

Angelton Interview Notes

Agency: HSCA

RIF: 180-10110-10006

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Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10110-10006
RECORD SERIES : SECURITY CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 014720

April 7, 1997

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 0

Number of Postponements: 19

Postponement # 1 (Page Doc List 1):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: The information is the true name of the individual whose pseudonym is John Scelso.

The postponed information will be opened in full on either May 1, 2001, or three months after the decease of the individual, whichever occurs first.

Release Date: 05/2001

Postponement # 2 (Page Doc List 2):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act. The Board is awaiting additional evidence from the CIA, at which time it will reconsider the postponement

Substitute Language: CIA Employee

Review Date: 05/1997

Postponement # 3 (Page 18):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it discusses sources and methods that properly

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may be withheld under Section 6(1)(B) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: Refers to CIA Employee, CIA Installation in Northern Europe 1

Release Date: 10/2017

Postponement # 4 (Page 18):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it discusses sources and methods that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(B) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: Refers to CIA Employee

Release Date: 10/2017

Postponement # 5 (Page 27):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it discusses sources and methods that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(B) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: Country

Release Date: 10/2017

Postponement # 6 (Page 28):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it discusses sources and methods that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(B) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: CIA Installation in Northern Europe 1

Release Date: 10/2017

Postponement # 7 (Page 82):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: The information is the true name of the individual whose pseudonym is John Scelso.

The postponed information will be opened in full on either May 1, 2001, or three months after the decease of the individual, whichever occurs first.

Release Date: 05/2001

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Postponement # 8 (Page 83):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: The information is the true name of the individual whose pseudonym is John Scelso.

The postponed information will be opened in full on either May 1, 2001, or three months after the decease of the individual, whichever occurs first.

Release Date: 05/2001

Postponement # 9 (Page 83):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: The information is the true name of the individual whose pseudonym is John Scelso.

The postponed information will be opened in full on either May 1, 2001, or three months after the decease of the individual, whichever occurs first.

Release Date: 05/2001

Postponement # 10 (Page 83):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: The information is the true name of the individual whose pseudonym is John Scelso.

The postponed information will be opened in full on either May 1, 2001, or three months after the decease of the individual, whichever occurs first.

Release Date: 05/2001

Postponement # 11 (Page 83):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: The information is the true name of the individual whose pseudonym is John Scelso.

The postponed information will be opened in full on either May 1, 2001, or three months after the

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decease of the individual, whichever occurs first.

Release Date: 05/2001

Postponement # 12 (Page 84):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: The information is the true name of the individual whose pseudonym is John Scelso.

The postponed information will be opened in full on either May 1, 2001, or three months after the decease of the individual, whichever occurs first.

Release Date: 05/2001

Postponement # 13 (Page 85):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: The information is the true name of the individual whose pseudonym is John Scelso.

The postponed information will be opened in full on either May 1, 2001, or three months after the decease of the individual, whichever occurs first.

Release Date: 05/2001

Postponement # 14 (Page 129):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it discusses sources and methods that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(B) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: Refers to Job Title

Release Date: 10/2017

Postponement # 15 (Page 155):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: Rest of CIA Employee Name

Review Date: 05/1997

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Postponement # 16 (Page 155):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: Rest of CIA Employee Name

Review Date: 05/1997

Postponement # 17 (Page 156):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act. The Board is awaiting additional evidence from the CIA, at which time it will reconsider the postponement

Substitute Language: CIA Employee

Review Date: 05/1997

Postponement # 18 (Page 156):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act. The Board is awaiting additional evidence from the CIA, at which time it will reconsider the postponement

Substitute Language: CIA Employee

Review Date: 05/1997

Postponement # 19 (Page 161):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it discusses sources and methods that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(B) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: Location

Release Date: 10/2017

Board Review Completed: 12/17/96

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JFK RECORDS

Cross Reference: None

Status in System:

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Date in: 01/25/96

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IDENTIFICATION FORM

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JSM 3/4/97

Agency: HSCA
Record Number:

Record Series: SECURITY CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY

Agency File Number: 014720

Originator: HSCA

From: Angleton, James R

To: R

Title: Testimony of James Angleton R

Date: 10/5/78

Pages: 169

Subjects:

- 1. Angleton, James, testimony before the committee R
- 2. CIA, methodology R
- 3. CIA, files R
- 4. CIA, association with Oswald R
- 5. Mexico City R
- 6. R

Document Type : transcript

Classification: U C S (T)

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Current Status: O (P) X

Date of Last Review: / /93

Opening Criteria:

Comments: Includes notes about CIA documents on Oswald and
two duplicates of testimony, in next two folders.

Box #: 3

Folder Title:

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ANGLETON DEPOSITION

CIA DOCUMENTS

#1904 CUBAN CONNECTION (W/ BELIN)

1934 CUBAN CONNECTION (W/ BELIN)

3 TELEPHONE TRANSCRIPT 10/1/63 (OSWALD + KOSTIKOV)

79 COLEMAN-SLAWSON MEMO ABOUT O. BEING OBSERVED IN
OFF. OF GOV. MILITARY ATTACHE IN MEXICO CITY

1977 TELEGRAM FROM MEXICO STATION RE: PHOTOGRAPHIC
COVERAGE

2008 1/31/64 RE: O'S CONTACT IN MEXICO CITY

177 DESCRIPTION OF AMERICAN MALE ENTERING GOV. EMB.

2033 7/23/64 BY DOOLEY RE: REPRODUCING MEXICAN PHOTO IN
WC REPORT

179 HQ RESPONSE TO MEXICO STATION 10/10/63 W/ CORRECT
DESC OF O

2144 CABLE 12/20/63 BY [See/so] RE: WITHHOLDING INFO
ON THE TAP

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#197 11/23/63 CABLE FROM MEXICO STATION TO HQ
STATION UNABLE TO COMPARE O'S VOICE

205 11/23/63 CABLE FROM MEX CITY TO DIR: SAITH O
SAME PERSON WHO CALLED SOV. EMB PRIOR TO
10/1/63

248 11/27/63 MEMO TO PAPICH: THAT THERE WAS CONTINU
PHOTO COVERAGE

1879 5/5/64 THAT O WAS IN CONTACT W/ CALDERON,
PEREZ, RODRIGUEZ

1892 ALLEGATION THAT CALDERON WAS CONNECTED W

1990 5/5/64 DEBRIEFING QUESTIONS FOR AMMUS

1898 5/6/64 FOLLOW QUES FOR AMMUS

1891 5/8/64 [] SUMMARY OF MEETING W/ AMM

1929-30 TRANSMITTAL OF AMMUS INFO TO WC

1932-33 ACTUAL INFO PROVIDED BY AMMUS: NO REF TO CAL

1907 5/14/64 BRIEF FOR PRESENTATION TO COMMISSION

1906 ANGLETON ON TRANSMITTAL OF INFO TO WC

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5/23/75
1950-54 ISSUE OF CALDERON'S POSSIBLE FOREKNOWLEDGE

1928 MATERIAL FROM MEXICO STATION SHOWN TO WC
NO REF TO CALDERON

1977 CABLE: MANN WANTED CALDERON ARRESTED

2088 CALDERON ET AL: REQUEST THAT NO ACTION BE
TAKEN W/O AGENCY CLEARANCE

2020 11/26/63 CABLE: O + ARNESTO RODRIGUEZ

1957-59 ELENA DE PAZ ALLEGATION

2055 [6/5/64] POSSIBILITY OF KGB TRAINING SCHOOL IN
MINSK

796 10/31/59 STATE DEPT DE ON O. ATTEMPTING TO RE-
NOUNCE CITIZENSHIP

J.C. #917 NAVAL MESSAGE: THAT O. OFFERED TO FURNISH RADAR
SECRETS TO SOVIETS

943 OSWALD FILE CARDS

2139 * 3/5/64 ANGLETON ON TRANSMITTAL OF MATERIALS TO LC

2138 * 5/12/64 ANGLETON TO ROCCA

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1	House of Representatives	Washington, D. C.
2	Select Committee on Assassinations	October 5, 1978
	Subcommittee on John F. Kennedy	

TESTIMONY OF:

P A G E

1 Mr. James Angleton

2

* * *

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ASSASSINATION OF JOHN F. KENNEDY

- - -

Thursday, October 5, 1978

- - -

U. S. House of Representatives,
John F. Kennedy Subcommittee of
Select Committee on Assassinations,
Washington, D. C.

Deposition of:

JAMES ANGLETON

called for examination by staff counsel for the Subcommittee,
pursuant to notice, in the offices of the Select Committee on
Assassinations, House Office Building Annex II, Room 3369,
Second and D. Streets, Southwest, Washington, D. C., beginning
at 10:00 o'clock a.m., before Albert Joseph LaFrance, a Notary
Public in and for the District of Columbia, when were present
on behalf of the respective parties:

For the Subcommittee:

MICHAEL GOLDSMITH, Staff Counsel

SURELL BRADY, Staff Counsel

CHARLES BERK, Staff Counsel

MARGO JACKSON, Researcher

For the Deponent:

WALLACE DUNCAN and PHILIP L. CHABOT, JR.
of the firm of Duncan, Brown, Weinberg & Palmer, P.C.,
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006

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P R O C E E D I N G S

TESTIMONY OF JAMES ANGLETON

1
2
3 Miss Brady. Let the record reflect that present this
4 morning for the deposition is the witness, James Angleton, who
5 has been administered an oath by the reporter, Albert Joseph
6 LaFrance empowered under the laws of the District of Columbia
7 to administer oaths.

8 Present for the deposition is Miss Surell Brady, counsel
9 for the Select Committee on Assassinations, Michael Goldsmith,
10 also counsel for the Select Committee on Assassinations,
11 and Margo Jackson, Research for the Select Committee on
12 Assassinations.

13 At this time, will counsel for Mr. Angleton identify
14 themselves?

15 Mr. Duncan. Wallace Duncan of Duncan, Brown, Weinberg
16 and Palmer, and Philip L. Chabot of the same firm.

17 Miss Brady. Let the record reflect that I have been
18 designated by the Select Committee on Assassinations of the
19 House of Representatives, pursuant to House Resolution 222 and
20 Committee Rule 4 to depose witnesses for the Committee.

21 Mr. Angleton, is this correct that you are appearing here
22 voluntarily?

23 Mr. Angleton. That is correct.

24 Miss Brady. You have been advised of your right to
25 counsel and have selected counsel of your choice, is that

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correct?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, but I would like to explain later why I chose counsel.

Miss Brady. You may do so at this time, if you wish.

Mr. Angleton. I chose counsel simply because of the surprise witness John Hart, that I was not notified in advance of his appearance either by the Agency or by the Committee. It seemed to me that lack of notification of a surprise witness of this sort changed the whole context of what I regard this inquiry to be. Therefore, having had the experience with the Church Committee and not having had counsel in giving depositions and all of that and not having the right of discovery during the course of the Church Committee hearings you might say I learned a lesson.

Miss Brady. Your comments will be noted in the record.

Mr. Angleton, at this time, are you under any restriction or privilege that would prevent you from answering all questions fully and accurately and without any intent to withhold information?

Mr. Angleton. As far as I know, if I understand the correspondence between the Chairman of the Committee and Admiral Turner, CIA, there are no restrictions although the cover letter signed by the Deputy Director Carlucci stated if I had any question I was to refer them to Mr. Breckinridge.

Miss Brady. Have you consulted with Mr. Breckinridge

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1 or the Agency about your appearance today?

2 Mr. Angleton. I consulted with him as to certain docu-
3 ments which I wish to see as it affected Mr. Hart's appearance
4 That was the General Counsel's office through my attorneys.

5 Miss Brady. Have you also been provided with a copy of
6 the Committee's Rules and have you and your attorney had time
7 to peruse those rules?

8 Mr. Angleton. I haven't perused them but I don't need
9 to. I read them sometime ago. I have not really seen them for
10 the last month.

11 Mr. Duncan. His counsel are familiar with the rules.

12 Miss Brady. Mr. Angleton, also the Committee Rules
13 provide that at the end of the deposition the witness may be
14 furnished a copy of that transcript. As you are aware, much
15 of the information you will be dealing with this morning will
16 contain classified information to some extent. We are asking
17 if you will waive your right to have an actual copy of the
18 transcript but of course it will be available to you and your
19 attorneys at the Committee for your views.

20 Mr. Angleton. Can I reserve until we finish this session
21 as to whether I want a transcript or not?

22 Miss Brady. Certainly.

23 Mr. Angleton. Since I don't know what we are going to go
24 into.

25 Miss Brady. That is fine.

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1 Mr. Angleton, first I would like to go into the background
2 of the Nosenko case. Can you tell me what position you held
3 with the Central Intelligence Agency in 1961?

4 Mr. Angleton. I was Chief of Counterintelligence.

5 Miss Brady. When did you first become involved in the
6 Nosenko case?

7 Mr. Angleton. I can't give you the exact dates but it
8 was when the first telegram arrived from Geneva that he had
9 contacted our people through an American diplomat.

10 Miss Brady. Which individual in Geneva did Mr. Nosenko
11 first contact in 1962?

12 Mr. Angleton. It was David -- the name will come back --
13 David somebody in the State Department who had previously been
14 stationed in Moscow.

15 Miss Brady. Do you know what the person's assignment
16 was?

17 Mr. Angleton. He was a part of the American delegation.
18 You mean the person being the American diplomat? He was a
19 member of the American delegation to the UN Conference or
20 whatever it was.

21 Miss Brady. In Geneva?

22 Mr. Angleton. In Geneva.

23 Miss Brady. When did word of Nosenko's first contact
24 first reach the Counterintelligence Staff at Headquarters?

25 Mr. Angleton. Almost immediately.

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1 Miss Brady. Through whom was that communication made?

2 Mr. Angleton. Through the Agency.

3 Miss Brady. Was that through a cable or what type of
4 communication.

5 Mr. Angleton. Telegram.

6 Miss Brady. Which division within the Agency was respon-
7 sible for the case at the time of the first contact?

8 Mr. Angleton. The Soviet Division.

9 Miss Brady. What was the role of the Counterintelligence
10 Staff?

11 Mr. Angleton. The Counterintelligence Staff is the
12 principal counterintelligence advisor to the Director.

13 Miss Brady. Was it normal for Counterintelligence to
14 handle defectors? Had they handled any defectors previously?

15 Mr. Angleton. Yes, we had handled a Hay Hannen, who
16 had been previously handled by others unsuccessfully and had
17 been turned over to Counterintelligence Staff and it was
18 through him that Colonel Abel was apprehended.

19 Miss Brady. Was it normal procedure then for the defector
20 cases to initially go through the Soviet Division and only to
21 Counterintelligence if problems developed? Was that the
22 procedure?

23 Mr. Angleton. No, there is no procedure. It is a ques-
24 tion of precisely how the events transpire. I can take up much
25 more in detail when we come to the person to whom Hart referred

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1 to as "X". But in short, we did not have jurisdiction over
2 Nosenko, then or any other time.

3 Miss Brady. What role were you playing? WERE you in a
4 consulting role at that time? How was information about the
5 case disseminated to you individually?

6 Mr. Angleton. It was not unusual in cases that dealt
7 with Soviet intelligence that copies of the telegram would be
8 sent to us automatically.

