

Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification

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After consultation with appropriate Federal agencies, the Review Board determined that the attached record from the House Select Committee on Assassinations may now be opened in full -- as referenced in the Federal Register notice for the Board's 12/13/95 meeting.

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
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HEARINGS

Before The

Subcommittee on the Assassination of

John F. Kennedy

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

EXECUTIVE SESSION

Washington, D.C.

Monday, June 19, 1978

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C O N T E N T S

2	<u>TESTIMONY OF:</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
3	Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko	6

4
5
6
7
8
9
10

E X H I B I T S

11	JFK F-1 Sworn Statement	<u>Marked</u>	<u>Received</u>
12		48	

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
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EXECUTIVE SESSION

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Monday, June 19, 1978

U.S. House of Representatives,
Select Committee on Assassinations,
Subcommittee on the Assassination
of John F. Kennedy
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 8:00 o'clock
p.m., in Room 1-D, Headquarters, Central Intelligence Agency,
Langley, Virginia, the Honorable Louis Stokes (Chairman of
the Committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Stokes, Define, Preyer, Fauntroy,
Burke, Sawyer, Dodd, Ford, Fithian and Edgar.

Also present: G. R. Blakey, G. Cornwell, E. Berning,
J. Smith, R. C. Morrison, K. Klein and M. Goldsmith.

The Chairman. At this time we will open the hearing.

Will you read for the record those members officially
designated?

At this time the Chair will entertain a motion to go
into executive session.

Mr. Dodd. I so move, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. That should be for today's hearing

1 and one subsequent day, to be held in executive session. On
2 the basis of information obtained by the Committee, the Com-
3 mittee believes the evidence or testimony may tend to
4 defame, degrade or incriminate people in accordance with
5 Section 2(k)(5) and 116 of the Rules of the House and
6 Committee Rule 3.3(5) requires such hearings to be in
7 executive session.

8 Mr. Dodd?

9 Mr. Dodd. I so move, Mr. Chairman, in accordance with
10 those rules, that the Committee be closed.

11 The Chairman. It has been properly moved that this
12 Committee go into executive session.

13 The Clerk will call the roll.

14 Ms. Berning. Mr. Stokes?

15 The Chairman. Aye.

16 Ms. Berning. Mr. Devine?

17 Mr. Devine. Aye.

18 Ms. Berning. Mr. Preyer?

19 Mr. Preyer. Aye.

20 Ms. Berning. Mr. McKinney?

21 (No response.)

22 Ms. Berning. Mr. Fauntroy?

23 Mr. Fauntroy. Aye.

24 Ms. Berning. Mr. Thone?

25 (No response.)

1 Ms. Berning. Mrs. Burke?

2 Mrs. Burke. Aye.

3 Ms. Berning. Mr. Sawyer?

4 Mr. Sawyer. Aye.

5 Ms. Berning. Mr. Dodd?

6 Mr. Dodd. Aye.

7 Ms. Berning. Mr. Fithian?

8 Mr. Fithian. Aye.

9 Ms. Berning. Mr. Edgar?

10 Mr. Edgar. Aye.

11 Ms. Berning. Ten ayes, Mr. Chairman.

12 The Chairman. Ten members having voted in the affirmative,
13 the meeting is now in executive session and members of the
14 public are thereby excluded.

15 Will the witness at this time stand and be sworn?

16 Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you will
17 give before this Committee is the truth, and nothing but the
18 truth, so help you God?

19 Mr. Nosenko. I do.

20 The Chairman. You may be seated.

21 The Chair will ask the Witness if he has been given a
22 copy of the Committee Rules?

23 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir, I have them.

24 The Chairman. Have you been subpoenaed to appear
25 before this Committee or are you appearing voluntarily?

1 Mr. Nosenko. I am appearing voluntarily.

2 The Chairman. Thank you.

3 At this time it is my obligation to advise you that
4 this Committee has been constituted by virtue of a resolution
5 passed by the House of Representatives, United States Congress,
6 and part of the resolution by which we were constituted, in
7 order to investigate the death of the late John F. Kennedy,
8 states under House Resolution 222 that the Committee shall
9 conduct a full and complete investigation to study the circum-
10 stances surrounding the assassination and death of President
11 John F. Kennedy, including determining whether the existing
12 laws of the United States Congress concerning the protection of
13 the President and the investigatory jurisdiction and capability
14 of agencies and departments are adequate in their provision and
15 enforcement, and whether there was a disclosure of evidence
16 and information among the agencies and departments of the
17 United States Government, and whether any evidence or informa-
18 tion not in the possession of an agency or department would
19 have been of assistance in investigating the assassination
20 and why such information was not provided or collected by that
21 agency or department, and to make recommendations to the House,
22 if the Select Committee deems it appropriate, for the amendment
23 of existing legislation or the enactment of new legislation.

24 At this point, the Chair will recognize counsel for
25 the Committee. You may proceed to question the witness.

1 Mr. Klein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

2 Before we begin, I would like to note for the record that
3 in addition to a stenographer taking stenographic notes of this
4 hearing, that it is also being recorded on tape. It has been
5 agreed that this hearing will be taped pursuant to certain
6 conditions, and these conditions are being set down because of
7 the security procedures involved, in that the witness fears
8 any permanent tape being made of his voice, that it might get
9 into the hands of KGB agents and this would greatly endanger
10 his own physical well-being.

11 The conditions that are being agreed upon are that it
12 will be taped with a single purpose of verifying the transcript
13 and that it does not constitute an agency record; and that
14 the tapes will be placed in a sealed envelope and handed to
15 Mr. Gmirkin who is a CIA agency employee. He will keep them
16 for retention until they are required for review at CIA
17 Headquarters by the reporter. The reporter will review those
18 tapes at CIA Headquarters and he will be accompanied by a
19 designated staff member of this Committee. Upon completion
20 of the review of the tape by the stenographer, the tapes will
21 be returned to Mr. Gmirkin. He will first erase them and
22 then arrange for the destruction of these tapes.

23 Would you please state your name for the record?
24
25

1 TESTIMONY OF YURI IVANOVICH NOSENKO

2 Mr. Nosenko. My name is Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko.

3 Mr. Klein. Mr. Nosenko, do you have any difficulty
4 speaking or understanding English?

5 Mr. Nosenko. I understand English. I can speak. Of
6 course, it is not perfect language, but I understand and I
7 think I can deliver my thoughts.

8 Mr. Klein. You don't need any interpreter for this
9 hearing?

10 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

11 Mr. Klein. You are appearing before this Committee
12 voluntarily?

13 Mr. Nosenko. Absolutely.

14 Mr. Klein. Prior to today, you have been given a copy of
15 the rules of this Committee?

16 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

17 Mr. Klein. I would like you to listen to the following
18 paragraphs of biographical data and tell us if they are correct.

19 Your name is Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko. You were born the
20 30th of October, 1927, in Nikolayev, Ukraine, in the Soviet
21 Union?

22 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

23 Mr. Klein. As a child you lived in Nikolayev in the
24 Ukraine and in Leningrad, where your father, Ivan Nosenko, was
25 a prominent Soviet shipbuilding engineer. At the time of his

1 death in 1956, your father was a Soviet Minister of Shipbuilding
2 in Moscow?

3 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

4 Mr. Klein. As a teenager, during World War II, you
5 attended various naval training schools. At the end of the
6 war you entered the Institute of International Relations in
7 Moscow where you specialized in International law and English?

8 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

9 Mr. Klein. In early 1953 you arranged for a transfer to
10 the KGB Second Chief Directorate, where you were assigned as
11 a counterintelligence officer in the American Embassy Section
12 of the American Department?

13 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

14 Mr. Klein. As a member of the embassy section you were
15 targeted against American correspondents and U.S. Army person-
16 nel residing in Moscow?

17 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

18 Mr. Klein. In June of 1955 you transferred to the Tourist
19 Section of the Seventh Department of the Second Chief
20 Directorate?

21 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

22 Mr. Klein. In 1958 you joined the newly created American-
23 British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Department?

24 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

25 Mr. Klein. In January, 1960, you were transferred to the

1 American Embassy Section of the American Department?

2 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

3 Mr. Klein. In March, 1962, you accompanied the Soviet
4 delegation to the Disarmament Conference in Geneva,
5 Switzerland as a security escort. You remained in Switzerland
6 until the 15th of June, 1962, at which time you returned to
7 the Soviet Union and resumed your duties in the American-
8 British Commonwealth Section?

9 Mr. Nosenko. In the Seventh Department of the Second
10 Chief Directorate.

11 Mr. Klein. In January, 1964, you again traveled to Switz-
12 erland as a security escort for the Soviet delegation and at
13 that time you defected. On 4 February 1964, you were subsequently
14 brought to the United States?

15 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

16 Mr. Klein. Mr. Nosenko, are you voluntarily appearing
17 before this Committee without a lawyer?

18 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

19 Mr. Klein. Would you tell the Committee what is the KGB?

20 Mr. Nosenko. KGB is the Committee of State Security under
21 the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union.

22 Mr. Klein. What is its function?

23 Mr. Nosenko. Secret police, it is intelligence, counter-
24 intelligence. More correctly to say, if you take CIA, FBI,
25 all other agencies who are dealing, working in the field of

1 intelligence, put in one fist, this is the KGB.

2 Mr. Klein. You worked for the First and the Seventh
3 Departments of the Second Chief Directorate, is that correct?

4 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Klein. What is the function of the Second Chief
6 Directorate?

7 Mr. Nosenko. Prior to 1960 the Second Chief Directorate
8 was responsible for counterintelligence work against all
9 foreigners coming to the Soviet Union, diplomats, tourists,
10 businessmen, delegations, private visitors.

11 But in 1960, from January, 1960, the Second Chief
12 Directorate in process of reorganization, took in one
13 fist, put all counterintelligence services which were prior
14 different services in the KGB. Let us say prior to 1960 KGB
15 were involved in counterintelligence work six different outfits.
16 Second Chief Directorate working against all foreigners,
17 counterintelligence work; Third Chief Directorate counter-
18 intelligence work against all Soviet armed forces. Fourth
19 Directorate counterintelligence work against Soviet intelligencia;
20 Fifth Directorate counterintelligence work in Soviet industry,
21 economy; Sixth Directorate, counterintelligence work in
22 transport; and Department K counterintelligence worked on all
23 atomic industry enterprises.

24 In 1960 it was made reorganization sponsored by the Central
25 Committee of the Communist Party Soviet Union, and personally

1 by Khrushchev, on the proposal of the Chairman of KGB, former
2 Chairman, Shelepin, and they put all these counterintelligence
3 outfits in Second Chief Directorate, excluding Third Chief Direc-
4 torate, which was dealing with counterintelligence in all armed forces. From
5 1960 and up to my defection, Second Chief Directorate was responsible for the
6 whole counterintelligence work, excluding the armed forces.

7 Mr. Klein. You also worked in the Seventh Department of the Second
8 Chief Directorate. What is the function of the Seventh Department?

9 Mr. Nosenko. The Seventh Department was responsible
10 for the work, counterintelligence work, against all foreign
11 tourists coming to visit Soviet Union, excluding Soviet Bloc
12 countries. I mean Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and
13 this type.

14 Mr. Klein. What were your responsibilities when you
15 worked in the Seventh Department of the Second Chief Directorate?

16 Mr. Nosenko. In the period 1955 up until January, 1960,
17 I was working in Anglo-American Section -- no, first of all,
18 '55 to '57, it was one section, against all tourists. In 1958
19 they were created on this base of one section, two sections to
20 work against tourists, one section against United States,
21 Britain, and Canada, and the other section against all other
22 countries. I was working in the Anglo-American Section.

23 From 1960 the whole department was working against
24 tourists; it was expanding because the tourists were expanding,
25 the amount of tourists coming Soviet Union was expanding and

1 KGB in Moscow responsible Seventh Department for work against
2 tourists also was expanding its apparatus.

3 Mr. Klein. Was it part of your job to try to entrap
4 American and British tourists and recruit them for the KGB?

5 Mr. Nosenko. Absolutely right.

6 Mr. Klein. How did you try to entrap them?

7 Mr. Nosenko. The main task in the work, counterintelli-
8 gence work, of the KGB against tourists, first of all, to spot
9 the so-called interesting targets. Who are interesting
10 targets? Speaking about American tourists, anyone on whom the
11 KGB has any information that he is an officer of American
12 intelligence community or suspected in connection with American
13 intelligence community, number one target.

14 Anyone who is working for Federal Government of the
15 United States, number one target.

16 Anyone who is specialist in any field on Soviet Union or
17 Russia, if it will be language, history, law, economy, whatever
18 it will be, it is also an interesting target.

19 All students, young people studying Russian language,
20 Russian history, Russian economy, whatever concerns the Soviet
21 Union or Russia, are interesting targets because there is always
22 the possibility that they in future will be working for the
23 Federal Government, for the State Department, for the Congress,
24 or maybe for intelligence community of the United States.

25 Besides that, anyone who has any Russian roots, if he was

1 not himself born in Russia but his parents, grandparents, were
2 born in Russia, is an interesting target.

3 The last one, any tourist who comes to the Soviet Union
4 second time automatically becomes an interesting target.

5 This is the category of people against whom Seventh
6 Department, Second Chief Directorate, was in the main working.

7 What I wanted to stress that KGB doesn't have possibility
8 and capability to cover all tourists; they don't even have
9 capability to cover 50 percent of all tourists. Small amount,
10 those who belong into this category, as I said, are interesting
11 targets.

12 Mr. Klein. How do you determine if a person fell into
13 one of your categories of "interesting"?

14 Mr. Nosenko. Let us say a man comes, an American comes in
15 Soviet Union. Before it may be some several years ago, 10
16 year, 15 years ago, he worked in the State Department. Maybe
17 he worked in the American Embassy in Moscow. He is a very
18 interesting target. Let us say there is information in the
19 archives of KGB, Central archives of KGB or archives of
20 intelligence service that Mr. Smith, let us say, was belonging
21 to American intelligence community which was noticed in process
22 of work of KGB, not only the Soviet Union but somewhere in any
23 part of the world, in the United States, in Germany or any other
24 place, and registration, what known facts about him, this
25 what gives immediately necessity for KGB to pay on him special

1 attention.

2 Let us say they don't have anything on this person but
3 in the process of being in the Soviet Union interpreter noticed
4 that in a group of tourists, let us say, 20 or 25 persons,
5 American tourists, everyone regularly, in the regular time,
6 going for breakfast, and an appropriate time, let's say, 9:30,
7 10:00 o'clock, the guide from Intourist takes them and leading
8 them to certain place, showplace for tourists; but one of the
9 tourists leaving hotel at 6:00 o'clock or 7:00 o'clock, 8:00
10 o'clock in the morning alone; KGB immediately pays attention
11 on him.

