination pay that is normal or whatever.

But, as I say, this is my first reading of it and I cannot comment to it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, were you told in 1963 that Alverado had made a statement about being offered money?

Mr. Rocca. No, no.

I was told solely that he had failed the polygraph and that upon told that he was being deceptive that he had agreed -- is basically the story I heard. This is hearsay, now.

But it's not -- it's not too far off what that says, I see now.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether his allegation that he was offered money by someone was ever examined?

Mr. Rocca. I do not know that. I do not know that.

But this should be followed up with the station people or the people who were in the station at the time, or who handled the case.

You could probably find the man who actually handled Alverado and question him about that, that aspect.

The interesting thing -- if we're finished with that and if I may just interject --

Mr. Goldsmith. Please do.

Mr. Rocca. -- is the fact that he talked about this red-headed Negro, because the red-headed Negro then comes into the story told by a woman.

Mr. Goldsmith. Elena Garro de Paz?

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Elena de Paz -- D-E-- new word -- P-A-Z.

So, if you believe in stream of consciousness in the way things happen, here they go. But my explanation for that is that she read it in the Warren Commission report or in some of the newspaper coverage, and that's the way it came out.

But I still took note of it in the memo that I put together for Belin as to those elements that suggested nuance, because she was very persistent in repeating her story. But she also happened to be a personal enemy of one of the other people involved.

Mr. Goldsmith. Silvia Duran?

Mr. Rocca. Silvia Duran. So, there is a question of conflict of interest.

But there were people in the embassy who believed her and continued to report, and there is at least one State Department man who reported right up to the very moment

of his retirement.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to show you --

Mr. Rocca. On this detail.

Mr. Goldsmith. --CIA number 1983, which is dated April 15, 1964.

It's a memo to Mr. Rankin from Mr. Coleman and Slawson in reference to progress in their area, which was Oswald's foreign travels. Specifically, on page 6 of that memo, on paragraph number 7, it indicates that the Warren Commission at that point had not yet been given a complete report of the Alverado story from the CIA.

I wonder if you could respond to that?

Mr. Rocca. I can't.

I have no response to it because this has been long since --

Mr. Goldsmith. That's paragraph number 7.

Mr. Rocca. What is the date of it?

Mr. Goldsmith. April 15, 1964.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. This is following their trip there and undoubtedly reflects their conversation on the spot. I think their note that we "know informally and through highly digested written reports that the allegations have been thoroughly investigated in establishing beyond a reasonable doubt as false" has really taken care of it.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, although it would seem that the allegation had been resolved several months earlier, and it is now the middle of April and they haven't received a complete report as yet. That's what I'm focusing on right now.

Mr. Rocca. Well, as I say, I think they got this as a result of being restimulated by their Mexican trip -- if I am correct in the timing. Obviously, if they wanted a final wrap-up report, they were certainly entitled to it. But they had the gist of it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever send them a final wrap-up report?

Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, I do not recall such.

Mr. Goldsmith. Paragraph eight refers to additional information of a confidential nature. Do you know what they are referring to there?

Mr. Rocca. With respect to your previous question, let me say that they did discuss this in their report.

Mr. Goldsmith. In the Warren Commission report.

Mr. Rocca. In the Warren Commission report.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am aware of that.

Mr. Rocca. And it seems to me impossible that they could have written what they did without having a complete and thorough knowledge of what had gone on.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the FBI participate at all in the

1 investigation of the Alverado story?

2 Mr. Rocca. To my knowledge, they did. But I have  
3 not read their reporting.

4 Mr. Dooley would have read that. That was one of  
5 his functions, reading those.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

7 Turning to paragraph eight, would you indicate if  
8 you know what the additional information of a confidential  
9 nature is that is being referred to there?

10 (Pause)

11 Mr. Rocca. I haven't the vaguest notion.

12 Could I look at the rest of the memorandum to see  
13 what the other topics are, because that's the only way.  
14 It may be a reference to the working out of the schedule  
15 in Helsinki. It could be a matter of the gun, the weaponry.  
16 It could be a matter of the Minsk business.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. I would just assume that you not look  
18 at the rest of the memo at this time, simply because it's  
19 very long. If it becomes necessary to show it to you in the  
20 future, we'll certainly make it available to you again.

21 Mr. Rocca. I can't guess at it.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

23 (Pause)

24 Mr. Goldsmith. While Mr. Berk is checking something  
25 for me, let me show you CIA number 2088.



1  
2 This is an information report on an individual;  
3 the individual specifically is Luisa Rodriguez Calderon. It  
4 dated 26 April, 1965.

5 The source apparently was AMMUG.

6 Mr. Rocca. 1965?

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

8 The document contains a statement to the following  
9 effect: "It is requested that the addressees take no action  
10 on any of the individuals mentioned in the personality  
11 reports without first checking with this Agency."

12 I am wondering what would be their reason.

13 Mr. Rocca. That would be routine. This is a  
14 dissemination.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. That does not indicate to whom the  
16 report is being disseminated.

17 Mr. Rocca. Well, there is a letter and the letter  
18 is simply not reproduced here. But normally this would have  
19 gone to all agencies in the intelligence community that had  
20 a counter intelligence interest.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

22 What would the purpose have been of the qualifying  
23 or restrictive language in that paragraph?

24 Mr. Rocca. The caveat.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Rocca. I would say that it represents the normal

practice in dealing with a live source of this quality and sensitivity and represents inter-agency practice.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. I mean, this is simply a question of keeping other people from getting into the source, without letting you know that they are doing it or getting on to the development of the leads.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would all disseminations to other agencies contain restrictive language like that?

Mr. Rocca. I can't say that all do, but I have written many of them myself and I have read many of them myself --

Mr. Goldsmith. And it is not at all uncommon for them.

Mr. Rocca -- that is it exactly. I wish I had stated it that way. It is not uncommon.

In fact, it is quite common.

Then again, it is designed to keep the channels --

Mr. Goldsmith. Please refer to CIA number 1991, which is a memo dated 1 June, 1964 in reference to Alverado. The memo is to Mr. Rankin from Mr. Helms. Specifically refer to paragraph four of that memo.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the Warren

Commission ever received a copy of the Alverado polygraph report?

Mr. Rocca. I do not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would there be a record of that fact, had the report been given to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Rocca. Mr. Hall prepared this. He was a very careful operator -- he has passed on.

It strikes me that somewhere there must be another memo that goes along with this.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would there be a record of the polygraph report having been transmitted to the Warren Commission if, in fact, it was?

Mr. Rocca. Not necessarily. There might have been a memo saying we regret or something of that kind. But, as I say, I can't say one way or the other.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, the Agency never compiled a list of materials that had been provided to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Rocca. In a single log?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, no. This I regret, to be utterly frank with you.

In other words, this is the final report that they were talking about.

Mr. Goldsmith. I'm not sure I'm following you.

Mr. Rocca. This is the wrap-up report that Messers

Coleman and Slawson were complaining -- well, not complaining, strike that -- that they were saying had not been received.

Now I dealt with both of them in a very friendly way.

Mr. Goldsmith. So that report was made available to them on 1 June, 1964?

Mr. Rocca. Which follows very closely after their report and we were struggling to get some of these things done, and it took time.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the Warren Commission was ever told about Alverado making the allegation that he had been offered money?

Mr. Rocca. I cannot say that at all. I have no recollection of it.

Mr. Goldsmith. If he had --

Mr. Rocca. I read it for the first time in that statement that you gave me.

Mr. Goldsmith. And the Warren Commission makes no reference to that.

Mr. Rocca. Well, the reference is enigmatic, as I see it. It could refer to a lot of aspects that might not be directly relevant to what was going on.

Mr. Goldsmith. Certainly.

Nevertheless, had the information been given to the Warren Commission -- I am not saying one way or another whether or not it was -- but had it been given to the

Commission, it is conceivable that the Commission would have wanted to examine that point further.

Are you familiar with the allegations that were made by a Mexican citizen named Gutierrez?

Mr. Rocca. You would have to tell me more about Gutierrez, because I don't recognize it from that name, though it may again be one of the things that I took up.

Mr. Goldsmith. Gutierrez was the Mexican citizen who said that he saw an individual whom he later recognized to be Oswald leaving the Cuban Consulate with another individual and that the individuals were discussing something sinister. Gutierrez may have further alleged that he saw money change hands as well.

Please read number 1979, which will adequately refresh your recollection, I think, on his statement.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Oh, this is the famous "observed in mid morning."

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. I would simply have to restudy the whole thing. It just doesn't register with me. I mean, I would have to go over the report. I think this is another matter that they did discuss, the Gutierrez lead.

The real question that comes up in my mind there is whether this might not have been done more or less in

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the FBI line. It certainly doesn't ring any bell to me.

Mr. Goldsmith. Essentially, to refresh your memory, Gutierrez alleged that he saw Oswald and someone else leaving the Cuban Consulate, that the individuals got off in a car, took off in a car. He overheard a conversation that was, at least to him, sinister in nature and made an allegation that a payoff was supposed to have occurred, possibly in that car.

Does that --

Mr. Rocca. This is something that, as I say, I have no recollection of, and my feeling is that the Bureau did whatever was followed up.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why would the Bureau have investigated this matter as opposed to the CIA?

Mr. Rocca. Their jurisdictional authorities, I mean, were de facto in Mexico and they ran over everything.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Bureau investigate Alverado?

There, it seems, that the Agency was responsible for resolving that issue.

Mr. Rocca. That might have been some kind of local, private treaty. But de Paz, for example, they did the initial work and discredited her as a source. It was we, that is, Win and the Embassy man, who continued the interest in it, with the Bureau's knowledge.

But my feeling is that they would not have accepted our investigation in a matter of that kind. They would have

1 gone over it themselves, and they did. They spent hundreds  
2 and hundreds of hours just going around Mexico City checking  
3 up on Oswald.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. So, your impression, then, is that  
5 the Bureau, rather than the Agency, investigated this issue?

6 Mr. Rocca. Could have. I mean, I'm trying to explain  
7 why I don't remember anything about it. That certainly  
8 doesn't strike a bell.

9 Now, it may strike a bell with [ ] or somebody  
10 else that actually was vested with this area.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Agency ever attempt to  
12 determine whether it had obtained a photograph of Gutierrez  
13 outside the Cuban Consulate or Embassy?

14 Mr. Rocca. I cannot respond to that.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Gutierrez was  
16 ever polygraphed?

17 Mr. Rocca. No, I do not.

18 You see, I draw a complete blank on this one.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

20 If you don't remember, I'm not going to press you  
21 on it, Mr. Rocca. We are certainly not here to attempt  
22 to simply create testimony. So, if you don't remember, I am  
23 just going to withdraw.

24 Mr. Rocca. Well, you will find people who will  
25 remember, I am sure.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Please refer to CIA number 2020, and read that document.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. I know of no followup or anything of that kind, as a matter of fact.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you identify the document for the record.

Mr. Rocca. It is a cable to the intelligence, the counter intelligence community -- White House, Department of State, and the FBI from the Agency on Oswald on the 26th of November, stipulating or setting forth information from Mexico regarding an alleged relationship between Oswald and Arnesto Rodriguez, who lives in New Orleans -- Arnesto Rodriguez -- and runs a Spanish language school, and is anti-Castro.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does the cable also make reference to a tape recording?

Mr. Rocca. According to Maria Rodriguez de Lopez, her son-in-law has a taped conversation with Oswald.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether this allegation, either of Oswald's connection with Arnesto Rodriguez or the fact of a possible tape recording was ever investigated by the Agency?

Mr. Rocca. No -- and it would not have been.

Mr. Goldsmith. The reason for that would have been

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what, sir?

Mr. Rocca. This is strictly within the investigativ  
responsibilities of the Bureau.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the Bureau  
ever pursued this lead?

Mr. Rocca. I do not.

This is not a matter -- in other words, this cable,  
in its entirety, is not anything regarding which I have any  
background information. I don't know, therefore, whether  
this was investigated.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Mr. Rocca. I assume, however, that it was.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now earlier, Mr. Rocca, you made  
reference to an allegation by a woman named Elena Garro de  
Paz.

Mr. Rocca. That's correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you state generally for the  
record what that allegation was.

Mr. Rocca. Well, again, I would prefer to answer  
the question having the benefit of a re-reading of the  
summary that I gave for Mr. Belin. But not having it at  
this moment, it was she who came in around Christmas Day,  
not Alverado.

Mr. Goldsmith. Right. Alverado came in shortly  
after the assassination.

1 Mr. Rocca. So, I correct that part. It was she.

2 She had become involved -- she is a highly  
3 controversial right wing personality, (a poet), and had  
4 become involved in a situation with the secretary or the  
5 receptionist at the Cuban Embassy.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Silvia Duran?

7 Mr. Rocca. Silvia Duran -- was a relative.  
8 They were hostile to each other. There was a long,  
9 apparently, background to that effect.

10 But she came in with a story which concerned  
11 essentially the passage of money by a red-headed Negro at  
12 the Cuban Embassy. But I cannot recall what her evidential--  
13 what the crux of her evidence was in this.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether she was referring  
15 to having seen this red-headed Negro at the Cuban Embassy  
16 or rather at a party that was being thrown by Horatio  
17 Duran?

18 Mr. Rocca. You're quite right. It was at a party.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether this allegation  
20 was ever investigated by the CIA?