9 Miss Brady. What action was taken by the Agency after
10 Nosenko was first contacted?

11 Mr. Angleton. There was no action taken. There was
12 great excitement. The first thing that one does in those
13 cases is to begin to run tracers against the registry and
14 files to see if there is any previous knowledge of the indi-
15 vidual.

16 Second was to consider the information which he submitted
17 in terms of file and tracers.

18 Miss Brady. What significant information was provided by
19 Nosenko at that time of the first contact?

20 Mr. Angleton. I have not seen those telegrams, I might
21 add, for several years but one of the more astonishing pieces
22 of information which he gave was to the effect that a Soviet
23 by the name of Belitsky, who was in contact with the Agency
24 was in fact a plant. He gave the name of our case officers
25 quite accurately who were handling Blitsky. He stated that

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Belitsky was an agent of the Department of Disinformation.

Miss Brady. Within the KGB?

Mr. Angleton. Within the KGB.

Miss Brady. Was that the first allegation you had of a serious Soviet penetration by the KGB?

Mr. Angleton. From whom? I am afraid I don't understand your question.

Miss Brady. Was that the first information you had had either through your own intelligence or through any other Soviet defector of a possible serious Soviet penetration?

Mr. Angleton. We had had hundreds of them, allegations.

Miss Brady. How would you characterize this allegation by Nosenko. Was it more serious? Was it more substantive?

Mr. Angleton. The facts were, to explain this -- it is a complex case, as you will find out all of these cases are, they cannot be simply explained in a few words -- Belitsky was a person connected with the media in the Soviet Union who traveled extensively in the West and who had in fact attempted in our view to be recruited by another allied intelligence service. Eventually he fell into the hands of the CIA or the Soviet Division who believed that they had made a firm recruitment of this individual and therefore, for a great period of time, I don't know how many years, they were in fact running him as an agent.

He would travel to and from Moscow to the West. Therefore,

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1 from that point of view, to have it declared that their
 2 case officers whose names were given accurately by Nosenko,
 3 were in contact with a control agent of the KGB, particularly
 4 the Department of Disinformation, they regarded that as an
 5 enormous discovery. But when we got that trace and began to
 6 analyze it we found the following:

7 Miss Brady. Excuse me. When you say we are you refer-
 8 ring to Counterintelligence?

9 Mr. Angleton. I am talking about Counterintelligence.

10 We found that the Foreign Service, whose favor Belitsky
 11 had curried at one time, had put him under surveillance and
 12 a number of other things while he was in their capitol. They
 13 came to the conclusion that he was in fact what we would call
 14 coat dragging, he was trying to be recruited. Therefore,
 15 they wouldn't have anything to do with him on the grounds
 16 that he was a suspected plant. So that was found in the files.

17 Second, we had information -- I will put it another way
 18 -- when we had "X" in a safe house there was some kind of
 19 entry made into his personal papers and we found, not the
 20 Counterintelligence but either the Office of Security or the
 21 Soviet Division found, on some notes that he had made
 22 apparently he was jotting down things to talk about -- and on
 23 that he had the name Belitsky; in other words, the files showed
 24 that had any analyst gone to Belitsky and so on that this was
 25 not startling news because here was, number one, a Foreign

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1 Service two or three years prior to that having given us a
2 full report on Belitsky as a suspected provocateur.

3 At the same time, we had in our possession information
4 from "X" that Blitsky was a plant.

5 Miss Brady. Based on that information, what conclusions
6 were you able to draw from Nosenko in terms of his giving this
7 information as a startling revelation?

8 Mr. Angleton. We drew no conclusions. I gave you only
9 one piece of information that I can recall. It stands out
10 because he also gave, I believe, the alias of Belitsky.
11 Now, I would like to have seen the telegrams that came in at
12 that period because when he had met our people there, Bagley
13 and whoever it was, he had made the statement that he would
14 only give them three or four pieces of information in return
15 for about \$200 or so, and that was a one time affair. That
16 was his original approach, and he needed that money in order
17 to make up for a deficit of what he had been using in drinking.

18 So, he gave other pieces of information, which may come
19 back to my memory, but at the moment, as I recall, they were
20 not the most startling in the world. Nevertheless, that is not
21 the basic point. The basic point was that the information
22 which I have just described on Belitsky would have made an
23 enormous impact on someone in Bagley's position if he was
24 unaware of the file checks.

25 Miss Brady. You have mentioned the testimony of John

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Hart. I take it therefore you are familiar with the transcript of that testimony?

Mr. Angleton. I am indeed.

Miss Brady. Are you also familiar with Mr. Hart's allegations or assertions that at the time of Nosenko's first interviews in Geneva, in an effort to sooth himself and calm himself he had been drinking heavily and admitted later to case officers he was drunk in the earlier interrrgation?

Mr. Angleton. I am familiar with it and I regard it as part and parcel of the Hart myth.

Miss Brady. What other information do you have on that bearing on what the condition of Hart was at the time of the first interviews?

Mr. Angleton. I happen to know that there was some drinking being done. My own feeling is that the CIA people were doing as much, if not more, drinking than Nosenko.

Miss Brady. Were there ever any reports, telegrams or other type of information from those persons interviewing him that he was in fact drunk.

Mr. Angleton. There may have been some description, oprational description, that he had been in some bars or scomething of that sort. There may have been. You see, I have to say to you that for many years, after I left the Agency, I have not left Counterintelligence. So, I see my friends and we still go over a lot of the same points and so on because we

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1 have this unhappy choice of leadership in the Counterintelli-
2 gence and in the Agency.

3 So that when I make some of these comments they are com-
4 ments that may not have been known to me at the time of my
5 activity but which I have learned subsequently.

6 Miss Brady. Is your lasting impression of Nosenko's first
7 contact that he was unstable or in any way unable to give
8 accurate information?

9 Mr. Angleton. If you have been 31 years in Counterintel-
10 ligence you don't draw any kind of inference at all. Conclu-
11 sions are the last thing you make based on a one time walk-in
12 who is only asking for \$200.

13 * There is a certain unreal air, to begin with, that a man
14 whose father was a Minister of the Soviet Union, to whom they
15 had erected a statue as a hero of the Soviet Union, would have
16 degenerated to the point that he would be willing to betray
17 his country for \$200 in exchange for four pieces of informa-
18 tion.

19 In other words, there is an unreal aspect to that which
20 is illogical because he knows the trade, he could have asked
21 for several thousands of dollars for one piece of information,
22 if he liked to drink and have girlfriends and all that type
23 of thing, the thing simply doesn't jibe.

24 Miss Brady. What other factors about the circumstances
25 of his contact would you say had an air of unreality?

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1 Mr. Angleton. Because he alleged to be from the Second
 2 Chief Directorate and the primary concerns of the Second Chief
 3 Directorate of the KGB are domestic, the same as the FBI.
 4 Therefore, if he was going to be in Geneva it was illogical
 5 up to a certain extent because there is what is called the
 6 "SK" or the security part of the First Chief Directorate, CIA
 7 part, who would normally be occupying that position.

8 Miss Brady. At that time was Nosenko challenged or
 9 questioned about any of these circumstances about his contact?

10 Mr. Angleton. I think in all honesty that Pete Bagley
 11 was so taken up by the Belitsky and other leads, other
 12 information imparted, that his basic concern was to break down
 13 this man or at least to induce this man to remain in contact
 14 with a view to future recruitment; therefore not to get three
 15 or four pieces of information but to get a lot of information
 16 and to offer him all kinds of inducements so that there would
 17 be a permanent relationship.

18 But in this sense it stood to reason that if a man was
 19 prepared to sell himself for \$300 or \$200 or whatnot, that you
 20 would have leverage over him in the ultimate if you desired
 21 to use such leverage, that he would have no options but to work
 22 for you.

23 Miss Brady. Was Bagley the case officer assigned to
 24 Nosenko at that time?

25 Mr. Angleton. He was stationed in Switzerland and he was

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1 a good Soviet expert.

2 Miss Brady. Within the Soviet Division?

3 Mr. Angleton. I don't know whether he depended directly
4 on them or whether he depended on the Western European Divi-
5 sion, but he knew several languages and had studied in Geneva
6 and was a part of our mission.

7 Miss Brady. Was any of the information or lead provided
8 by Nosenko at that time given to another source to evaluate?

9 Mr. Angleton. I will put it this way. When Pete came
10 back, I permitted him to read hundreds and hundreds of pages
11 of transcript from "X".

12 Miss Brady. At this time could we identify "X" for the
13 record?

14 Mr. Angleton. Anatole Golitzen. I can't give you dates
15 or anything but he was absolutely shocked when he read this
16 information.

17 Miss Brady. What was the basis for his surprise or shock?

18 Mr. Angleton. Because he was unaware of it. Now, I
19 might add, we have one missing point here. Before he came
20 back I had sent a long telegram, a questionnaire, to Geneva,
21 for which I drew heavily upon "X's" information, because, to
22 use a word I sort of invented in the business and I don't like
23 to have folks around know where it came from but I al-ays
24 believed in using "litmus paper", in other words, having a
25 fact not known, that the other side does not know we know.

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1 So that in the course of elicitation that thing is exposed
 2 to an individual and he is unaware of the fact that we do know
 3 the whole story, say, on that particular matter.

4 Now, if he is in a position where he had had access and
 5 knows that and withholds it from you, it is an indicator,
 6 because, after all, a defection is a change of allegiance.
 7 Further than that, a person who defects has to transfer his
 8 sense of security and everything to the other people. He has
 9 to tell you about penetrations in your organization and all of
 10 the troubles of your organization in his own defense because
 11 he could be assassinated by somebody within your own organiza-
 12 tion. Therefore, it is in his self interest to expose every-
 13 thing.

14 So that this was a very long telegram, which I again have
 15 not seen since practically that day, you might say, in which
 16 I spent many hours pulling together those questions for them
 17 to submit to Nosenko. To this day I don't know whether those
 18 questions were submitted. I can't recall them. I mean,
 19 whether he left before they got the telegram or not, I don't
 20 know.

21 But I did not tell them that it came from "X", as I
 22 recall. It only simply stated as a follow-up in his position
 23 as Second Chief Directorate "will you please take up
 24 the following names" There was no explanation. "Will you
 25 take this up. Have you ever heard of this? Have you ever

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1 hard of that." And so on.

2 I can't recall, there may have been responses in all of
3 that. In my time frame it is all telescoped down to Pete's
4 return. So, to go back to your question as to whether this
5 was taken up with any other source, the logical thought that
6 occurred to me was that since Golitzen was the first defector
7 who had ever given us in any department had the order of
8 battle of the Second Chief Directorate, that he would be the
9 logical man to turn to for evaluation.

10 This was put up to Mr. Helms and Mr. Helms -- the deci-
11 sion was that he would never wish to disclose the name or
12 circumstances or the fact that we had been approached at that
13 given time and moment by this defector. So we resorted to
14 another device, and we took a page out of the chapter of the
15 operation in which for some months, if not years, a member of
16 the Eastern Bloc intelligence communicated to us through an
17 Embassy anonymously, and therefore we took the information,
18 basic information, that was given by Nosenko and we disguised
19 it as though it was an anonymous letter sent to us, and we
20 showed that anonymous letter to Golitzin, who read the infor-
21 mation and who stated this is disinformation, this is a provo-
22 cation.

23 Miss. Brady. What was Golitzin's status with the Agency
24 at that time?

25 Mr. Angleton. His status with the Agency was a defector

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1 who had supplied several thousands of pages of very hard core
2 information which had resulted in perhaps the most major
3 counterespionage cases in this country, I mean in the whole
4 Western world.

5 Miss Brady. At the time of Golitzin's defection, did he
6 give any indication of what he expected the KGB reaction to
7 be to his defection?

8 Mr. Angleton. Exactly. He said that when he defected
9 -- I mean at some given stage, and again I can't tell you the
10 exact dates on this -- let me put it this way: He defected
11 in Helsinki. We sent him on to Sweden and put him on an air-
12 plane with his wife and child with a view of a direct flight
13 to the United States. Either through bad weather or for
14 reasons I do not know his plane was diverted to Germany. He
15 had warned [] that there was a penetration of
16 the Agency.

17 Miss Brady. Was he able to identify it any more than
18 that?

19 Mr. Angleton. No, he just said "you have to be very
20 careful how you treat my information because there is a pene-
21 tration."

22 Now, [] in my view committed a terrible
23 error in giving a very brief, excitable summary of the infor-
24 mation disclosed by Golitzin which he was able to derive in
25 that short period of time. He included this allegation of

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1 penetration whereas anyone more mature would know that you do
 2 not send that type of information through a cable where dozens
 3 of copies are going to be made and disseminated to various
 4 desks. It is the type of thing that you would have almost
 5 traveled home with the agent and reported to the Director.
 6 But that was not done and it was paragraph 7 in the cable that
 7 had this statement that the source states we must be extremely
 8 careful and he is fearful because there is a penetration in
 9 the Agency.

10 So, that was 11 that he told our man. He gave him a
 11 warning in order for him to be careful and how he handled
 12 whatever he did send back about him.

13 As I recall, Golitzin was supposed to have met a delega-
 14 tion coming in from Moscow at the airport at the time we were
 15 putting him on the plane and sending him on to Stockholm, so
 16 we knew the alarm would be immediate. So, when the plane
 17 was diverted -- and I might also add that I don't think his
 18 wife and child had ever flown before or anything but they
 19 were terribly ill, and I don't think she knew anything about
 20 the defection until about the last minute, and she had
 21 relatives behind in the Soviet Union, so there were a lot of
 22 emotional problems -- so when the plane was diverted to
 23 Germany his suspicions were immediately that something was up
 24 and therefore he began to fear for himself, because this was
 25 not in accordance with the understanding. It was supposed to

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1 be a direct flight to the United States.

2 Therefore, when he arrived in Germany he did what he
 3 would not have done under other circumstance. He warned our
 4 people in Germany that the agent to which he was referring
 5 about the penetration had operated in Germany. Since the
 6 person was a Russian speaker and of Russian origin, in fact
 7 born in Russia, it would be logical that the Agency would put
 8 him in contact or use as a handle that very man who could
 9 assassinate him since he was one of the number one Russian
 10 experts.

11 Not knowing this at all, he had all the suspicions in the
 12 world of that diversion. So, it entailed his disclosing to us
 13 or to the German station a great deal of information regarding
 14 that agent.
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Miss Brady. Did he indentify the agent?

Mr. Angleton. Only by cryptonym.

Miss Brady. What was the cryptonym.

Mr. Angleton. Sasha, S-a-s-h-a.

Miss Brady. Was the agency able through that cryptonym to actually identify that person?

Mr. Angleton. Eventually. I will go into that if you would like.

Miss Brady. All right.

Mr. Angleton. First I want to get him back to the United Statea. He is stranded here in Germany.

So, he arrived with his family and was put up in a safe-house. In the meantime the very night that some of these cables came in, the Deputy Chief of the Soviet Division was Mr. Howard Osborn, later our Director of Security, and he came rushing to my home with the telegram that had arrived at night, as I recall, therefore he got in touch with me. We spent some time discussing it with a view of implications and all those things you want to have in mind before the opening of business next day.