12 Let us say this tourist mailed a letter and this letter
13 was intercepted by the KGB, going to one of Soviet citizens.
14 He immediately smells of the work of American intelligence.

15 Against this target the work is going on to catch them
16 red-handed, those who are involved in any intelligence task, in
17 any intelligence operations. And on the basis of this maybe
18 try to recruit him or to put him on trial, to arrest him.
19 Tourists don't have any diplomatic immunity. It's not diplo-
20 mat. It is very easy for the KGB to arrest them.

21 What they have done by the way, in 1960-'61, the whole
22 number of processes against tourists, against those who are
23 interesting from the point of view to recruit them as sources.
24 KGB trying to involve them, let us say, in any intimate
25 relations with Russian women, to involve them in any black market

1 activities and through their agents, informants, then in a
2 certain moment to arrest them and on the basis of this threat
3 that he is going on trial, try to recruit him; or, let us say,
4 he showed some inclination toward homosexuality, which was very
5 widely used by the KGB, trying to scare him, to frighten him,
6 that in accordance with Soviet laws he is going in jail up
7 to eight years; but there is possibility always to cover if
8 he agrees also to help to those who will cover this case.

9 Mr. Klein. Was it difficult to recruit Americans?

10 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sure, it was difficult.

11 Mr. Klein. The Americans that you were able to success-
12 fully recruit --

13 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

14 Mr. Klein. How did you use them?

15 Mr. Nosenko. The majority of cases of recruitment
16 done by the Seventh Department, Second Chief Directorate,
17 99 percent were given to Intelligence Service and Intelligence
18 Service were deciding how they would use it. Prior to 1960,
19 there was a little bit, not a little bit, quite a bit, disorder
20 in this field.

21 The Seventh Department was recruiting right and left, not
22 even thinking there is any necessity or there is any use. Why?
23 Because recruitment considered a big success. Officers who
24 recruited received a monthly salary, thanks from the Chairman,
25 which go in his personal file. They were trying to recruit not

1 thinking how it would be used, this target. I remember in 1957
2 was woman recruited. She was a secretary living and working
3 in Salt Lake City in State of Utah. What KGB residentura in
4 New York or Washington could do? They cannot travel in the
5 State of Utah and she cannot travel such a long distance in
6 Washington or New York. Surely nobody will use it. From 1960
7 there was a strict order in approachment to recruitment.
8 If Seventh Department, Second Chief Directorate, sees there is
9 possibility to recruit a person, they prepare a paper and
10 before even transferring this paper to the Chiefs of Second
11 Chief Directorate, they are going in appropriate department, let
12 us say, concerning American tourists in American Department of
13 Intelligence Service, First Chief Directorate, and showing we
14 have such and such materials on such and such person. Are you
15 interested in him or not?

16 The Intelligence Service is telling, yes, we are interested
17 and Chief of department will put a signature. After that,
18 the officer, through his chiefs, put in papers for asking
19 permission from the chiefs of the Second Chief Directorate for
20 recruitment.

21 Only in the cases when Intelligence Service agreed. As
22 I said, it was 99 percent. But from late 1950s the Seventh
23 Department, Second Chief Directorate, started to pay attention
24 to recruitment, let us say, with Americans from tourist firms
25 and tourist firms which had any deals, negotiations, any contracts

1 with Soviet Intourist. Why? Because when KGB had sources
2 in, let us say, Tours, Four Wind Tours, tourist firm and
3 others, we had to get little crumbs of information on tourists
4 who must come ahead before they will come.

5 I had a couple of such agents. Let us say he was
6 recruited on the basis, he wanted to make a deal with Intourist.
7 When he has come for negotiations with Intourist, my officer,
8 one of the officers, who was under cover for Intourist,
9 participated in the negotiations. Without permission of KGB
10 Intourist is not making deals. KGB is telling when to make
11 deals and with whom. The officer, being in contact with this
12 American businessman, from the Soviet American tourist firm,
13 invite him for dinner, for lunch, where he hints him, that I
14 can maybe help you make a deal with Intourist. This tourist
15 businessman interesting to have a deal because he is making money
16 on this.

17 He says, "But, you know, there is such a saying, I will
18 scratch your back if you will scratch my back. Agreed?" He
19 says, "Agreed." Here is a deal with Intourist. After that,
20 the officer slowly started to approach him to the prime interest,
21 what they want from him. They are asking him, "When you are
22 directing groups or individual tourists, if you find out
23 that this or that American citizen who is going to visit Soviet
24 Union is working for the Federal Government but he is not put
25 it in the questionnaire, you know, you put us a certain mark

1 and officer settles what kind of mark, a dot or a scrape of
2 the fourth and proper corner, or let us say, you are gathering
3 a group of 20, 25 persons and on the last day when you get
4 24 or 25 persons, there is added one or more Americans to
5 this group. We are interested in this because the analysis of
6 work showed it usually intelligence, American intelligence,
7 adding their person or their officer.

8 Further, let us say this American citizen who wants to
9 come to the Soviet Union knows Russian language but he did not
10 put it in questionnaire because there is not such a question,
11 "Do you know the Russian language?" There is a question, "Do
12 you have any relatives in the Soviet Union? Any friends?"
13 If he found out that he knows Russian language or he has some
14 friends, some relatives, he will put us certain mark.

15 For this purpose it was started from 1958 to recruit
16 from American tourist firms, and I can tell you that by '60,
17 '63, '64, we had almost in every American tourist firm which
18 was dealing with Intourist, we had at least one source. This
19 was for the purpose of using these foreigners by the Second
20 Chief Directorate of the Seventh Department for its own
21 purposes.

22 In other cases, what ever recruitments have been done, we
23 immediately transferred file of materials to Intelligence
24 Service.

25 Mr. Klein. Were the people that you recruited ever used

1 for propaganda purposes, anti-American, anti-Western propaganda?

2 Mr. Nosenko. In my cases, in the Seventh Department, in
3 years of my work, I don't remember any case. I am not
4 excluding any, but simply I am telling you that I do not know.

5 Mr. Klein. Did you personally ever induce any Americans
6 to defect to the Soviet Union?

7 Mr. Nosenko. No.

8 Mr. Klein. Did you ever try to induce any to defect?

9 Mr. Nosenko. No. I participated in recruitments, yes.

10 Mr. Klein. Can sometimes a recruitment lead to a
11 defection?

12 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, it can.

13 Mr. Klein. Was that considered a favorable result?

14 Mr. Nosenko. No.

15 Mr. Klein. Why is that?

16 Mr. Nosenko. KGB was interested to recruit and person
17 goes back home, he can supply information, work with KGB
18 residenturas in the United States.

19 Mr. Klein. Do you know of any KGB officers who had
20 convinced Americans to defect to Russia?

21 Mr. Nosenko. I do not know. Just a second, sir. There
22 was a case, it was intelligence services started, a case of
23 Martin and Mitchell, two employees of NSA; but I do not know the
24 details. It seems to me they simply were warned by KGB it
25 is time to go, because otherwise they will be arrested. This

1 is the only case.

2 Mr. Klein. At the time you defected, what was your title?

3 Mr. Nosenko. I was Deputy Chief of Seventh Department,
4 Second Chief Directorate.

5 Mr. Klein. Was your advancement to that position in part
6 due to your successes in recruiting Americans?

7 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, Americans, British.

8 Mr. Klein. Did you receive awards and bonuses for
9 recruitment?

10 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Klein. When you recruited an American, did you ever
12 try to gather intelligence information from them?

13 Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

14 Mr. Klein. How would you go about doing that?

15 Mr. Nosenko. It depends. Let us say in 1956 it was
16 recruitment of an assistant professor, one of the well known
17 universities in the United States; he was recruited on compro-
18 mising materials; he was involved in homosexual activity
19 in the Soviet Union. KGB planted him an agent and made photo-
20 graphy of this.

21 The pitch, the recruitment was done not in Moscow, but during
22 his trip when he left Moscow. It was the first recruitment
23 of -- tourism was opened in 1955, the first recruitment took
24 place in 1956 of any tourist. It so happens that it was an
25 American tourist. He was recruited and approached in Kiev by

1 me. Colonel Kozlov, Deputy Chief of Seventh Department, I
2 went with him to Kiev for this operation.

3 After recruitment, he agreed to cooperate on the basis
4 of the threat that he is going to jail in accordance with
5 Soviet law it is punishable; he does not have any immunity;
6 besides that, the KGB will try to supply the information about
7 his activity, such behavior in Soviet Union to university
8 where he is working. The man agreed to cooperate with Soviet
9 Intelligence. From him was taken in written form agreement.

10 After that, always in any case of recruitment, on the
11 money basis or compromising material, always KGB officers
12 trying to get from him something, some kind of information which
13 can be later used, if he will be rejecting, to point out to
14 him, "Just a second. You entered into relations; you started
15 to supply material against your country" or whatever he knows.
16 In this case, in the case of the assistant professor, we were
17 interested and KGB very much interested. In Vatican there is
18 Russian School. In Vatican in Rome there is a school
19 well known, Russicum School, because it is known that intelli-
20 gences of the West are using this channel. We were interested
21 in who were the teachers whom he had seen, who were the stu-
22 dents in this school.

23 Besides that, he had given several names whom he knew.
24 Besides that, we were asking him about his university and
25 professors or teachers who were teaching any Russian or Soviet

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21

1 Union disciplines in his university and try to get from him some
2 characteristics on this person whom he mentioned. The idea
3 was that after that we have always the possibility to press
4 him that he supplied materials. He started up the "road"
5 road. By the way, as far as I know, even they had several
6 meetings with him later in the United States.

7 Mr. Klein. Approximately how many people did you recruit?

8 Mr. Nosenko. Twelve, fourteen.

9 Mr. Klein. How many years were you working when you
10 recruited those 14 people?

11 Mr. Nosenko. The first recruitment '56.

12 Mr. Klein. Up to '64.

13 Mr. Nosenko. Up to '64.

14 Mr. Klein. You were a specialist in recruiting Americans
15 to work for the KGB?

16 Mr. Nosenko. No, I cannot say I was a specialist.

17 Mr. Klein. That wasn't your specialty?

18 Mr. Nosenko. No, specialty was counterintelligence
19 work against foreigners. This is the specialty.

20 Mr. Klein. Wasn't recruiting part of the work?

21 Mr. Nosenko. It is a part, but this is not a specialty.

22 Mr. Klein. You also served in the First Department of
23 the Second Chief Directorate; is that correct?

24 Mr. Nosenko. The First Department, Second Chief
25 Directorate, yes.

1 Mr. Klein. What is the function of the First Department,
2 Second Chief Directorate?

3 Mr. Nosenko. To work against the American Embassy in
4 Moscow.

5 Mr. Klein. Could you elaborate a little bit on what you
6 did do?

7 Mr. Nosenko. A process of studying. You see, the work
8 against tourists differs from the work against diplomats,
9 because tourists are coming a short period of time and
10 diplomats are usually serving at least three, three and a half,
11 four years in the country. That is why the approach, the methods
12 are different, but the final task goes the same: first of
13 all, to spot a man, all personnel of the Embassy of the
14 United States in Moscow, those who are using the cover of
15 diplomats but practically are officers of American intelligence
16 community -- to spot these people and to watch them, to find
17 their sources, to find their targets, to find their agents,
18 and on the basis of this, catching him red-handed, try to
19 recruit, persona non grata announced, and after that, ask him
20 to leave the Soviet Union. Against diplomats who are not
21 involved in intelligence, the work is going on in directions
22 to accumulate as much as possible material to find on him as
23 a character, to study his strong points, his weak points
24 of character, his hobbies, his interests, his behavior, to find
25 any weak spot on which to try to make an approachment for

1 recruitment and for use in future by the Intelligence Service
2 in the United States or in any other part of the world where he
3 will be serving as a diplomat.

4 This is the prime task in work against the American
5 Embassy.

6 And one more, of course, to keep under complete control
7 all social contacts or whatever acquaintances, with soviet
8 population, having in mind those who have contacts with
9 American diplomats, with American personnel of the U.S. Embassy
10 in Moscow, must be agents or informants of the KGB or on many
11 occasions officers are socializing under certain covers. And
12 those who have had Soviet people, Soviet citizen contact,
13 immediately take in active work, checking the basis, what is
14 behind his acquaintance with this or that American diplomat
15 and to cut this connection. This in main three task, main tasks
16 in work against the American Embassy in Moscow.

17 Mr. Klein. You defected in early 1964. At what point
18 did you make the final decision to defect?

19 Mr. Nosenko. Pardon me?

20 Mr. Klein. I say, you defected in early 1964; is that
21 correct?

22 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

23 Mr. Klein. At what point did you, in your mind, make the
24 decision that you were going to defect?

25 Mr. Nosenko. Sir, the decision of defection didn't come

1 1958 there were two GRU. One GRU work with armed forces, and
2 another GRU was of navy intelligence separately. I was working
3 in navy intelligence. I was sent and I was working at the
4 Soviet Seventh Fleet in the Soviet Far East in the city of
5 Sovetskaya Gavan, Soviet harbor, where I was working in intelli-
6 gence of the Seventh Fleet.

7 I was working there in '51, '52, in the field of
8 information. Daily I have seen American periodic press; I have
9 seen newspapers. We were receiving San Diego Times, let us
10 say. We were receiving Stars and Stripes. We were getting
11 Army, Air Force and Navy magazines.

12 I, knowing language, , was digesting the press.

13 Besides that, intelligence of the Seventh Fleet had
14 several radio detachments which functioned day and night,
15 intercepting radio messages. Honestly, to tell you, gentlemen,
16 I remember it was the war in Korea, I tell you the Americans
17 were talking their heads off. I never forget when it was in the
18 Inchon operations prepared in 1952, we were leading by
19 radio intercept; we were leading every ship from the West Coast
20 up to Korea, every day on the map, where they are going, who
21 is captain of the ship, what cargo, what troops are there,
22 what air wings left the West Coast and going where he is
23 making stops -- all was intercepted, plus the press, and on the
24 basis of this we were making daily reports.

25 That is my information, direction.

1 Well, besides this work, I had the possibility to see
2 a little bit, not to see but to get the feel of American through
3 American press, not through Soviet newspapers. When I started
4 to work in KGB in Second Chief Directorate, it opened my
5 eyes. First of all, I think I was lucky I was working in
6 counterintelligence, not in intelligence, because working in
7 Second Chief Directorate, and not only in Moscow but every
8 year visiting different cities in Soviet Union, different
9 Republics and different inspection trips, or in some cases in
10 different conferences, I had the possibility to see how the KGB
11 working at the republics, different cities, different
12 districts.