21 Mr. Rocca. My feeling is from just reading the  
22 record -- and this came after, when I was working on the  
23 thing, reading the file in connection with Mr. Belin's  
24 request -- that Mr. Scott pursued it very thoroughly.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Incidentally, you indicated that



Mrs. de Paz went to the Embassy around Christmas Day.

Do you recall what year that was?

Mr. Rocca. Oh, yes.

It was the end of '63, early '64. And, if it wasn't Christmas Day, it was New Year's Day or the weekend, because there was -- her story was that her life was in danger. She had reported her information to the Minister of Interior or to the Gobernacion. They had put her up in a hotel. I mean, there was an entire scenario which she read. There were very few probative and evidential details to sustain her story.

According to the record, as I remember it, the FBI representative regarded it as simply not so.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether she was given a polygraph?

Mr. Rocca. No, I don't think she ever -- I remember nothing in the record that shows that she was polygraphed.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why she was not polygraphed whereas Alverado was polygraphed?

Mr. Rocca. Was she?

Mr. Goldsmith. I'll rephrase the question.

Do you know why she would not have been polygraphed when someone such as Alverado was polygraphed?

Mr. Rocca. No, I can't answer that.

I think that probably it was because of the -- I

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certain couldn't -- I certainly can't answer for the people who were making the operational decisions on the spot. I can guess that her story was simply not believed or there was sufficient disbelief not to warrant that extent of imposition on her personality.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you certain that Elena Garro de Paz went into the embassy in December of 1963 or January of 1964?

Mr. Rocca. No, I'm not. I mean, I'm guessing entirely.

Could it have been a year later?

Ah.

Of course. It was the next year that she walked in. It was the end of '64 or the beginning of '65. I recall now that this gives the link, because the Warren Commission had already issued its report which had mentioned the red-headed Negro and the lead, and therefore in reading her story, there always occurred the virus that she had simply taken advantage of an evidential detail which was already in the public domain.

This is now my recollection.

This is after the Warren Commission had completed its work.

Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, according to CIA number 1957, which is part of the lengthy memo that you

prepared for Mr. Belin, you indicate that the first reference to Elena Garro de Paz, or the first time she formally made an allegation on the record, was on 12 October, 1964.

Mr. Rocca. And the Warren Commission came out on the first of October.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you please read through CIA number 1957 through 1959, those three pages.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Yes, indeed. This was my writeup of the case, retrospectively, as one of those elements that had happened after the Warren Commission had looked after this, that suggested the possibility of Cuban involvement or that something further could be and should be done about the Cuban aspect, should be undertaken.

Mr. Goldsmith. That document makes reference to an individual named Carvillo, who allegedly detained Elena Garro de Paz at the Vermont Hotel in Mexico.

Do you know whether Carvillo ever had any connection with the CIA?

Mr. Rocca. No, I do not.

Mr. Goldsmith. What about June Cobb? Do you know whether she ever had any connection with the CIA?

Mr. Rocca. I do not.

She is a -- I thought you were going to say DGI. Doesn't she come in in some kind of --

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether she ever had any connection with DGI?

Mr. Rocca. This is what has been alleged in the record, but I can't accept that as evidence.

As far as I know, there is no investigative substratum for that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether anyone ever approached Carvillo and asked him--

Mr. Rocca. No, I do not.

Mr. Goldsmith. -- why he detained Elena Garro de Pad

Mr. Rocca. No, I do not.

Certainly that part of it entered into the period of '63, if she was telling the truth. Of course, we don't know whether she is telling the truth because she told her story for the first time, as far as the record is concerned, in '64, at the end of the year.

For that reason I inserted this into the record of episodes that struck me as being at least interesting from the standpoint of re-reviewing the file, from the Cuban point of view.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please refer to CIA number 2055.

Mr. Rocca. Where would that be? Are we using this number (indicating)?

Oh, I see.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you review that item?

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(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you identify that document?

Mr. Rocca. This is a response by Mr. Helms to -- a memorandum by Mr. Helms to Mr. Rankin, General Counsel of the Warren Commission, regarding allegations pertaining to an intelligence training school in Minsk, U.S.S.R.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is the date of the document?

Mr. Rocca. I'm trying to find it up here. Maybe you can help me.

Mr. Goldsmith. The document appears to be undated, so we'll just have to refer to it again as CIA number 2055.

It is possibly 5 June, 1964?

Mr. Rocca. I would say that that's close enough, inasmuch as Tom Hall, again the analyst who worked on Soviet matters in R & A, prepared it.

The allegations -- what would you like me to say about this?

Mr. Goldsmith. According to that document, there was no reliable information indicating that there was a training school, an intelligence training school in Minsk, is that correct?

Mr. Rocca. That's correct, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether subsequent to the time that this document was written any information was obtained indicating that, in fact, there was a training school.



1 of an intelligence nature in Minsk?

2 Mr. Rocca. As far as -- to my knowledge, there was  
3 no such.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, I think that this might be  
5 an appropriate time to break for the day.

6 I have, I would say, no more than two hours of  
7 questions remaining.

8 I would ask you to refrain from discussing or  
9 disclosing any of the testimony that you have given today  
10 to anyone else.

11 May I have your assurance on that point?

12 Mr. Rocca. You may count on it.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you.

14 The reason I make that point is because the committee  
15 when it takes a deposition, does not have the same effective  
16 authority as it does when it conducts a hearing in Executive  
17 Session.

18 Mr. Rocca. I note that from your ground rules.

19 But you may rest assured.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

21 I didn't want you to infer from the fact that I was  
22 asking that that I consider that a risk in this particular  
23 case. That is a question or a statement that I routinely  
24 make.

25 In any event, I think that we will resume questioning





tomorrow morning at 10:00 o'clock.

Thank you for your time today.

Mr. Rocca. All right.

(Whereupon, at 5:00 o'clock, p.m., the taking of the deposition of Raymond G. Rocca recessed, to recommence on Tuesday, July 18, 1978, at 10:00 o'clock, a.m.)

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Before The

Subcommittee on the Assassination of John F. Kennedy

of the

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

**HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

CONTINUATION OF THE DEPOSITION OF RAYMOND G. ROCCA

Washington, D.C.

July 18, 1978

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## SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

Subcommittee on the Assassination of John F. Kennedy.

Washington, D. C.

Tuesday, July 18, 1978

Continuation of the Deposition of

RAYMOND G. ROCCA,

called for examination by counsel for the Subcommittee, pursuant to recess from the preceding day, in the offices of the Select Committee on Assassinations, Room 3370, House Annex Number 2, Second and D Streets, S. W., Washington, D. C., beginning at 10:20 o'clock, a.m., when were present:

For the Subcommittee:

MICHAEL GOLDSMITH, COUNSEL

CHARLES BERK, STAFF MEMBER.

- - -

(The witness, Raymond G. Rocca, having been previously sworn, was called and testified as follows:)

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, I would like to thank you for being here today.

I would like to remind you that you are still under oath.

Before we get started on the actual substance of the deposition, I would like to ask you whether you discussed the substance of yesterday's deposition with anyone?

Mr. Rocca. I did not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

I believe yesterday we finished the session with a brief discussion of whether there was an intelligence training school in the city of Minsk, and you indicated that in 1963 there was no reliable information indicating that, in fact, there was such a school in Minsk.

Do you have any other information that pertains to that point?

Mr. Rocca. I think you have summarized exactly what I said, that there was no confirmation available that there had been or was during the time that Oswald was in Minsk a training school of the service in that city.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever receive any indication subsequent to 1964 that, in fact, there was no such school in Minsk?

Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, there has never been any confirmation or indication.

Mr. Goldsmith. One way or another?

Mr. Rocca. One way or other.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Mr. Rocca. We're talking now about the KGB central headquarters, the people who would be actually responsible for the training.

Mr. Goldsmith. Right.

Mr. Rocca. I know nothing about what local schools

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1 or local provisions might be made by the White Russian --  
2 this is the White Russian -- SSR -- republic. As far as  
3 I know, they have no school training there either.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. So far as you know, the Warren  
5 Commission was given all of the information that was available  
6 on that point --

7 Mr. Rocca. Yes, indeed.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. -- and there has not been any additional  
9 information since 1964 that touches upon it?

10 Mr. Rocca. That's correct.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to another area, now, would  
12 you indicate for the record what a 201 file is?

13 Mr. Rocca. A 201 file is a jargon expression that  
14 grew up, I suppose, out of the old army system, 201 files in  
15 World War II. It was applied when our files, CIA files,  
16 were set up in 1947. I am speaking now out of hearsay.  
17 The phrase applies to files created on personalities, for  
18 dossiers on personalities. They are referred to, in other  
19 words, broadly speaking, as 201 files.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. So, a 201 file essentially is a  
21 personality file?

22 Mr. Rocca. (Nods affirmatively.)

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Does a 201 file contain information  
24 of operational significance?

25 Mr. Rocca. Yes, it can. It depends on how the

1 material has been selected and put together.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. What is the criterion for the opening  
3 of a 201 file?

4 Mr. Rocca. These are specified exactly in a handbook  
5 which is written and to which I refer you. The criteria  
6 have changed, or were changed, over the years, at the beginning  
7 to apply to individuals who were either agents or suspect  
8 agents of adversary services, all adversary services,  
9 intelligence, counter intelligence, sabotage interest,  
10 our own agents, collaborators, and others, at the determination  
11 again in terms of criteria, who fell within the mission of  
12 the Agency.

13 These categories are specified and I refer you, then,  
14 to that publication. It's at the Records Integration Center.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had occasion to open a  
16 201 file?

17 Mr. Rocca. Personally?

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

19 Mr. Rocca. No.

20 I always would indicate this and have other people  
21 do it. As far as I know, I have not ever done the process,  
22 except perhaps as a part at one point of my formal training  
23 or other. But I have no recollection of having opened a file.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. On those occasions when someone from  
25 the CI staff opened a 201 file on an individual, would the

primary purpose of such an opening be to obtain information on a person who was of potential counter intelligence significance

Mr. Rocca. It could be that.

It could be of purely passive interest. It is to serve as a repository for the accession of additional information of whatever kind, overt, covert, or whatever.

So, it does not necessarily indicate any kind of aggressive interest at all.

It simply serves as the receptacle or repository for the retention of information, and recovery of information.

Mr. Goldsmith. If an individual is perceived as a counter intelligence threat, would a 201 file normally be opened?

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

At the time that the file was opened on Mr. Oswald, which would be 1958 or 1959, my impression is that U.S. defectors were not in the list of individuals on whom files would be opened automatically by the Records Integration Division, which actually could do this and did it as a matter of formal duty.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, there are categories, categories of individuals, which automatically result in the opening of a 201 file, whereas in some cases you are saying that the opening of a file is discretionary.

Is that accurate?

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1 Mr. Rocca. It's an analyst's choice.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. But in some cases it might be  
3 mandatory, and in some cases it would be discretionary?

4 Mr. Rocca. Well, according to the handbook it would  
5 be mandatory. Whether it would be done or not would depend  
6 upon the analyst's capacity to judge whether this fell within  
7 the mandate.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Please review CIA number 796.

9 (Pause)

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had a chance to review that  
11 document?

12 Mr. Rocca. This is a State Department document.

13 Yes.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. What is the date of that document?

15 Mr. Rocca. October 31, 1959.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. That document indicates in  
17 substance, does it not, that Lee Harvey Oswald appeared at  
18 the American Embassy in Russia to renounce his American  
19 citizenship? It indicates that he had applied for Soviet  
20 citizenship. It indicates, among other things, that his  
21 attitude was arrogant, aggressive, he had recently been  
22 discharged from the Marine Corps, and it says he has offered  
23 the Soviets any information he has acquired as an enlisted  
24 radar operator.

25 Now, would the information contained in this State



1 Department telegram, which was routed to the CIA and which  
 2 we have obtained from the Office of Security at the CIA --  
 3 would the information contained in this telegram normally  
 4 lead to the opening of a 201 file?

5 Mr. Rocca. It depends on where it went in the Agency.  
 6 If it went to the Office of Security, they would have opened  
 7 their own file on it. But if a copy did not go to the DDP  
 8 at that time, the Deputy Director for Plans, there would be  
 9 no way of knowing about it.

10 So, I cannot respond.

11 But normally, that would have been actionable,  
 12 I would say retrospectively. And I have no knowledge whether  
 13 or not it ever did come into our hands at that time.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Right.

15 We will get into that momentarily.

16 Mr. Rocca. As a matter of fact, I think the substance  
 17 of this cable was reported in the newspapers.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Is there any formal communication  
 19 channel between the Office of Security and DDP which would  
 20 serve the purpose of having communications of this kind  
 21 be passed to the appropriate office for action?

22 Mr. Rocca. Not necessarily. There obviously should  
 23 be. But if the people in the Office of Security will receive  
 24 this, inasmuch as it concerns an American, and it was  
 25 presumably relevant to their interest in Americans, and possible

1 security interests from the defensive security point of view  
2 of CIA itself, they might not do it, in which case the  
3 normal liaison, which would be via a liaison officer  
4 or simply a routing slip from the chief of the Office of  
5 Security would not take place.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. More specifically, then, is there  
7 any link between the Office of Security and the CI staff  
8 which would serve the purpose of passing information of this  
9 kind to the CI staff, as it would seem that the information  
10 contained in this memo is relevant to the CI staff in  
11 particular, rather than any of the divisions within DDP?