I will now digress on Sasha. Under the charter or under the regulations of the Agency all matters dealing with CIA personnel are strictly jurisdictional matters of the Director of Security. In other words, the security investigations of personnel, their security files as distinguished from personnel

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1 files, the polygraph, the investigations of applicants, the
 2 periodic reexamination of personnel, the periodic repoly-
 3 graphing of personnel, allegations regarding personnel,
 4 employees, et cetera, are strictly within the sole jurisdic-
 5 tion of the Director of Security. That also includes physical
 6 installations and so on.

7 So that they would be obviously the first party to whom
 8 one would turn with an allegation regarding penetration and they
 9 would have under all circumstances the right of direct contact
 10 with the source because they alone would have the files from
 11 which they could analyze gathered information for interroga-
 12 tion and followup, et cetera, description or any small item of
 13 information that might lead to identification.

14 Now Golitzen's story basically was this that he had
 15 been on the Emigre Desk in the First Chief Directorate of
 16 Soviet Intelligence and the file of this agent, Sasha, had
 17 been transferred at a given time, I think it was 1951 or there-
 18 abouts, had been transferred to the American Department and
 19 that he had a chance to look at that file and they knew that
 20 the individual's name ended in "insky" or something of that
 21 sort, and that agent had come back into Russia at one stage
 22 while in Germany to see his parents.

23 Miss Brady. What do you mean by coming back?

24 Mr. Angleton. That means that unbeknownst to anybody,
 25 say, he might have walked down a street in Berlin, walked

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1 in a house, out the back entrance, changed clothes, identity,
 2 disguise or what not, been put on a plane, flown there, and the
 3 redeposited in West Berlin, and no one would ever have known
 4 that he spent a week in Moscow. In other words, he had a cover
 5 story that he was on vacation or sick and so on. It means any
 6 kind of covered travel, covert travel.

7 So that the Security Office interrogated him at tre-
 8 mendous length. We were privy to much of this information.
 9 Therefore, it was the duty of the Security Office to delve
 10 into all personnel files and all security files of all employees
 11 past and present, to try to come up with somebody who fit the
 12 puzzle because there were enough indicators. They came up
 13 with the name of an individual, and they were fairly certain that
 14 they had made an identification because he had asked them
 15 "Give me all the names of the personnel whose names end in
 16 'insky' and I will go through all those names and it may strike
 17 me," because after all 10 years had passed since he had seen
 18 that file. He had seen it illegally as it was transferred from
 19 one department to another. But this told us something. This
 20 told us that if we had been really sharp that while the man
 21 was on the Emigre Desk, his file was on the Emigre Desk, he
 22 was an agent in the emigration movement, but when his file
 23 was transferred to the American Desk, then it means that his
 24 status must have changed, which in fact had happened. The
 25 actual Sasha had worked as a penetration agent of Russian

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1 emigre groups. During the course of that employment sought
 2 out the CIA and gave the CIA information betraying the emigre
 3 groups and built himself up with the CIA people in Germany to
 4 a point where they recruited him as an agent.

5 So he ceased to be a man working on emigres and he was
 6 transferred to the American Department. That coincides pre-
 7 cisely with the career of Sash when he is finally identified.
 8 But this terrible blunder was made that they omitted from this
 9 list real Sasha.

10 Miss Brady. How was that possible?

11 Mr. Angleton. You would have to ask the Office of
 12 Security.

13 So they go down there, and of all the names he says,
 14 "This is the closest that I can come to it," and it so happened
 15 that the person that he pointed out was a person who had been in
 16 OSS and who did have relatives in Russia and who had changed
 17 his name but his original family name did end in "insky." This
 18 was true because among the information that "X" had given us,
 19 he had taken actual documents out of the embassy in Helsinki,
 20 Soviet documents, we had a very sophisticated research and
 21 development program of an electronic device by which we could
 22 shoot a beam against a windowpane and turn the windowpane
 23 into a receiver so you could listen to conversations within
 24 a room. There was a communication from Moscow to Helsinki
 25 and it appeared to be a general communication to all stations

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1 and it stated "beware of this kind of CIA-FBI gadget."

2 Then it went on even to describe that so many had been
3 ordered by the FBI and so many by the CIA and so on and so on.

4 Now this was not the kind of thing that a desk officer --
5 I mean this was not giving away anything other than it showed
6 that they knew in fact about one of the most secret things
7 we had. So it did not lead you anywhere by having that docu-
8 ment. But the man who was wrongly suspected was the secretary
9 of our technical production board of which I was the oldest
10 member, who therefore sat in as the secretary in all our
11 meetings in which all the sophisticated research and develop-
12 ment was discussed. If you looked at it with this mistaken
13 "insky" business, he conformed to a "T" with an individual
14 who could have supplied that basic information embodied in
15 that document taken out by "X."

16 Miss Brady. How long from the time of the first "insky"
17 information by Golitzen was it until you resolved which person
18 you were actually talking about?

19 Mr. Angleton. It took a very long time because finally
20 they came up with the "insky." We had some very curious things
21 about the "insky." Number one, he has been described and
22 downplayed by everybody as only being "a contract agent." If
23 there is anything that has disgusted me throughout my career
24 it has been from the time of the Colby period up to the present,
25 with a brief respite during the time of Director Burke, who

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1 I think was really putting the Agency, after all the travails
 2 and so on, back on course. I mean he had gained the respect
 3 of foreign intelligence chiefs. He had sensitivity to what
 4 intelligence was about, the personnel. He was making strikes in
 5 trying to bring back some luster to CIA after the Church Com-
 6 mittee. But nothing has disgusted me as it has from the Colby
 7 period all the way on through in what I regard as destroying
 8 a profession.

9 This present director gives me no confidence whatsoever
 10 both in terms of his firing of employees, the falsity of the
 11 justification, putting out that they had to get rid of people
 12 because we had overrecruited during Vietnam was the official
 13 statement, things of this sort. There is no truth to these
 14 matters. We did not recruit during Vietnam. Every component
 15 of the Agency had to supply X percentage of their own personnel
 16 to be directed to Vietnam. I had to give up X percentage of
 17 my people for tours of duty. It was compulsory. So that
 18 everyone went through this agony of taking people with families
 19 and what not and deciding which man you were going to choose
 20 to send to Vietnam.

21 And we had troubles, the Agency had troubles because you
 22 had all kinds of hardship problems come up. You had all kinds
 23 of things and at one stage the idea was that if a person did
 24 not go when he was told, that then he would be separated from
 25 the Agency, and that was regarded as too harsh and so on. It

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was a very dre-dful period. So that these so-called alle-
gations on the firing and so on are just simply not true.

While I am on the firings, I might also state that any
of us who regard ourselves as professionals knew many of the men
who were fired. But Turner didn't know any of them then. Some
of the finest men were fired. This goes back because Colby
had salted the place with his personnel os that they remained
on a long time after his departure in very prominent positions
such as the head of the Clandestine Service, the Deputy Head
of the Clandestine Service, and so on and even into the Bush
period.

Hart was one of Colby's men from the Far East Division.
I was astonished to read the statement that he was supposed
to be an expert because Hart's first job that I think he
ever had in the Agency was under me as a very junior employee C:

[J.

Miss Brady. I know you want to go into some detail ---

Mr. Angleton. I am saying my strong views on the kinds
of distortions and self delusions that have gone on when it
came to the identification in fact of the true Sasha, of
trying to brush him off as a minor contract employee when in
fact in Germany he was in the most influential positions of
recruiting agents that we would sent into the Soviet Union.
In other words, we would sent 10 people from Berlin but all
of those people were identified by Sasha to the Soviets and

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all of them were put under control. So that the rot set in.

In other words, from a espionage point of view the moment that the opposition knows one of your agents who is in contact with another, and then unbeknownst, it is not long in a police state before identification of the entire net is ascertained. Being Russian, he worked in a very influential position in the actual operations that had to do with penetration, I mean with recruitment of Soviets for the purpose of espionage in the Soviet Union.

Miss Brady. When roughly was Sasha identified as the person that Golitzen mentioned?

Mr. Angleton. I can't be precise on this but I would say around '63, '64. It became more and more -- we found, for example, that shortly after Golitzen's telegram that was given wide dissemination [] to the effect that there was a penetration, we found a letter, which may have been predated, of Sash writing a letter denouncing a member of the Soviet Division as a Soviet agent, and this man's nickname was Sasha.

Miss Brady. The man being denounced by Sasha had a nickname Sasha?

Mr. Angleton. His name was Alexander and the nickname of Alexander is Sasha.

In all of his duties while he was in Germany Sasha's superior was the man he denounced. He stated that if the

1 Agency did not do anything about Sasha that he would go to the
 2 Attorney General. It was not too long after that he resigned
 3 from the Agency.

4 Miss Brady. Which, the superior or the ---

5 Mr. Angleton. The real Sasha. In other words, the man
 6 he was denounced, but in all of his dealings with him in Ger-
 7 many as subordinate never referred to him as Sasha. he refer-
 8 red to him as Alexander or by his last name.

9 So that is a very important point in terms of either, one,
 10 the Soviets notifying him that in their damage report they
 11 knew that Golitzen had seen the file on him, which was
 12 entitled "Sasha," and the question then is, which we don't know
 13 because he has never been broken, as to why it is that we have
 14 him denouncing a man whose nickname is Sash, known to everybody
 15 as Sasha?

16 Miss Brady. Was there ever any evidence that the superior
 17 named Sasha had in fact been an agent of the Soviet?

18 Mr. Angleton. No, but the sort of man that had been so
 19 much dealing in this kind of affairs, knew so many Soviets and
 20 was so exposed to to speak, and served in the field so long
 21 in Germany and all that, that it was not beyond the realm of
 22 imagination when you had such an allegation, that one might
 23 have been diverted to him, being tied up for months and
 24 months believing that he was the person to whom Golitzen
 25 was referring.

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Now let me explain to you that Golitzen stated what the Soviet reaction to his defection would be because this is very important to us to have a member of that organization describe to us, what we had to watch out for, and therefore since he knew the inner workings of the organization because he had served at a time when other people had "defected," he had been on the Far East Desk when a Soviet officer was going to defect to the Brits and the British had a Soviet agent penetration in their organization who informed the KGB and this was a man who was going to defect in Japan and from KGB or "GRU," it may have been the military intelligence, he was going to defect to the British.

The British official in the field cabled London about this would-be defector he was going to meet and all that and not other than George Blake was the recipient of that telegram. He went to his Soviet control and the Soviets kidnapped this individual and brought him back to Russia and Golitzen was on the Far East Desk handling that case. So we are dealing with an expert therefore on what you do when you have defectors.

So, Golitzen told us that the first stage would be that everything would be dropped to do a damage report, namely he was 16 years in KGB, he had many jobs, it would be laborious, they would have to go through all the materials that he could possibly have had access to.

Now it is not as difficult for KGB to make a damage

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report as it would be in the United States Government.

Miss Brady. Why is that?

Mr. Angleton. Because the controls over information and the controls on access and all of that are so rigorous that if a man saw a file there have to be signatures, and time out and time in, and so on and files do not float around and the don't use Xerox machines, and I can go on and on.

Compartmentation is the key to their security. Therefore, in making the damage report their first concern would be to protect agents and to get at those matters where they knew that he knew names of people where we could react immediately. They would also know from the damage report there were things that would take us a long time to arrive at. If you only have a cryptonym and one or two events how are you going to make any identification? Do you see what I mean?

Whereas if you have the name, address and telephone number of the agent, they can almost write him off as being burned. So that would be number one. That would be the damage report.

Then that damage report would go to two places. It would go to the 13th Department, which would be the Department of Execution or Wet Affairs, assassination, and it would go the Department of Disinformation, the Department of Disinformation being concerned with strategic deception ---

Miss Brady. Excuse me, before Golitzen's defection had

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1 the Agency independently decided or learned that there was a
2 Department of Disinformation? Was there corroboration of the
3 existence of that?

4 Mr. Angleton. We knew of Soviet deception for years but
5 we did not know the magnitude of its elevation to a Directorate
6 in May of 1953. In other words, from the beginning we knew
7 from the days of Dzerzhinsky and Lenin, Dzerzhinsky who was
8 the head of Cheka, we knew that deception played a most prom-
9 inent role in Soviet covert activity. We knew that all through
10 the war. And we knew it through our double agent handling
11 and we knew it through literally thousands of cases. In
12 other words, no one can run a double agent, you don't run
13 double agents unless you also resort to deception, and
14 deception is integral to that because you are not going to
15 give away all your real stuff. You give away false stuff to
16 achieve your objectives.

17 When I come in to describing the background of Sasha,
18 then I think you will see more of what I mean by way of sophis-
19 tication by the Soviets and why this thing to try to shuffle
20 him off as a contract agent is ridiculous.

21 But going back to Sasha again, we held many meetings
22 with the FBI on that since they were brought fully into it.
23 Since it was dealing with a Soviet agent in a sense they have
24 concurrent jurisdiction.

25 Miss Brady. Were they brought into it as soon as the

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1 Golitzen allegation had become well known?

2 Mr. Angleton. Yes.

3 Miss Brady. What position did they take on the possible
4 penetration?

5 Mr. Angleton. For a long time they went into it. We
6 had many meetings. We had meetings with the Bureau, FBI, mem-
7 bers of the Counterintelligence and Security Office on this
8 matter. We had to our satisfaction identified the real Sasha.
9 They sent us a letter in which they said that we were wrong
10 in our identification and therefore they proposed that we
11 send all our information to the Defense Department so that they
12 could look into it and see if the individual did not fit some-
13 body in Defense. That is a matter of record.

14 It shows exactly that the FBI at that time, for whatever
15 it was worth, that with all the same information, with all
16 those facts, et cetera, et cetera, they perceived that this was
17 not the right identification and the information should be
18 transferred to the Pentagon.

19 Miss Brady. Did Sasha touch any of their operations or
20 programs?

21 Mr. Angleton. Off the top of my head I can't say because
22 one would have to go over a damage report of the real Sasha,
23 of all of the things that he would have had access to, of all
24 of his friends that would talk about their cases which would
25 impinge on the intelligence community. Since he did not confess,

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1 the FBI in my view were not simply sophisticated enough to
 2 handle the Sasha case. They went over and interviewed him
 3 directly. Then he went and disappeared. He was seen emerging
 4 from the Soviet Embassy and then they challenged him, "Why were
 5 you in the Soviet Embassy?" He said, "Well, you are asking
 6 me all these personal details about my mother and father and
 7 all this, so I went in there to find out about them." But
 8 later on, and this is very important, we had this agent Rgor,
 9 who has been referred to in the press, who was responsible
 10 for the Shadrin case, the kidnapping of the person in Vienna.
 11 The Counterintelligence Staff took the firm position, unequiv-
 12 ocaly, that Igor was a plant.

13 That was our 100 percent position. Both the FBI and the
 14 Office of Security took opposite positions. They are the
 15 ones who took Shadrin -- his real name was Artamanov, and took
 16 him to Vienna where he was kidnapped. This is where you have
 17 all the stories -- I have newspaper clippings of the Nicholas
 18 Horrocks' article which is the most detailed leak that I know
 19 of in the government by way of accuracy and so forth. I
 20 only ask why anyone would leak that because if he had been a
 21 true agent of the Agency he was killed by that article.

22 It first appeared in Time Magazine. The New York Times
 23 brought up this entire matter. It is very important because
 24 Igor, to establish his bona fides told the FBI and the Office
 25 of Security that Shadrin was their agent, that we must not do

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anything to hurt him because he was an idealist, not a mercenary and he threatened us that if we did anything about Sasha, the Central Committee had already approved a plan of great retaliation, propagandawise and so on against the Agency and the country.