13 I received a good, good feeling and understanding, working
14 in Second Chief Directorate, how the people are controlled, the
15 people of the Soviet Union, starting from small, urban region
16 or rural region, city, districts, until there were republics,
17 how to put the control of the whole population. Only working
18 in Second Chief Directorate I could really understand how could
19 one-party system -- the true dictatorial system, could survive
20 so many years, because of the strongest, strongest police, huge
21 machine, like KGB. Besides, there is MVD police, which is also
22 controlling population. Besides the party apparatus in every
23 region, every district, every city, party organization, in any
24 outfit, any factory, any plant, any institute, it is again
25 watchdog for population. The Second Chief Directorate, working

1 in this directorate helped me to understand. Further, surely
2 working in the Second Chief Directorate against the Americans
3 in the main I have seen regularly Time, Newsweek, U.S. News
4 and World Report, Reader's Digest. I read what is going
5 on. My personal contact, even with those whom I recruited,
6 with those whom I was not successful in the recruitment but were
7 attempts, my personal contact with Americans, with British --
8 they opened for me my eyes in true understanding of what is
9 the true freedom.

10 Further, my trips which I made, a few trips abroad as a
11 security officer with the Soviet groups, sport delegations,
12 diplomats, as security officer, opened my eyes even more,
13 because the first time I was abroad at the West I was so
14 surprised.

15 All my life I had heard and read how the West, how
16 capitalistic society is degenerating and going down and decaying
17 and I have seen, first my trip was in England, seeing the
18 contrary, they are prospering. I talked once in England the
19 first time I talked with a driver of a bus. I asked how much
20 he is making, how he is living, and what I compared, in Soviet
21 Union even engineer is not living in conditions what living the
22 driver of the bus. Well, these trips also helped me.

23 What I meant to say, it is the whole process. I cannot
24 tell you what directly but the whole, these things, it was
25 growing feeling, more and more dissatisfaction in the country

1 where I was living.

2 There is one more thing. Maybe it is not sounds important,
3 but I think it is important for me. You see, I was born in
4 Ukraine. I am Ukrainian by nationality. But when I was about
5 six and a half, seven years, I moved from the Ukraine to
6 Russian part, Leningrad and later Moscow. What I mean, I being
7 very small kid, I didn't accumulated the feeling to my Ukraine.
8 I was too small.

9 When I started in school in Leningrad and Moscow, I always
10 felt myself as a stranger because they have also certain
11 nicknames to different nationalities and nationalistic feeling
12 very sharp in the Soviet Union. I always was called such a name,
13 you know, derogatory. I felt a stranger there; that is why
14 I never accumulated love to the Soviet, to the Russian part. You
15 see, what I mean, this helped me later. I didn't ever have any
16 nostalgic feeling to the Soviet Union, to Russia itself. I
17 tried for several years, for several years I tried to be
18 approached. I made my attempts on the first, my trip to England.
19 I knew that among those British who were covering the Soviet
20 delegation with which I was in London, the residentura KGB in
21 London they told me that they have certain materials, that he
22 is an officer of MI-5, British counterintelligence. I invited
23 him in the evening for a beer, talk how I liked England, how
24 I liked London. I was a young officer. Then I was scared on
25 my own. I wanted to be approached. I was thinking that he

1 understand that I, who was undercover of Deputy Chief of
2 Delegation, I am the only one who is going from hotel alone in
3 embassy, from embassy back in hotel alone, not as delegation
4 member. They are always in groups.

5 Employees of Soviet Embassy in London are coming to visit
6 me. I have some talkings. I was thinking that they would under-
7 stand there is something funny here; it must be KGB guy. That
8 is why I approached to the guy who on whom they have materials,
9 that he is from British Intelligence. When I talked with him,
10 telling how I enjoyed London, how I enjoy my trip and being here
11 in England, I was thinking that he will start to get, or try
12 to get from me some feelings, nothing.

13 The next day then I again approached him. I brought in
14 Soviet Embassy several cans of caviar and said to him, "Sir,
15 I want to give you a small present, is black caviar. I enjoyed
16 our last evening going in pub, through a spirit of the British
17 pub, I enjoyed talking with you."

18 Now, I am thinking he must report to the chiefs, "Listen,
19 the Soviets tried to bribe me." They must make some decision.
20 Well, I am waiting. The next day he approached me and telling
21 Mr. Nicolai -- I was under false name on this trip as Nikoläev,
22 not Nosenko -- Mr. Nikoläev, I want to talk with you. I am
23 thinking, now it is coming. He approached me. I want to give
24 you a present. He give me a present, a beer mug. This is how
25 my first attempt to approach the British Intelligence went, in

1 vain.

2 Well, there were other attempts and nothing happened. In
3 1962, being on Disarmament Conference, I simply in open, not
4 in open, I tried several different also tricks; nothing happened.
5 After this I approached to member of American mission in Geneva
6 who a year before left Moscow but when he was in Moscow
7 for four years it was known to the KGB in process of their
8 work that if he is not an officer of the CIA, he at least must
9 be cooperating with CIA because it was registered a couple of
10 times his participations in intelligence mission. One of them
11 was mailing letter.

12 I approached to him and I said, "Sir, I would like to
13 see you privately anytime today." We arranged a meeting. I
14 said, "It is strictly between us." I met him and I said, "Sir,
15 I am officer of the KGB. I accompany the delegation as security
16 officer, but I want you to help me to have a contact with the
17 CIA."

18 Here I make a lie. I didn't tell that my approachment
19 is strictly on ideological basis. Why? Because it is known
20 in KGB in quite a few cases when the Soviet and KGB or
21 intelligence officer, trying to approach American intelligence,
22 they were rejected.

23 By the way, Colonel Penkovsky, the first time made an
24 attempt to be recruited, not recruited, tried to cooperate with
25 Americans, when he was working as assistant of Army attache in

1 the Soviet Embassy in Turkey, and he was rejected by American
2 intelligence, later this man has enough courage to repeat his
3 attempts and made approachment to British Intelligence who
4 started to work with him.

5 Surely then American intelligence also started. Well, it
6 was known several cases when it was rejected people. I knew it.
7 I was afraid that if I said on an ideological basis, plus my
8 father was a member of the Soviet Government, he is buried in
9 the Kremlin wall -- that in Nikolayev there is shipbuilding
10 plant of his name, they will never believe me, plus my growth
11 in positions in the Seventh Department, Second Chief Directorate,
12 that is why I decided I wanted to say, I simply need some money.
13 I want to sell a couple pieces of information, \$500. But this
14 was my approachment and when I approached them, the only one
15 condition I told them in the beginning -- and I met them quite
16 a few times in Geneva in '62 -- I said, "Under no conditions
17 I won't go on any meeting with you in Moscow or the Soviet
18 Union because hoo, hoo, I working in counterintelligence; I know
19 that one meeting, but the second, that is all, it goes away.
20 No, I will not agree to meet you. Only when I will come next
21 time abroad I will contact you."

22 Mr. Klein. When you defected in 1964, did you leave behind
23 a wife and child?

24 Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

25 Mr. Klein. Now, in intelligence circles, if a defector

1 is legitimate, they use the term "bona fide" to describe him?

2 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

3 Mr. Klein. If a defector is sent by a foreign intelligence
4 agency, do they use the term "dispatched" to describe him?

5 Have you heard that term, "dispatched"?

6 Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

7 Mr. Klien. Are you a bona fide defector or a dispatched
8 defector?

9 Mr. Nosenko. I am bona fide.

10 Mr. Klein. Is your defection in any way part of a KGB
11 plan?

12 Mr. Nosenko. No.

13 Mr. Klein. How long after your defection in 1964 was it
14 before you were brought to the United States?

15 Mr. Nosenko. I come in January 1964 in Geneva. On the
16 second day I sent a cable which I had addressed, and in two
17 days I knew by prearranged in 1962, I knew in a certain place
18 I will be met. I appeared in this place on the day before, for
19 checking for security purposes. The street was very, it
20 wasn't main street, not many people. I know the time when I
21 must meet. I was at the same time but the day before simply
22 to check this area. It was very ideal conditions and exactly
23 at a certain time when I appeared, two minutes before the
24 appropriate time -- of course, two or three hours spent before
25 checking that I am don't have any tail, do not have any tail, I

1 appeared and at exactly the appropriate time appeared a person --
2 by the way, on the street there wasn't a soul; there were a
3 couple of cars, which I checked before; they were empty; no
4 one. There wasn't a soul. Then appeared gentleman with hat
5 absolutely covering his face, with big, dark glasses -- it
6 was dark because it was evening -- some kind of false beard,
7 a moustache, and passing by me he put in my pocket a little
8 note.

9 I left immediately the place and after spending some
10 time checking that I don't have again no tail, I approached the
11 public phone, the telephone booth, read the note, that it was
12 phone, where to give a call. I give a call. There was voice
13 of an officer whom I had seen in '62 said, "George, welcome.
14 This-and-this address." I said, "Okay." I left. I checked.
15 When I seen it was clear, I took taxi, arrived. I
16 arrived after it took place about forty minutes. Forty minutes
17 later this officer who passed me a note arrived. He was still
18 circling and checking. I told him from the first day,
19 "Gentlemen, this time I am not returning back. I want to
20 start procedures on my defection."

21 A day is passing, two, three, four. There were certain
22 conditions when I went. First of all, the condition was that
23 I was being deputy Chief of the Department, I can get recalled
24 anytime for preparation of All Union Conference on Tourism
25 which must take place April or May. Under this agreement, I

1 was allowed to go abroad on a short time.

2 Second, the Chief of the whole Counterintelligence Service,
3 General Gribanov, which I found out two or three days before
4 leaving in Geneva, himself went abroad; very unusual case; he
5 went to Austraiia and after Austria, France, Paris, and on the
6 way back he must stop in Geneva; and time coming any day he can
7 stop in Geneva. Surely he will see me and say, "What in the
8 world are you doing here, Deputy Chief of Department, for security
9 purposes with such small delegation."

10 He will say, "Let us go back home." Of course, when
11 decision was made, when is going on, they told me procedures
12 is going on, surely I was nervous, and the last straw happened
13 the third of February, 1964. The head of the Soviet delegation
14 on Disarmament Conference, Mr. Tsazapkin, said that next day I
15 want all delegation to put in one place. Soviet mission in
16 Geneva has one building where we will put everyone. We have
17 part living in one hotel, part in another hotel, and himself,
18 the head of the delegation, and his deputy, was living in
19 the Soviet mission. We were splitted. "I want eveyrone the
20 next day to move. We will be all in one building." For me,
21 it would be difficult every day; every day I was going and
22 visiting officers from CIA. I felt that some kind that was
23 going on, you know, foul play or whatever you say. They are
24 not in a hurry. It passed over ten days more and they are
25 not telling when it will be. I said, "When will we start to

1 move." After this last straw when Jsazapkin announced that the
2 delegation must be living in one building, the next day, morning,
3 I left, suitcase and everything. I took only small, small
4 briefcase and directly wnet to the secret address. I said,
5 "Gentlemen, I am not returning." "Why? We are not ready."
6 I said, "Uh-uh." I said, "I am not going. I cannot." "No,
7 no, no, we are not ready." I said, "No, gentlemen, there has
8 come a recall telegram: -- it was a false statement; it wasn't
9 true -- "but, gentlemen, I don't know how long to continue
10 this game."

11 They didn't even started anything to do. I simply pushed
12 them on this. I made a false statement about the recall tele-
13 gram which didn't come. It could be, but there wasn't. This
14 night, on the 4th, by midnight, I was transferred to Germany,
15 Frankfurt, where I was staying up to the 12th of February. On
16 the 12th of February I arrived in the United States of 1964.

17 Mr. Klein. Upon your arrival in the U.S. in February
18 of 1964, did there begin an investigation of your bona fides
19 by the FBI and the CIA?

20 Mr.Nosenko. Right.

21 Mr. Klein. Were you questioned by the FBI?

22 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

23 Mr. Klein. Were you questioned by the CIA?

24 Mr. Nosenko. There were questions but it was not any
25 official interrogation or investigation.

1 Mr. Klein. You were questioned by the CIA agents
2 beginning in 1964, were you not?

3 Mr. Nosenko. In general, sometimes they would come
4 and talk, nothing was recorded. Like for example, the FBI,
5 several persons were coming in daily. We would start in session
6 at 10:00, let us say, 9:30. We would break for lunch, then
7 continue further.

8 Mr. Klein. But you spoke with agents from both the FBI
9 and the CIA?

10 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

11 Mr. Klein. When you were questioned in 1964 by the FBI
12 and the CIA, was the subject of Lee Harvey Oswald one of the
13 things they both spoke to you about?

14 Mr. Nosenko. As I remember rightly, there arrived an agent
15 from the FBI who said that he has some connection with
16 the Warren Commission and he was asking me questions concerning
17 Oswald, whatever I knew. After that -- it was recorded. After
18 that -- I had seen him second time -- his conversation was transcribed.
19 I read it with him and I signed it.

20 But later I was interrogated by CIA concerning Oswald.
21 I mean in the second part of 1964.

22 Mr. Klein. Prior to your defection, did you expect that
23 you would be questioned by the FBI and the CIA about what
24 you knew of Lee Harvey Oswald. Before you defected?

25 Mr. Nosenko. Surely, I did not know everything, and I told

1 them what I knew.

2 Mr. Klein. What I am saying is, prior to the time you
3 defected -- you were still in Russia -- did you know that the
4 question of what Lee Harvey Oswald did in Russia was a very
5 important question in the United States, that Americans were
6 interested in that?

7 Mr. Nosenko. Honestly, I didn't have such a thought,
8 because he didn't do anything there which indicated that he
9 was involved in intelligence work, and at the same time the
10 KGB did not do anything concerning him in approachment or recruit-
11 ment him. But the fact, surely, what I knew of him, I told
12 but it didn't come to me any such importance of this question
13 in those days even when I come in 1964 because we didn't notice
14 the KGB working against Oswald, didn't notice anything in his
15 behavior indicated that he has a certain mission intelligence.

16 And at the same time, KGB, because of a certain number of
17 things, completely crossed the question concerning use of
18 him.

19 Mr. Klein. When you came to the United States in 1964,
20 the FBI and the CIA began to speak to you and asked you questions
21 about Lee Harvey Oswald. Did you then realize that that was
22 an important subject to the Americans?

23 Mr. Nosenko. Surely, surely. It is an important question.
24 I understand even there that it is important, but simply I
25 tried to tell you that there wasn't anything done by the KGB

1 of vital importance -- recruitment, approachment to him, and
2 there wasn't by KGB anything noticed in his behavior indicated
3 that he has come with purpose of, let us say, some espionage
4 activity.