12 Mr. Rocca. Well, you are again looking at it with  
13 20-20 hindsight. There certainly were all the channels  
14 that one could expect in an organization, as I indicated  
15 on the chart yesterday, for the passages of such a piece  
16 of material. In point of fact, State should have routed  
17 it to the DDP.

18 It is in that kind of routing and selection that you  
19 could get slippage.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. So, if I understand your testimony,  
21 it is that, in fact, there was a communication channel  
22 between Office of Security and CI staff which would serve the  
23 purpose of passing along this type of information. Whether  
24 or not the information in fact was passed along is another  
25 question. But there was a channel.

Mr. Rocca. Oh, indeed.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like you to review a document that is known as Warren Commission Exhibit 917.

I might note for the record that at the bottom of the exhibit there is an indication that the document was routed to the CIA, although there is no indication specifically which office at CIA received this document.

Warren Commission Exhibit 917, for the record, is a confidential message from the Navy to the Chief of Naval Operations.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had a chance to review that document?

Mr. Rocca. Yes, indeed.

Mr. Goldsmith. We just might note for the record that this document is somewhat briefer than the earlier one you just reviewed, the State Department cable dated 10-31-59. This one also states that Oswald was in the Marine Corps as a radar operator and has offered to furnish the Soviets information he possesses in U.S. radar.

Again, would the information contained in this type of communication normally lead to the opening of a 201 file?

Mr. Rocca. In the DDP. At that time, as I say, it was not automatic.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand. Your testimony is

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1  
2 very clear on that. It would have been something  
3 discretionary.

4 Mr. Rocca. Yes.

5 Defectors was added as a mandatory category as a  
6 consequence of this whole case.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. I might point out that --

8 Mr. Rocca. So, if I were reviewing this thing and  
9 it had come across my desk, I would certainly expect it to  
10 go to a 201 file.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

12 Mr. Rocca. But there would be other 201 files,  
13 or other files, that ought to receive it, too, including  
14 the Office of Security.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. What is CI/SIG?

16 Mr. Rocca. CI/SIG is Counter Intelligence, Spécial  
17 Investigations Group.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what the purpose of that  
19 group was in 1959 to 1960?

20 Mr. Rocca. Well, this group was set up originally  
21 when the staff was set up and before I joined it. So, are you  
22 limiting your question only to that time or to its general  
23 functions?

24 Mr. Goldsmith. My question was focusing on the period  
25 1959 to 1960.

(Pause)

1 Mr. Rocca. The point is that it was set up to handle  
2 especially sensitive cases in the area of security of personnel  
3 and in particular, cases involving security of personnel  
4 who were also of operational interest, as were operators.

5 In other words, it was an interface with the Office  
6 of Security.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. In other words, when you say  
8 security of personnel, you are referring now to CIA --

9 Mr. Rocca. DDP personnel, and Agency personnel to  
10 the extent that they might affect the DDP's interests.

11 This was the channel to the Office of Security.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. So, is it fair to say here that the  
13 purpose of the CI/SIG unit was to insure that DDP was not  
14 being penetrated by a foreign intelligence service?

15 Mr. Rocca. That, I think, would probably be one of the  
16 sensitive kinds of cases that they would be interested in.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. What other types of sensitive types  
18 of cases would they be interested in?

19 Mr. Rocca. I think they would probably have been  
20 interested in any kind of case involving security of DDP  
21 personnel, or operations like the LINGUAL operation, which  
22 was placed within its purview. That involved, in other  
23 words, sensitive work against the Soviets designed to  
24 produce information, again bearing chiefly on the security  
25 of personnel and of operations.

1  
2 Mr. Goldsmith. When would someone within the  
3 CI/SIG unit have occasion to open a 201 file?

4  
5 Mr. Rocca. I would imagine that they would have had  
6 that occasion whenever a question arose that concerned  
7 people that came within the purview of the mission that I  
8 have described, namely, the penetration of our operations  
9 or the advancement of our particular interests with respect  
10 to the security of those operations. These now become very  
11 difficult questions to answer without some thought, because  
12 I would have to think of, really, general trains of operations,  
13 and in that area I was not, of course, briefed. But I think  
14 in substance what I have said covers what I know about it.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Okay.

16 You just made a reference to --

17 Mr. Rocca. I mean, there were many sensitive areas  
18 that involved aspects, that involved sources and access to  
19 materials that were of higher classification than what you  
20 have shown me.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. You just made reference to having  
22 been briefed.

23 Would you clarify for the record what you mean by  
24 having been briefed.

25 Mr. Rocca. Did I say -- I did not say that.

Mr. Goldsmith. I think that you did, and what I  
suspect you referred to was during your time in the Agency

1 things that you may have been briefed upon.

2 Mr. Rocca. Oh, yes. I mean, I was not briefed  
3 on the entire range of their operations.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. You were not briefed by the Agency  
5 for this deposition, were you?

6 Mr. Rocca. I was not.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. You weren't briefed by anyone of the  
8 staff prior to taking the deposition?

9 Mr. Rocca. Indeed not. I have had no contacts  
10 whatsoever about this.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

12 I just wanted to clarify that.

13 (Pause)

14 Mr. Rocca. The specific purpose that lay behind  
15 the creation of this office I think grew out of the penetrations  
16 of OSS by the Soviets.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Okay.

18 Getting back to the concept of a 201 file, will a  
19 201 file always indicate whether the individual involved  
20 had a relationship of some kind with the Agency, either as  
21 an agent, a source, a contract employee, whatever? By looking  
22 at a 201 file, will you always know whether, in fact, the  
23 person had a relationship with the Agency?

24 Mr. Rocca. One of the categories for opening a file,  
25 for opening a 201 file, was the contractual or fiduciary

1 relationship, and if that was the case, if the file had  
2 been opened in that instance, it would either be manifest in  
3 the file or there would be an indication in it directing  
4 whoever had the file to go to whatever place had the  
5 responsibility for the fiduciary relationship.

6 Now, as I stated, this is only one category in the  
7 list of criteria for the opening of files, and as far as I  
8 know, the 201 file that was opened on Oswald was opened by  
9 Mrs. Edgerter pursuant not to that, but to the potential  
10 interest that she, as an analyst, felt lodged in the fact  
11 that he had been a defector and it figured on that list.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. I think that you are anticipating  
13 my questions, and we will get to the Oswald 201 file in  
14 particular momentarily.

15 Let's get back to the question that I asked a moment  
16 ago.

17 Will the 201 file always indicate the fact of a  
18 relationship with the CIA, if there was such a relationship?

19 Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, it would.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. So, if someone were an agent, source,  
21 or --

22 Mr. Rocca. The whole purpose of the file, and the  
23 opening of that file, would be to prevent others from recruiting  
24 the same agent, from making use of the same agent, for  
25 other agencies who perhaps had been in contact to do that,

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1 and therefore it would have to appear in some way or other  
2 on the face of the file.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Then the next step in the analysis  
4 is the following one.

5 From the absence of any indication in the file,  
6 in the 201 file, that someone had a relationship with the  
7 Agency, either as an asset, agent, source, contract employee,  
8 whatever -- from the absence of such an indication, can one  
9 safely infer that, in fact, there was no such relationship?

10 Mr. Rocca. I would say so, yes.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Are documents ever removed from  
12 201 files?

13 Mr. Rocca. They should not be removed from the  
14 files. That was, of course, part of the standard order of  
15 procedure.

16 The fact is, however, the file itself passed through  
17 many hands in the course of dealing with it, and it would be  
18 technically possible to do so.

19 I cannot deny this. I mean, this is something that  
20 exists on the face, as I see it.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. So, in theory, no documents should be  
22 removed from a 201 file, but it is possible to remove  
23 documents from a 201 file?

24 Mr. Rocca. Well, it could have been -- it could have  
25 been done.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. When someone removes a document from  
2 a 201 file, is it required to indicate on the file that a  
3 document has been removed?

4 Mr. Rocca. Well, of course -- and the purpose, and  
5 it would have to be signed for.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

7 Mr. Rocca. Now this is the advantage of using the  
8 machine.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Which machine are you referring to,  
10 sir?

11 Mr. Rocca. The computer.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. What purpose does the computer  
13 serve?

14 Mr. Rocca. The computer serves to give a permanent  
15 record to a title, and the removal of that title cannot take  
16 place without creating a record, and therefore it is always  
17 traceable. This represented, therefore, as these questions  
18 were being discussed during the '50's, the answer to either  
19 arbitrary or inadvertent removal. At least it always seemed  
20 to be that way and a lot of other people agreed.

21 (Pause)

22 Mr. Rocca. Let me say, in addition, on that point  
23 that the system employed, as I recall it, a numbering device  
24 which worked from the first paper, which was number one, up,  
25 so that any paper that had been removed lower than the top

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paper would, unless it had been replaced by another, or if the entire numbering system had not been altered, have appeared immediately as absent. This was the device for internal control that functioned during the first years of the system.

Mr. Goldsmith. Normally, in a 201 file, are the documents filed chronologically? By that, I mean the earliest document, the first document to go into the file, which might be the field personality file request form that led to the opening of the file, that would be the first document, and then the next document in time would go immediately on top of it, and so on, so that effectively documents are in the file in the same sequence in which they were made available to the file.

Mr. Rocca. But the 201 would not be the repository for a personal history questionnaire and that kind of thing; that is, the key documents in establishing a fiduciary relationship would not be in the 201. They would be in a separate file held by the desk and whoever was handling the individual.

Mr. Goldsmith. That's a separate question.

Aside from that, however, would the documents normally go into the file in chronological order?

Mr. Rocca. Let me assure you, Mr. Goldsmith, that there are people who are far better informed on this topic than I am, and therefore whatever I say should be taken cum

grano sale, as they say, with a grain of salt.

Mr. Goldsmith. Normally in a 201 file, will the documents be filed sequentially?

Mr. Rocca. And I want that to be very well understood. The whole matter of records, in other words, is a matter for which people are paid very high salaries, and they have been in charge in this area from the very beginning. But changes and modifications to the system have taken place. But I would defer to their statements with respect to a number of the questions that you have asked.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had occasion to review any 201 files?

Mr. Rocca. Yes, I've read many, many of them.

Mr. Goldsmith. Hundreds of them?

Mr. Rocca. Not hundreds, I would say. I can't -- a figure like that -- but I have read many of them.

Mr. Goldsmith. To the best of your recollection, did the files that you read contain their documents in the chronological order in which the documents arrived? In other words, I am asking you to respond to the question that I raised earlier.

As a matter of routine, are the documents filed in the 201 file in sequential or chronological order, so that the earliest document would be on the bottom and the last document would be on top?

1 Mr. Rocca. Normally. Normally that would be the case.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Now you mentioned the PRQ's, the  
3 personal record questionnaires. You indicated that they  
4 would not be in the 201 file.

5 Where, to your knowledge, would they be located?

6 Mr. Rocca. They would be located in particular files  
7 held by the desk responsible for the agent.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Would they be located in an operations  
9 or projects file?

10 Mr. Rocca. I think that probably is the correct  
11 term, yes.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. Please examine CIA number 788, which  
13 is the field personality file request form that was used in  
14 the case of Mr. Oswald.

15 I think you had occasion to review that yesterday.

16 (Pause)

17 Mr. Rocca. I see nothing different here from what  
18 I saw yesterday.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

20 I hope that you don't see anything different from what  
21 you saw yesterday since it's been in the safe all evening.

22 According to that document, when was a 201 file opened  
23 for Lee Oswald?

24 Mr. Rocca. Nine December, 1960, is the date for  
25 the request.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Is there anything unusual about the Oswald 201 file being opened over a year after the Agency was initially informed of Oswald's defection and the fact that he was alleged to have offered information to the Soviets?

Mr. Rocca. I find that not unusual in view of the flow of work and the pressure of work. I couldn't explain that gap in terms of anything, except just the normal flow of business, in view of what I know about the opening of it.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, you think the normal flow of business might account for a delay of over a year?

Mr. Rocca. Well, it depends on what was the date of the material that we got from State.

Mr. Goldsmith. Rather than reviewing all that now, I will just indicate that the material from State started to arrive in late October or early November of 1960.

Mr. Rocca. So, the flow is correct, I would say, in terms of what was going on. There was an obvious interest in this kind of material.

Mrs. Edgerter exercised an analyst's choice in opening the file.

I think there is nothing in the time lapse that would indicate anything, except the flow of work.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now Mrs. Edgerter was a member of the CI/SIG unit, is that correct?

1 Mr. Rocca. Yes, indeed.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Is it unusual for the CI/SIG unit,  
3 which was involved in very sensitive operations -- not  
4 operations, investigations pertaining to possible penetrations  
5 of DDP personnel -- was it unusual for this unit to open a  
6 201 file on someone like Oswald?

7 I guess the gist of my question is I don't see how  
8 Oswald is relevant to the primary purpose of CI/SIG.

9 Mr. Rocca. Well, I would disagree with that.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Please explain.

11 Mr. Rocca. I would consider this to be fully within  
12 the competence of this unit, especially in view of the large  
13 number of defectors that had accumulated by this time.  
14 There were others, Americans, in many instances, people  
15 that, it is my recollection, we regarded as more serious,  
16 potentially, losses. I can remember one who had the  
17 specifications of a nozzle that prepared plastic in a  
18 particular fashion. There was press stuff in the interim,  
19 two clippings that had come out. Patricia Blake had  
20 written her articles.