Miss Brady. Was that the reason for the inaction in the Sasha case, that he was merely allowed to resign?

Mr. Angleton. Oh, no. This is after he had already resigned.

He went on to say that they had 29 volumes of Sasha's reports to them while working for us and all this material was the ammunition that would be used in the event that Sasha was hurt.

Now, the reason I explain this to you is that having represented for 31 years probably the most distinguished group of loyal people that I have ever known and the most hard working people, to have the Agency send as a representative of the Agency an individual of Hart's character and inexperience before that Committee to take up a case of this magnitude and to listen to the committee people talk about the Chamber of Horros of the Agency was redolent of the Church Committee, totally adversary, reviving the past, and it raises very grave questions about the integrity of your committee and it raises those questions in a way that the American people have been horn-swoggled.

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1
2 In other words, you can't set the clock back. You
3 have unleashed something here that is going to go very far, one
4 in destroying the climate of defection from the Soviet Union
5 of other defectors who will have access to that testimony, who
6 are on the American Desk.

7
8 There was no pre-conference held in the Agency by
9 anyone bringing in people who worked for 31 years in the
10 counterintelligence field. Mr. Hart never interviewed -- he
11 interviewed me once and violated our agreement. I volunteered
12 to appear before him and I asked that there be a recording
13 machine and I asked that there be a transcript so that there
14 could be an accurate record and I could go over the transcript.
15 I had one interview with Mr. Hart and I was never called again.

16 Miss Brady. Mr. Angleton, I understand fully your position
17 on it.

18 Mr. Angleton. But I want to be very clear on this because
19 I would not be going into any of these details necessarily with
20 you if it were not for the fact that Mr. Hart opened up a
21 great number of doors which you can't close.

22 Miss Brady. I agree fully with that. Within the scope
23 of the questions I want you to go into depth and explain it.
24 If we go off in this ---

25 Mr. Angleton. I don't want anyone to read the transcript
26 and wonder why I am going into these details on Sasha, Colby,
27 the FBI and all these other matters with a committee investigation

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1 the assassination of JFK, when it is only relevant in terms of
2 the actions of your committee.

3 Miss Brady. I understand that.

4 Mr. Angleton. Therefore, we have to go in parallel. Since
5 the door is opened I find it my responsibility in terms of the
6 integrity of the counterintelligence and in terms of the
7 national interest that I close some of these doors and put it
8 into perspective one way or the other.

9 Miss Brady. So that context stays clear, too, if I can
10 continue to ask questions I think we will get out all the
11 information you want.

12 Mr. Angleton. I am trying to make it coherent though in
13 terms that these sidetracks and diversions are also influenced
14 by the Hart testimony.

15 Miss Brady. That is fine.

16 Bringing us back to the Nosenko case, was the Sasha
17 allegation being investigated at the time of Nosenko's either
18 first contact or at the time of his actual defection?

19 Mr. Angleton. Yes.

20 Miss Brady. Did he give information on the allegation or
21 possible penetration?

22 Mr. Angleton. To my recollection his statement was that
23 they had never been successful in making recruitment.

24 Miss Brady. Was he interrogated specifically about the
25 Sasha allegation?

1 Mr. Angleton. Let me point out here again by way of
2 explanation that the Counterintelligence Staff had no juris-
3 diction whatsoever over Nosenko. Nobody in the Counter-
4 intelligence Staff ever interviewed him or saw him. The
5 Counterintelligence Staff never signed up nor was every con-
6 sulted on any of the administrative setups. We didn't know
7 anything about his salary and all that type of thing or the
8 projects and so on. So that when you are asking me this thing
9 it is all hearsay or things I can remember from reports that
10 were submitted to us by people in other components, so to
11 speak, who were dealing with hi-m. I am not saying for the
12 moment that we got all the reports and transcriptions and so
13 on. I am just simply stating that they got into another
14 Sasha which led to the identification of an army officer who
15 had been recruited in Germany, and he said that this was Sasha.

16 That was an operation continued by the Office of Security
17 in the Bureau for a long period of time. I think it evaporated
18 in the end. I can't remember any of the details. I can
19 remember that he stated how he was trying to recruit somebody
20 and how recruitment of Americans was impossible. I mean
21 page after page after page of their lack of successes on recruit
22 ment of Americans.

23 Miss Brady. Was his information about a possible pene-
24 tration just of no substantive value or did it actually detract
25 from the information that Golitzen had given about Sasha?

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Mr. Angleton. Totally detracted from what Golitzen had to say. In fact, the two pieces of information cited by Hart, one, about the foreign agent in the west, all of that had been Golitzen. The microphone business was all from Golitzen. I sent a memorandum to the State Department in June 1962 alerting them to the microphone in the embassy.

Miss Brady. Was that based on information that Golitzen had provided?

Mr. Angleton. That is right. Also, if I recall correctly Nosenko said we were to look into one part of the embassy and not in the other part. They were found where he said we were not supposed to look.

Miss Brady. Was there any contact with Nosenko from the time of his first contact in '62 ---

Mr. Angleton. No.

Miss Brady --- by the Agency?

Mr. Angleton. No.

Miss Brady. Was that normal?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, because he said that he would not report from the Soviet Union because of the total police control and controls which they had in Russia. Therefore, he would not risk his life in trying to communicate and we should not try to communicate with him.

Miss Brady. Whom did he contact finally when he made the actual defection in '64 and where did the contact take place?

1 Mr. Angleton. He had some kind of contact of notifying our
2 people. I don't know the details of it. Immediately a member
3 of the Soviet Division or a person who was taking over the
4 Soviet Division and others went there and got him and brought
5 him to Germany.

6 Miss Brady. What reason did he give in 1964 for being
7 willing to defect when earlier he had only wanted money?

8 Mr. Angleton. I think he gave ideological reasons.

9 Miss Brady. Were they accepted as credible at that time?

10 Mr. Angleton. I can't really say. I will put it this way.
11 I can't really answer you honestly without telling you that
12 there was another case that occurred after he went and left
13 us. Two American tourists were walking down the street in
14 Moscow. A man came up and handed to them a batch of documents.
15 This batch of documents was documents of the Second Chief
16 Directorate, files from the Second Chief Directorate, which
17 is there FBI, internal memoranda of their operations against
18 us. It explained how we lost certain agents, Penkofsky, for
19 example.

20 The American Ambassador was not there. The tourists
21 brought them to the Embassy. The Ambassador was not there
22 but the Charge d'affaires feared that this was a Soviet prov-
23 acation and insisted that the documents be returned to the
24 Soviet Government, the Foreign Office. We photographed the
25 documents before they were returned. Obviously the very

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1 giving back of those documents were permit the Soviet Govern-
 2 ment to identify beyond a shadow of a doubt the individual
 3 who gave those documents, whether he was genuine or not genuine.
 4 The individual concerned was a man named Cherepanov and
 5 Cherepanov was a man known previously to us in Yugoslavia
 6 at the time when Philby was in the British intelligence and who
 7 had offered his services to the British and to ourselves and was
 8 regarded as a provocateur.

9 He returned to the Soviet Union. Knowing Philby, and I
 10 know him very well personally, Philby had also given away to
 11 the Soviets a very high grade defector in Turkey. A very high
 12 grade defector named Volkov contacted the British authorities
 13 and promised to give them the identities of X number of Soviet
 14 agents in the British Government in return for X number of
 15 British pounds. The telegram and communications of Volkov
 16 came to Philby. He went to his Soviet control. Volkov was
 17 kidnapped immediately by the Soviets. That was the end of
 18 Volkov.

19 So, we had a similar situation that when Cherepanov made
 20 his overtures to the British, Philby was in the British
 21 Intelligence Service, he was a Soviet expert, and Cherepanov
 22 ends up many, many, many years later being in the Second Chief
 23 Directorate with alleged access to the most sensitive infor-
 24 mation which is the internal documents and how they picked
 25 up Penkovsky.

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1 Nosenko's story was that he personally engaged in the
 2 search and running down of Cherepanov at the Turkish frontier
 3 and that he had been captured and executed.

4 We began to get this same playback, through other sources,
 5 of the Cherepanov story. An illegal, for example -- if you
 6 know what an illegal is -- an illegal agent of the Soviets who
 7 had been in touch with us for a long time made a trip back to
 8 Moscow. He said that he went to the house of a General for
 9 dinner and they were discussing the Cherepanov case and how
 10 Cherepanov was tracked down at the border and arrested and exe-
 11 cuted. Now it is inconceivable tht an illegal who is really at
 12 the bottom of the totem pole in terms of the hierarchial
 13 matters, would be dining with a Soviet general who would
 14 reveal to him the Cherepanov case, because the world of the
 15 illegal is something so divorced from the internal parts of the
 16 bureaucracy or headquarters, if you see what I mean, and yet
 17 here all of these confirmations of Nosenko started popping out
 18 of the walls from all kinds of sources who are not in the
 19 position to know.

20 This characterizes a great deal of things said by Nosenko
 21 which were confirmed by Soviet agents of the FBI or CIA. The
 22 orchestration began immediately. Were were inundated with
 23 confirmations, even of stories which he later denied, even of
 24 stories which he later denied. In other words, where he said,
 25 "I was wrong, there was no recall telegram," et cetera, et

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cetera, but the others had already said that he had been sent a recall telegram.

Miss Brady. Were these confirmations of his story happening between the time of his contact and his defection or later?

Mr. Angleton. Later after he defected.

Miss Brady. Were you able to get any other independent information about Nosenko between 1962 and 1964 about who he was where he had served, what his background was?

Mr. Angleton. Obviously we knew a great deal about his father. We have have had one or two sources. I can't give you the time spent, whether it was between defections or not of people who go to school with him. We had a case in Turkey that came up that some lady's husband had been in the same class or things of that sort. I can't recall whether it was before or after the defection.

Miss Brady. I am going to need to take a short break if I can for just a minute.

Mr. Angleton. Surely.

(A brief recess was taken.)

Miss Brady. During the recess, Mr. Angleton, you referred to an article you wanted to make part of the record. Will you do so at this time.

Mr. Angleton. Yes. I had a telephone call yesterday from a friend who subscribes to the London Economist and who read out the following statement from the foreign news section, which

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1 is a special blue bulletin, dated 27 September 1978. The
2 subtitle is "Nosenko footnote."

3 Paragraph one. "Mr. James Angleton, the former Chief
4 of Counterintelligence, CIA, was due to testify for six hours
5 on 22 September to the House Subcommittee that is investigating
6 the Kennedy assassination. (See last weeks foreign report.)

7 "He pulled out for the time being on the grounds that, (a)
8 he needed time to review the testi-mony of John Hart, who had
9 made damaging allegations about the handling of the suspected
10 defector Yuri Nosenko, and, (b), he wanted his lawyer upon
11 (sic) classified information."

12 I simply don't know how this was acquired. I haven't
13 had time to try to analyze it in terms of dates and so on. But
14 I had a telephone call frm the reporter from the Wilmington
15 Delaware paper whose name is Joe Trento, who has written a
16 series of sensational reports about moles in the CIA, including
17 myself as a mole and others, and who purports to have agents
18 in the CIA and who purports that a former colleague of mine,
19 Cleveland Cram, who I understand has been called back in service
20 to write the history of the counterintelligence, is actually
21 working on this question of moles. Trento also wrote an article
22 in "Penthouse" together with a colleague named Roman for the
23 August issue which deals with KGB penetration through the United
24 Nations. The article on the whole is totally apocryphal in
25 terms of allegations attributed to me, I mean statements

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1 attributed to me regarding that.

2 I was shown a draft of this article by one William Cor-
3 son, a colonel, several weeks before its publication. William
4 Corson is a former Marine colonel who purporst to have excellen
5 contacts with the Senate and House intelligence people, includi
6 Senators and including the Director of the CIA and others. He
7 is listed as the Washington representative of Penthouse maga-
8 zine. He has also written a book, which is in the public
9 domain, on the Office of Strategic Services, OSS. He is an
10 author of that book. I can't recall its title.

11 I received this telephone call at the Army-Navy Club
12 in which Trento stated that the Agency had put my head in a
13 basket by producing John Hart and whether I had any comments
14 to make. I said no. Then he went on to make a statement that
15 Nosenko was going to sue the CIA, that he mentioned names, which
16 I did not catch at all, the operation I think he mentioned was
17 Meadowlark and he insisted that he and Corson wanted to see me
18 immediately.

19 I told him that my lunch was getting cold and that I had
20 guests, et cetera, and "no, thank you." Now I don't know
21 whether he said anything or not but it has b-en my experience
22 that when he has called me to give me information, which is
23 his sole purpose, that he sayd, "I have great admiration for
24 you and therefore I want to inform you of the following," and
25 he gives me a lot of things and whether I say "ho" or "hum)

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He has a long quotation from me out of whole cloth, and I only heard a fragment on the radio last night about the Wilmington, Delaware newspaper, something of this sort and I didn't hear it, I lost it. It must be on the Paisley case. But he alleges to have informants in the committee.

I will say that I have a tape recording of 20 or 30 minutes of Joe Trento, this man Roman, and the editor of Penthouse, there way up in New York, and myself down below, denouncing their going ahead with that article, since Corson had been put on notice that this was all false, I mean that the whole thing was full of fabrications. I think they are unaware of the fact that I made that tape recording, I know they are unaware of it, in which they apologized to me and they offered me all the space I want in any forthcoming issue, et cetera, et cetera.

When I threatened that I would take legal action they announced that three million copies had already gone through the printers, et cetera. When I pointed out to them that it creates a lie, in other words, that we must never lie regarding KGB because it destroys the climate of defection, it means that the Soviet on the American Desk who reads all of that then says, "Well, they are just as bad as we are, so therefore there is no inducement to come over," and it is a tremendous disservice, because they had such allegations as the fact that Department Five staffs the United Nations. Well, Department Five

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1 is the new name that the Western Counterintelligence have
2 learned to be the old Department 13 of Assassinations and
3 Sabotage.

4 In other words, the whole thing is a complete hysterical
5 piece of spies in the United Nations. So you have the
6 editor of Penthouse pleading with me that he thought he was
7 doing me a great favor, that their whole purpose had been to
8 balance out all the adverse media business against CIA, by prin-
9 ting something against KGB and citing me as discovering agents
10 inside the Agency and all this kind of thing.

11 I only put this out because of Trento's call to me
12 regarding the Hart testimony and also the fact of what his
13 sources stated and so on.

14 There is much more than I can recall because I was standing
15 up with waiters on both sides and a great deal of noise and I
16 was extremely irritated by the abruptness with which he stated
17 that Corson wanted to see me immediately, et cetera, et cetera.
18 He does mention real names of people within the CIA. In other
19 words, what I am saying is whether he had sources or not I
20 cannot say or whet her he is an innocent being manipulated by
21 dissident elements in the Agency and so on, or retirees, I
22 do not know.

23 I might add that Mr. Helms gets the brunt of this because
24 he has a vacation place there in Lewes, Delaware, and somebody
25 keeps calling him every time these Trento articles come out

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1 in which he is mentioned as a mole and investigations by the
2 Agency about that and so on.

3 Miss Brady. Let us turn again to the Nosenko matter,
4 if we can. Are you able to describe or characterize the
5 Agency's attitude toward Nosenko when he actually defected in
6 1974?