5 Mr. Klein. I understand you are saying that the KGB
6 did not take any action with regard to Oswald. What I am asking
7 you is, the CIA or the FBI, were they very interested in
8 finding out whether the KGB had taken any action or not with
9 regard to Oswald?

10 Mr. Nosenko. Gentlemen, they were interested but it was
11 not their prime interest; prime interest was case, cases,
12 recruitments of Americans.

13 Mr. Klein. When you were still in Russia, did you know
14 that Lee Harvey Oswald was the alleged assassin of President
15 Kennedy?

16 Mr. Nosenko. In 1963, two hours after it took place,
17 was announced on radio that took place assassination of the
18 President of the United States. Sometime later was a
19 second announcement that the killer was Lee Harvey Oswald.

20 Mr. Klein. Was there an investigation by the KGB on
21 Lee Harvey Oswald?

22 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

23 Mr. Klein. Was it of great importance that the KGB
24 investigate him?

25 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, it was given by the KGB, by the Soviet

1 Government, very great importance.

2 Mr. Klein. And did it occur to you at that time that the
3 American Government would also be very interested in what Lee
4 Harvey Oswald did or did not do in Russia?

5 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

6 Mr. Klein. So you did know it was of great concern to
7 Americans what Oswald did or didn't do in Russia?

8 Mr. Nosenko. What was concerned Americans, I did not
9 know what concerned Americans. I could imagine but knowing
10 that there wasn't recruitment taking place, if he was recruited,
11 then it becomes vitally important.

12 Mr. Klein. Did you imagine that Americans might be very
13 interested in whether or not he had been recruited, that the
14 question would be something that Americans would be interested
15 in?

16 Mr. Nosenko. Honestly speaking, I was thinking that their
17 attitude would be that they would understand that he is not
18 stable person, that he is a nut, because all his behavior shows
19 he is a nut, not only trying to commit suicide, but he defected.
20 He was allowed to defect, finally was allowed. How long was
21 he there before he decided to return back? After he was
22 back then he tried again, attempts to go again Soviet Union.
23 He is a tumbleweed, a rolling stone.

24 Mr. Klein. You are talking about information which you
25 knew as a member of the KGB, is that right?

1 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

2 Mr. Klein. Did it occur to you that Americans, not
3 having access to the files that you had, would be very interested
4 to know the facts that you have given us?

5 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, I agree.

6 Mr. Klein. When you spoke to the FBI and the CIA in 1964,
7 was it apparent that they were interested in knowing?

8 Mr. Nosenko. Sure, they wanted to know whatever I knew,
9 what I knew I knew.

10 Mr. Klein. Is it part of the duties of an intelligence
11 officer to have a good memory?

12 Mr. Nosenko. Sure.

13 Mr. Klein. Do you have a good memory?

14 Mr. Nosenko. I cannot tell about myself. I don't think
15 I have a bad memory, but I can't say I have a good memory.
16 I have memory.

17 Mr. Klein. When you spoke to the FBI and the CIA in 1964,
18 you told them everything you knew about Oswald?

19 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

20 Mr. Klein. Were you able to remember everything that
21 you had found out about Oswald?

22 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, I remembered, because that is why I
23 said to that.

24 Mr. Klein. You didn't have any trouble remembering what
25 happened?

~~TOP SECRET~~

41

1 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

2 Mr. Klein. You told it all to them?

3 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

4 Mr. Klein. Did you know at the time you were being
5 interviewed by the FBI and the CIA, did there come a time you
6 knew that the President of the United States, President Johnson,
7 had created a commission to investigate the assassination of
8 President Kennedy?

9 Mr. Nosenko. Right. And for this purposes arrived agent
10 whom I had not seen before. He talked with me; all was
11 recorded. After that, he has come second time to me, showed
12 me transcription, and I signed it. Later there were interroga-
13 tions concerning this question, but this was in another
14 conditions; it was absolutely hostile conditions, with threats.

15 Mr. Klein. Did you know that the information that you
16 were giving the FBI at that time would go to the President's
17 commission?

18 Mr. Nosenko. Surely; I understand.

19 Mr. Klein. Did you consider it important that you give
20 them the correct information?

21 Mr. Nosenko. Absolutely.

22 Mr. Klein. That you give them all the information you knew?

23 Mr. Nosenko. All information I knew.

24 Mr. Klein. When you spoke to the FBI about Lee Harvey
25 Oswald, did you always tell them the truth?

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1 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

2 Mr. Klein. Did you always tell them everything you knew?

3 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

4 Mr. Klein. When you spoke to the CIA about Lee Harvey
5 Oswald, did you tell them the truth?

6 Mr. Nosenko. The same; the same.

7 Mr. Klein. Did you always tell them everything you knew?

8 Mr. Nosenko. Absolutely.

9 Mr. Klein. Did you think that by telling the FBI and the
10 CIA the truth about Lee Harvey Oswald that that would help
11 in proving to them that you were a bona fide defector?

12 Mr. Nosenko. I was approached to this question that I must
13 tell whatever I know, the truth.

14 Mr. Klein. Did you think by telling them the truth about
15 that, that that would help prove that you were a bona fide?

16 Mr. Nosenko. I didn't have this thought because on the
17 contrary, I had the other thought. I was "tried" -- in
18 quotation -- and convicted long before I defected, in '62.

19 Mr. Klein. You are referring to your belief that they
20 had decided that you were a dispatched agent?

21 Mr. Nosenko. Right; they decided in '62.

22 Mr. Klein. Let me put it this way. Would it be fair
23 to say that you knew when you spoke to the FBI about Lee Harvey
24 Oswald in 1964 that if you lied to them that this would indicate
25 to them that you weren't a bona fide defector?

1 Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I defected on an ideological basis; that
2 is why my task to give whatever I know, and only in truth form,
3 whatever I know, because in this way I can say my thanks
4 to the country which accepted me.

5 Mr. Klein. My question is, by telling them the truth did
6 you feel that you were proving that you were a bona fide
7 defector?

8 Mr. Nosenko. I wasn't thinking in this way. Simply, I
9 was thinking that I must tell the truth, whatever case they
10 ask -- Oswald, Oswald, other case, other cases.

11 Mr. Klein. Was telling the truth about everything,
12 Oswald included, the most important thing to you at that time?

13 Mr. Nosenko. Right. The most important for me was to
14 cooperate on the full-scale with all my capability, all my
15 knowledge, to give them information, whatever I knew about
16 KGB, whatever I knew about cases. It is my contribution to
17 the country which received me, accepted me, has given me asylum.

18 Mr. Klein. And was telling them about Lee Harvey Oswald
19 part of that contribution?

20 Mr. Nosenko. And Lee Harvey Oswald, surely.

21 Mr. Klein. In all your interviews with the CIA and the
22 FBI, did you always tell them the truth about everything?

23 Mr. Nosenko. The question concerning recall telegram
24 wasn't true.

25 Mr. Klein. Was there anything else that wasn't true?

1 Mr. Nosenko. The question concerning my rank wasn't true.
2 Mr. Klein. You told them one rank but really you had a
3 lower rank?
4 Mr. Nosenko. Right.
5 Mr. Klein. Was anything else not true?
6 Mr. Nosenko. The only thing in the beginning, in 1962,
7 I did not tell them that my defection on an ideological
8 basis because I was afraid of to be rejected.
9 Mr. Klein. Did you make that lie about your rank in order
10 to impress them and make them think you were more important?
11 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir. It wasn't only this. You see, what
12 happened, I was appointed Deputy Chief of Seventh Department in
13 1962. On an analogous cases was appointment of another
14 officer, Deputy Chief in Second Department, Second Chief
15 Directorate. Both had rank of Captain. The position of Deputy
16 Chief of Department, Colonel. In 1963, in September, 1963,
17 was made presentation on my next rank; my next rank was be Major
18 but when it was all confirmed on the level of Department, on
19 the party organization, and all papers were given for signing
20 and further must going in Personnel Directorate, the Chief of
21 Second Chief Directorate General Gribanov decided in my case
22 and in the case of another Deputy Chief of the Second
23 Department also captain himself, must be made presentation on
24 Lieutenant Colonels, what was done in 1963. It was well
25 known fact in Second Chief Directorate, in 1963, December, I

1 was sent on a short trip in Gorki district in search of former
2 KGB officer Cherepanov, who ran away. He tried to contact
3 Americans. He contacted them but it was unsuccessful.

4 Americans returned the papers, considered him a plant
5 when he was through. He noticed the KGB working against him.
6 He ran away. All over the Soviet Union started the search
7 of Cherepanov. In difference places appeared signals. It was
8 in Gorki district signal. I was sent because I know him.
9 personally. I work in same department with him, and search on
10 him in Gorki district, and when I was sent in Gorki district,
11 they put on my travel document "Lieutenant Colonel Nosenko." This
12 was document with me when I come in January. Surely, of
13 course, human vanity. I said I Lieutenant Colonel. It
14 wasn't true. But didn't took it from a finger.

15 Mr. Klein. Did there come a time in 1964 after you had
16 defected when the CIA put you in isolation?

17 Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

18 Mr. Klein. Approximately when was that?

19 Mr. Nosenko. The 4th of April, 1964.

20 Mr. Klein. How long were you in isolation?

21 Mr. Nosenko. Five years.

22 Mr. Klein. Five years, until 1969?

23 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir, three and a half in extreme
24 Spartan conditions.

25 Mr. Klein. It was Spartan conditions?

1 Mr. Nosenko. It is what Rockefeller Commission said, name-
2 less defector over three years in extremely Spartan conditions.

3 Mr. Klein. Did there come a time in 1967 when you began
4 to speak to a CIA officer named Bruce Solie?

5 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

6 Mr. Klein. Did he question you extensively?

7 Mr. Nosenko. Every day, excluding Sunday.

8 Mr. Klein. Did you always tell him the truth?

9 Mr. Nosenko. Only the truth.

10 Mr. Klein. Did you tell him everything you knew about
11 the things that he asked you?

12 Mr. Nosenko. Absolutely.

13 Mr. Klein. Did you believe that by telling the truth to
14 Bruce Solie, that it might get you out of isolation?

15 Mr. Nosenko. I always believed in spite of all these
16 years that sooner or later truth will come to an end. I believed
17 that I would be free. It was another thing how long it would
18 take.

19 Mr. Klein. Did you believe that by telling Solie the
20 truth --

21 Mr. Nosenko. I was also telling before Bruce Solie the
22 truth; they didn't want to believe.

23 Mr. Klein. You did tell him the truth at all times?

24 Mr. Nosenko. All times.

25 Mr. Klein. There came a time when you were taken out

1 of isolation?

2 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

3 Mr. Klein. Were you allowed into the mainstream of
4 American life, allowed to walk around free?

5 Mr. Nosenko. Yes. I started life in April, 1969.

6 Mr. Klein. Did there come a time when you became a
7 citizen of the United States?

8 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

9 Mr. Klein. When was that?

10 Mr. Nosenko. 1974.

11 Mr. Klein. Today are you presently an employee of the
12 CIA?

13 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

14 Mr. Klein. How would you describe your job?

15 Mr. Nosenko. Consultant on KGB in main, on counterintelli-
16 gence work of the KGB.

17 Mr. Klein. Do you recall speaking to me on May 11, 1978?

18 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

19 Mr. Klein. Was that the first time we met?

20 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

21 Mr. Klein. Did we speak here in this CIA building in
22 Langley, Virginia?

23 Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

24 Mr. Klein. Did you voluntarily speak to me at that time?

25 Mr. Nosenko. Absolutely.

1 Mr. Klein. Did you speak to me again on May 26, 1978?

2 Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

3 Mr. Klein. Was that here again at CIA?

4 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Klein. Was that also voluntarily?

6 Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

7 Mr. Klein. Did you speak to me a third time on May 30?

8 Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

9 Mr. Klein. Was that here at the CIA?

10 Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

11 Mr. Klein. And on May 30, 1978, did you voluntarily agree
12 to give me your deposition?

13 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

14 Mr. Klein. A sworn statement?

15 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

16 Mr. Klein. Did you tell me the complete truth in that
17 deposition?

18 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

19 Mr. Klein. At this time, Mr. Chairman, I would ask that
20 this witness certificate and this Select Committee on Assassini-
21 nations' deposition be marked for identification and shown to
22 the witness.

23 The Chairman. You may proceed.

24 (The document referred to was marked
25 as JFK Exhibit F-1 for identification.)

~~TOP SECRET~~

49

1 Mr. Klein. Mr. Nosenko, looking at the document that
2 you have in your hand now, the deposition, do you recognize it?

3 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

4 Mr. Klein. Have you seen it before?

5 Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

6 Mr. Klein. Is that the statement that you made to me, or
7 a transcription of the statement you made to me on May 30, 1978?

8 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

9 Mr. Klein. Have you had an opportunity to read it?

10 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Klein. Did you read it again today in my presence?

12 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

13 Mr. Klein. When we read it, did you go over it page by
14 page?

15 Mr. Nosenko. Page by page, line by line.

16 Mr. Klein. And tell me if there were any errors in it.

17 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, slight, little.

18 Mr. Klein. When there was an error, did you then dictate
19 to me how it should have been?

20 Mr. Nosenko. Right, and we made corrections.

21 Mr. Klein. And we made the corrections?

22 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

23 Mr. Klein. Then did you put your initials at the end of
24 the line where we made the corrections?

25 Mr. Nosenko. To each correction.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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Mr. Klein. As a result of that, is that document a correct transcription of the statement you made to me on May 30, 1978?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. I draw your attention to the witness certificate. Did you sign that document?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir. I did sign it.

Mr. Klein. Does that document attest to the fact that it is a true and accurate transcription that you have before you?

Mr. Nosenko., Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. Do you know the purpose, the reason this Committee was created?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Klein. Do you consider the job of this Committee to be an important job?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Klein. Do you believe that it is important to speak to us and tell us everything that you know about Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir, only this way.

Mr. Klein. Did you speak to us in complete truth about Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Klein. Since I began speaking to you in May of 1978, has anyone from the CIA spoken to you about Lee Harvey Oswald since May 1978?

1 Mr. Nosenko. No one.

2 Mr. Klein. Has anyone from the CIA told you what to say
3 to this Committee?

4 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

5 Mr. Klein. Has anyone from the CIA told you what not to
6 say to this Committee?

7 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir. On the contrary, before I met you,
8 I was told that I must tell everything, whatever questions will
9 be. I even asked if questions will be concerning cases, the
10 names, even these, whatever stuff the Committee would like,
11 "What you know you must answer."

12 Mr. Klein. Since I began speaking to you in May 1978, has
13 anyone from the CIA shown you any documents other than the
14 deposition which you have in front of you?