21 In other words, there was an accumulation of material  
22 which concerned Americans, and a gathering interest at that  
23 time, 1959 and 1960, in the KGB, ultimately confirmed by  
24 Golitzin, as I reported yesterday, that no defector from the  
25 American armed forces -- and that list that we had from



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State consisted of at least two or three other military defectors from West Germany, and I would have considered it a dereliction not to have opened a 201 file.

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, I certainly agree that a 201 should have been opened at that time, and it would also seem that the appropriate unit within the Agency to open the file would have been the CI staff.

My question is more narrowly focused in why would CI/SIG in particular have been opening the file.

Mr. Rocca. Because of their concern, basically, with the problem of Americans and they were the recipient of the materials, probably from the Office of Security, if not the actual copy of that material, certainly the chit chat. Bruce Solie was -- B-R-U-C-E S-O-L-I-E -- constantly in touch with Mr. O'Neill and with Mrs. Edgerter, I am sure.

Mr. Goldsmith. But from the face of it, it does not appear that Oswald posed any sort of a counter intelligence threat in terms of the penetration of DDP personnel.

Mr. Rocca. Of the U.S. security interest. At a very high level, though, he did, involving other departments and agencies of the government.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand, and I am not suggesting that a file should not have been opened by the CI staff. I am just trying to determine why CI/SIG in particular, which was concerned about DDP penetrations, would have been opening



the file.

Mr. Rocca. Let me go back and open a little parenthesis about this. What I regard now, in the light of what you said, is probably a too narrow view of what SIG was interested in.

They were also concerned with Americans as a security threat in a community wide sense, and they dealt with FBI cases, with the Office of Security cases, and with other cases on the same level, as they dealt with our own, basically.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, how would the function of CI/SIG --

Mr. Rocca. At least, that's as I would represent it. But again, Mr. O'Neill would be the person to judge exactly and I would defer to him.

Mr. Goldsmith. How would the function of CI/SIG in that case be different from in the Office of Security, in general?

Mr. Rocca. It would be with respect to where and what had happened to DDP materials with respect to a defection in any of these places.

Mr. Goldsmith. Again, though, Oswald had nothing to do with DDP at this time, at least apparently.

Mr. Rocca. I'm not saying that. You said it.

Let me take the Dunlap case.

Mr. Goldsmith. I'm not familiar with that case.

Mr. Rocca. If we can get off of this, because I

1 don't want any misinterpretation.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Neither do I.

3 Mr. Rocca. This is an NSA case. A defector, a  
4 Soviet agent, has committed suicide and subsequently it was  
5 determined that by finding the materials in his house he had  
6 actually stashed away a large number of reports coming  
7 from the DDP, and indeed coming from Soviet defectors that  
8 had provided the material.

9 That case, and the handling of the relations with  
10 NSA on Dunlap, was a matter handled by SIG and by Ops jointly.  
11 They worked together on that. It illustrates, therefore,  
12 in another area the community wide aspect to security and  
13 security problems, on the assumption that against the KGB  
14 you've got to work together in cases involving security  
15 and penetration or you are going to be had separately.

16 This concept is, I think, very definitely an  
17 authorization for the opening by SIG of the file in these  
18 circumstances. And indeed, I would say that to test it, one  
19 should look at whether or not files were opened on the  
20 other names in the State Department list.

21 If you find that that is the case -- and it is my  
22 belief that that is the case, although I have no way of  
23 proving it because it has never actually ever been put to the  
24 point where it was necessary to do this as a test -- I think  
25 that the question you are getting at is answered.

It is a formal part of their responsibility.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Turning to CIA number 788, again, I would like to direct your attention to the box that is labeled "other identification." In that box there is a number one, next to which someone wrote in the letters "AG."

Do you know what those letters would stand for?

Mr. Rocca. I do not.

Mr. Goldsmith. At the bottom of the page, at the bottom of this document, it indicates that Oswald's file is a restricted file.

Do you know why the file would have been restricted?

Mr. Rocca. My impression would be that this would have been restricted in order to assure knowledge in SIG in this as one of a category of files involving American defectors, that they would want to know about in the event that anyone else developed information or expressed an interest of any kind.

For example, the Lee Harvey Oswald file was restricted when it was taken over by R & A, when it was given to me.

Mr. Goldsmith. So that, if anyone --

Mr. Rocca. So that, if anyone came in and checked that file --

Mr. Goldsmith. You would know about it.

Mr. Rocca. -- I would know immediately who he was.

I would be asked, "Can this person look at the file, " and obviously I would permit that.

So, in other words, it is a subsidiary form of control which permits some kind of internal order in the processing of the material.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you please examine CIA number 943, which is a Xerox copy of three file cards. Please confine your attention simply to the top two file cards, both of which pertain to Lee Harvey Oswald.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had a chance to review this document?

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Turning your attention to the top card, which as I indicated refers to Lee Harvey Oswald, in the upper right hand corner of that card there is an indication which says "CI Project/RE, 9 November, 1959."

Do you know what "CI Project/RE" refers to?

Mr. Rocca. The CI Project refers to -- I don't know what the RE is at this point, but I may figure it out by the time I finish talking, answering the first part of the question -- CI Project is simply a name of convenience which was used to describe the HTLINGUAL or HDLINGUAL, or whatever it was. But the RE may be a name or initials of

people. I can't associate that.

This is the first time I have seen these cards, as far as I know.

Mr. Goldsmith. But the term "CI Project" to the best of your knowledge refers to the HDLINGUAL program?

Mr. Rocca. To the mail intercept program, and that was the convenient form, that was the phrase that Mr. O'Neill used when he talked about it.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, this suggests that Oswald may have been the subject of this mail intercept program or one of the subjects.

Mr. Rocca. It suggests that there was something in it that was actually accessioned, or that they were given this as a warning to be on the alert for it in their screening of the materials. I cannot determine that from this. In other words, it may have been a watch list card that flowed naturally out of the opening.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Ah -- RE means [ ]

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you spell that for the record.

Mr. Rocca. This is my guess, now, as I say.

[ ]  
And he was a translator on the project.

Mr. Goldsmith. So that suggests that there was a mail

1 intercept that --

2 Mr. Rocca. No. It suggests only that there was a  
3 warning that there should be an alert for it.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. To him?

5 Mr. Rocca. Well, to whomever was using  
6 that watch list because it would be used by people surveying  
7 the materials.

8 You can readily answer your own question by just  
9 going through the materials and spotting them, as far as  
10 the contents are concerned.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. I would like you to review a document  
12 marked CIA number 2035. This is a document dated 20 February,  
13 1964, and it's a memo to you, Chief of the CI/R & A unit.

14 (Pause)

15 Mr. Rocca. Who gave it to me?

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had a chance to read this  
17 document?

18 Mr. Rocca. Yes, yes.

19 The machine's listing of documents officially  
20 recorded as being -- was requested and is attached. The  
21 actual -- of this type was begun in '63. A few items of  
22 previous dates were also recorded. A comparison of the  
23 documents physically available and the 201 file, and those  
24 reports as being as shown -- 37 documents that should be  
25 in the 201 file are not available. This total is made up

of two dispatches, seven memorandum from the FBI, one CSCI, two State Department documents, and 25 cables."

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you remember receiving this memorandum?

Mr. Rocca. No. But it's not of any particular import. These materials had been simply displaced for separate handling on the 201, and I judge that this was something that Mr. Hartman prepared or had prepared for me, which I handled through him.

Mr. Goldsmith. The memo doesn't have a signature attached to it.

Mr. Rocca. Well, it has to be written by someone who knows, who has access to the material. He and the RID people are those ones.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it customary for those memos not to contain signatures of the authors of the memos?

Mr. Rocca. It depends on how rapidly they are written. This I think is his signature, is his writing (indicating.)

Mr. Goldsmith. By that you are referring to the script notation?

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now why do you say that this is of no particular import?

Mr. Rocca. Because we know that there are two dispatches. We know that there are seven memoranda which

1 were being probably read by Mr. Dooley and therefore were not  
2 in the file. We know that there is a CSCI and therefore  
3 all of these are accountable pieces of paper. In other  
4 words, they haven't disappeared. The 25 cables were probably  
5 in the materials that went back to the GP Floor period.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Well, how do we know, in fact, that  
7 the materials have not disappeared?

8 Mr. Rocca. Well, I would say that we know that by  
9 simply going back and looking at the file at the present time,  
10 to begin with. This was not, in other words, an attempt to  
11 trace materials that had disappeared from the file.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. Now this document makes reference to  
13 an attachment of the missing --

14 Mr. Rocca. It says that they should be in the 201  
15 but they are not in it. But that doesn't mean that they are  
16 not present.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. The document makes reference to an  
18 attachment which contains a list, a more detailed list, of the  
19 specific documents that are not in the file. The committee  
20 staff has been unable to locate that attachment in the Oswald  
21 201 file.

22 What would be the best way to determine whether, in  
23 fact, the documents that were unavailable on this date had,  
24 in fact, been returned to the file?

25 Mr. Rocca. Ask Mr. Hartman to do it and he will



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give you the answer to it. I obviously asked for this, and as I say, my recollection is I would have asked him for it pursuant to an attempt to get a grasp over exactly what should have been -- what should be in the file when we machined it.

Mr. Goldsmith. If the document is of no particular import at all, why is it marked "Secret, Eyes Only?"

Mr. Rocca. Everything is marked "Secret, Eyes Only."

Mr. Goldsmith. When you say "everything," you --

Mr. Rocca. This is an occupational disease. So that does not give me great trauma.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you suggesting that the documents in the Oswald file commonly contain the sensitivity indicator known as "Secret, Eyes Only?"

Mr. Rocca. Well, most of them do, I would say. Or, a good number of them do. I think the point is academic. I mean, the classification was one applied by a secretary, whoever typed the memo.

In other words, these papers are not -- this is not a list of papers that have been removed from the file permanently. And, I don't recall the circumstances under which at this time this request was made. But I think the person who worked on it is a person who probably could shed some light on it.

Mr. Goldsmith. I should indicate for the record that the staff's review of the Oswald file has uncovered extremely



1 few documents with the specific notation "Secrety, Eyes Only,"  
2 which is one of the reasons that we focused on this particular  
3 memo, as it suggests that there are materials that are not  
4 in the file, which should be, and particularly because the  
5 attachment referred to is not available in the file itself.

6 (Pause)

7 Mr. Rocca. Where do you find the reference to the  
8 attachment? This is what I can't find.

9 "It is attached," is that it?

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, in the first sentence.

11 (Pause)

12 Mr. Rocca. Well, as I have stated, I have no  
13 recollection of the episode. My best recollection on the  
14 basis of the handling of the time was that this was an  
15 effort to make sure that we had everything together. We  
16 requested this kind of review. This answer came back. I  
17 have no way of explaining why it was "Secret, Eyes Only."  
18 I don't regard it necessarily as of any great significance,  
19 per se. The person who did it would have to explain it.

20 But I am certain that the next step that I would take  
21 would have been to say to get these items into the file.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Of course, we don't know which items  
23 specifically they are.

24 Mr. Rocca. Well, I mean -- two dispatches, seven  
25 memoranda from the FBI, one CSCI -- I mean, the file at this

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stage, this is February, 1964, the machine file was in the process of being accumulated. The file itself was in use. We were right at the beginning, in other words, of assembling the machine record which eventually we would show and did show to the Warren Commission later on that year. In other words, I would characterize this document as an interim summary, a status report, on the attempt to create the final mechanized record of the file. I in no way would attribute to this language the fact that these actual materials were missing.

Mr. Goldsmith. You have indicated that the handwriting in the lower lefthand corner of the page is Mr. Hartman's.

Mr. Rocca. That would be my guess.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you read for the record what that script writing indicates.

Mr. Rocca. "Please keep loosely in the last volume of Oswald's 201" and it's scratched out. It is X'd out. I don't know what this is (indicating.)

Mr. Goldsmith. I can't make that handwriting out either.

Mr. Rocca. Well, if it isn't Mr. Hartman's handwriting he could help identify it. That's the point.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would there be any reason to keep this document in the last volume of Oswald's 201?

Mr. Rocca. Well, the last file means it is the last

1 one that's been opened, I mean, in the serial performance,  
 2 in a looseleaf sense. In other words, it would be the most  
 3 recent one.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Okay.

5 Mr. Rocca. Last in the sense of the most recent one.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Please refer to CIA number 2075, which  
 7 is the second page of a memorandum to the Director of the FBI  
 8 dated 30 January, 1964. The subject matter is Jack Ruby.

9 My question is a very narrow one.

10 This page contains some cross references indicating  
 11 which files received a copy of this memorandum, and among  
 12 other listings it indicates that a copy went into a file that  
 13 is referred to as a dummy file. This parenthetically indicates  
 14 dummy -- "CI/R&A(Dummy)".

15 What is a dummy file?

16 Mr. Rocca. Whoever wrote this kept dummy files,  
 17 which would be a file for his own purposes of what he had  
 18 sent to us.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Is a dummy file then simply a soft  
 20 file?

21 Mr. Rocca. A soft file or whatever you want to call  
 22 it. It would be eventually destroyed, I suppose.

23 It would be for his reference in checking off what  
 24 had been sent.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Okay.

1 Mr. Rocca. That would be my best guess under the  
2 circumstance.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have any basis today for thinking  
4 that Oswald may have been an agent of the KGB?

5 Mr. Rocca. I would have to say what I stated  
6 yesterday, that there is no credible evidence at this moment,  
7 at this time, on the basis of the records that we have that  
8 he was a KGB agent in the United States.