7 Mr. Angleton. Yes. I can't characterize it at that time.
8 I think it was regarded generally as a great coup.

9 Miss Brady. Did you share that view?

10 Mr. Angleton. I regarded it as a very interesting
11 development.

12 Miss Brady. Referring again to Hart's testimony, he
13 mentioned I believe that the Deputy Chief of the Soviet Branch
14 gave great weight and significance to the case whereas you just
15 felt either that it was not that significant or that there
16 were great doubts. Is that accurate?

17 Mr. Angleton. He quotes me as stating that when Bagley
18 came over that he had "a great efficiency." or words to that
19 effect. Now my recollection is, and this is where I would
20 have to go back to the files, that I don't recall whether
21 Bagley came over after the first meeting with Nosenko -- I
22 think it was in the first meeting with Nosenko that Bagley came
23 over. I would have to know which one it was, whether it was
24 the first meeting or the second meeting in which I displayed to
25 him, exhibited to him, the transcript of Golitzen. But when he

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1 read those he was thunderstruck. In other words, what I am
 2 trying to say is that I did not influence him one way or the
 3 other. I just simply pointed out these are the things to
 4 read. He spent three days and nights in my office, outer
 5 office, reading and taking notes of the interviews with
 6 Golitzen that had taken place many, many months before.

7 I can tell you this, the moment that the news broadcast
 8 carried the information that Nosenko had defected in Geneva
 9 and that Tsarapsin, the head of the Soviet Delegation, had
 10 denounced the Swiss Government for being in collusion with
 11 terrorist powers and had kidnapped him and what not, that we
 12 were, many of us, including foreigners, in conference with
 13 Golitzen in another building.

14 Immediately that Golitzen heard of the defection of
 15 Nosenko, he immediately said "that has to be the source of
 16 that letter you showed me." It so happened that McCone, as
 17 I recall, was in that building. It was not our normal building
 18 in McClean. It was a building that we had in town. If I
 19 recall correctly, he want-d to see Mr. McCone immediately.
 20 As I recall I took him into see Mr. McCone. It was a building
 21 where Mr. McCone would use those offices where he was going to go
 22 to the White House back and forth, to the Secretary of State,
 23 in town, and very few minutes from the White House, so that
 24 he would use it every so often. Golitzen made the definite
 25 statement that this was in fact the author of all of those

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1 items that he had seen before and that this was obviously a pro
2 ocation.

3 Miss Brady. Was that the beginning of some of the charac-
4 terization of Golitzen as paranoid, to use Mr. Hart's term?

5 Mr. Angleton. I find that kind of accusation the kind
6 that must have set off the greatest peals of glee in the KGB
7 of the many statements of his defection.

8 Miss Brady. To your knowledge had there been any diagnosis
9 of Golitzen as paranoid prior to that time?

10 Mr. Angleton. I imagine in the short time that you and
11 I have known one another that you could write a psychological
12 profile of me and I could write one of you. I would say that
13 that is about the kind of imprecision or unprofessionalism of
14 writing a profile on Golitzen by a trained psychiatrist or
15 psychologist.

16 While we are on it, at some stage I could have gone
17 through this thing page by page, which I would like to do, and
18 just simply point out as one went along, but I will take it up
19 from there. Golitzen was a man who at a very early age had had
20 the opportunity, because of a study which he did in training
21 school together with his colleague, one named Kersheyev, had
22 written to the Central Committee, which was permissible in
23 the Soviet system, a critique of Soviet espionage based on their
24 studies, and that critique went to the Central Committee
25 and as a result of that, going through channels and it took

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1 several months, it arrived at the highest level, including
2 Stalin.

3 Out of the blue, and he was way down in the south of
4 Russia, he and his colleague were flown to Moscow and met with
5 Stalin. Berea, and all the chiefs of intelligence, because
6 it had gone through those channels to Stalin and it pointed
7 out what the glaring errors were in the modus operandi against
8 the United States. So, it wasn't once but it was twice that
9 he saw those personalities..

10 Second, his great quality was the analytical quality. In
11 other words, where two separate components within the KGB
12 had different points of view he was brought in many times to do
13 the analytical side for the superiors in terms of the two points
14 of view. His mind without question is one of the finest
15 analytical minds. He is not necessarily an operations officer,
16 but he is an analytical type and he is a historian by background.

17 I dare anyone to dispute a historical date or time, whether
18 it deals with Mamelukes or Byzantine or whatever it may be.
19 He is a true. Therefore he is very precise in terms of what
20 he states and he separates the fact from speculation and so on.
21 So that I don't regard a man who comes from that system as being
22 paranoid who wishes to impart to the President of the United
23 States the strategic matters which he derived from documents
24 of the Soviet Government.

25 After all, he knew Stalin, he had access because the

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1 KGB is the underpinning of the regime. Unlike what happens
 2 in the Western World you could take many of the senior people
 3 in the CIA who do not have the slightest idea of what is going
 4 on in the State Department or in the National Security Council
 5 or in the President's mind. They would not have access to the
 6 thinking or the policy in its formation, whereas the KGB is
 7 the underpinning of the regime who supplies all the guards
 8 to the Krelmin, who have the only intimate knowledge of who is
 9 related to whom, which are the best kept secrets in the Soviet
 10 Union, have access to the Central Committee and have access to
 11 strategy and to plans, because they are an integral part of
 12 the policymaking.

13 In other words, Andropov, the Chairman of State Security,
 14 is a member of the ruling class. He has been elevated as an equ
 15 with Brezhnev and with others so that it is a terrible mistake,
 16 which I think runs through all of Hart and through all those
 17 people who have really never dealt in Soviet matters either
 18 historically or casewise. I can recall no achievement of
 19 Hart's in his entire career that ever came to my attention of
 20 any value whatsoever as a contribution to counterintelligence.

21 Miss Brady. At the time Golitzen was assisting in the
 22 assessment of Nosenko was there any type of assessment in the
 23 Agency about Golitzen's value to the Agency?

24 Mr. Angleton. Of course. When you say within the Agency
 25 I want to clarify again and take exception to some of the

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1 niceties of Hart'd delusions that he foisted on your committee.
 2 He keeps talking about a small group in the CIA. He keeps
 3 talking about the fact that he didn't know about certain things
 4 the thousands of us that didn't know, if one quotes on of
 5 his things, that were unaware of this or unaware of that or
 6 unaware of the other. Therefore, he puts it in a pejorative
 7 sense, that there were very few people who knew.

8 Now let us give consideration to the people who knew.
 9 The Director knew. The Deputy Director knew. The head of
 10 the Clandestine Services knew. The Deputy Director of Clan-
 11 destine Services knew. His deputy knew. The Chief of the
 12 Soviet Division and all of his selected people, the Chief of the
 13 Counterintelligence and his selected people, the Chief of the
 14 Office of Security and his selected people, the FBI and their
 15 selected people. So that it is not "some kind of cabal that
 16 was jealous reasons of its own denying Hart an others"
 17 "knowledge," because an intelligence service has only one
 18 defense against penetration and that is compartmentation. In
 19 other words, it is because of compartmentation that we didn't
 20 know thousands of things about the Soviets.

21 But because Golitzen had made up his mind to defect many
 22 years before he actually arrived, he was actually without our
 23 knowing an agent in place trying to bring down their compart-
 24 mentation, therefore he got himself into positions which per-
 25 mitted him to break down their compartmentation into fields

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1 where they weren't realizing that he was doing this for the
 2 purpose of acquiring vast knowledge in other fields which were
 3 not his duties, and amongst those was attending the higher
 4 counterintelligence school where visiting KGB people would
 5 come in to speak and talk about their operations.

6 Reading all of the KGB training books, knowing how those
 7 training books were -- for example, a case would be given there
 8 they would change the name of the locus of the operation, but
 9 he would know and find out the secret that if it was signed by
 10 so and so, released by so and so, that that man was in the
 11 Western European desk handling Scandinavian matters and there-
 12 fore the case as described in the training school did not
 13 occur in Turkey, as it was so stated in the training lectures,
 14 but was handled in Scandinavia or in West Berlin, by knowing who
 15 the case officers, et cetera, were who approved that being
 16 submitted to the training school.

17 So that compartmentation was in the line of authority of
 18 the Director. It was not something which the CIA staff imposed.
 19 It was not something that people without authority imposed. It
 20 was the approved handling of the Directorship and the leader-
 21 ship of the Agency and it is based on the need to know prin-
 22 ciple in which you do not bring people in who have nothing
 23 to contribute to the case. It is not a matter of cocktail
 24 talk or what not. It is compartmented and it is compartmented
 25 hopefully in a way that if there is a leak at least you have a

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1 bigger list of people you know for your investigative leads.

2 In other words, if Golitzen gave a highly sensitive piece
 3 of information and there was evidence that that information fell
 4 in the hands of the opposition, then we would be in a position
 5 to know that these are the X number of people alone who had
 6 access to that information as a basis for a leakage or whatever
 7 it may be. So that I simply state that when I mentioned earlier
 8 that Hart if a creature of the Colby regime I will go a step
 9 further and state that in my dealings with Colby and the first
 10 dealings when he took over as the Deputy Director of the Clam-
 11 destine Service from Mr. Karamessines, who unfortunately
 12 passed away a couple weeks ago and could have been very eloquent
 13 on this subject, his statement was that we are now in a new
 14 period in which you have to open the windows and let the fresh
 15 air in.

16 Now that may be all right for a lunatic assylum or sana-
 17 torium to have all that fresh air come in but in the intelli-
 18 gence business it just does not work.

19 So that throughout Mr. Hart seems to be a person who seems
 20 personally aggrieved that he was unaware of all of these things
 21 happening. But this was the real world. It is the real
 22 world that we have been engaged in for 31 years with the Soviets.
 23 It was not a world which we created. In other words, we had
 24 the first major defector in the West who was Gouzenko who
 25 took all the telegrams from the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa

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1 out with him when he defected, which lead to the huge atomic
 2 espionage going on in Canada and the U.S. He was a code clerk
 3 and he had that kind of access. That was the number one magic
 4 eye opener to Western counterintelligence in the largest sense
 5 of the word.

6 The second major defector was Petrov who was Chief of the
 7 KGB in Australia, and his wife who was a code clerk in the
 8 KGB and who had been in many stations. He defected to the
 9 Australian security. He gave abundance of information.

10 So that, in other words, this is the world that spec-
 11 ialists in counterintelligence live in which is the factual
 12 world of what they do. So we are not dealing with Nosenko as
 13 some abnormality in the thing. It was simply a part of the
 14 continuum which we had seen all the manifestations of during
 15 World War II when we were in counterintelligence working
 16 against the Germans. We began to bump into the Soviets right
 17 and left working against us.

18 In other words, we did not create a cold war or have a
 19 paranoid attitude about the Soviets. They taught us. In other
 20 words, they did it by kidnapping people, by murdering people,
 21 by shooting down our aircraft as they did over Yugoslvaia and
 22 not giving up the bodies until Truman gave them an ultimatum
 23 and we had the 10th Mountain Division about ready to go in, which
 24 probably would have been a good thing. That is when they gave
 25 up the bodies and the aircraft.

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1 In other words, what I am trying to say is that there is
 2 an attitude in the Agency that there is no regime and there-
 3 fore the past is the past and we will forget it and we will
 4 start fresh again. But you can't undo all the cases of the con-
 5 tinuum of penetration and of everything that has been going on
 6 from the days of Lenin. These cases keep going on.

7 I will give one example which I think is a very simply-
 8 minded one but one that is true and which is illustrative of the
 9 problem with Nosenko. Again it is illustrative of the Agency's
 10 inability and the Directorship over there to understand what
 11 intelligence and counterintelligence is all about.

12 Now during the war there emerged a General Turkul. General
 13 Turkul had been a White Russian general who after the revolution
 14 fled. He worked in many Balkan countries as a mercenary mil-
 15 itary man. I think among other things he helped restore King
 16 Zog to the throne in Bulgaria. He established a residence in
 17 Istanbul and he became sort of a magnet for White Russian or
 18 anti-Soviets. He was I believe in the cavalry and he was very
 19 prominent and what not and he became quite a personality in his
 20 own right. He made contact with the Fascists and with the
 21 German general staff and gave such high grade information
 22 regarding the Red Army that he was being paid fantastic sums
 23 of money both by the Italians and the Germans for his intell-
 24 igence. Now his cover story or legend -- and keep in mind
 25 I haven't been on this case for 25 years, so I am just reading

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1 the highlights of it -- his cover story or his legend was that
 2 he had a network of agents throughout the Red military, through
 3 out the Red Army, and that the Chief of the Signal Corps of
 4 the Red Army was his agent and that this network reported
 5 through well-handled cells, well compartmented cells, up to
 6 the Chief of the Signal Corps.

7 So that the head of the Signal Corps, who also ran the sch
 8 for training young WT operators -- that means wireless telegraph
 9 operators in morse code and transmissions for the armed forces
 10 -- would give them practice messages which they would transmit,
 11 say, from Archangel to the Crimea or what not, but that these
 12 were actually encoded messages for which he had the code, and
 13 therefore he wouldn't go and explain anything further about all
 14 this but the fact that he could have the most recent infor-
 15 mation of troop movements, of internal things going on in the
 16 Soviet Government and all the rest of it was because of this
 17 fantastic network that he had and the fact that alone he had
 18 the code and that he could receive this information by wir-ess
 19 et cetera, and that here all of these hundreds of students,
 20 which is typical, and you have in cryptographic work what
 21 are called practice messages.

22 They can be the same groups this way and a thousand
 23 groups this way and a thousand backwards or they can be all
 24 kinds of things that are gibberish, in other words. They are
 25 also used to confuse anyone who is listening to those messages.

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1 But his statement was that these were actually the encoded
 2 intelligence reports and the he therefore had the proper sig-
 3 nals and he could intercept all this and he could decode it
 4 and this was the intelligence.

5 Now he eventually ended up very highly favored by the
 6 German intelligence and the German general staff during the
 7 war. He went to Germany. His information proved extremely
 8 valuable to the Germans because Soviet divisions were destroyed
 9 based on his information on troop movements and all of that.
 10 Had the war gone on another three months or more, he would have
 11 replaced, because what he had been doing was undermining General
 12 Blassov who had a tremendous army of Russians working with
 13 Hitler.

14 I am not going into speculation that if Hitler had
 15 treated Blassov as an equal he could have been a major factor
 16 in the Soviet campaigns if he didn't have his whole attitude
 17 on race problems and so on.

18 But Blassov represented to the Soviet Government the most
 19 dangerous single element since the revolution because Stalin
 20 had made a decree that any captured Soviet officer or enlisted
 21 man was a traitor. In other words, he put out that procla-
 22 mation that anyone who was captured, who did not fight to the
 23 death, was a traitor. So here you found brave men being
 24 captured who were already traitors and Blassov who was an
 25 anti-Bolshevik accumulated really the cream of the prisoners of

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1 war and so on who wanted to fight against Russia and against
 2 Bolshevism and they came from all over, the Georgians, from all
 3 of the provinces. So that Western intelligence began to go into
 4 the General Turkul case as to bona fides because there were inter-
 5 ceptions of messages which are known as the MX-MORUTZ which
 6 were intercepted and they pertained to this whole overall oper-
 7 ation.