15 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

16 Mr. Klein. The questions I just asked you, about whether
17 anybody gave you any instructions or anybody spoke to you about
18 Oswald, other than the CIA, has anybody had any contact with
19 you at all since May, 1978, about Oswald other than myself?

20 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

21 Mr. Klein. At this time I was going to ask you to tell us
22 everything you know about Lee Harvey Oswald, but if anybody
23 would like to take a break at this point, or if you would like
24 to take a break, we can do that.

25 The Chairman. I suggest that we break about five minutes

1 and give the witness a chance to relax a little bit, and the
2 Committee members.

3 (A brief recess was taken.)

4 The Chairman. The Committee will come back to order.

5 The Chair at this time will again recognize counsel for
6 the Committee to proceed.

7 Mr. Klein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

8 Mr. Nosenko, at this time will you tell this Committee
9 everything that you know about Lee Harvey Oswald, beginning
10 the first time you ever heard his name and going right through
11 the assassination and any events you know relating to Lee
12 Harvey Oswald which happened after the assassination?

13 Will you try to speak slowly so that everybody can
14 understand what you say?

15 Mr. Nosenko. The 1959, was rather fall or summer of 1959,
16 was rather difficult year for the Second Chief Directorate
17 because every department of Second Chief Directorate, besides
18 the tasks and goals and lines of their work, were also
19 involved in special type of work.

20 In 1959, in the summer opened American exhibition in
21 Moscow and every department was involved in also this work.
22 Also, my Seventh Department which was working against tourists
23 was spending a big percentage of time and effort in working
24 against the American exhibition in Moscow. In the fall of
25 1959 to me approached Senior Case Officer Major Georgiy Ivanovich

1 Rastrusin, R-a-s-t-r-u-s-i-n. He was responsible for counter-
2 intelligence work against Intourist, itself. He told me that
3 an American tourist, Lee Harvey Oswald, applied to interpreter
4 of Intourist with request to stay in the Soviet Union. I asked
5 him who is working against him. Nobody was working against him.
6 What materials we have on him? He showed me several pages. One
7 was questionnaire which every tourist before coming to the
8 Soviet Union is filling.

9 There was two checkups before he arrived in the Soviet
10 Union, a checking in archives of KGB, one checkup in Central
11 Archives, and another checkup was in Archives of Intelligence
12 Service, because Intelligence Service has its own archives. Both
13 these checkups showed no exist on any materials on Oswald.

14 Besides that, there was made a summary, a short summary,
15 from Intourist, based on Intourist information that Lee Harvey
16 Oswald arrived on such period of time and visiting this and this
17 cities, how long he will be as a tourist in the Soviet Union.

18 There was also information from the agent of KGB, an
19 interpreter of Intourist who worked with Oswald, about Oswald
20 in general. There was written by hand of this Officer Rastrusin
21 in a summary concerning a request of Oswald to stay in the
22 Soviet Union. That's all. He never was before in the Soviet
23 Union. There wasn't any material on him. The questionnaire
24 indicated no interesting position, no interesting work. I
25 do not remember that even there was anything where he is working.

1 I went with these materials to the Chief of Section. I was
2 Deputy Chief of Section, working against American-British-Canadian
3 tourists. I went to Chief of Section and showed to him.
4 "Let's go to the Chief of Department, report." And I, Chief of
5 Section, Major Rastrusin, Case Officer, went to the Chief of
6 Department, showed him materials. We said, that is all that
7 we have, but we have such and such situation. He wants to stay
8 in the Soviet Union. First of all, Intourist is not dealing
9 with this questions. Second, we did not see him as an
10 interesting target and no one had worked against him, prac-
11 tically.

12 And it was decided at this meeting with Chief of Department
13 to make such a thing that Intourist was instructed to answer
14 to Mr. Oswald that in accordance with all Soviet procedures,
15 regulations, first of all, Intourist is not dealing with this
16 question. Second, in accordance with all regulations, proce-
17 dures, he must apply to the Consular Department of the Soviet
18 Embassy in the United States and apply with this request to
19 fill certain forms and it will go by usual, routine procedures,
20 but not in case that tourist would like to stay. The Intourist
21 is not dealing with this question. And in this one was given
22 him to answer. Next I heard about him that happen when
23 he cut his wrists. The same officer, Rastrusin, has come to
24 me and said that an interpreter has come to him the next day and
25 after it was announced to him that Intourist is not dealing

1 with this question, he must return back in his country and
2 apply in proper procedures to the Soviet Embassy. Next day
3 she is come to take him on a show in Moscow. She was waiting
4 for him in the lobby for 20 or 30 minutes, and he is not coming.
5 Then she checked. Maybe he is not in the hotel. But when it
6 was checked, his key wasn't -- usually anyone who is leaving
7 hotel must leave key in the hotel on the floor where he is
8 living -- his key was not on the floor in the hotel.

9 He was in his room. Then she went to the manager of
10 the hotel administration and said, "Something maybe happened --
11 a heart attack, who knows." And administrator, and she went with
12 administrator and somebody else from the hotel; they broke the
13 door and they found Oswald was laying with cut wrist. Imme-
14 diately was given a call for an ambulance; he was delivered
15 to the B-o-t-k-i-n Hospital where he received a transfusion
16 and stitches on his wrist.

17 But being in hospital after he was saved, he again said
18 that "If they will not allow me to stay, I will commit suicide;
19 I will kill myself."

20 Immediately again I went to the Chief of Section. We
21 went to the Chief of Department. This and this thing happen.
22 "We are not interested in him. He was not presented for us a
23 target of interest." We officers and I and the Chief of
24 Section, Chief of the Department, we understanding what can
25 happen if he will kill himself, it can be reaction in press in

1 the West that KGB or Soviet Union killed an American tourist.
2 This was the period when Khrushchev only returned from his first
3 trip to the United States, when he had meetings with President
4 Eisenhower and was so-called Camp David spirit, warming Soviet-
5 American relations. And ahead there was a trip in May of 1960
6 of Khrushchev to Paris on meeting of leaders of big four
7 countries. Surely this will not help to Soviet-American relations
8 and it can hurt in any way Khrushchev's further trips.

9 We decided that it is necessary to report, and it was
10 made decision that Intourist who was in those years part of
11 Ministry of Foreign Trade, must report to the Minister of
12 Foreign Trade, who in his turn will report to the Government.
13 But KGB when it will be asked said we don't have any interest.
14 Whatever we have, this is material; that's all. In this way,
15 it was reported to Khrushchev. I do not know that Chairman of
16 the KGB reported or not, but I know that the Soviet Government
17 received the report and Khrushchev personally received report.

18 My feeling, whatever I know, that on the basis of being
19 scared that this man can kill himself, was decided in spite of
20 the fact that KGB is not interested, it was decided the question
21 to allow him to stay. On the level of the government with him
22 dealing, processing of him was done by the Red Cross, Soviet
23 Red Cross organization.

24 The Government decided, allowed him to stay. At the same
25 time the decision concerned where he will stay. It was decided

1 he will stay in Minsk, capital of Byelorussia, and where it will
2 help him with work. And Red Cross by decision, because decision
3 of this government, had given him a pension. It was in those
4 days 700 rubles; later because of devaluation it was 70 rubles,
5 because they devalued one to ten.

6 After it was made decision of the Soviet Government to
7 allow him to stay, immediately it was necessary to open on him
8 file. Ontourist is not opening on every tourist a file.
9 There is file, let's say, American tourism in 1964, and it can
10 be consist of 20 or 25 volumes, all in one file, consist of 20
11 or 25 volumes, but on special targets who are suspected belong-
12 ing to intelligence, on targets of special interest to KGB
13 for recruitment, are opened separate files on this type of
14 tourist.

15 On Oswald, because he was allowed to stay and being a
16 foreigner, was opened immediately a file. At the end of 1959
17 a file was opened by Officer Krupnov and registered in Central
18 Archives of KGB.

19 In 1959, the end of 1959, by December was prepared a file
20 for sending. Whenever Oswald was leaving Moscow to go
21 to Minsk, immediately file will be sent to KGB of Minsk, and this
22 file was accompanied with a document signed by the Chiefs
23 of Second Chief Directorate, what kind of work to lead against
24 Oswald in Minsk.

25 Anyone who is staying in the Soviet Union, defector, will

1 be always suspected maybe it is a game of American intelligence.
2 Maybe he is a so-called agent sleeper. Always against him will
3 be going watching him.

4 Concerning Oswald, in this document accompanying file
5 prepared was written what to do against Oswald, to cover him with
6 agents, net, covering him in place of his living and in place of
7 his working, to keep him periodically under surveillance, which
8 means for a month or month and a half he will be under sur-
9 veillance, will be followed.

10 Then will be made break for month, two months; then again
11 he will be taken under surveillance. This is so-called term,
12 periodical surveillance, to keep under control his telephone
13 conversations and to keep under control all his correspondence,
14 which means any letter coming to him or any letter going from him
15 in the Soviet Union, abroad, is controlled by the KGB. Under
16 no conditions to approach to him.

17 Gentlemen, I am sorry, I did not mention one vitally
18 important thing. When he was in hospital, when he cut his
19 ~~wrist~~ and when he announced that he will repeat the same if they will not
20 allow him to stay, he will kill himself, it was decided in the Seventh Depart-
21 ment in the presence of me, Chief of Section, Chief of Department, to check
22 him through a psychiatrist. And was given command to Officer Rastrusin to ar-
23 range it that psychiatrist of the Botkin Hospital will check him and at the
24 same time Rastrusin was ordered to arrange another psychiatrist from
25 another hospital, independent, and they will check him in.

1 different times, not together, and each one will write opinion
2 separately.

3 I have seen these both reports; they were not long, page,
4 page and a half. I do not remember all details. The main aspect
5 which was important for the KGB, both their opinions coincided
6 that Oswald was mentally unstable. This was the reason when he
7 was going to Minsk that in the document which was accompanying
8 his file was said under no conditions anyone must contact him.

9 . This type of work was assigned to KGB of Minsk.

10 The only one thing for qualification I want to add, that
11 up to September, 1963, none of the KGB's outfits in Leningrad,
12 in Kiev, in Byelorussia, in any part of the Soviet Union, can
13 make an approachment to any foreigner without permission of
14 Moscow.

15 Only in 1963 was making special permission concerning KGB
16 apparatus in Leningrad and only concerning Finnish tourists because
17 a big amount of tourists were coming from Finland and not going
18 to any part of Soviet Union, only Leningrad, and after two,
19 three, four or five days, back to Finland. That is why it was
20 decided to allow the KGB of Leningrad in September, 1963, to
21 go on approachment when they consider it necessary, without asking
22 permission of Moscow. But no one in the Soviet Union without
23 Moscow can approach on his own to the foreigner. This is what
24 I knew about Oswald up to 1963, because January 1960, and
25 from January 1960 and up to the end of 1961 I was working back

1 in American Department against American embassy.

2 I returned back in Seventh Department in January 1962. In
3 1963 to me has come Chief of Section, one of the sections of
4 the Seventh Department, Lieutenant Colonel Alekseev, A-
5 A-l-e-k-s-e-e-v, and told me that he received a call from First
6 Chief Directorate, Intelligence Service, Colonel Turalin, who
7 was working in Service No. 2 of Intelligence Service and who
8 asked him to come visit him in his office.

9 This Colonel Turalin had given him a cable which only
10 just now has come from KGB's Residentura in Mexico City. He
11 brought this cable to me. I have seen it and I read it. I cannot
12 tell you word and word but the main sense, it was a short cable,
13 maybe half a page, "American citizen Lee Harvey Oswald
14 visited Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, Consular Department of
15 Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, and asked visa to the Soviet
16 Union."

17 For me, it was -- by the way, I didn't know that he was back
18 in the United States-- I said, "How come? Isn't this Oswald
19 who in 1959 cut his wrist?" "Yes, this is the same. By the
20 way, he returned back home and he married a Soviet woman."
21 Well, I said, "Then I remember this took place in 1959." I
22 went with this Lieutenant Colonel Alekseev to Chief of the
23 Department, and said, "This is Oswald with whom we had a problem
24 in 1959. He wants back. I didn't know he was married, that
25 he is in the United States."

1 He said, "No, under no conditions we don't want to hear
2 anything about him." And Alekseev was told by the Chief of
3 Department in my presence that he must come back in Intelligence
4 Service to this Colonel Turalin and tell him that must be given
5 an answer.

6 You see, in this cable the fact that he visited Soviet
7 Embassy and at the end of this cable was asked what kind of
8 action must be taken. Why? I assumed because Oswald when he
9 visited consulate in Mexico City, he told them he was in the
10 Soviet Union before, because otherwise when the person never
11 was in the Soviet Union they will not ask even Moscow; they
12 immediately will decide on the place, the Residentura can even
13 not ask Moscow what to do.

14 And Alekseev was told to go back in Intelligence Service
15 and to tell them that we are not interested in him and again
16 would recommend to give him so-called soft brush, such a
17 term it is. What does it mean? That he will be recommended,
18 after he returned back home in the U.S., to visit the Soviet
19 Embassy Consulate Department, where official form raised this
20 question, fill certain forms and it will go by regulation and
21 procedures, usual. This was what was done.

22 Later in 1963 there was an announcement on the Soviet
23 radio, two hours after it took place, that the President of
24 the United States was assassinated in Texas. I do not know
25 how long, what period of time, but later, again there was a

1 second announcement and it said that the killer was Lee Harvey
2 Oswald.

3 Gentlemen, here was a chaos in KGB, surely. I received
4 immediately a call, telephone call from Chief of Second Chief
5 Directorate, General Gribanov. He ordered me to
6 contact by special phone the leaders in Minsk, the Chief of KGB
7 in Minsk, and to ask them immediately to send a file on Oswald
8 in Moscow, all materials on him.

9 And Gribanov added not to wait even any commercial line,
10 plane, but to use military airplane; but the file must be in
11 short period of time in Moscow.

12 The second question he ordered me to ask them, did anyone
13 contacted him, maybe before he left Minsk? Did anyone from KGB
14 contacted him? These questions I relayed immediately to Minsk.
15 I wanted to speak with the Chiefs of Second Directorate,
16 KGB, of Byelorussia. I could not catch the person whom I knew,
17 Deputy Chief of Second Directorate, Colonel Lazyutin, L-a-z-y-u-t-i-n.