9 If you are asking me as a counter intelligence specialist  
10 generally what my feelings are on balance regarding his  
11 relationship to the KGB, I would answer that there is no questi  
12 that he was debriefed in detail by at least two eschelons of  
13 Soviet authorities, one of which, if not both of which, were  
14 KGB, and if there are indeed two, one was the Thirteenth  
15 Department. I am relying now on defector information for  
16 that judgment.

17 He himself in his statement, which you have reminded  
18 me of, indicated that he felt free to give that information.  
19 I think it is now ascertained beyond reasonable doubt that he  
20 knew from direct observation enough about U-2 to give that  
21 as a most significant item of information to the Soviets, and  
22 that he himself, as he said, felt free to give radar informatio  
23 So, placing together the contact at the camp in California,  
24 the Marine Camp, going back to the Delgado testimony, the  
25 rapidity of his release from the Marine Corps, presumably on

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compassionate reasons which turned out to be a trip to the Soviet Union and all the rest, I would say there is no question therefore, about the debriefing and his cooperation.

Mr. Goldsmith. What would the other eschelon have been that debriefed Oswald?

Mr. Rocca. It would have been one of the screening units connected with the journalistic apparatus or foreigner apparatus of the fourth -- of the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate group of the Internal Group which, however, defers on matters of military specialties-- I understood this from a defector; I think this is sustained by others -- to the Special Department.

So, there is no question in my mind that he was, therefore, in their hands.

At that point, it becomes purely speculative, except that there is much more circumstantial evidence involved in his handling and treatment in the U.S.S.R. that can be more pertinently commented to, and was in part pertinently commented to, in the memoranda submitted to the Warren Commission, but can be I think more fully and pertinently commented to by the defectors available today, which show highly specialized and favorable treatment.

There is also the fact -- and this is just pure -- are we on the record?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

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Mr. Rocca. This is just pure counter intelligence lab work, and as I say, it's absolutely impossible to talk about these things in public, but Minktenbaugh, a confessed Soviet spy -- M-I-N-K-T-E-N-B-A-U-G-H -- another who went to the Soviet Union in 1959 and 1960 -- he was connected with Johnson, the Sergeant Johnson case -- was assessed, trained, and returned to the United States on a separate mission. He had made his contact in Berlin, as had Johnson.

The interesting thing is that they presented him to a woman who was to come to the United States with him as a wife, under the guise of a wife. He is a homo, and so the thing did not work, though they tried. But the M-O, if you put the Marine business together, is close to exactness on the methodology, that is, the setting up of a couple, but the timing is what is interesting -- 1960.

These are just things that keep you thinking in the middle of the night. Was the case officer who handled Minktenbaugh and who we know by his own confession and polygraph now he is out and serving time and he has, as I judge, told his story completely -- was he part of the same -- here, Minktenbaugh is an Army defector, or Air Force, whatever. Think about the problem of recruitment in a gross sense that the Soviets would have. Note these associations in time and space.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission told about

this defector, Minktenbaugh?

Mr. Rocca. This has all been developed since then.

Mr. Goldsmith. When did the Minktenbaugh case break?

Mr. Rocca. Oh, it broke after 1964 - 1965.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the woman companion to Minktenbaugh was a witting collaborator to the plot?

Mr. Rocca. Oh, she was, indeed.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Now I trust you understand that I am not stressing this. I am simply stating it as a fact on the table in a laboratory sense, which counter intelligence people are supposed to be dealing with. It is not for publication.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you familiar with the allegation that Lee Harvey Oswald was a CIA agent?

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. When did this allegation first arise?

Mr. Rocca. It came out almost immediately. It was in the press immediately, as I recall.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the allegation ever brought to your personal attention?

Mr. Rocca. No, not for any action.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were you ever directed to conduct an investigation into this?

Mr. Rocca. No.

I certainly sent Mr. Hartman around to ask people

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1  
2 whether there were any traces in all of the files of the agenci  
3 to which we had access to ascertain whether there was ever any  
4 contact with this man.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Why did you do that?

6 Mr. Rocca. Because it disturbs me greatly that the  
7 thing could even be suggested.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. And when did you send Mr. Hartman  
9 around to conduct this?

10 Mr. Rocca. Oh, it was in that period and later.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. What was the result of Mr. Hartman's  
12 investigation?

13 Mr. Rocca. There was no indication that was ever  
14 produced that Lee Harvey Oswald was ever in any kind of  
15 fiduciary relationship.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall what Mr. Hartman's  
17 investigation entailed?

18 Mr. Rocca. No, I don't.

19 I mean, he went around simply asking people in the  
20 various desks, in the various components, in the Contacts  
21 Branch.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Did he submit to you in 1963 or 1964  
23 the results of his investigation?

24 Mr. Rocca. I cannot recall that.

25 He certainly did verbally, which was that there was no  
substance to the claim.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think that the issue is sufficiently important to have warranted a written report to you in 1963 or 1964?

Mr. Rocca. Well, if there was no substance to it, I think not.

We were not investigating this. I mean, this was a matter actually of pertinence to the Office of Security, to the Director, to Mr. Helms, and the others, and if there were to be a formal investigation, I would have said they would have done it.

Certainly in the staff meetings this question was raised at the highest level -- has this man ever been in touch? So, this was not one of the, in other words, one of the questions that I was given formally to work on. It was a matter of personal interest.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether Mr. Helms ever asked you to examine this question?

Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, he never asked me, no. Nor did Mr. Angleton.

That is the best of my recollection at this moment.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please review CIA number 201 through 208.

This is a memorandum for the Chief of the CI staff dated 18 September, 1975, subject matter is the allegations of Lee Harvey Oswald's connection with the Agency.

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Mr. Rocca. 1975?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Rocca. Your question referred to the earlier period.

Mr. Goldsmith. I know.

Now, in 1975, you were no longer Chief of the CI staff, were you?

Mr. Rocca. I never was the Chief of the CI staff.

Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you.

I stand corrected.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Hah -- he did remember it.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Well, I find this -- I'm glad it exists. It bears out my recollection.

Mr. Goldsmith. Okay.

Mr. Rocca. But bear in mind that this was something that I did out of absolute deep, deep personal animus. Well, that's the wrong word -- that is, the suggestion that to me I still find greatly offensive. This is the last man in the world who could have ever been -- who would have ever met our criteria for recruitment.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you be more specific in the reason for that?

Mr. Rocca. Well, I mean, his whole background, his

1 psychiatric record, his conduct -- this is now on the basis  
2 of what we learn from the record, and it just seemed to me  
3 just so incongruous and vicious that -- I lose my temper,  
4 I'm sorry.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Are most of the agents that work with  
6 CIA case officers necessarily stable individuals?

7 For example --

8 Mr. Rocca. There are some very definite rules  
9 governing the psychological stability of agents, and these  
10 rules break down into about, among others -- one is their  
11 background record in terms of family and associations;  
12 second, their innate qualifications on testing; third, whether  
13 they have told you everything about themselves, whether you  
14 know everything about them; and finally, whether they are  
15 psychologically stable.

16 So, you have a whole series of qualifications that he  
17 would fail.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. The criteria that you are referring to  
19 now which pertained to whether someone would meet the Agency's  
20 requisite for serving with the Agency as an agent, are these  
21 criteria formally adopted in any Agency regulations or  
22 documents of some kind?

23 Mr. Rocca. They're in a handbook.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. And was the handbook in existence in  
25 1959?

1 Mr. Rocca. Indeed.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. So, it would be very easy, for  
3 example, simply to --

4 Mr. Rocca. This was a part of the training. The CI  
5 staff wrote the handbook. I wrote it, or edited it.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. What is the title of the handbook?

7 Mr. Rocca. It's called "Criteria for Double Agents."  
8 In this case it would have been a person in touch with two  
9 services.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Would the same criteria apply to someone  
11 who is not necessarily a double agent?

12 Mr. Rocca. It would apply to all agents. They apply  
13 to all agents.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. And such a handbook was in effect in  
15 1959?

16 Mr. Rocca. That handbook was in existence and was a  
17 part of the formal training program I referred to in R & A.  
18 It was a part of the job of R & A to draw up these criteria,  
19 which had not been previously drawn up in the OSS history.

20 So, on my record of observation of individuals, the  
21 study of the background and history of the entire topic --  
22 and we covered it in detail, that is, reading the background --  
23 this man would have been rejected out of hand. He would never  
24 have been considered.

25 Now I have the suspicion that maybe the Soviets got

1 to the same point with him.

2 But this is off the record -- this is not off the  
3 record. I mean, this is just a joke.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Referring again to 201, to CIA number  
5 201, this is a memo that was prepared apparently by Mr.  
6 Hartman.

7 Do you know at whose request Mr. Hartman would have  
8 prepared this memo dated in 1975?

9 Mr. Rocca. He prepared it at my request, I think.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. No, this memo -- well, you were no  
11 longer with the Agency formally in 1975. Would he have  
12 prepared this memo for you in 1975?

13 Mr. Rocca. I was still on contract with him, and  
14 this was still, this was certainly pertinent to what the  
15 Rockefeller Commission was doing. It is my recollection,  
16 inasmuch as I have already recalled it in part -- you see,  
17 when I mentioned that your previous question had referred to  
18 1963, well, I recall that part where he did refer to 1963.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. So, in 1975, you asked --

20 Mr. Rocca. I simply asked him to do this because  
21 I recalled that we had at my instance undertaken within the  
22 staff on my own responsibility this kind of thing.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. What was the purpose of your asking  
24 him to prepare this memo in 1975?

25 Mr. Rocca. To get on the record his recollections of

1  
2 what had happened in 1963 with respect to this gross  
3 allegation.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. So, by asking him to do that, were  
5 you recognizing that Mr. Hartman had not gotten on the record  
6 in 1963 when he conducted the initial investigation?

7 Mr. Rocca. No, no.

8 At that time he did this and reported to me. It was  
9 a purely internal matter. But by 1975, it seemed to me  
10 worthy of putting down on the record.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. But in 1963 it was not put in the  
12 record?

13 Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, it was not.

14 Let me say that we were, of course, hamstrung by  
15 allegations in the record which we informally checked out  
16 in that fashion. So, I mean, this was perfectly, I think,  
17 normal.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. I note that the 1975 memorandum goes  
19 into very great detail as to all the steps that Mr. Hartman  
20 took to determine whether Oswald had any connection with the  
21 Agency.

22 Does this extensive detail strike you as somewhat  
23 unusual for a memorandum written twelve years after the  
24 investigation was actually conducted?

25 Mr. Rocca. No.

I told him to simply put down everything he could recall

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about where he had gone.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, I notice that in CIA number 2106, letter E, he indicates that through the Security Research Section of the Office of Security, he had the security files checked. There was no record of Oswald.

Now, in fact, the Security Office did have a record on Oswald in 1963. Did that strike you as an incongruous --

Mr. Rocca. I don't think that view is referring to -- that that was referring necessarily to the topic of the interest, namely that there was any kind of a relationship with him that involved the Agency, or else they simply didn't tell him. It certainly would be incongruous if they had a file.

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, we have seen several Office of Security documents pertaining to Oswald, preassassination.

Mr. Rocca. That's right, and you have to know which office in the Office of Security you are talking to. I can't judge this one at all, except in terms of these two elements: (a) that it may have been a part of the Office of Security that literally didn't have a file; or that the file that they showed him was totally derivative, consisting of press and other well known items, and therefore he did not consider it really new information or significant information within the terms of the memorandum.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, on CIA number 2108, he indicates



1 that there are five documents which had been sent to the Agency  
2 before the assassination. "Two of the documents have been  
3 sent to us" -- referring to the Agency -- "by the FBI, two  
4 by the Department of State, and one by the U.S. Navy."

5 So, in other words, Mr. Hartman felt that prior to the  
6 assassination there were five documents from other agencies in  
7 Oswald's 201 file.

8 Mr. Rocca. Well, some of them you have actually  
9 shown me, or I thought so -- I mean, they seem to have been  
10 in the file.

11 (Pause)

12 Mr. Goldsmith. Off the record.

13 (Discussion off the record.)

14 Mr. Rocca. Is the point whether it is five or one?

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Burke is attempting to locate the  
16 document that I was going to refer you to at this point.  
17 The specific one I have in mind is a --

18 Mr. Rocca. Well, I can check this record against the  
19 actual records in the files. I assume that this represented  
20 his best statement.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. In fact, that statement contradicts  
22 the listing of documents that was given to the Warren Commission  
23 by Mr. Helms in 1964. Mr. Helms indicated that there were,  
24 or at least his list indicated that there were more than  
25 five documents received from other agencies.

1 Mr. Rocca. Well, Mr. Hartman erred, then, or at least  
 2 I would assume on this, unless he actually had some kind of  
 3 consultation with the record, which he could have had, inasmuch  
 4 as these materials were at hand. I would say that there is  
 5 no doubt that -- in other words, there is no definitive  
 6 significance to be attached to that expression. On recounting  
 7 he may find six, or he may find four. He was not, I think,  
 8 in putting this memorandum together --

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what a DBA is?

10 Mr. Rocca. DBA, I would judge, is a bureau, is a  
 11 bureau indicator.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. According to that memorandum by  
 13 Mr. Helms, there were substantially more than five documents  
 14 in the file. I am wondering what the reason for the inconsis-  
 15 tency is between the Helms record and the Hartman memo.