8 Now the question on bona fides of General Turkul was split
 9 right down the center. It split the Allied intelligence service
 10 in terms of whether he was bona fide or not bona fide.

11 We had his German case officer in the Abwehr. We had him
 12 in Vienna in a high security prison and on a given day NKVD
 13 officers who were part of the repatriation commission -- that
 14 was forceful repatriation of Russians back to Russia -- came
 15 over in American uniforms and raided that prison trying to
 16 get the case officer and they were caught by a colleague of mine
 17 in OSS in flagrante.

18 Now that only heightened the whole question of bona fides
 19 on Turkul. It was not until 1967 or 1968 that my deputy Rocca
 20 broke the case, the General Turkul case, through General
 21 Orlov who was the most senior defector that there has ever been
 22 from the NKVD or the OGPU or the KGB.

23 Miss Brady. When did Orlov come over?

24 Mr. Angleton. He came in 1934. He defected but he never
 25 made his presence known until the death of Stalin in 1953. He

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1 wrote for Life Magazine a series of articles on the crimes of
 2 Stalin. He wrote a letter to Stalin on his defection outlining
 3 all of Stalin's crimes and stating that "if you bother me or
 4 my relatives or there is any sign of trying to touch me I will
 5 publish your crimes." He submitted in an attachment all of the
 6 crimes and the Soviets never made any effort whatsoever to take
 7 retribution against him.

8 He was the head of the NKVD in Spain during the Civil War.
 9 When Stalin died the pact was over, the agreement was over,
 10 and therefore Life magazine I believe paid him \$40,000 for three
 11 articles in which he spells out the crimes of Stalin which later
 12 on are incorporated in Khrushchev's secret speech. General Orlov
 13 is without question one of the most intelligent and most valued
 14 men who had never been properly debriefed by the United States
 15 Government.

16 Miss Brady. What was his status in the United States?

17 Mr. Angleton. He had relatives and he just emerged and
 18 then he was interviewed by the FBI without any human base being
 19 created which you need with a defector and he broke off with
 20 them. They did not even tap the wealth of information which
 21 was at his disposal. It happened in the Huntington case as
 22 well. When you go in and try -- in other words, these men
 23 don't regard themselves as agents of the country. In other
 24 words, it is the same as Golitzen has stated on occasions that
 25 "I have left them but whether I have joined you is another

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1 matter." It is a treatment that is accorded to them and what
2 not.

3 Miss Brady. W-s the Turkul case and the Nosenko case
4 the two most obvious cases that were split on the bona fides
5 issues? Had other cases been significantly split within the
6 Agency than those two?

7 Mr. Angleton. In the Agency there were practically few
8 people who were involv-d in Turkul unless they were in OSS
9 although later on we had people in Germany working still on
10 the Turkul case when we became CIA. The point I am trying to
11 say is that here you take all the years that Orlov told Rocca
12 you have to keep in mind this is going back and recreating
13 from the revolution all the way through NKVD, OGPU, all the
14 rest of it, building up machine computerized records of every
15 single Soviet case from the day of Lenin so that you would have
16 a data base where you understood comprehensively all of the
17 activities, organizations, changes in modus operandi and so on.

18 In the course of all of this he took up the Turkul matter
19 and Orlov read the critical fact which was that a man by the
20 name of Katz Nelson who was under Dzerzhinsky around 1934 came
21 to Paris, I believe it was Paris, and one of the purposes of
22 his trip was to meet with Turkul. Now Katz Nelson was the
23 Deputy Chief of the NKVD for the Ukraine, a personal friend
24 of Dzerzhinsky and Lenin. He was a cousin to Orlov and he
25 was the one who warned Orlov of the forthcoming purges and that

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1 he had better be careful of recall telegrams. There were
 2 many attempts by, I think it was Jassov, head of the Service,
 3 to try to invite Orlov to come to Belgium and to go on to a
 4 Soviet ship to have a conference on a very important matter,
 5 et ceter, et cetera. He found in Spain a code clerk who was
 6 loyal to him, told him there was another member in the mission
 7 of the NKVD who was there unbeknownst to Orlov and probably for
 8 purposes of assassinating him because of the fact that he had
 9 put off any recall to Moscow.

10 His cousin was one of those executed in the 1937 purges.
 11 So that the wealth of information is such that I can say,
 12 and I understand the agreement that you have, if I understand
 13 it correctly, with the Agency and the Chairman, that any
 14 security oaths and what not are suspended for the purpose
 15 of this.

16 Miss Brady. Yes.

17 Mr. Angleton. I just want to repeat it because I am
 18 getting into fields that have never been gone into and which in
 19 my own view are more properly the field of the Senate Intelli-
 20 gence Committee rather than the Assassination Committee. But
 21 had anyone patiently worked with Orlov, and I might add in
 22 this respect that the Agency once contacted him and the
 23 relationship fizzled out because of personalities, the Soviet
 24 Division tried to have a contact with him and it fizzled out.
 25 It was only when Mr. Allen Dulles was writing his book on the

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1 craft of intelligence that I suggested to him that he pay a
2 tribute to General Orlov's book which is one of the really great
3 books, and Mr. Dulles wrote and we helped him out a lot on
4 the book in different ways -- and Mr. Dulles wrote a fine
5 tribute to General Orlov's book and so on.

6 One day Mr. Dulles called me to tell me that the Orlovs
7 were in town and that General Orlov had called him to thank him
8 for the fine tribute, that he had invited him to dinner. Mr.
9 Dulles was no longer Director or anything. He asked me whether
10 I would come to the dinner. I said, "No, I am not the man
11 for that. I would like to send Rocca." So that is how Rocca
12 met him and handled him up to his death. He recreated in
13 one country alone 34 Soviet cases. That was a country that had
14 been overrun by the Germans, where the Germans had taken away
15 all the Soviet files so they didn't have any archives. He
16 recreated 37 cases in that country.

17 In other words, the most important cases to them and so on.
18 The most important thing was that when he was in Spain he
19 knew that on Franco's staff -- he himself was chief of NKVD,
20 with the Republicans fighting Franco, but he knew the senior
21 agent they had was on Franco's staff, that he was a young Brit-
22 ish reporter whose father was an Arabist and he knew his code
23 name, SINJAN, that was Philby, whose father was the famous Sir
24 John Philby, an Arabist. All of that was available in 1953.

25 I am simply trying to stress what it means that when someone

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1 tries to take the Nosenko case and go and believe that they
2 are going to resolve it against a time factor, whether it be
3 the Warren Commission or whether it be the fact that the Direc-
4 tor wants it resolved or whether it is any other kind of arti-
5 ficial constraints, it is out of kilter and not in step with
6 counterintelligence.

7 In other words, the philosophy of the counterintelligence
8 is not to have his hostile interrogation because hostile
9 interrogation gets one nowhere unless you have a superior
10 piece of intelligence unbeknownst to that individual.

11 Miss Brady. Who made the decision to go to the hostile
12 interrogation of Nosenko?

13 Mr. Angleton. The Soviet Division.

14 Miss Brady. Were you consulted?

15 Mr. Angleton. No. In fact I think I was in Israel but
16 I am not certain.

17 Miss Brady. Which individual, the Chief of the Soviet
18 Division?

19 Mr. Angleton. I never reconstructed exactly who made
20 the decision.

21 Miss Brady. Do you know when the decision was made?

22 Mr. Angleton. I know it was after they thought they
23 had enough ammunition to break him.

24 Miss Brady. At that point, the so-called thousand page
25 report had already been issued, had it not? Prior to the

decision to go to hostile interrogation had it been written?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. Let me dwell on the question of hostile interrogation so that we understand one another.

I was many years in espionage and I think I can say in all modesty I probably recruited more agents than any person in the CIA who would be known to you, by that I mean whose names have ever come out. I recruited very high level people in terms of access to codes and so on. I simply say that because I was not just simply counterintelligence but I was also in the espionage game for a long time before I became Chief of Counterintelligence. I was Chief of Special Operations among other things. The ultimate in our business is that espionage, the ultimate of an espionage case is to get the codes of the opposition. The ultimate in counterespionage is to protect your own codes.

That is the ultimate. There are all kinds of achievements from recruiting a man all the way on up. But the heart of everything is documentation. It is not just simply agent reports. It is to be able to have the documents of the opposition or to read their telegrams so that you know at the same time they know, so that you can make your own evaluation, not based on what someone told you but on the actual documents.

So my statement to you is a world that I am very familiar with, I mean in terms of when I am dealing with Golitzen he

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refers to documents or codes and all of these things, they are part of my life. It is the only life I have known because I started off as a corporal in our organization, in the Army, and I never went to an officers training school or anything and I never asked for anything.

So, my commendations or rewards by foreign governments or by my own government can be seen there. They are on the record and I didn't write them. So, the men I chose were of like caliber, Rocca, Scotty Miler, and I can go through a whole series of them, because experience taught me also how to judge men. For example, when we come to Peter Bagley, who has been denigrated publicly through the auspices of your committee with the help of Admiral Turner, Bagley was one of the finest officers in the organization. Bagley didn't know it but it had always been on my mind in evaluating a man that he might well be one of my nominees for somebody who might become the head of the Clandestine Service some day because he had certain qualities to him that I observed that were needed for that type of leadership.

First in intelligence, his schooling, his knowledge of languages, his total dedication. He didn't have a penny to his name. I mean he drove a car that I think was the oldest car in the Agency. He had personal misfortunes, his son was blinded in one eye and a number of other things. But at the same time it was a part of his whole upbringing. Two

of his brothers were admirals of the fleet. One brother was the senior admiral in London which controlled all the fleet in the Atlantic and what not. The other brother was an admiral, chief of the Bureau of Personnel of the Navy.

His uncle was Admiral Leavy. I don't have to describe what that means when your uncle is Admiral Leahy. So does anyone believe that a man of Pete Bagley's qualities is the same person described by Hart?

Miss Brady. I believe you are referring to a memo or so-called letter that Mr. Hart ascribed to Mr. Bagley?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Miss Brady. Did you have any knowledge of such a letter or memo?

Mr. Angleton. Of course not. I never heard of any such thing. But I know that a case officer who is working, I mean who is really thinking through a problem, can go from the logical to the reductio absurdum. In other words, if you follow me, if you are told to think of everything that was the color blue you could start off with the blue of Tintoretto and start getting down into the fact that I am going to sing the blues or something.

You go from those things that you would communicate to somebody to those things which would be I mean in reductio absurdum. The memo never went anywhere.

It was a personal paper of the man himself. All I am

1 trying to say is that Pete Bagley is the first man in the
 2 world that knows that the Agency would never tolerate liqui-
 3 dation. He would never dare come into Helms and say that "We
 4 have to liquidate the man."

5 The thing is so absurd that the very thought of it shows
 6 the motivation of Hart to sensationalize and to put some
 7 kind of onus on the past, because Hart is married to a young
 8 lady, she is not so young but she is a senior supergrade in
 9 the Soviet Division.

10 Miss Brady. Was she there at the time of the Nosenko
 11 assessment?

12 Mr. Angleton. Yes, but she was not in counterintelligence.
 13 She was in estimates with Len McCoy. When Colby destroyed the
 14 Counterintelligence, as far as I am concerned, Len McCoy was
 15 put into counterintelligence to take over from Rocca. He has
 16 no qualifications for that job. Len McCoy and Mr. Hart's wife
 17 were in the same group in the Soviet Division.

18 Miss Brady. Were you ever party to conversations about what
 19 is termed the embarrassing consequences of Nosenko's detention
 20 or possibly disposal even short of liquidation?

21 Mr. Angleton. I am personally aware of that because I go
 22 back to what I have always felt about any of these people. I
 23 am not opposed to taking in anyone, all defectors are welcome.
 24 In other words, what I am trying to say is the more the merrier.
 25 But you don't ever tell them that you disbelieve them. In

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1 other words, you elicit, you get their whole cover story from
 2 A to Z. You put up all kinds of hypothetical things to them.
 3 You feed them litmus and so on.

4 Miss Brady. What was your role in the counterintelligence
 5 after the decision had been made to go to hostile interro-
 6 gation and he was actually incarcerated? What was the CIA
 7 doing at that time?

8 Mr. Angleton. We were following up traces. Let me put
 9 it this way. Much was made of the fact that out of X numbers
 10 of days of incarceration he was only interrogated X number
 11 of days. I worked it out that every three and a quarter days
 12 he was seen. Now let us logically look at it. The people
 13 who would do the interrogation are people who also have other
 14 responsibilities. They have In boxes and other cases that are
 15 breaking. That is number one.

16 Number two, they have to take the product of that interro-
 17 gation back to headquarters from a distant location and do all
 18 the research and analysis and traces and dossiers on what has
 19 been provided during that day's interrogation.

20 I can assure you, having don this many times, myself, with
 21 other defectors, having to travel to New York and spending
 22 until four o'clock in the morning and getting two hours sleep
 23 and getting the first plane down and calling in people to get
 24 traces run and go back that same afternoon, it is a little
 25 gruelling when you are also Chief of Counterintelligence

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handling hundreds of telegrams and new cases that come in. I am certain that when I figured that they saw him once every three and a half days, that, without knowing this as a fact, this would be the logical time factor of doing, one, your work as Deputy Chief of the Soviet Division and whoever else he had helping him, and doing the traces, preparing your questions for the next encounter, et cetera.

So that I find nothing illogical in that.

I personally believe that the trouble with hostile interrogation is that you can foresee that you are not going to be successful unless you have something so incriminating that the man cannot deny it. In other words, if you photograph him actually in the company of a known Soviet agent passing a document or if you had a cipher break of a telegram which says, "Go and see Nosenko and tell him that we enjoyed his report on Bagley but try to find out about his brothers who are admirals to give a fanciful thing, if you had such a thing of that sort where it is incontrovertible evidence, then you could go to hostile interrogation. I don't mean by hostile you could tell him that he is a liar. Hostile interrogation to me would be to show your card to the man, that you disbelieve him. Whereas there is no reason to do that. In other words, you listen to him. You thank him for his information but you have never let him know that you disbelieve him until you have heard and exhausted his entire story and that can take several months

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1 to get all the details out. It is only after you analyze all
 2 that that you see that you still don't have anything on which
 3 you can break him. The fact that there was no telegram, the
 4 fact that his rank might be wrong, or you can take all the
 5 dozens, which I don't have at hand, dozens of contradictions,
 6 my attitude was that these were fundamental contradictions
 7 reinforced by the fact that other people under suspicion were
 8 fortifying his testimony and that, most important, that Igor
 9 when he came out confirmed that Sasha, Alexander, had submitted
 10 enough reports within the Agency, 29 volumes, to be used by
 11 the Central Committee against the United States, in a plan
 12 approved by the Central Committee, if any harm came to him,
 13 et cetera, et cetera, that he went to the Soviet Embassy.

14 At the same time he confirms the bona fides of Nosenko
 15 and goes into a long thing about how important Nosenko is,
 16 he is more important than Golitzen and so on. Now we know
 17 he is a fraud.