18 Then I invited Chief of Department of Second Directorate,
19 KGB, Byelorussia, Gruzdev, who I knew personally -- and this
20 department was responsible for foreigners when they were in
21 Byelorussia -- the same department was responsible for
22 also Oswald. I told him, relayed the order of Gribanov.
23 He said it would be done. I said, "Particularly Gribanov
24 interested, did you or your officers in any way contacted
25 Oswald." He said, "Surely not; we cannot, because we were

1 dealing with him in accordance with your instructions how to
2 work against him when you sent a file to Minsk." I said,
3 "But still, maybe somebody contacted him before he left." "No
4 one." After that, I know later, Gribanov himself Chief of Second
5 Chief Directorate, talked with leaders of KGB of Byelorussia.
6 I know that also Chiefs of First American Department, Second
7 Chief Directorate, were talking also with Byelorussian KGB
8 on this question. Well, the file on Oswald was approximately
9 in two hours was in Moscow. One officer, Seventh Department,
10 Second Chief Directorate, went to airport meet the officer
11 from Minsk. He was delivered in headquarters of KGB, he arrived
12 with suitcase. It was about seven or eight files, such thick
13 files, on Oswald. And these files were delivered in the
14 Office of Chief of Seventh Department where was Chief of
15 Seventh Department, I, Officer, Krupnov and Chief of Section.

16 And we immediately paid attention on the first volume,
17 because whatever important documents are in file, they must
18 be in first section or first volume, where are going all plans,
19 any contacts, any summaries on file in first section. This is
20 the important documents.

21 We went page by page in spite of the fact that we received
22 all talking that nobody contacted. Still we were working,
23 maybe somebody talked with him. There isn't any indication
24 that anyone talked with him.

25 By this time we were understood that we must prepare a

1 resume on the whole file which must be reported to the Chief
2 of Second Chief Directorate who in his turn must report to the
3 Chairman of KGB and Chairman of the KGB must report to Khrushchev.

4 It took us about hour, hour and a half. We were looking
5 only this first section. There wasn't any indication. And in
6 the final summary on the whole file, when it was closed after
7 he left. At this moment appeared Deputy Chief of First
8 American Department of Second Chief Directorate, Colonel
9 Matveev, M-a-t-v-e-e-v. He has come with a couple of officers
10 and said Gribanov ordered to them to review the file and
11 prepare the resume. That is understandable. The most presti-
12 gious department in the whole Second Chief Directorate is
13 American Department, First Department, surely. They took
14 all materials and we never have seen them and they prepared a
15 resume immediately, which was reported up.

16 The only one another thing I know about Oswald, that two,
17 three, four or five days later, that Gribanov sent a group of
18 four or five officers from Second Chief Directorate for investi-
19 gation in Minsk. A man of those four or five officers was one
20 of my friend, Officer Krivosheev, K-r-i-v-o-s-h-e-e-v. He told
21 me privately that he talked with several people, with workers
22 in the plant where Oswald was working. Oswald was working in
23 the plant and he belonged to a little circle, chess playing
24 circle, can be check players circle, you know, hunting circle.
25 He was belonging to the hunting circle. He went a number

1 of times with group of workers of the plant who belonged to
2 the circle on hunting trips. Usually it was supplied a
3 van by the administration of the plant and they were taken
4 for hunting.

5 The interesting point what he stressed, and it was surprise
6 for me, he told that Oswald was a very poor shot. Why I was
7 surprised, because, you see, you are hunting rabbits, ducks;
8 it is not a rifle; it is a shotgun; it is pellets with big
9 circle. It is not a single place. He even could not shoot a
10 rabbit. On several occasions the workers who went with him
11 hunting were giving him a rabbit to return with something back
12 a result of his hunting.

13 These all things which I know concerning Oswald.

14 Mr. Klein. You have testified that Rastrusin was the one
15 who came to you and told you that Oswald wanted to defect?

16 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

17 Mr. Klein. Where were you when the conversation took
18 place?

19 Mr. Nosenko. I was sitting in the room. I was Deputy
20 Chief of Section. With me were three or four officers in the
21 same room.

22 Mr. Klein. And was it your office?

23 Mr. Nosenko. We were sitting those days in rather
24 stranded conditions. I was Deputy Chief of Section; it was not
25 big deal.

~~TOP SECRET~~

66

1 Mr. Klein. Was it your office where the conversation took
2 place?

3 Mr. Nosenko. Sure.

4 Mr. Klein. Do you recall the names of any of the people
5 present when you first learned about Oswald?

6 Mr. Nosenko. I cannot tell you who was present or
7 who was not. I can tell who was sitting in this room, other
8 officers who worked in this room.

9 Mr. Klein. Was Krupnov present at that time?

10 Mr. Nosenko. No, Krupnov appeared later.

11 Mr. Klein. You told us that there followed an investigation
12 of Oswald to find out who he was and what you knew about him.

13 Who was the one that actually did that work? Who would that be?

14 Mr. Nosenko. Rastrusin found on him materials what we
15 had, which I told you what kind of materials we had.

16 Mr. Klein. And did he find these materials before he had
17 come to you or was that after speaking to you that he went and
18 found those materials?

19 Mr. Nosenko. Well, he has come and reported me the
20 case concerning application or request of Oswald to stay in the
21 Soviet Union. I asked immediately what we have. He said, "Just
22 a second." He went and bring me this questionnaire, two
23 checkups, information from interpreter, then written information
24 from Intourist, how long his tour in the Soviet Union, and
25 written by Rastrusin personally by hand, his summary on why

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1 the requests of Oswald to stay in the Soviet Union.

2 Mr. Klein. And he brought that all to you right away?

3 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

4 Mr. Klein. Did anyone else do any work investigating
5 Oswald? Was that all done by Rastrusin?

6 Mr. Nosenko. You see, nobody was working against him. As
7 I told you, Seventh Department work against tourists is not
8 covering even 70 percent of tourists, a small percentage. I
9 must add that every tourist will be checked on. On him will be
10 questionnaire, how long his tour and checkups in archives on any
11 existing material, but it does not mean work against him. Why?
12 If he is not an interesting target, it is laying materials, it
13 will be gathered and go in files.

14 Mr. Klein. Other than the materials which Rastrusin
15 had that day, did you ever see any other materials on Oswald
16 as part of the investigation to find out --

17 Mr. Nosenko. No, later it was document. Again, Rastrusin
18 supplied document on what took place in the hospital. No, first
19 what took place in cutting wrist, then later in hospital, then --

20 MR. Klein. Prior to the time he cut his wrist?

21 Mr. Nosenko. No other materials we had on him, excluding
22 those which I indicated.

23 Mr. Klein. All of them were brought to you by Rastrusin?

24 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

25 Mr. Klein. Do you remember sitting there with the other

~~TOP SECRET~~

67-A

1 officers and did anybody make any comments about Oswald, about
2 what to do with him at that time?

3 Mr. Nosenko. Nobody was making comments. The reason,
4 every room there is a senior officer. If it is not Deputy Chief
5 of Section -- we had only two Deputy Chief of Section -- there
6 is a senior case officer and if somebody has come to me
7 reporting nobody interrupted, they are doing their work.

8 Mr. Klein. You remember them doing their work?

9 Mr. Nosenko. No. I know that officers were present, but
10 I do not remember, let's say, what Sakharov was doing, what was
11 another officer, Belikov, was doing, I cannot tell you.

12 Mr. Klein. Do you know if those two officers you named
13 were actually in the room at the time that Rastrusin told you
14 about Oswald?

15 Mr. Nosenko. There were several officers there, seating
16 in this room.

17 Mr. Klein. Do you know which one?

18 Mr. Nosenko. No. I cannot tell you who exactly was present
19 or not because it will be trying to guess. No.

20 Mr. Klein. But you recall that Krupnov was not present
21 at that time?

22 Mr. Nosenko. Krupnov was not, because Krupnov appeared
23 a little bit later in the Seventh Department.

24 Mr. Klein. He wasn't in the Department at that time?

25 Mr. Nosenko. He wasn't even in the Seventh Department. He

1 wasn't working. He appeared in a month after it took place he
2 was transferred in Second Chief Directorate in Seventh Department.

3 Mr. Klein. From the time that Rastrusin told you about
4 Oswald until the time that you made the decision, as you told
5 us it was made, not to allow him to defect, did any KGB
6 officer ever speak to Oswald?

7 Mr. Nosenko. Nobody was speaking from the KGB with Oswald.
8 The decision was done on the level of Chief of Department with,
9 of course, opinions, mine, Rastrusin, Chief of Section.

10 Mr. Klein. But nobody spoke to Oswald?

11 Mr. Nosenko. No, nobody from KGB, nobody went to
12 speak with Oswald.

13 Mr. Klein. And exactly why did no KGB officer ever speak
14 to Oswald before they made the decision about whether to let
15 him defect?

16 Mr. Nosenko. We didn't consider him an interesting target.

17 Mr. Klein. Was that the only reason, that he was not an
18 interesting target?

19 Mr. Nosenko. Later, when he tried to kill himself, it was
20 of course, another reason that he is mentally unstable.

21 Mr. Klein. I am talking about before.

22 Mr. Nosenko. Before it he did not present an interest for
23 the KGB, in the eyes of the Seventh Department.

24 Mr. Klein. You talked about the great amount of work
25 that the Second Department had due to the American

1 exhibition which was taking place in the fall of 1959?

2 Mr. Nosenko. Summer and fall of 1959.

3 Mr. Klein. Were a lot of the KGB officers in the Seventh
4 Department working on tourists and people who were visiting?

5 Mr. Nosenko. At the same time they were all responsible
6 for certain work against American exhibition in Moscow.

7 Mr. Klein. Approximately how many tourists and people
8 were working at the exhibition that gave this new caseload of
9 people at that time?

10 Mr. Nosenko. You see, it is a rather difficult approachment.
11 Ninety percent of all employees on American exhibition
12 were considered in connection with intelligence community by
13 the KGB because 90 percent of them were speaking Russian
14 language. If they were not officers, they must be contacts of
15 intelligence community of the U.S.

16 Mr. Klein. When the exhibition was over, did things get
17 back to normal in the Second Department?

18 Mr. Nosenko. Surely.

19 Mr. Klein. Had Oswald come after the exhibition, might
20 he then have been spoken to?

21 Mr. Nosenko. No. It was one of the reasons but it would
22 be the same attitude.

23 Mr. Klein. So then what was different in this treatment of
24 Oswald --

25 Mr. Nosenko. The difference was that nobody even was

1 responsible for him, it was simply laying material, checkups,
2 but nobody was working actively against him.

3 Mr. Klein. If he had come when the exhibition had ended,
4 would then somebody have at least been working actively on
5 him?

6 Mr. Nosenko. It is possible that he would be paid more
7 attention. It is possible but he did not present an interest
8 for the Seventh Department.

9 Mr. Klein. You testified that a file was later opened on
10 Oswald and it was opened at the time he was allowed to stay; is
11 that correct?

12 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

13 Mr. Klein. It was opened by Krupnov?

14 Mr. Nosenko. Krupnov.

15 Mr. Klein. What was in the file, what kind of documents?
16 Will you describe as best you can what was in them?

17 Mr. Nosenko. Only those documents which I told you and
18 whatever else I have seen is the only documents which prepared
19 by Krupnov which must accompany the file of Oswald to Minsk.
20 That is all what I have seen.

21 Mr. Klein. That is the letter that Krupnov sent to
22 Minsk?

23 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

24 Mr. Klein. Was the questionnaire that Oswald filled out
25 on entering the country, was that in that file?

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Mr. Nosenko. Sure.

Mr. Klein. Did you see it?

Mr. Nosenko. I have seen it before. I have seen it when Rastrusin has come to me and showed materials.

Mr. Klein. Can you tell us anything about the questionnaire?

Mr. Nosenko. The usual form, typographically done in the Soviet Union, which all Soviet embassies have, and also the tourists who are not applying directly to the Soviet Embassy abroad but making arrangement to visit Soviet Union through tourist firms who have contract with Intourist, they also fill in this questionnaire which tourist firm then supplies to the Soviet Embassy. The same.

Mr. Klein. You remember that there was a file created. Do you remember ever seeing this file? Do you have a recollection of seeing a file on Oswald?

Mr. Nosenko. No, only when there has come a return from '63 from Minsk.

Mr. Klein. Did you see the file in '59?

Mr. Nosenko. No, the accompanying document, which was reported.

Mr. Klein. But you never saw the file itself?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Klein. You don't know how many pages were in the file?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Klein. Who told Krupnov to open the file on Oswald?

1 Mr. Nosenko. The Chief of Section ordered him. Because
2 must be more material before file went in Minsk. I have not seen
3 them. Materials which KGB must receive from Red Cross, materials
4 concerning what I knew only orally about the decision of the
5 Soviet Government, must be more, but I have not seen them.

6 Mr. Klein. Did you see the Intourist report written
7 about Oswald?

8 Mr. Nosenko. Only the first information from interpreter;
9 later when he cut his wrist, and later concerning his behavior
10 in the hospital and tried to kill himself.

11 Mr. Klein. Did you see any other reports on Oswald at
12 that time?

13 Mr. Nosenko. I have not seen anything, excluding the
14 document which was prepared to accompany the file of Oswald.

15 Mr. Klein. In 1959 did you know at the time the decision
16 was made not to allow Oswald to defect, at that time did you
17 know that Oswald had been in the United States Marines?

18 Mr. Nosenko. No. It was known he was in the Marines, yes.

19 Mr. Klein. How did you know that?

20 Mr. Nosenko. I do not know how I know. It was reported
21 to me or something in the file. It was known that he served in
22 the Marines. Interpreter put in her information, must be.

23 Mr. Klein. The last part?

24 Mr. Nosenko. I said, must be an interpreter had it in her
25 information supplied to KGB that he served in Marines. He must

1 tell her because it was known that he served in the Marines.

2 Mr. Klein. Do you recall reading it in the interpreter's
3 report.

4 Mr. Nosenko. It must be I have read, because it was known
5 that he served in the Marines.

6 Mr. Klein. Do you have any recollection of what document
7 you read it in?

8 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

9 Mr. Klein. But you know you read it in some document?

10 Mr. Nosenko. I told you what I knew, what I had seen.

11 Mr. Klein. Did you also read what his job was when he was
12 in the Marines?

13 Mr. Nosenko. No.

14 Mr. Klein. Did you read where he had served in the Marines?

15 Mr. Nosenko. No.

16 Mr. Klein. What you read was that he had been in Marines.

17 Mr. Nosenko. Yes. There was indication that he served
18 in Marines.

19 Mr. Klein. Did you read what his rank was in the Marines?

20 Mr. Nosenko. He served. He wasn't an officer; he was
21 drafted, was served in the Marines. That is all.

22 Mr. Klein. You say he wasn't an officer. Whatever
23 document you read, did it tell you what his rank was?

24 Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I don't remember the details. I am
25 telling only what I remember.

1 Mr. Klein. Do you recall discussing with any members of
2 the Seventh Department the fact that he had been in the Marines?

3 Mr. Nosenko. No.

4 Mr. Klein. At the meeting that you had that you described
5 to us when it was determined that he would not be allowed to
6 defect, was it discussed that he was in the Marines?