16 Mr. Rocca. I think that you could undoubtedly work  
 17 it out and it would turn out to be something completely  
 18 (excusable) because the DBA memo -- this is a cryptonym  
 19 for bureau material.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Burke has located the document.

21 According to this document, which is CIA number 2038,  
 22 prior to the assassination, included in Oswald's 201 file  
 23 were seven documents from the FBI, ten from the Department of  
 24 State, two from the Department of Navy, one from the  
 25 Immigration and Naturalization Service, and then there were

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internal CIA documents and newspaper clippings.

Mr. Rocca. So, he is just wrong.

His talley is in error.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, at the bottom of 2038 there is a notation which I would like you to review. In parentheses it indicates "inventory of documents contained in file attached for all but addressee."

Let me bring that to your attention and see if you can explain that to me.

Mr. Rocca. Oh, we did not attach the actual documents to anybody but the addressee. We gave them just a list of those documents, apparently. That would be my reading of this.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Mr. Rocca. I mean, it would have required a large scale reproduction.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would a file search conducted by Mr. Hartman in 1963 definitely have resolved the question of whether Oswald was ever connected with the Agency in any way?

Mr. Rocca. As far as I'm concerned it would have.

Mr. Goldsmith. Assuming things were done in the ordinary course of business.

Mr. Rocca. Assuming that he had checked all the places that he had said he checked and that we knew about, that would

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1 have been definitive.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Now, you indicated earlier that you  
3 did not regard it unusual that Oswald's 201 file was opened  
4 over a year after the first indication of his giving information  
5 to the Soviets was obtained by the Agency.

6 Mr. Rocca. But only within a few months of the  
7 receipt of the first information regarding this as I under-  
8 stood it.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Well, the information was initially  
10 received in October of 1959. The file was opened in  
11 December of 1960, over a year after the initial receipt of  
12 the information.

13 In October or November of 1960, the State Department  
14 sent information and it was sometime after the State Department  
15 communicated to you and Oswald that the file was opened.

16 Mr. Rocca. In other words, we're arguing here the  
17 stimulus and how close to the action the stimulus was.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Exactly.

19 Mr. Rocca. I'm saying that the stimulus -- speaking  
20 for Miss Edgerter, I don't know what prompted her to do this,  
21 or the timing, because it was not my component. I had no  
22 knowledge that the action even was being done. In fact,  
23 I was pleasantly surprised on the 23rd, which was a Friday,  
24 to know that we -- and I learned this on Saturday morning  
25 when I went into the office -- that we even had a 201 on

1 him.

2 So, I'm simply giving you my best guess, Mr. Goldsmith.  
3 And I don't regard it as unusual.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you regard the fact that the Agency  
5 never debriefed Oswald or that there is no record of such a  
6 debriefing upon Oswald's return from the Soviet Union as  
7 unusual in any way?

8 Mr. Rocca. No, not at all.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Why not?

10 Mr. Rocca. Because under the delimitations agreement,  
11 he was strictly the Navy's baby, and the FBI's baby, and  
12 that is it.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Even though he may have had information  
14 of --

15 Mr. Rocca. I'm going to Indian wrestle with you on  
16 this one.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, I want to indicate to you  
18 that, again, you should not infer from my line of questioning  
19 that we --

20 Mr. Rocca. I'm not. I'm joking. I'm joking.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. -- are predisposed in any way towards  
22 the resolution of this issue. And, I don't want to arm  
23 wrestle with you.

24 Mr. Rocca. Well, you are aware of the delimitations  
25 agreement and the specifications that it sets out with respect

1 to the approaches to and the responsibilities for the security  
 2 of members of the Armed Forces, former members of the Armed  
 3 Forces. It's a very, very strictly adhered to code that  
 4 Mr. Over and the members of the domestic community drew  
 5 up in 1940, and which we respected very, very carefully.  
 6 This is a decentralized approach to security. It has its  
 7 disadvantages and any kind of cooperation that you get has to  
 8 come from -- on cases, has to come from mutually arrived at  
 9 agreement.

10 And this man, as a Navy man, a Marine, was strictly  
 11 their baby. And that would be my answer to it.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. What is the formal name given to this  
 13 agreement between --

14 Mr. Rocca. It is called the Delimitations Agreement.  
 15 It is a primary document in trying to understand the very  
 16 grave difficulties we have in working against an integrated  
 17 adversary.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. And this agreement was promulgated in  
 19 1940, roughly?

20 Mr. Rocca. 1940, and revised at various times  
 21 periodically. It still exists and it governs and lays down  
 22 the ground rules.

23 And, if anyone asked me in R & A at that time whether  
 24 or not we should debrief this man, the first thing that would  
 25 have come to my mind was stay away from it, it's a Navy

1 matter, a Marine matter, and a Bureau matter, and they should  
2 have priority.

3 No one did, incidentally.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Even though Oswald may have had  
5 information of a positive intelligence nature, in other words,  
6 not only did Oswald pose an interest to the American  
7 intelligence community because he may have been a counter  
8 intelligence security threat, but he also had access to  
9 information on the Soviet Union that might have been of  
10 positive intelligence significance, is your position still  
11 that no component within the Agency would have had an  
12 interest in debriefing him?

13 Mr. Rocca. Would not have had a legitimate interest  
14 on its own to have done this. It would have had to  
15 coordinate with the Navy or with whatever component had the  
16 responsibility under the Delimitations Agreement.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Despite the fact that Oswald may have  
18 had positive intelligence information?

19 Mr. Rocca. Indeed, indeed.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Please refer to CIA number 2137,  
21 which is a memo for Mr. Rankin dated 1 July, 1964, specifically  
22 dealing with the question of how Oswald was able to make  
23 the trip on a direct flight from London to Helsinki on  
24 October 10, 1959 and arrive at his downtown hotel in  
25 Helsinki by midnight of the same day, when the only flight

1 leaving London was a FinAir flight that would have arrived  
 2 in Helsinki at 11:30, a time that would not have permitted  
 3 Oswald to have cleared customs and made the trip to the  
 4 hotel.

5 This has been an issue that has received some attention  
 6 recently. I am wondering whether the Agency was ever able  
 7 fully to resolve this question.

8 Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, they were not. They  
 9 gave up -- there was a time schedule worked out and passed  
 10 to this Commission. This was a report done by Mr. Murphy's  
 11 people, that Mr. Wigren, who I mentioned yesterday, worked  
 12 on. I cannot judge its relevance without reading it. But  
 13 I do agree that there is a -- he did move fairly fast.  
 14 But that may be just traveller's luck.

15 (Pause)

16 Mr. Rocca. I can add nothing to this.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Agency ever able to resolve  
 18 the question of how Oswald was able to obtain a visa to enter  
 19 the Soviet Union as quickly as he did?

20 Mr. Rocca. This, too, was a matter prepared by  
 21 the appropriate component. I cannot recall its specific  
 22 details or really judge it in terms of its definitive  
 23 quality. I think probably we did the best job we could  
 24 on it.

25 You see, on the memo that you have just shown me,



1  
2 which 2137, Duncan was the researcher in SB Division, who  
3 worked on the problem and prepared the memorandum.

4 I certainly am not qualified to challenge conclusions  
5 they reached.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. I am not asking you to challenge their  
7 conclusions.

8 I am asking you whether any additional information  
9 ever came to your attention pertaining to this issue.

10 Mr. Rocca. Ah, that's another matter. I'm sorry, I  
11 didn't understand that.

12 No.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. According to CIA number 2047, which  
14 I will read to you in relevant part, it indicates that an  
15 Agency source stated that there was no record that there was  
16 any request for a U.S.S.R. visa processed through normal  
17 channels for Oswald at any time during 1959, and the source  
18 indicated it was difficult to explain how Oswald might have  
19 received his visa in two days without going through normal  
20 channels. "The only conclusion which can be drawn is that  
21 Oswald must have received his visa directly from the Soviet  
22 Embassy in Stockholm, which occasionally has done special  
23 cases." But the source has no evidence to confirm this  
24 assumption.

25 Do you know whether the Agency was ever able to  
resolve the question of how Oswald was able to obtain his

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1 visa so expeditiously?

2 Mr. Rocca. No. I do not believe that they were able  
3 to do that. This is, however, one of the open questions  
4 that should be worked on.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Does that suggest in your mind that  
6 Oswald may have had an intelligence connection of some kind?

7 Mr. Rocca. Indeed.

8 Let me -- strike that. It would suggest that if  
9 indeed it turns out that he did have facilitation in his visa  
10 of that kind--in other words, that visa facilitation would  
11 tend to suggest that and not the other way around, as I  
12 originally indicated.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Would Mr. Hartman's investigation  
14 into the question of whether Oswald was connected with the  
15 Agency also have led him to determine whether Oswald was an  
16 agent of some other U.S. intelligence agency?

17 Mr. Rocca. I think probably not.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. You mentioned earlier that --

19 Mr. Rocca. Though I reserve. If he mentions in his  
20 memorandum the Inter-Agency Source Defector List, which I  
21 think he should have checked, there should have been a  
22 reference there.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Would that conclusively indicate  
24 whether Oswald was an agent of another agency?

25 Mr. Rocca. If all of the provisions that were -- and I

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1 misstated the list -- this is the Inter-Agency Source  
2 Register, not the Inter-Agency Defector List -- the Inter-Agency  
3 Source Register -- and I believe he did check it. If the  
4 provisions governing coordinating had been carried out,  
5 there would have been a drop card in there.

6 So, the answer to your question would be yes, at least  
7 as a start.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether the Warren  
9 Commission was at all particularly concerned with regard to  
10 the question of whether Oswald was an agent of the CIA?

11 Mr. Rocca. No questions of that kind, as far as I  
12 can recall, were directed through this working level associatio  
13 that I had with Slawson and Coleman and others on this  
14 point, as far as I know.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Although apparently there was a meeting  
16 with Mr. Dulles that you attended where Dulles indicated to  
17 you that the Warren Commission had asked him to investigate thi  
18 question.

19 Mr. Rocca. The meeting with Mr. Dulles, as you kindly  
20 noted yesterday, was for another purpose, and he simply brought  
21 that in as a matter of collateral, reading the memorandum,  
22 as he tended to do, of course. This was a matter that had  
23 come up.

24 So, there was, apparently, an interest to the extent  
25 that Rankin talked to him about it.

1 But I was not brought in on that phase.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Why was Mr. Dulles disinclined to  
3 get involved in this issue?

4 Mr. Rocca. I think it was -- I'm simply guessing,  
5 now -- I would say that it would involve a whole matter of  
6 conflict of interest; that is, as a member of the Commission,  
7 he should be objective in these matters. That would be my  
8 guess.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. How would you evaluate the significance  
10 of Oswald's early discharge and relatively expeditious  
11 discharge from the military?

12 Mr. Rocca. I think it shows palpable and manifest  
13 bad faith on his part and I can't go beyond that because  
14 I don't know any more facts.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Bad faith in the sense that he was  
16 getting a hardship discharge and then took off for the Soviet  
17 Union?

18 Mr. Rocca. That's right.

19 Yes. Is that the correct word to use, when a person  
20 gives an excuse that is not sustained by his subsequent  
21 actions?

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Well, does the fact that he obtained  
23 this early discharge suggest to you that Oswald may have had  
24 intelligence associations of some kind?

25 Mr. Rocca. Not necessarily. People would have

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1 done this -- lots of people get out of the armed forces  
2 for various reasons. I don't think that alone can really  
3 stand the weight of the interpretation that you have  
4 suggested here, taken together with the meeting with  
5 presumably the Cuban, whoever it was, that Delgado describes,  
6 the Schweitzer correspondence, which apparently should be  
7 looked at again in terms of whether or not it was really a  
8 screen, because if it was, then it shows a degree of  
9 deliberateness which associates itself with the request for  
10 compassionate departure from the Marine Corps. It tends then  
11 to accumulate points on a line that this was a deliberate  
12 course of action.

13 But even when you put all of that together, you are  
14 far from anything that would exclude any contrary hypotheses,  
15 and that is what you are trying to get out of analysis.

16 For that reason, as I said yesterday, you have to be  
17 very, very careful in drawing conclusions.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Excuse me.

19 (Pause)

20 Mr. Goldsmith. You indicated yesterday that you did  
21 not have any memory of the Gutierrez allegation.

22 Mr. Rocca. I was unable to do any kind of reading  
23 in the report, or in the depositions to the Warren Report  
24 last night, so it still is a vague and hazy affair.

25 (Pause)

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you have any responsibility  
2 with regard to the CIA's handling of the Nosenko issue?

3 Mr. Rocca. During the time of the Warren Commission?

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

5 Mr. Rocca. None at all.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Which unit was responsible for  
7 Nosenko at that time?

8 Mr. Rocca. The handling responsibility was SB  
9 Division.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Does that stand for Soviet Branch?

11 Mr. Rocca. Soviet Branch, Soviet Division -- Mr. Murphy  
12 In the staff which would have had an interest, the components  
13 concerned would have been Ops, the Ops component, it would  
14 have been Mr. Hunt.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. What's Mr. Hunt's first name?

16 Mr. Rocca. James Hunt - not Howard Hunt.

17 And, perhaps even Mr. O'Neill and SIG, although I  
18 cannot say on this.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever have any involvement  
20 in the Nosenko case?