18 So then you take all the cases where that same earmarked
 19 information of the lie is and you go through that to make the
 20 identification of the other channels. When you begin to find
 21 that an FBI source made the identical statement and so and
 22 so made the identical statement and then you have Nosenko saying
 23 "I lied, I didn't receive the telegram," and you look at these
 24 other sources who said he received the telegram, et cetera,
 25 et cetera, what does it raise in your mind except the classical

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1 thing, when you become involved in a double agent case you
 2 are inviting for yourself a lot of trouble unless you have a
 3 superior source. In other words, to run a double agent or pene-
 4 tration who is going to pass on information compells you to
 5 exhaust a great deal of real information to build up his cred-
 6 ibility with the other side. You find yourself at time not
 7 achieving your objective and therefore you have to throw more
 8 good information after good information and still not achieve
 9 your objective.

10 If the other side is astute enough, they can force you to
 11 the wall in terms of having to give up stuff finally that you
 12 can't give up and maintain the credibility of that agent. You
 13 are on a train going to fast to jump off.

14 That is the reason I don't believe in hostile interro-
 15 gation. In other words, I prefer the elicitation thing regard-
 16 less of the time span, whether it be the Warren Commission or
 17 whether it is the Director who has to have an answer right
 18 away, et cetera.

19 I gave the Turkul case as one of the most obvious kinds of
 20 cases, showing how long all Western counterintelligence
 21 worked on Turkul and how it eventually was resolved.

22 So that I can understand the Director who wants an answer,
 23 who has to resolve it, who can't go any further with it. I
 24 don't step away from Bagley and I don't step away from those
 25 people. Xhey had the jurisdiction. In their judgment they had:

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1 to make a decision, if you follow me. Therefore, when Helms was
 2 confronted with that entire thing and the recommendations were
 3 made and all that and he goes to Katzenbach and so on, I may
 4 have known at the time or heard it or something but it was the
 5 first time I knew that Dave Murphy had gone to see Katzenbach
 6 and they had had such a meeting.

7 I did know Katzenbach very well before he became Attorney
 8 General. So when I read or heard the testimony of Helms I
 9 was quite surprised about that meeting. My point is that I
 10 can see that once they embarked on hostile interrogation it
 11 would be very hard to get off that train because once you
 12 starting telling a man you don't believe him, then he can shift
 13 his story and you don't know what he would have told you had
 14 you continued the elicitation. There were very many pieces of
 15 litmus, as I call it, things which if he was bona fides in
 16 the ultimate sense, in the sense of wanting to join our society
 17 and protect our society, there are priorities of information
 18 which he would have volunteered immediately as benefit to
 19 the United States.

20 Miss Brady. I think you mentioned you wanted to break
 21 at 12:30. Is that correct?

22 Mr. Chabot. It might be a good time.

23 Miss Brady. Let us be back here at 2:00 o'clock.

24 (Whereupon, at 12:45 a.m., the hearing was recessed, to
 25 reconvene at 2:00 p.m. the same day.)

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TESTIMONY OF JAMES ANGLETON RESUMED

1
2 Mr. Goldsmith. Did the CIA conduct an investigation
3 into the assassination of President Kennedy?

4 Mr. Angleton. There was never any formal investigation
5 as such in the sense that there was never any thing like an
6 inspector general thing or task force.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. How would you characterize the responsi-
8 bility of the Agency vis-a-vis the work of the Warren Commis-
9 sion?

10 Mr. Angleton. I think when the assassination occurred
11 -- I will state the obvious, that no one in the history of
12 the Agency had even been confronted with the assassination of
13 a president. In other words, practically anything that ever
14 happened in the Agency always had some precedent. In this
15 area, there was complete chaos, so to speak. So, the original
16 jurisdiction of course, devolved on the Bureau, the FBI.

17 When the Commission was set up I think it took it a long
18 time to get to focus as such. In other words, I don't think
19 the community as a whole -- I mean Johnson in forming the
20 Commission, obviously there was advice from a lot of people --
21 my view is that he just simply hit on the Commission idea
22 as spreading the responsibility with some kind of blue ribbon
23 panel.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. I understand the purpose of the Commission
25 in general terms. My question though is how would you

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1 characterize the role of the Agency vis-a-vis the work of the
2 warren Commission?

3 Mr. Angleton. I think it went through a metamorphosis
4 in the beginning. You had the Director, who was a very close
5 social and personal friend of the President and therefore in
6 a sense he wasn't just the Director of Central Intelligence,
7 he was also a very close personal friend. So that I think he
8 had broad views on it that went beyond the Agency and I think
9 his Agency responsibilities.

10 I think that the metamorphosized into a thing where it
11 began to focus more on it as an agency would facing any
12 problem. In the beginning you had the Director, you had
13 the Deputy Director, you had case officers, you had division
14 chiefs, all seeing the Warren Commission independently. You
15 had FBI liaisioning at many different levels. We had liaison
16 offices. That would be the normal way of approaching any
17 kind of business.

18 In a sense, it took some time to get this thing to focus.
19 There was some control of knowing what different elements in
20 the Agency were capable of doing or knew or whatnot.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. How long did it take to get focused so
22 there was an effective team of some kind at the Agency provid-
23 ing the Warren Commission on a regular basis with information?

24 Mr. Angleton. I can't give you a time factor. I know,
25 and this is only memory without having seen any papers, from

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my own memory I know I was raising certain questions of duplication and of the fact of trying to get all the papers pulled together in one place. In other words, if you got a call from the Director you could not be really sure that you were giving a final answer. It did not necessarily mean that was the answer.

Mr. Goldsmith. Eventually was the responsibility for coordinating the Agency's work given to any particular unit or component?

Mr. Angleton. We had what I called at that time, and still refer to as the point of record. In other words, it didn't have any command function but at least it was trying to get hold of all the telegrams, all of the memoranda of record, all the agency participation, et cetera.

Mr. Goldsmith. By we are you referring to the CI Staff?

Mr. Angleton. That is right.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why did this responsibility devolve upon the CI Staff?

Mr. Angleton. Basically because you might say it was trying to find someplace of common concern. We had research and analysis. We were very strong on research and analysis in the person of Rocca, the fact that he had some pretty good legmen around him that could be diverted from what they were doing to run errands and do work.

Mr. Goldsmith. You made reference to Mr. Rocca. Who

1 within the CI Staff was primarily responsible for coordinating
2 the effort to assist the Warren Commission?

3 Mr. Angleton. He was the principal point.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. What responsibilities, if any, did you
5 have at that time with regard to the work that was being
6 performed to assist the Warren Commission?

7 Mr. Angleton. I never saw anybody from the Warren Commi-
8 ssion. I am coming back to what you are saying. I preface
9 it by saying that I never did meet anybody from the Warren
10 Commission to my knowledge, outside of Mr. Dulles and that
11 was not in an official capacity. My basic thing was to read
12 over everything that came across my desk but basically shoving
13 the responsibility on to Rocca to the point of the legwork
14 which meant that he didn't have to go through me to deal with
15 other people in the Agency.

16 The normal course of events, if he was going to go, if the
17 Director called him or Deputy Director and so on, the channel
18 would normally be that he would be on the phone to me about it
19 and we would confer. He was given a lot of latitude. But I
20 have to explain something here.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Please do.

22 Mr. Angleton. Our main concern -- when I say concern, I
23 don't mean it in the sense of importance or anything, but at
24 that time we were in the middle of the day of the assassina-
25 tion, I can recall it very distinctly, there was a high

1 representative of a foreign government who had arrived the day
 2 before and had presented a letter of complaint to Mr. McCone
 3 regarding an allegation as to one of his service's number two
 4 man, a Soviet suspect. So he had come with this letter from
 5 the Chief of that service to register this complaint.

6 If I recall corectly, he had lunch with the Director
 7 and then he was to meet with me and my Deputy. Now, this was
 8 one of those ball-ups of an individual from that country, our
 9 representative, who had been back and had been privately
 10 briefed as to the security problems relating to that station
 11 and to that country. Without authorization he disclosed to the
 12 chief of that service the name of this individual who was in
 13 fact this chief's deputy. So you can imagine the crisis that
 14 devolved from this unauthorized leakage.

15 So this snowballed into quite a package, I might add, and
 16 it went on for I think about a year, with many visits from the
 17 Internal Security of that country to us during which all kinds
 18 of cooperation was given, depositions, and all that, and in the
 19 end they determined that -- I will put it this way, whatever
 20 they determined they gave us no final report but the head of
 21 that government appointed a special commission which got rid
 22 of him, in short.

23 So that the day of the assassination this was one of the
 24 primary concerns of Counterintelligence. So it was running in
 25 that office, I mean running in the conference room, running to

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1 people, finally getting rid of the follow, staying on at night,
2 seeing what happened, et cetera, et cetera.

3 In the meantime, the Western Hemisphere Division was
4 involved, the Soviet Division was involved, the Deputy Director
5 was involved, et cetera.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that you were working in the
7 context of a crisis situation by virtue of the facts that you
8 made reference to. In light of that understanding, however,
9 my question is what responsibilities did you have with regard
10 to the work that the Agency was performing to assist the
11 Warren Commission?

12 Mr. Angleton. I didn't have any specific responsibility.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. The CI Staff became a point of record?

14 Mr. Angleton. That is right.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. You were head of the CI Staff?

16 Mr. Angleton. But that does not follow in that strict
17 sense. The Director could call or anyone could call Rocca
18 without reference to me. In other words, it was a very
19 special situation. He was doing a job of common concern.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. To what extent did you get involved in
21 the work of the Agency?

22 Mr. Angleton. I got very much involved in the immediate
23 question, having been 31 years in the business and probably
24 as much knowledge as anybody about the Soviet assassinations,
25 assassinations as such by foreign services. My immediate

1 concern was the question of Soviet intelligence, Soviet Bloc
2 intelligence.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Did Rocca, as a matter of routine, pass
4 on to you information that he considered to be important?

5 Mr. Angleton. Yes. It was not just passing it on. If
6 he had a matter that he regarded as a development or something
7 that I had to know because of its relationship to whatever I
8 might be doing or anybody else in the Staff might be doing,
9 then he wouldn't hesitate after hours to get on the phone and
10 break in and so on, if there was such a type thing.

11 Our relationship was such that it was only 20 feet away
12 from his office to me.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Did he keep you apprised of the key
14 developments in the Kennedy case so far as the Agency was
15 concerned?

16 Mr. Angleton. There was an awful lot of activity going
17 on which I wouldn't say that we knew at the moment that it
18 was happening. In other words, there were a lot of people who
19 would be in the WH Division that might not know about that.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Even though the CI Staff was a point of
21 record it does not necessarily follow that the CI Staff was
22 informed of all key developments that the Agency had become
23 aware of?

24 Mr. Angleton. I can't say that as a fact. I am simply
25 saying there were so many things going on that you couldn't

be sure because, after all, unless somebody sent you something how did you know that activity or that particular thing was going on? In other words, my memory is one that, unlike what I said earlier where you have a task force or you have a problem where there is no point of record but somebody who is charged and where no action is taken without the clearance of that individual, there wasn't that kind of situation.

Mr. Goldsmith. Insofar as information was made available to Mr. Rocca, did he actively keep you apprised of those facts that he considered to be important?

Mr. Angleton. I think so, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. From what you are saying I get the impression generally that the situation was not all that well organized. Did Mr. Helms or anyone else issue an order indicating that CI Staff was a point of record and that all pertinent information for the Warren Commission or information relevant to the investigation was to pass through the CI Staff?

Mr. Angleton. I think it was to be at least deposited there. There was an order of some sort, some kind of instruction, that made it clear that everything was to be pulled together in the Counterintelligence Staff. That man was Rocca.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was [See/so] responsible for coordinating the aspects of the Agency work on the assassination?

Mr. Angleton. J. C. King was the head of the WH Division and [Scelso] was his right hand man handling all the Western Hemisphere stuff.

Mr. Goldsmith. My question was probably more specifically was [Scelso] given responsibility for coordinating the Agency's initial efforts to support the FBI in attempting to investigate the Kennedy assassination?

Mr. Angleton. I can't remember exactly the terms of reference of [Scelso] except that he was very prominent.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall ever having any conflict with [Scelso] concerning areas of responsibility with regard to the Agency's effort to investigation the assassination?

Mr. Angleton. Nothing that I can recall except that I always felt uneasy when anyone met with the FBI or anybody else that we didn't either have a participant or somebody present.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why was that?

Mr. Angleton. I am talking about the regular counter-intelligence liaison being centered in the Counterintelligence Staff.

Mr. Goldsmith. If I understand you correct, what you are saying is that the CI Staff essentially was responsible for liaison with the FBI. For that reason, you would have wanted to be kept informed?

Mr. Angleton. That is right. Simply that my experience

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with liaison is that when you speak with him voices to an organization you are bound to have misunderstandings. In other words, if you have people who have never dealt with the FBI, there is a art of dealing with any interagency or investigative group, you know -- but [De/so] was very prominent because obviously the trip to Mexico and the telegrams were coming in to SH Division as the action division.

Mr. Goldsmith. By Mexico you are referring to Oswald's trip?

Mr. Angleton. Yes. The cable when it comes in has in the upper left hand corner a place where it says "action". It will designate the component. Then it will have another line which shows dissemination. So that action would be WH Division unless it was the Deputy Director himself who signed the cable in which case the action would be indicated on that cable at the designated point. Dissemination showed everybody else who had a collateral interest of some sort.

All of a sudden you might see somebody on there that you wondered why he was on it. Something like that might arouse the question, why has the cable gone here, there and so on.

Mr. Goldsmith. What individuals within the Agency to your knowledge were responsible for maintaining contact with the Warren Commission, communicating information to the Warren Commission.

Mr. Angleton. Just simply from my recollection, it would

have been the Director, Mr. Helms, J. C. King, [See/so], Dave Murphy, who was the Chief of the Soviet Division, Rocca, and perhaps, but I am not certain, maybe one or two of his men.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was there any formal procedure established for communicating information to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know that it was formal. It was more on what the subject matter was.

Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, I take it that the CI Staff per Helms order would have been informed of the information that would have been available to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. We tried to keep on top of it. I think as time went on we got a little more of a grasp, I mean the people who were involved, and also they began to call us in the sense that we were passive, once we started getting all the information and making sure that traces were run and all that, it was in their interest to call us and ask questions.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, you are referring to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. Both the Warren Commission and any of the other components in the Agency dealing with them.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you able to state in general terms what areas the Agency attempted to give emphasis to in attempting to support the Warren Commission? In other words, were there investigative hypotheses that were pursued?

Mr. Angleton. I think the fundamental one was the whole

1 thing of trying to get some idea on Oswald and traces, hypo-
 2 theses, on the question of whether there was any foreign
 3 influence involved.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Which area of foreign influence received
 5 emphasis?

6 Mr. Angleton. The Soviet would be one, and of course
 7 Cuban.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you feel that you were given by your
 9 superiors at the Agency all relevant information concerning
 10 the assassination which would have ensured that the Agency's
 11 investigation and ultimately the Warren Commission's investi-
 12 gation would be completely thorough?

13 Mr. Angleton. At the time I did.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. What about today?

15 Mr. Angleton. After I left my job as Chief, Counter-
 16 intelligence, but while they kept me on ice for the Church
 17 Committee -- let me put it that way, I had been working very
 18 hard on that AP story that came out about Castro's warning
 19 about attempted assassinations against him.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. When did you first learn of the anti-
 21 castro assassination plots sponsored by the Agency?

22 Mr. Angleton. I had wind of something from time to time
 23 but never one I didn't stick my nose into in the sense that
 24 I had been brought up in a world of compartmentation and I
 25 tried to live up to that. I regarded it as a twoway street.