7 Mr. Nosenko. He did not present an interest.

8 Mr. Klein. Did somebody say "this guy is a Marine" and
9 somebody else said "It doesn't matter"?

10 Mr. Nosenko. It doesn't matter, sure.

11 Mr. Klein. My question is, was it at least discussed or
12 mentioned?

13 Mr. Nosenko. No, it was read, it was mentioned in the papers
14 that he served in Marines; that is all. But we didn't pay
15 attention.

16 Mr. Klein. I understand it was mentioned in the paper.
17 But what I am asking you is do you have a recollection at that
18 meeting when they decided not to allow him to defect,
19 do you have a recollection of them talking about the fact that
20 he was in the Marines?

21 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir. We didn't discuss the question.
22 We didn't consider it is important.

23 Mr. Klein. You said there was a meeting between Rastrusin,
24 the Chief of Section, the Chief of Department, and yourself,
25 at which time it was determined that he would not be allowed

1 to defect?

2 Mr. Nosenko. It was not determined that he would not be
3 allowed to defect; it was decided that he doesn't present for
4 us interest and that is why we would recommend to Intourist
5 to answer him, if he wants to defect he must apply in accordance
6 with the Soviet procedures, apply to the Soviet embassy in the
7 country where he is living, but not to use for these purposes
8 the channel of tourism.

9 Mr. Klein. You decided to recommend to Intourist to
10 turn him down?

11 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

12 Mr. Klein. Where was that meeting that you had with these
13 three other people?

14 Mr. Nosenko. In the office of Chief of the Seventh
15 Department.

16 Mr. Klein. You said that there was a discussion. He
17 asked you what information you knew about Oswald and you told
18 him?

19 Mr. Nosenko. We showed the papers what we had. He also
20 read the same papers what I read, what Chief of Section
21 read and Chief of Department read. "What is interesting?"
22 "I don't see. Do you see?" "No, I don't see anything."

23 Mr. Klein. How long did the whole meeting take place?

24 Mr. Nosenko. It is difficult to say; ten minutes, twelve,
25 fifteen. I cannot tell exactly.

1 Mr. Klein. It was as a result of this meeting that Intourist
2 was told to tell him he could not defect; is that right?

3 Mr. Nosenko. Intourist was ordered to tell him that --
4 first of all, Intourist himself is never dealing with questions
5 of who stay in Soviet Union, who would like to stay, because it
6 is a business organization; their task is to get foreign
7 currency; that is all, to give them service for what they paid.
8 KGB is controlling it. KGB is telling them what is KGB's
9 interest.

10 Mr. Klein. My question is, after the four of you met in
11 the office of the Chief of Seventh Department, you looked at
12 the paper and said nothing is interesting. Then the Chief said,
13 "Tell him to go back to the United States". Is that right?
14 Is that what happened?

15 Mr. Nosenko. The Chief said, "Let us make him the so-called
16 soft brush. "

17 Mr. Klein. In effect, that is when the decision was made,
18 in that office?

19 Mr. Nosenko. Absolutely, right.

20 Mr. Klein. You were there?

21 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

22 Mr. Klein. And it took about ten minutes?

23 Mr. Nosenko. Ten or fifteen minutes.

24 Mr. Klein. Was the First Chief Directorate, that's the
25 Intelligence Section, were they informed that an American named

1 Oswald wanted to defect?

2 Mr. Nosenko. No, they were not informed.

3 Mr. Klein. Was the First Department of the Second Chief
4 Directorate, the American Department, were they informed that
5 this American named Oswald wanted to defect?

6 Mr. Nosenko. No.

7 Mr. Klein. Was there any discussion at this meeting that
8 you were at about whether you should inform the First Chief
9 Directorate or the First Department?

10 Mr. Nosenko. No, it was only to our judgment; if we had
11 seen that he presents an interest. Let us say Oswald was a
12 teacher in college, let us say somewhere teaching one of the
13 Russian disciplines, Russian economy or whatever it would be.
14 Surely he is interesting; surely we will report, we will talk
15 with First Chief Directorate, we will talk maybe with American
16 Department. It is what we will decide. But in this case
17 we didn't see any necessity.

18 Mr. Klein. So no other departments were informed?

19 Mr. Nosenko. No.

20 Mr. Klein. Did everybody agree -- of the four people,
21 did you all agree he was uninteresting?

22 Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

23 Mr. Klein. Were there any other reasons discussed other
24 than the fact he was not interesting?

25 Mr. Nosenko. No. Can I clarify one question? Gentlemen,

~~TOP SECRET~~

78

1 in the process of discussing the first question by CIA, FBI, you,
2 I feel that you are thinking that there are certain procedures,
3 certain rules, how to act with defectors. There are no such
4 rules and regulations. If you will look back on the
5 history, 20 or 25 years, how many Americans defected to the
6 Soviet Union. You can count on your fingers; it is rare
7 occasion. How many Soviet defect to the West? It is a big
8 number. Of course, at the west, it is understood and the special-
9 ists are thinking there must be certain rules and procedures
10 like maybe exist in the United States, in Great Britain. There
11 isn't such rules. There were not rules in Second Chief Director-
12 ate because it very rare occasion when it happened, very rare
13 occasion, that American decided to stay. That's one thing.

14 The second thing is necessary to point out, that Intelli-
15 gence Service, the First Chief Directorate, whatever they are
16 doing, it is absolutely different from whatever is done by
17 Second Chief Directorate, counterintelligence. Whatever con-
18 cerns any foreigner on the territory of the Soviet Union it is
19 only what Second Chief Directorate will decide.

20 And if, let us say, Intelligence Service has an interest
21 in any foreigner, he arrives in the Soviet Union, Intelligence
22 Service, even if it is their source and agent, cannot meet him
23 without discussing the question with second Chief Directorate.
24 What I want to tell, the big boss, the true hand at the terri-
25 tory over the Soviet Union, Second Chief Directorate.

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1 Mr. Klein. You told us that Rastrusin is the one that told
2 you that Oswald had cut his wrist. Is that correct?

3 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

4 Mr. Klein. Who was present when he told you this?

5 Mr. Nosenko. Say it again, it was in my room, I cannot
6 tell you who was present.

7 Mr. Klein. Was Krupnov present?

8 Mr. Nosenko. No. Krupnov appeared later. He wasn't
9 even working in the Seventh Department when it happened.

10 Mr. Klein. Were you surprised to learn that Oswald had
11 cut his wrist?

12 Mr. Nosenko. Pardon me?

13 Mr. Klein. Were you surprised to learn that Oswald had cut
14 his wrist?

15 Mr. Nosenko. Surely.

16 Mr. Klein. Had he done or said anything that you knew
17 about before this to indicate that he might do something like
18 that?

19 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir, no indication.

20 Mr. Klein. Did you discuss the fact that he cut his wrist
21 with the other people in the room?

22 Mr. Nosenko. Immediately when it was reported, immediately
23 went to Chief of Section and we went to the Chief of Department.

24 Mr. Klein. Was he surprised?

25 Mr. Nosenko. We were not discussing surprise; what we must

1 do.

2 Mr. Klein. But no one had expected thatto happen?

3 Mr. Nosenko. No.

4 Mr. Klein. And it was after this that you began to think
5 Oswald might not be normal?

6 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

7 Mr. Klein. Before the wrist incident?

8 Mr. Nosenko. No indication. We didn't have any knowledge

9 Mr. Klein. He seemed as normal as anybody, before?

10 Mr. Nosenko. In accordance with what we had on him,
11 there wasn't any indication.

12 Mr. Klein. Whose idea was it to have a psychiatrist
13 examine Lee Harvey Oswald? Who actually thought of it?

14 Mr. Nosenko. I cannot tell you. When we reported to the
15 Chief of Department, then in the office was taken decision, of
16 course was approved by the Chief of Department, to check him
17 from psychiatrist. It was decided, let's check him independently
18 through two specialists.

19 Mr. Klein. You said the Chief of Section and the Chief
20 of Department and yourself were present when you decided?

21 Mr. Nosenko. And Rastrusin was.

22 Mr. Klein. And Rastrusin.

23 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

24 Mr. Klein. Did everybody agree that you should have a
25 psychiatrist check him?

1 Mr. Nosenko. We didn't make any vote.

2 Mr. Klein. Did anybody say, "No, we should not do this"?

3 Mr. Nosenko. No.

4 Mr. Klein. Where did you discuss it?

5 Mr. Nosenko. In the office of Chief of Seventh Department,
6 Colonel Dubas, D-u-b-a-s.

7 Mr. Klein. Was there a discussion? Tell us what happened
8 in the office.

9 Mr. Nosenko. Well, in KGB is military discipline.
10 Officers has rank. You are reporting. The Chief will ask you
11 what do you think. You are tell him. What proposals? You are
12 tell him. No propose, he decides.

13 Mr. Klein. Did you agree that it should be done?

14 Did you think it was a good idea?

15 Mr. Nosenko. To check? Yes, to check psychiatrist, yes.

16 Mr. Klein. Do you recollect him asking you whether --

17 Mr. Nosenko. No, I cannot recollect.

18 Mr. Klein. Did you tell him it was a good idea, that you
19 believe it to be a good idea?

20 Mr. Nosenko. No. They asked me, did I believe. Sure, I
21 believed it was a good idea.

22 Mr. Klein. How long were you in the office when that
23 decision was made to have the two psychiatrists check him?

24 Mr. Nosenko. Twenty minutes, half an hour.

25 Mr. Klein. Do you recall the name of the psychiatrists who

1 checked him?

2 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

3 Mr. Klein. Did you ever personally speak to the psychi-
4 atrists who checked him?

5 Mr. Nosenko. No.

6 Mr. Klein. You testified that you read their reports and
7 the reports both said "mentally unstable"?

8 Mr. Nosenko. Mentally unstable.

9 Mr. Klein. You testified it was a page or page and a half?

10 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

11 Mr. Klein. Were they typed reports or written?

12 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, it was typed.

13 Mr. Klein. Who brought these reports to you?

14 Mr. Nosenko. Rastrusin, because he was ordered to arrange
15 this psychiatrists checkup through administration of one hospital
16 and through another clinical hospital.

17 Mr. Klein. Where were you when he brought the reports to
18 you?

19 Mr. Nosenko. I don't remember. I must have been in my
20 room, in my office where I was working.

21 Mr. Klein. Did you discuss the reports with anybody?

22 Mr. Nosenko. No. We received them and immediately went
23 to the Chief of Section. He read it and we all went to the
24 Chief of Department.

25 Mr. Klein. At any time did you discuss what you had read

1 in the report?

2 Mr. Nosenko. When I read I went to Chief of Section,
3 surely, we were talking concerning this report. Surely we
4 discussed that he is not mentally stable, and here, both
5 psychiatrists coincided opinions who checked him separately,
6 independently after the fact of cutting wrist, and then
7 still continuing to press and telling he will kill himself if
8 he will not be allowed.

9 Mr. Klein. Did you discuss it with Rastrusin, the report?

10 Mr. Nosenko. I must be, what he showed me.

11 Mr. Klein. Had you ever done anything like this, having
12 two psychiatrists examine any other American defector or
13 potential defector?

14 Mr. Nosenko. No, this is the first time in my experience.

15 Mr. Klein. Is that why you remember it so well, because
16 it was the first time?

17 Mr. Nosenko. It was so unusual; man cut wrist, then
18 still continuing and pressing, threatening to kill himself,
19 surely.

20 Mr. Klein. After that --

21 Mr. Nosenko. I never heard another case like this.

22 Mr. Klein. After that, did you ever hear of a case where
23 they had psychiatrists examine an American defector like
24 this?

25 Mr. Nosenko. No. There was another case where an American,

1 but it was arrangement made from Far East, I think, country. He
2 was delivered in Soviet Union. He was mentally unstable and
3 there participated psychiatrist around him. I was not involved
4 this case, I only heard.

5 Mr. Klein. You were never involved in any other case --

6 Mr. Nosenko. I wasn't involved. I heard simply about case.

7 Mr. Klein. You were never involved in another case where
8 they had a psychiatrist examine somebody, like this case?

9 Mr. Nosenko. No, no.

10 Mr. Klein. Is that why you recall it, because it was
11 the only time it ever happened?

12 Mr. Nosenko. It was the only another time I heard a
13 psychiatrist around foreigner. It was another case, and it
14 was communications.

15 Mr. Klein. Did anybody in the Seventh Department brief
16 the psychiatrists about what you people knew about Oswald?

17 Mr. Nosenko. No. It must be -- just a second. I do
18 not know. I can assume, that when Officer Rastrusin was
19 arranging the checkup of psychiatrist, he must tell that there
20 is an American tourist who cut his wrist and threatening to
21 kill himself. He must said such thing.

22 Mr. Klein. You testified that the KGB, in your words,
23 washed its hands of Oswald after he cut his wrist; is that
24 correct?

25 Mr. Nosenko. Pardon me?

1 Mr. Klein. You testified that the KGB washed its hands of
2 Oswald after he cut his wrist; they did not want anything to
3 do with him?

4 Mr. Nosenko. Absolutely, right.

5 Mr. Klein. To your knowledge, was the KGB consulted when
6 the final decision was made to allow Oswald to remain in the
7 Soviet Union?

8 Mr. Nosenko. I do not know. But I assume that the Chairman
9 of KGB must reporting to the Soviet Government, to Khrushchev.

10 Mr. Klein. Were you consulted by the people who made the
11 final decision?

12 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

13 Mr. Klein. Was rastrusin spoken to?

14 Mr. Nosenko. As far as I know, no.

15 Mr. Klein. Was the Chief of your section spoken to?

16 Mr. Nosenko. I do not know.

17 Mr. Klein. Was it unusual for the KGB people involved not
18 to have been consulted in the decision?

19 Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not know this part, but I can
20 tell you I assumed that when it was made, decision in the Govern-
21 ment, the Chairman of the KGB must be asked, he must report
22 to the government.

23 Mr. Klein. What would the KGB's position have been?

24 Mr. Nosenko. That KGB does not have any interest in
25 this person.

1 Mr. Klein. To your knowledge, did the KGB inform the
2 people who made the decision about the two psychiatrists who
3 examined Oswald and found him mentally unstable?

4 Mr. Nosenko. It is, again, assumption, Mr. Klein. No
5 doubt when Chairman of the KGB was reporting to the Soviet
6 Government, to Khrushchev, he must mention that he was checked
7 by psychiatrists and this is their opinion.