21 Mr. Rocca. Later.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. When was that?

23 Mr. Rocca. In 1966 - 1967.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. What was your role at that time?

25 Mr. Rocca. If it's relevant to your interest, I mean --

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1 Mr. Goldsmith. The reason that it would be relevant  
 2 is because of the manner in which Mr. Nosenko was handled by  
 3 the Agency vis-a-vis the information that was given about him  
 4 to the Warren Commission. It requires the committee to look  
 5 into both his treatment in 1964 as well as years subsequent  
 6 to that time.

7 Mr. Rocca. My entry into the Nosenko case -- I am  
 8 perfectly willing to discuss this -- I think it enters into  
 9 certainly Mr. Marcucci's indication -- was in connection  
 10 with the review and appraisal of the final report prepared,  
 11 or the first draft final report prepared by the Soviet  
 12 Division on the case, and their proposed recommendations  
 13 for the handling of the case which, as I say, took place  
 14 in '65, '66, or '67.

15 I was asked -- by that time, in other words, the case  
 16 had reached a concrete stage of, a pile of, a report that  
 17 was nearly a foot high. I was asked to read it and to comment  
 18 upon it and its recommendations.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. What was your assessment of that report?

20 Mr. Rocca. My assessment of the report was -- and this  
 21 is on the record, and there is a report, and I defer all of  
 22 my remarks here to that paper, because the question is a  
 23 complex one--that the report should be cut down by at least  
 24 half; that it was too long; and that the overall diversity  
 25 of the report, which included a lot of other elements that

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were not related to the Nosenko case, concerned other aspects, like the Golitzin case, be cut out of it, because they simply encumbered it; that overall, the appraisal that was made that he was a dispatch defector -- and that certain action should be taken by the FBI to confirm this or to review it and to take further action with respect to his stay in the United States -- should be looked at with great care because he had rights under the circumstances.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who made the actual decision to detain Nosenko under hostile conditions during the period in which he was in CIA custody?

Mr. Rocca. The Chief of SB Division, to the best of my knowledge.

Mr. Goldsmith. What input did Mr. Angleton have on that?

Mr. Rocca. I think he was opposed to that.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was Mr. Angleton's suggestion for the way that Mr. Nosenko should be treated?

Mr. Rocca. This is not within my competence to answer because I don't know the thing. It concerns -- in other words, you are asking me questions that deal with the period that was antecedent to the time that I came into the case.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did Mr. Angleton ever discuss that with you?



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Mr. Rocca. On the basis of hearsay, then, discussions, Mr. Angleton would have wanted a much longer period of interrogation based on the actual materials that had been accumulated before anything like hostile interrogation was undertaken, if at all. In other words, to my recollection, in my recollection, there was a significant difference on this point. But it was ex post facto; the decision had already been taken and made and that was irreversible at that time.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what role Mr. Helms had in making that decision?

Mr. Rocca. I do not.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to discuss with you briefly a hypothetical, and I am aware of the Agency's position regarding Nosenko today.

Hypothetically, if it could be established without any doubt that the story that Nosenko gave to the FBI and the CIA regarding the manner in which Oswald was handled in the Soviet Union -- if it could be established that that story was completely untrue or completely unbelievable, what significance would that have on the question of whether Nosenko was a bona fide or a dispatched defector?

Mr. Rocca. It might have no significance, or it might have much significance.

He could be a bona fide defector who had been fed

1 these materials on the basis of some kind of preknowledge  
2 that it was his intent to go and that he is therefore an  
3 unwitting bearer of a version of the case. Or, on the  
4 other hand, it could indicate that he is a controlled channel  
5 of communication.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. So, your opinion is --

7 Mr. Rocca. And there are shades of in between  
8 these two.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Your opinion is that that doesn't cut  
10 either way, then, in terms of the accuracy of his --

11 Mr. Rocca. No, it doesn't. It cuts both ways.  
12 I mean, this is the point. It doesn't resolve it to the  
13 exclusion of any other hypothesis, which is what I was  
14 talking about is the nature of the evidence that you need  
15 here, and until you get it, you've damn well got to keep it  
16 out of the press, it seems to me, because you create problems,  
17 then, at the human level that are really irresolvable. That  
18 is what is, of course, dangerous.

19 I thought you were going to ask a totally different  
20 question, which is how would it affect the whole hypothesis  
21 of Oswald in the KDB, which would strike me as being a  
22 much more relevant question to ask.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Well, Mr. Rocca, I'm afraid that you  
24 anticipated my next question.

25 Mr. Rocca. Oh, I'm sorry.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Why don't you answer that one now.

2 Mr. Rocca. Well, I would have to do it the same way,  
3 Mr. Goldsmith.

4 It would take, in other words -- it would take very,  
5 very hard evidence either of an agent character or of a  
6 cipher breakthrough to convince me that he was a mandated  
7 killer to begin with, because the nature of the crime, his  
8 conduct and association with the deed are such that this  
9 responds entirely to what I would consider a self-motivated  
10 act.

11 So, even if, in other words, he were in touch with  
12 the KGB and an agent--and that would be the implication if  
13 you drew the evidence on Nosenko as being a phony agent,  
14 right -- coming back to your question -- I still believe  
15 you would be far from the point of being able to go into the  
16 World Court or the United Nations or into a diplomatic  
17 demarche or indeed into something even more serious and  
18 state this to have been the causative act.

19 Is that being fair on the evidence?

20 It seems to me this is what is required in a case of  
21 this seriousness.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. I just have one more question to ask  
23 you prior to taking a brief recess.

24 Mr. Rocca. Let me add, however, what I said yesterday,  
25 that notwithstanding that question, there is no question in

1 my mind that there is additional information in both Havana  
2 and in Moscow that bears on this motivation and conduct.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you please review CIA number  
4 2041, which is a cable dated 6 January, 1964, dealing with  
5 an individual named Mohammed Reggab.

6 (Pause)

7 Mr. Rocca. Let's see. This is a person in Berlin.  
8 I don't know that I have reviewed this.

9 (Pause)

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Reggab was an individual who came  
11 forward and indicated that at one time he had been a boyfriend  
12 of Marine Oswald, and he gave the authorities on her backgroun  
13 that differed from the story that Marina herself gave.

14 I am wondering if you are familiar with Mr. Reggab's  
15 story?

16 Mr. Rocca. No.

17 Mr. [ ] who originated this, is still present.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Mr. Reggab ever  
19 worked for the Agency?

20 Mr. Rocca. I do not know that.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. The memo suggests the possibility that  
22 he was going to start working for the Agency.

23 Do you know whether that was ever pursued?

24 Mr. Rocca. I do not know that.

25 I simply am not cognizant of the facts here.

1 Mr. Rocca. Incidentally, are you still talking  
2 hypothetically?

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Well, if you would like to discuss  
4 something hypothetically, I am open for it.

5 Mr. Rocca. I want to revert to the Minktenbaugh  
6 analogy and the woman and the case, the MO.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Please do.

8 Mr. Rocca. These things, identities in time and space,  
9 and method, are significant, at least at the laboratory level,  
10 so that the kind of thing that the Soviets might have had in  
11 mind for Oswald and Marina--if that is her true name,  
12 whatever her identify is, and if we do know all about her,  
13 and my great regret is that she was not polygraphed, as Ruby  
14 was -- I think this is very definitely a portion -- because  
15 she certainly to Patricia Blake said things that I had not  
16 heard on the record before about her past.

17 The Walker thing fits better into the pattern of a  
18 special kind of operational thing, if you, indeed, can believe  
19 that Walker was a part of Oswald's interest, as she claims  
20 it was.

21 So, you have, in other words, coming back to the  
22 hypothesis, that element of taint with Oswald on the part  
23 of the KGB. But I do feel that however you press it on the  
24 basis of the present "evidence" -- in quotes -- it still  
25 falls short of suggesting that he was a mandated killer in

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this instance.

I want to make that perfectly clear.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Let's take a brief recess at this time.

(A brief recess was taken.)

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to inform you, Mr. Rocca, having just taken this brief recess, that I have had occasion to review some additional documents that were provided to me by the Agency.

Yesterday you made reference to a second memorandum that you had prepared with regard to the work of the Rockefeller Commission and that document has now been made available to us.

Mr. Rocca. In its entirety?

Mr. Goldsmith. So far as I know, in its entirety, so that many of the points that were raised yesterday, where you made reference to the memorandum, will be pursued by my staff and myself. But I just wanted to clarify that because there was some suggestion that there was a memorandum that was missing and, in fact, it has turned up.

Mr. Rocca. Good.

Mr. Goldsmith. I have a few questions to address to you. Basically they are of a wrap-up nature, followup questions based upon our review of yesterday's discussion.

First, dealing with Luisa Calderon, the suspected

1 DCI agent who may have had contact with Mr. Oswald, I would  
 2 like you to refer to CIA number 1843, which is a cover  
 3 page to a transcript. The transcript is the one that  
 4 contains the conversation in which Luisa Calderon makes  
 5 her cryptic reference to the Kennedy assassination and  
 6 suggests that she may have had foreknowledge.

7 I am not going to go into any detail with regard to  
 8 the transcript itself as you and I have already discussed  
 9 the substance.

10 I would simply ask you to read 1843 and tell me if  
 11 you can identify whose handwriting appears on that page.

12 Mr. Rocca. Oh, you are not asking me to read this.  
 13 We talked about this yesterday.

14 I'm afraid I cannot recognize it, I'm sorry to say.  
 15 It just makes no impression. It looks like a woman's  
 16 handwriting, but these are just guesses.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. The handwriting indicates that a  
 18 transcript is to be sent to someone named Galbond--  
 19 G-A-L-B-O-N-D -- via Kingman.

20 Do you know who those individuals were?

21 Mr. Rocca. I do not. My guess would be that  
 22 this has to do with the Warren Commission and their receipt of  
 23 the material.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. The notation, the handwritten notation,  
 25 also indicates the following comment: "Nothing to Buro" --

1 and Buro is spelled B-U-R-O-- "yet."

2 Do you know whether this transcript was ever given  
3 to the FBI?

4 Mr. Rocca. No. Whether that transcript was or not,  
5 I cannot say. They already knew the substance of it, of  
6 course, from the earlier transmissions. My guess is that  
7 this was the translation from Spanish that was done for the  
8 Commission by the Agency.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the FBI was  
10 specifically informed about the conversation that Luisa  
11 Calderon had in which she made the reference to the Kennedy  
12 assassination?

13 Mr. Rocca. I'm certain of it -- that is, I can't  
14 prove it by the papers that were shown to me yesterday. But  
15 I would be certain of it in my own mind.

16 (Pause)

17 Mr. Rocca. As I say, it is my recollection that  
18 these things were translated for the Commission by the Agency.  
19 They would be done by people in WH Division who had the  
20 competence in the language, and therefore there would be  
21 different components involved and different routings,  
22 obviously.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall ever seeing any cable  
24 traffic that made specific reference to Luisa Calderon  
25 and this conversation?



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Mr. Rocca. No. I would not exclude that there had been such, though. But I don't remember any.

Mr. Goldsmith. Can you indicate that the Bureau received via transmission this conversation?

Mr. Rocca. Oh, I am certain of it.

Mr. Scott would have taken it up directly with his Bureau colleague at a certain point, when it was indicated that there should be lateral transmission.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like you to refer now to CIA number 2206, which is a summary of events that took place during the visit by Warren Commission staff to the Agency station in Mexico City in 1963. Paragraph seven of this document specifically indicates the information that was unavailable for review by the Warren Commission staff.

Would you please review paragraph seven of this document

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. I have reviewed this.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Is there any reference in that document, specifically in paragraph seven, to the Warren Commission staff being given access to a transcript of Luisa Calderon's conversation?

Mr. Rocca. There is no reference. There is no specification that among the items listed is that piece.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now yesterday we discussed this issue and I asked you whether you would be willing to assist the

1 in trying to resolve it. I recall your response as affirmative.

2 Mr. Rocca. I will always volunteer for anything.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. We will attempt to make arrangements  
4 with the Agency to give you access to some of these materials  
5 so that we can determine conclusively whether or not this  
6 information was given to the Warren Commission staff.

7 Mr. Rocca. At what point or --

8 Mr. Goldsmith. We are interested in whether the  
9 information was given to the Warren Commission and when.

10 Mr. Rocca. Ever -- ah.

11 This memorandum is Win Scott's summary memorandum.  
12 Again, things can be omitted from memoranda, and I would  
13 assume that that's the case in this instance.

14 He was so firmly committed -- Win was, personally --  
15 to the fact of Cuban involvement. In fact, he went far  
16 beyond what I would regard as publicly discussible, inferential  
17 judgments in that regard, in his discussions with me that I  
18 can't believe absolutely that he would ever withhold it.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you give us a summary now of  
20 what Mr. Scott's theories were with regard to the possibility  
21 of Cuban involvement.

22 Mr. Rocca. He felt that there was very definitely  
23 the possibility of Cuban involvement with Oswald, but he  
24 could not arrive at any definite information. And frankly,  
25 I don't remember getting down to details that would be of

1  
2 really significant use to you in your own investigation  
3 here, beyond the statement that he also had this conviction.  
4 He also felt that way about the Soviets, of course.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Now, yesterday we also discussed the  
6 photograph that had been taken of the individual who has been  
7 referred to by the press as "The Mexico Mystery Man," and  
8 I showed you a document labeled CIA number 2138, which is  
9 a memo dated 12 May, '64, from Mr. Angleton to you, in which  
10 a statement is made to the effect that the Agency might  
11 consider waiting out the Commission with regard to this  
12 issue.