8 Mr. Klein. You have no personal knowledge of that?

9 Mr. Nosenko. Personal knowledge, no.

10 Mr. Klein. You testified that he was sent to Minsk.
11 Who decided that Oswald should be sent to Minsk?

12 Mr. Nosenko. It was on the level of government I cannot
13 tell you.

14 Mr. Klein. Do you know where he worked in Minsk?

15 Mr. Nosenko. He worked on the Plant factory, making
16 radios.

17 Mr. Klein. Do you know who decided that?

18 Mr. Nosenko. You see how it happens -- when it was
19 decided that it will be allowed to stay, the Red Cross was
20 ordered to make a processing of him and surely people from Red
21 Cross who talked with him, they asked what he can do. But,
22 again, I cannot tell you exactly this I have seen, this I know
23 exactly. It is an assumption.

24 Mr. Klein. Was KGB consulted as to whether --

25 Mr. Nosenko. I do not know, sir.

~~TOP SECRET~~

87

1 Mr. Klein. How did you learn he was sent to Minsk and
2 worked in a radio factory?

3 Mr. Nosenko. It was when Krupnov was preparing the
4 document which was sent with file, what kind of work must be
5 done against Oswald in Minsk.

6 Mr. Klein. Are there any kinds of criteria that you know
7 of for determining what type of work a defector should be
8 given?

9 Mr. Nosenko. I don't know. In accordance with what
10 he can do, in accordance with his profession, how he can be
11 used.

12 Mr. Klein. Now, when it was determined that Oswald was
13 going to be allowed to stay in the Soviet Union and live in
14 Minsk, did any KGB officer speak to him at that time?

15 Mr. Nosenko. No. As far as my knowledge, nobody was
16 speaking with him.

17 Mr. Klein. Why didn't the KGB speak to him then?

18 Mr. Nosenko. KGB once said, "We don't have interest."
19 The same was reported to the Government, must be by the Chairman,
20 that the KGB doesn't have interest. KGB didn't wanted to be
21 involved.

22 Mr. Klein. Who made the decision that nobody should
23 speak to Oswald?

24 Mr. Nosenko. The fact that Seventh Department from the
25 beginning had an opinion he doesn't present interest, this was

1 prevailing fact. That is why not talk with.

2 Mr. Klein. You told us that the letter was written to
3 Minsk telling them not to speak to Oswald. Who told Krupnov
4 to write that letter?

5 Mr. Nosenko. Must be Chief of Section who possibly
6 talked this question with Chief of Department. I have seen only
7 when Krupnov prepared this document.

8 Mr. Klein. You have no knowledge of who made the decision?

9 Mr. Nosenko. No.

10 Mr. Klein. Are defectors sometimes used for propaganda
11 statements?

12 Mr. Nosenko. They can be, but I don't know of example.

13 Mr. Klein. Who determines if a defector will be used for
14 a propaganda statement?

15 Mr. Nosenko. It is difficult to say. If KGB has any
16 interest in defector, they are working with defector, can
17 be born idea in the KGB in the appropriate department which
18 is dealing with this defector. It can be, let's say, come
19 request from the Central Committee, from the Department of
20 Propaganda who of foreigners can be used for the purpose of
21 propaganda, like was used in early 1950s on Annabella Bucar.

22 Mr. Klein. To your knowledge, was it ever considered
23 whether to use Oswald for any propaganda?

24 Mr. Nosenko. No, I never heard about using him for the
25 purposes of propaganda.

1 Mr. Klein. How long was the letter that was written to
2 Minsk by Krupnov??

3 Mr. Nosenko. About two pages.

4 Mr. Klein. Was it typed?

5 Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

6 Mr. Klein. To whom was the letter sent?

7 Mr. Nosenko. On the name of Chairman, KGB, of Byelorussia.

8 Mr. Klein. You had an opportunity to read the letter;
9 is that correct?

10 Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

11 Mr. Klein. Now, you have told us that the letter stated
12 there should be periodic physical surveillance of Oswald and also
13 technical surveillance, tapping his phone; is that correct?

14 Mr. Nosenko. Right, control of correspondence, coverage of
15 Oswald by agents, informants.

16 Mr. Klein. Were the details of such technical and physical
17 surveillance in the letter that you saw?

18 Mr. Nosenko. Pardon me?

19 Mr. Klein. Were the details of the technical and
20 physical surveillance in the letter?

21 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir, in the letter it was simply by points,
22 coverage by agents in place of his work, in place of his living,
23 periodical coverage of Oswald by surveillance, control of his
24 correspondence, control of his telephone conversations.

25 Mr. Klein. Why did you read the letter?

1 Mr. Nosenko. You see, officers prepared the documents. He
2 is not going himself reporting to Chief of Section. He is coming
3 to Deputy Chief of Section and giving it to Deputy Chief of
4 Section who in his turn reporting it to the Chief of Section
5 for signature.

6 That is why I was simply seeing it, being in line.

7 Mr. Klein. You told us that the physical surveillance
8 involved people following Oswald around for a period of time?

9 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

10 Mr. Klein. How long?

11 Mr. Nosenko. A month, month and a half; then will be
12 break for two months, month and a half, can be three months, then
13 again take him under surveillance, or can be less. Let's say
14 in this period of time they finished surveillance against him,
15 they made the break, but the telephone tapping is continued and
16 telephone showed that he arranged -- wants to meet somebody.
17 They can put immediately surveillance because here a period
18 signal with whom he is meeting. What is it? Who is this
19 person? But periodical it means not constant from the day he is
20 starting living Minsk until he left Minsk. It is not constant
21 surveillance but from time to time.

22 In KGB such term is used "periodical" surveillance.

23 Mr. Klein. Did the letter specify how long a time it would
24 be on?

25 Mr. Nosenko. No, periodical. It means month, month and a

1 half, something around this. Usually this is done by this way.

2 Mr. Klein. When you had this kind of physical surveillance,
3 when it is on, how many agents would be following him?

4 Mr. Nosenko. I assume it would be the usual brigade;
5 they are called a team, brigade of surveillance; it can be
6 three, four.

7 Mr. Klein. They would be following him every day for a
8 month or month and a half?

9 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

10 Mr. Klein. When they see him meet somebody, do they then
11 attempt to find out the name of the person he meets?

12 Mr. Nosenko. Sure. After he met somebody and they parted,
13 part of the brigade will follow with target, let us say, with
14 Oswald, and part, one, two person, will follow this person whom
15 he met. They will lead him where he will come. He returns to the
16 place of living, in this house, in what apartment? Then they
17 check through administration of the house, who is living in this
18 apartment, plus they will make photo picture in process of
19 leading surveillance of this person. When they check where he
20 is living, find his name, every person, every year living in the
21 apartment houses is presenting such kind of document from his place
22 of work. They know where he is working. They can check also
23 in place of his working, what position, because here in the apart-
24 ment house it will be known that he is working on such plant,
25 such factory.

1 They know in what factory he is working; the surveillance
2 continues to check what position he has in this plant. After
3 that the information this material is send to officer responsible
4 for the target, for Oswald. Surely officer who receive such
5 information immediately will starting to check this Soviet,
6 let's say Soviet, who had a meeting, acquaintance with Oswald.

7 The officer responsible for target for Oswald receiving
8 information that such meeting took place, who this person, where
9 he is living, where he is working, immediately filling up
10 checkups in archives of the KGB Byelorussia. Besides another
11 form he is immediately filling a form to make -- to find out
12 about this character in place of his living, in place of his
13 working. An appropriate department in surveillance responsible
14 for this will start to check through agents' net in place of
15 his living of this Soviet, in place of his working, what kind of
16 person he is, what his moods, how patriotic he is, how good he
17 is a loyal citizen, and et cetera, et cetera.

18 The KGB officer who is responsible for Oswald will check
19 out any Soviet who had contact with Oswald.

20 Mr. Klein. The KGB would have lists of the people who
21 were acquainted?

22 Mr. Nosenko. Every person, not lists; that's why was a file
23 so think, on every his acquaintances; must be quite a lot of
24 material. All these checkups.

25 Mr. Klein. You mean the file you saw in 1963, one of the

1 reasons it was so thick --

2 Mr. Nosenko. So thick because of different materials,
3 checkups, his connections, acquaintances.

4 Mr. Klein. Would this type of physical surveillance, would
5 it go on indefinitely?

6 Mr. Nosenko. Sureveillance, I told you, it is periodical.

7 Mr. Klein. I understand that, but you say on a month, off
8 a month, on a month. Would that pattern go on indefinitely?

9 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir, because he always will be
10 suspected as a possible agent, agent sleeper.

11 Mr. Klein. You told us that there was technical surveil-
12 lance in that they tapped his phone?

13 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

14 Mr. Klein. When they tapped his phone, did they make
15 recordings of the conversations?

16 Mr. Nosenko. Usually tapping telephone on tape recorder;
17 then it is transcribed; next day officer receiving all his
18 conversation of previous day. If he was talking with somebody,
19 he had given a call, they would indicate he talked with such
20 and such a telephone number and if was any names mentioned, they
21 would put. Again, officer starting check up this person and
22 starts work against this person with whom he talked.

23 Mr. Klein. This also would continue indefinitely, this
24 tapping of his phone?
25

1 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sure.

2 Mr. Klein. How many agents would be involved in that?

3 Mr. Nosenko. One officer is responsible ;but an officer
4 maybe himself, has, let us say, ten or 12 or 15 agents around
5 him; but it can be agents and other officers. Because there
6 is somebody who is responsible for this plant where he was
7 working. It means the officer responsible for Oswald will be
8 in contact with officer responsible for this factory where
9 Oswald was working, and asking him whatever new there is through
10 your set of agents concerning Oswald.

11 Mr. Klein. Was it normal that this physical, and
12 technical surveillance should be used on an American
13 defector?

14 Mr. Nosenko. Used this type always, not against foreigners,
15 against who KGB working, and also against Soviet citizen.

16 Mr. Klein. I am sorry --

17 Mr. Nosenko. This is the work of KGB; this is how they
18 work in controlling people and watching.

19 Mr. Klein. I understand, but I am saying, other American
20 defectors, did they have similar surveillance?

21 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, it continued on all other defectors,
22 even though it may be another defector that KGB be in contact
23 they would still continue to watch him.

24 Mr. Klein. In the surveillance you told us about, when
25 Marina Oswald began to see Lee Harvey Oswald, the surveillance

1 would have picked her up?

2 Mr. Nosenko. If in this moment there was surveillance, sure,
3 they would immediately pick her up.

4 Mr. Klein. And if she made a phone call to him, they would
5 pick it up?

6 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

7 Mr. Klein. Do you recall when you saw the file --

8 Mr. Nosenko. I know, sir, that there were materials on
9 Marina Oswald. Whatever materials they had, checkups on her,
10 whatever they found out, whatever documents concerns her
11 appeared after she acquainted with Oswald were in the file, but
12 I didn't have time to pass for the whole file. As I told you,
13 I have seen only this first section of first volume, what is the
14 most important documents, where there was mentioned he
15 married Marina, who she is, et cetera, as a resume. But there
16 were materials, it was seven or eight thick volumes.

17 Mr. Klein. As an experienced intelligence officer, if
18 he met Marina Oswald on March 17 -- how long would you estimate
19 it would take before this type of surveillance, physical,
20 technical checking of the people at his plant, how long do you
21 estimate it would take before the KGB would know about her?
22 If he met her, say, on March 17th?

23 Mr. Nosenko. In the same March they would have quite a
24 big batch of material on her.

25 Mr. Klein. They would have to know about her before?

1 Mr. Nosenko. Right. Where she was working, where she was
2 living, where she was studying.

3 Mr. Klein. You told us that you learned from Alekseev
4 that Oswald wanted a visa to travel from Mexico City to the
5 Soviet Union, is that correct?

6 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

7 Mr. Klein. You told us that there was a cable that
8 you read which was sent from the Mexico City Residentura to the
9 First Chief Directorate, is that right?

10 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

11 Mr. Klein. How long was the cable.

12 Mr. Nosenko. It was a half page.

13 Mr. Sawyer. Mr. Chairman, you know we are going tediously
14 over and over and over details that this man has already covered.
15 I personally object to sitting here and having the same things
16 repeated in minutiae that he has already answered. He said
17 there was a half page along about an hour ago.

18 The Chairman. Counsel will take note of the member's
19 concern and govern himself accordingly.

20 Mr. Klein. Do you recall who was present when you read
21 the cable?

22 Mr. Nosenko. Alekseev who brought it to me. Nobody
23 else because I was sitting in my office; I was sitting alone;
24 I was Deputy Chief of Department. After I read it, I told him
25 that I didn't know that he married; I didn't know that he left

1 Soviet Union because my knowledge was by 1959 then; that is all.

2 Mr. Klein. Mr. Chairman, I have a few more questions, but
3 possibly this would be a good point to break.

4 The Chairman. The Chair notes that it is now five to
5 11:00. Counsel has indicated some additional questions that
6 he has prior to turning the witness over to the members of the
7 Committee.

8 It would be the suggestion of the Chair that we recess for
9 this evening and we continue these hearings tomorrow evening.

10 Is there any discussion?

11 Mr. Dodd. What is that program, Mr. Chairman?

12 The Chairman. The Chair suggests that we recess for this
13 evening and that we reconvene tomorrow evening, for the second
14 session, unless there is some desire to continue on this
15 evening.

16 Mr. Dodd. How much longer do we have? Maybe we can
17 finish up with counsel's questions.

18 The Chairman. Will counsel advise the Member of that?

19 Mr. Klein. I don't have too much more. I have ten
20 minutes.

21 Mr. Dodd. Why don't we take a five minute break?

22 Mrs. Burke. Let him go on and finish.

23 The Chairman. What is the pleasure of the Members?

24 Mr. Devine. I think the attention span of the Members is
25 probably exhausted at this point, as well as the witness, and

1 the stenographer. It seems to me it would be wise to take a
2 break and let the counsel have the first ten minutes tomorrow,
3 and go from there.

4 Mr. Sawyer. I may say, too, based on conversations in
5 our van, a couple of the Members had about two hours sleep
6 last night.

7 The Chairman. Any further comments?

8 Mr. Preyer?

9 Mr. Preyer. I would think that we might do well to
10 adjourn at thistime and get a fresh start tomorrow. I see
11 desperate signals coming up from the court reporter.

12 The Chairman. Mr Dodd, anything further?

13 Mr. Dodd. I will agree with that. Let us quit tonight
14 and start again tomorrow.

15 The Chairman. There might be some possibility, in light
16 of the fact that the House is not in session tomorrow,
17 that we could start a little earlier. If that is agreeable
18 with Members, we will try to work out a little earlier time
19 and advise your office.

20 If there is nothing further at this time, the Chair
21 will recess this hearing pending a time to be set for tomorrow
22 evening.

23 (Whereupon, at 11:00 o'clock p.m., the Committee recessed,
24 to reconvene on Tuesday, June 20, 1978, at a time to be
25 determined.)