13 I'm sorry, I referred to the incorrect document.  
14 In fact, it is number 2139, and the date is 5 March, '64. The  
15 memo is from you, Mr. Rocca, to Richard Helms, and you indicate  
16 that Mr. Angleton does not desire to respond directly to  
17 the request from Mr. Rankin for some materials.

18 In the second paragraph you indicate that Mr. Angleton  
19 would prefer to wait out the Commission in the matter covered  
20 by paragraph 2.

21 Would you please review this at this time.

22 (Pause)

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know when the Warren Commission  
24 was given the full story on the photographic surveillance  
25 operation in Mexico City, and specifically the relationship  
between that operation and the Mexico mystery man?

1 Mr. Rocca. Could I ask a question here as a matter  
2 of information?

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Certainly, please do.

4 Mr. Rocca. "This is responsive to paragraph three  
5 of Rankin's letter, see reference tab" -- is that here?

6 Mr. Goldsmith. No.

7 In fact, the letter was not attached to the document,  
8 although it is indicated that it was.

9 Mr. Rocca. "J does not desire to respond directly  
10 to paragraph two of that letter which made a levy for our  
11 material which had gotten into the hands of the Secret Service  
12 since 23rd of November. We found that except for three  
13 telegrams all that the Secret Service had was material we  
14 had sent to McGeorge Bundy at the White House. Apparently  
15 he had simply passed it to the Secret Service as a matter of  
16 internal information. Unless you feel otherwise, Jim would  
17 prefer to wait out the Commission on the matter covered by  
18 paragraph two, which is a levy for our material which had  
19 gotten into the hands of the Secret Service since the 23rd  
20 of November and which has previously been described. If  
21 they come back on the point, he feels that you or someone  
22 from here should be prepared to go over to show the Commission  
23 the materials rather than pass them to them in copy.  
24 Incidentally none of these items"-- is --"of new substantive  
25 interest. We have either passed the material in substance



1 to the Commission in response to earlier (levies) or the  
2 items refer to aborted leads -- for example, the famous six  
3 photographs which were not of Oswald (and) the passenger  
4 manifest of an airline which also did not pertain to Oswald.  
5 If you desire to take note of the levy in paragraph two,  
6 we would recommend that you indicate on the attached" and  
7 so forth.

8 Well, we don't have the Rankin thing. But my  
9 recollection is that very shortly thereafter this --

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Incidentally, for the record, I just  
11 want to indicate that we've reviewed the Rankin letter and  
12 it is unclear specifically what it is referring to. That's  
13 why I haven't bothered to show it to you.

14 Mr. Rocca. Well, it's very clear that this is unclear,  
15 too, because it refers to something unclear, it seems to me.

16 In other words, it sounds like something that had been  
17 gotten to Rankin in a kind of vague and hazy way, that was  
18 really not substantively new, that he made an issue of, and  
19 that this refers to simply avoiding duplicating needlessly  
20 a paper that had already been disposed of, or taken care of,  
21 or was in the process of being taken care of.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Now nevertheless, there is language  
23 to the effect there that Mr. Angleton was concerned with  
24 waiting out the Commission.

25 Mr. Rocca. Well, in other words, if he could show



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that this material was not of any new substantive interest and that it was already being taken care of, it would avoid a needless stage of reproduction and of discussion -- I think is the intent behind this.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you when the Warren Commission staff was told about the Mexico City photograph?

Mr. Rocca. I cannot recall the date of it, but they came over and received the photograph and looked at it from my very hands. I had in my hand an envelope containing the entire run of the photographs that had been submitted to me by the desk, the WH desk, Mr. [SCELSO] as of that time.

What date that was -- it could be May, it could be April, it could be March. I think it was later -- it was sooner rather than later.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me show you a document labeled 24 March, 1964. The subject is Mexico City, CIA dissemination of information on Lee Harvey Oswald. The document, rather, is labeled March 26, 1964, and it is an internal memo, Warren Commission staff, CIA number 2221 and 2222. In 2222, the author of the memo indicates as follows: "As you know, we are still trying to get an explanation of the photograph which the FBI showed Marguerita Oswald soon after the assassination. I hope that paragraph four of the memo of March 24, 1964, sent Mr. Rankin by the CIA is not the answer which the CIA intends to give us to this inquiry."

Would you please review that.

Mr. Rocca. Could I ask you again what paper this is?  
Is it from the Commission?

Mr. Goldsmith. It's a Commission internal memorandum --  
Slawson - Coleman, to Rankin.

(Dause)

Mr. Rocca. Do we have paragraph four of the memorandum  
of March 24?

Mr. Goldsmith. That letter, unfortunately, is not  
available. The Agency did not send that to us.

Mr. Rocca. My recollection is that whatever this  
confabulation implies, that at some particular point -- and  
I don't remember the date, it was either at the end of March  
or April -- they came over and I showed them personally--

Mr. Goldsmith. You would certainly agree that by the  
end of March, that on this day, the --

Mr. Rocca. As of this day it sounds as if they don't  
have it.

Mr. Goldsmith. --the explanation given was not  
satisfactory?

Mr. Rocca. Well, I mean, they may have -- one thing  
that came out of my reflections on our talks yesterday and  
also today is the fact that these are all bricks assembled  
in a particular fashion.

What appears to be lacking is a sense of the operational

1 relationship with which these bricks were handled at the time.

2 In this particular case, while they may not have had  
3 the final explanation or even an explanation that we ourselves  
4 were satisfied with inasmuch as we were dependent on reports  
5 from Mexico City, they certainly were aware of the fact that  
6 the thing was being worked on and that the issue existed.  
7 In other words, there was no question of withholding -- and  
8 this took place at the conversational level and was obviously  
9 unrecorded in any way. I find myself impossible here to fill  
10 in the proper cement on the operational level that would make  
11 some of these bricks more plausible than they would seem,  
12 as they are taken out and just held up.

13 But I have an absolute recollection of giving them  
14 these photographs, and in the memorandum that you've gotten  
15 today, you will see that it turned out that there were even  
16 more photographs in the file -- not of the particular eight  
17 men, but of others in the coverage which they provided in  
18 '75. Now this comes out of the desk.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you agree, nevertheless, that the  
20 author of this memo was not satisfied with the explanation  
21 that the Agency had provided with regard to the photographs  
22 as of that day?

23 Mr. Rocca. Yes, yes.

24 He was certainly reflecting that in his internal  
25 memorandum -- memoranda.



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Mr. Goldsmith. Was there ever any effort on the part of the CIA to coordinate testimony given to the Warren Commission with the FBI?

Mr. Rocca. None that I know of.

Mr. Goldsmith. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record)

Mr. Goldsmith. What efforts, if any, were made to prep Mr. McCone prior to any briefings that Mr. McCone gave to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Rocca. I'm afraid I have to refer to whatever is in the record, if any, on that, because I did not deal personally with Mr. McCone on these matters.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was there ever a concern evinced by Mr. Angleton or yourself or Mr. Helms that Mr. McCone give consistent testimony, either testimony or statements, to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Rocca. The thought would never have crossed my mind and, therefore, speaking for myself, the answer is negative. I have never -- I have not heard of anything involving either Mr. Helms or Mr. Angleton in that respect, to the best of my knowledge or recollection.

Mr. Goldsmith. Reading from CIA number 2138, which is a memo for Mr. Rocca from Mr. Angleton dated 12 May, 1964, it indicates as follows: "The DDP wishes to have from you a short but comprehensive memorandum which highlights the

1 basic issues or positions entered into by the Agency in its  
2 dealings with the Commission. For example, Rankin indicated  
3 that the Commission would wish to hear the Director's views  
4 as to how improvements might be made in protecting the  
5 President's life. Further, they will probably ask questions  
6 regarding the possibilities that a conspiracy existed.  
7 Such general questioning certainly necessitates that the DCI  
8 be made aware of the positions taken during previous  
9 interviews."

10 That language suggests that there was some concern for --  
11 Mr. Rocca. Well, this was a concern for a briefing  
12 paper, as to what the main lines of response should be. This  
13 is a perfectly normal and regular procedure, followed in  
14 the Agency before and since and in other agencies, and I think  
15 we saw yesterday the briefing paper that went up, that was  
16 the product of, a combined product. But how the paper was  
17 used by Mr. Helms is something that I can't respond to.

18 You asked me whether or not --

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Either Mr. Helms or Mr. McCone  
20 apparently--

21 Mr. Rocca. You asked me about Mr. McCone.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, and apparently the briefing --

23 Mr. Rocca. So, I have no way of knowing what Mr.  
24 Helms did with the paper, with Mr. McCone, or whether it  
25 was used at all. It would seem to me that as you read their

1 depositions before the Commission, they had obviously read  
 2 the paper or it had been reviewed. However, what they said  
 3 was far less substantial than what was indicated there. So  
 4 I can't say anything on the basis of a simple analysis at  
 5 all at that point.

6 But this is a routine request for preparing material  
 7 for the boss.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Was there any concern that the boss  
 9 would start making inconsistent statements?

10 Mr. Rocca. Why, I can't believe it. That wasn't  
 11 what prompted it. It was that he would have a formal basis  
 12 for saying whatever he had to say that would be responsive  
 13 to the Commission's needs.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. During its review of the Agency's  
 15 Oswald file and related files, the staff of this committee has  
 16 come across transcripts of telephone conversations involving,  
 17 for example, Mr. McCone, Mr. [ ] My question to you is  
 18 whether as a matter of routine telephone conversations were  
 19 either taped or transcribed by the use of a stenographer  
 20 listening to the conversations?

21 Do you have any knowledge of this taking place in  
 22 1963 and 1964?

23 Mr. Rocca. I have no knowledge that this took place  
 24 as far as CI is concerned at any time, which is what I can  
 25 seek to. That it was a practice of the Director to have these

1 conversations recorded is something I think that came out  
2 of the Watergate matter and is therefore a matter of record  
3 for his own use.

4 But whether any of that was done in 1963, now, is  
5 simply -- this is the first I've heard of it.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to show you a transcript  
7 of a telephone conversation between Mr. McCone and Mr. Hoover  
8 dated 26 November, 1963. It is CIA document number 2134.

9 Does that appear to be a transcript of a telephone  
10 conversation?

11 Mr. Rocca. Yes, it does.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you read the middle paragraph,  
13 which makes reference to an FBI informant.

14 (Pause)

15 Mr. Rocca. That's LIENVOY. That's their material  
16 ]

17 ]  
18 Mr. Goldsmith. So, how would --

19 Mr. Rocca. I would interpret it that way. I have  
20 never read this piece of paper that I recall. That would be  
21 my reaction.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, let's get this clear.

23 The Director of the FBI, Mr. Hoover, is making referenc  
24 to an informant that the FBI had in Mexico City, and he is  
25 indicating that the informant has informed the Bureau as to

the contents of Oswald's conversations in Mexico City.

From your answer, I take it that you assume that Mr. Hoover is referring to the LIENVOY operation.

Mr. Rocca. And he is subtly letting Mr. McCone know that Mr. McCone's resources down there were not unique, that they, too, had access to [ ]

Mr. Goldsmith. [ ]

Mr. Rocca. [ ]

], yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. [ ]

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, how would Hoover have had access to this information?

Mr. Rocca. By the 26th, or by after the event, he would have been able to get [ ] I think everything. I think they just rushed to give him everything.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, he would have had a [ ] informant, do you think, that might have given him this information?

Mr. Rocca. I think that that terminology is sort of standard terminology that he would have used to cover and sort of mythologize their coverage down there, and that what he is referring to are [ ] the Bureau would

1 have independently developed on the case by that time. I  
2 would defer, obviously, to a Bureau man in reading it. But  
3 I think that this is the correct line of interpretation.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know Anne Goodpasture?

5 Mr. Rocca. The name is familiar and I must have met  
6 her.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. She was a case officer in Mexico City  
8 working with Win Scott.

9 Mr. Rocca. She wrote that wonderful summary --

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Which summary are you referring to?

11 Mr. Rocca. -- of the case, of all the file. It's  
12 a thick collection which summarizes every document in the  
13 Mexican file.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. In the Mexican Oswald file?

15 Mr. Rocca. Yes, in the Mexican Oswald file. I  
16 don't know. I mean, it may well be, but I certainly have  
17 not dealt with her -- well, I hesitate to use the word  
18 "intimately," but in the sense of this case.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

20 Do you know Mr. Scott Breckenridge?

21 Mr. Rocca. Only in terms of the formality of concern  
22 of the Inspector General.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether he was ever  
24 involved in the investigation of the Kennedy assassination?

25 Mr. Rocca. I don't know at all.

1 The individual over there who was involved was Lieder,  
2 John Lieder at the time I left.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, I have no further questions  
4 to ask you.

5 I would like to thank you for making yourself available  
6 to the committee staff for the past day and a half. You've  
7 been very patient and you've been very generous with your  
8 time.

9 I would like to ask for your assurance that you will  
10 not disclose your testimony nor the questions that were  
11 asked of you to anyone else.

12 Mr. Rocca. I give you that assurance.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you.

14 We will be in contact with you in an effort to resolve  
15 some of the questions that arose by virtue of this deposition.

16 Thank you very much, sir.

17 Mr. Rocca. Not at all.

18 Thank you.

19 Thank you, Mr. Berk.

20 Mr. Berk. Thank you very much.

21 (Whereupon, at 1:27 o'clock, p.m., the taking of the  
22 deposition of Raymond G. Rocca concluded.)  
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