1 But when someone has assigned things from the Directorate
2 it is not your job to try to break down that compartmentation.
3 I learned by pure accident that there had been a Mafia
4 contact.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. When did you learn that?

6 Mr. Angleton. I learned that, and I can't give you a
7 date but it is obviously in the record someplace, I learned
8 it because the FBI liaison fellow was at my house one evening
9 when the Bureau was frantically trying to get hold of him.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you remember when that was?

11 Mr. Angleton. I can't remember the date.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. Was it before or after the Warren
13 Commission work was completed?

14 Mr. Angleton. I think it was after the Commission.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Who was the FBI liaison?

16 Mr. Angleton. Sam Papich. According to the Bureau
17 procedures, he had left what his schedule would be and where
18 he would be at every moment. The call came in from the field
19 office, as I recall, and they stated that from surveillance
20 of Rosselli from California, I think it was California, he had
21 met an individual whose description was precisely that of
22 Bill Harvey. They were a little upset.

23 I heard enough of it to tell Sam not to say anything
24 and tell him he would call back or words to that effect. Then
25 he told me that they had said that Rosselli got off a plane

1 by such an individual. They were baffled.

2 So I immediately called, I told Sam, I said "Look, this
3 thing, you have to keep in mind that the FBI had separate
4 liaison with the Cuban group because of the complications of
5 Miami and all that."

6 I said, "It is not my affair but don't start getting a
7 lot of explosions happening until we get this thing clarified
8 a bit."

9 Sam agreed. I think he told me he would be back at them
10 but not to get excited, or words to that effect.

11 I called Harvey's wife and asked her "Where is Bill?"
12 She said, "Duke Zeiberts."

13 "Will you get hold of him and tell him to call me
14 immediately, that there is a crisis?"

15 Bill called within a few seconds so to speak. I just
16 handed the phone, I said, "Bill, a German somebody wants to
17 talk to you." So I gave him the telephone. I didn't listen
18 in on the conversation but I know that Sam got the answers he
19 wanted and he called back the Bureau and apparently had the
20 surveillance called off. This was around 10 o'clock, between
21 9 and 10 o'clock at night. Then he took it up with Bill the
22 next day.

23 I mean, from then on it left me and became a privileged
24 matter between him and the desk.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. I realize that I have asked this question

one time. I would like to ask it again.

Mr. Angleton. I seem to be avoiding your question.

Mr. Goldsmith. No, you have answered my question. You have given me a lot of detail about the circumstances surrounding your first learning of the anti-Castro assassination plot. The question I want to ask again is, do you recall approximately when you learned this information?

Mr. Angleton. No, I don't know the time. I was working on a lot of that before I left the Agency.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you able to state whether it was before or after the Warren Commission had completed its work?

Mr. Angleton. I am certain it was well after the Warren Commission had completed its work but I have no feeling for dates.

Mr. Goldsmith. This is really the only relevant issue so far as we are concerned.

Do you think that the work of the CI Staff in attempting to facilitate the efforts of the Warren Commission was affected in any way by the failure of other CIA officials to inform the CI Staff of the anti-Castro assassination plots?

Mr. Angleton. I will put it this way, whether it would have facilitated the Warren Commission I don't know. I think the problem, I just told Miss Brady I was very unhappy not to have been informed either by your Committee or the Agency in advance that Hart was going to testify, he put me at a

1 terrible disadvantage in the sense that I would have been glue
2 to the radio to have heard him, therefore, I lost three or
3 four or five days and nights to dredge up that testimony with
4 a lot of calls coming in from a lot of concerned people.

5 Then, forewarned, I heard a lot of Helms testimony
6 except for interruptions. This question keeps coming up,
7 whether it would have helped the Warren Commission. I would
8 answer in this fashion, that the counterintelligence concern
9 with the assassination could not keep pace with the life of
10 that Committee. In other words, the Committee's requirements
11 or demands, or whatever it may be, they had a life of their
12 own and they had deadlines to meet.

13 In other words, they were working at a faster pace than
14 we were in terms of our activities and they couldn't coincide.
15 In other words, for example, in private discussions with Allen
16 Dulles I told him that personally I believed there should not
17 be a finality to the report. In other words, the door ought
18 to be left open. You don't have an assassin assassinate the
19 assassin so to speak, without all these terrible things going
20 to come out of the closet. I didn't have in mind at that time
21 the Cubans, so to speak, so much as I did the whole question of
22 the Soviets, the Nosenko business, and many other things.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. I believe that Mr. Helms in his public
24 testimony indicated that in retrospect he would have taken the
25 information on the anti-Castro assassination plots and put them

1 in a truck and driven to the steps of the Warren Commission and
2 simply delivered them there.

3 Mr. Angleton. I heard the statement.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. That is the statement in substance. Do
5 you think that the information should have been given to the
6 Warren Commission.

7 Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I still haven't seen all
8 that information. Before leaving the Agency I can recall going
9 through a file and I found that there seemed to be a -- I won't
10 say disappearance but when I went to a certain individual and
11 said "Where is the report on Fitzgerald, et cetera, et cetera,
12 "In Paris?", whatever it was, that I could feel the door shut-
13 ting around me.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Can you think of any good reason for not
15 giving that information to the Warren Commission?

16 Mr. Angleton. What puzzles me is whether even if they had
17 that, whether they would have seen its significance. In other
18 words, I even wonder whether people in the Agency understood
19 the significance of what that assassination business meant.
20 I think we would have seen it probably more sharply.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. By "we" you are referring to the CI
22 Staff?

23 Mr. Angleton. Yes. I think we would have seen it more
24 sharply because of the fact that we were more intensely
25 engaged in this whole Soviet Bloc assassination. We had more

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experience in terms of Department 13 and the whole history of 30 years of Soviet sabotage and assassinations. It was not something to us that was a dream world. We knew of cases and we knew of the modus operandi and so on.

Also, I never had much confidence in the Cuban operations, whether it was run by Bissell or anybody else so far as security went. I just didn't feel that you can run operations of that sort, imigre groups and all the rest of it, and maintain security.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever receive any positive indications that there were in fact security problems with regard to these anti-Castro plots?

Mr. Angleton. I just happened to know a lot of the people involved and I couldn't see it. You would hear too many rumors. I don't like to make that statement and leave it there. I went through the whole Bissell period of the Bay of Pigs -- not having been a part of it, in other words, I was in the TB sanitarium and I got back -- while I was in the TB sanitarium I heard a great deal about the Cuban operations from people who were not even party to it.

I had lunch with Bissell and he asked me, I mean he raised the thing in some fashion, he invited me to lunch when he got back. I asked him only one question. I said, "Do you have any escape hatch?"

He took quite an offense at that. He said, "What do you

mean?

"In case the thing falls flat on its face is there some-
one who goes to Castro and says 'you have won the battle.
What is your price?'"

In other words, have you planned for the failure as much
as planned for the success? We never met again until after
the Bay of Pigs. We never had one word exchanged.

So I say this only because I can't take an operation --
and then we had all this experience through the SS period, we
had it with the Polish imigraion, we had it with the failure
of the Albanian operations and everything else -- when you
start dealing with large masses of people and try to have
these fictional covers they simply don't hold up.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think that the Cuban aspect of the
assassination was thoroughly and adequately investigated by the
Agency and by the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. No. I personally believe that the United
States intelligence services did not have the capabilities to
ever come to an adjudication. I don't think the capabilities
were there.

Mr. Goldsmith. This is regardless of whether or not the
anti-Castro plots would have been made available to the Warren
Commission, you are saying regardless of that, our intelligence
agencies did not have the capability to investigate that
thoroughly.

1 Mr. Angleton. Unless they had a code break or a defector
2 or something.

3 Let me take a case by say of example to show you what I
4 am trying to say. I think it was in 1962 or thereabouts we had
5 this young man from Hungary who was aviation internal security,
6 Hungarian Intelligence Security, Bela Lapusnyik, a very
7 important defector to the Austrians who knew of the internal
8 activities of AVH against embassies, recruitment of personnel
9 in embassies and their whole modus operandi, et cetera.

10 The Austrians were very reluctant to give us the custody
11 we wanted and yet as a service they didn't have the leads and
12 have the comprehensive knowledge of a VHO. It was only
13 indirectly that we could pose questions to them and get
14 answers but the answers we were getting were enough to show the
15 tremendous importance of this individual.

16 Finally, with a lot of pressure it came to an agreement,
17 that on a Sunday they would have exhausted all international
18 interest in the man and he would be transported to the United
19 States. On the morning of his being transferred to us, even
20 though he was in a high security jail, with police and whatnot,
21 he was found dead. He was in his late 20's, in
22 perfect health.

23 Immediately it was declared that it was food poisoning.
24 It just didn't stack up that it would be food poisoning.

25 Now, we had had an allegation from reliable sources of

1 penetration of the Austrian security service. It was a posi-
 2 tive type of allegation from a high grade source. So Stern
 3 Maggen sent all kinds of people down there. They printed
 4 and everybody reprinted the fact that the official finding
 5 was food poisoning. Even the Vienna Institute of Forensic
 6 Medicine, which is one of the most famous ones in the world,
 7 supported the statement.

8 Some years later, we had another Hungarian defector. The
 9 moment he got off the plane I got hold of him. I met him out
 10 in a safe house and one of the first things I hit him with was
 11 about Lopusnyik. He gave the story that he had access to that
 12 file, that that file was in the custody of the Chief of
 13 Ministry of the Interior and so on, and he explained in detail
 14 that he had access to it and they did not have the means of
 15 conducting an assassination but the Czechs had the agent and
 16 the Czechs were the ones who did the assassination. That was
 17 on the eve of the man coming to the United States.

18 I will say this. He had only been skimmed on the surface
 19 in terms of the way he would have been, in the way of the
 20 assets, and I mean recruitment, who the agents were in
 21 embassies and so on. That showed capability, it showed
 22 flexibility, but it also showed collaboration among Bloc
 23 services, the sharing of resources and cohesiveness of
 24 action, and that is supported by many other cases, Rumanians,
 25 Soviets and so on, all prove able cases, all cases which had

prosecutions involved and evidence certified.

Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to another area now, to what extent did the Agency's concern for protecting sensitive sources and methods have an effect on the nature and quality of the information that was made available to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. By quality what do you mean?

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the information given to the Warren Commission in sanitized form, for example?

Mr. Angleton. All I can say to that is that I hope so. I don't know. I know that my view is that no piece of information should go out of the Agency where if that document is compromised it destroys the source.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know if in fact that was the Agency's position that when information touching on sensitive sources and methods was involved it would be sanitized at least to those sensitive aspects and then given to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. What I am trying to say is that I can see the Chief of the Division or somebody if he was talking to the counsel there and there wasn't any record being made and so on, that he might feel that he ought to tell him a little bit more to give him some sense of evaluating that this is more important and this is important, something of that sort.

Mr. Goldsmith. Overall, was there a concern about protecting sourceces and methods when giving information to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. I can't answer that question because I really don't know. I know that you had a lot of people dealing with them. My personal view is that if we ever had information that incontrovertibly showed that there had been a foreign power that had assassinated the President, then that would supersede all sources and methods.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let us go off the record for a moment.

(Off the record discussion)

Mr. Goldsmith. Did Mr. Dulles play any special role on the Warren Commission so far as the Agency was concerned?

Mr. Angleton. Only by virtue of his having been the Director.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know if he in any way represented the interest of the Agency to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. I don't think that he had any understanding with Mr. McCone at all. In fact, I am quite confident he would not have had an understanding. They were not on the best of terms.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have any personal knowledge one way or another about that?

Mr. Angleton. I personally had a relationship with him?

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have any personal knowledge

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concerning whether he represented the interest of the Agency on the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. Explain that to me.

Mr. Goldsmith. For example, there would have been areas that the Warren Commission and the Agency may have been somewhat at odds. One area that comes to mind is in the Nosenko area where the Agency may have had a preference for having the Warren Commission not treat the Nosenko issue at all whereas the Warren Commission may have wanted to deal with that issue in some way. That would be a case where the Agency's interest would be at stake.

My question is, do you know whether in a case of that kind Mr. Dulles would have made an effort to represent the Agency's position to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. No, I don't think so. I think that you have to first keep in mind that Dulles was pretty much his own man. He was an attorney with Sullivan and Cromwell. He was about as independent a man as I know when it came to questions of his personal integrity. He wasn't a person who tried to compromise a lot of things, if I can put it that way.

When it got down to something as serious as going on the Commission he did not give the President an answer right away. In other words, he raised with the President, according to what he told me, because he called me the very day he got back from wherever he was up in New York and had received a call from

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the President, and he recounted to me the fact that he had raised all these conflicts, possible conflicts, in the public eye if he took that job.

We kicked that around as to the pros and cons. I knew he wanted the job. Like anyone in retirement this was a challenge to him and so on. But I think by way of character there would be no loyalties to the Agency or anybody else superseding his mandate from the President.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me show you a document that corresponds with JFK Exhibit F-529 at the Committee's final hearings. This document actually is one that we reviewed that was the basis for the question that I just asked you. I would ask you to skim two paragraphs. Read the third one and the fourth a bit more carefully and then we will talk about it.

Mr. Angleton. I don't think that necessarily changes anything that I said. What I am trying to say is that I am certain if he believed that this was a proper course on it and the doubts on Nosenko were expressed, whether it was the Bureau talking to him or anybody else talking to him, that he would still be persuaded by the facts, not by the fact that it was the Agency.

Mr. Goldsmith. The third paragraph there simply suggests the possibility that Mr. Dulles was attempting to represent the interest of the Agency and the Committee was concerned with (a), whether that was more than just a possibility,

1 whether it was a fact, and (b), to what extent that was preva-
2 lent?

3 Mr. Angleton. I will say this. If there was anything in
4 that memorandum that he regarded as being detrimental to the
5 Commission's work, my view is that there would have been an
6 explosion and he would have exploded.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. By that you mean then that he would be
8 giving priority to the work of the Commission rather than to
9 the Agency?

10 Mr. Angleton. And I think in there he is giving priority
11 to the Commission. Whenever briefing he received -- I was
12 unaware of the meeting that is being referred to here but I
13 am just saying that he was obviously persuaded, if there were
14 these doubts on the Nosenko thing, that this thing, the contro-
15 versy as to bonifides, that it would -- I mean, it was one of
16 those kinds of things that would be detrimental to a finding
17 of the Commission.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to have that marked as
19 Angleton Exhibit Number 1.

20 (The above referred to document was marked Angleton
21 Exhibit Number 1 and follows)

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1 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Mr. Dulles had any
2 special arrangement with Mr. Helms?

3 Mr. Angleton. No. I was never present with both of them
4 together. I don't know the content of any of their meetings
5 so far as I can recall.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. What role did the Mexico City station
7 have in the Agency's investigative effort?

8 Mr. Angleton. It had a very important role for two
9 reasons. One, Win Scott was the Chief of the Mission down
10 there, was perhaps one of the more capable officers we had.
11 He had been in the FBI. He was a very highly intelligent man.
12 He had assets, to wit, the overage, sources. If you had to
13 grade stations across the board in terms of different kinds of
14 coverage or assets or agents or whatnot, I would give him a
15 very high batting average. He was a real professional.

16 Further, he had an excellent relationship with the FBI
17 which had a huge station down there, and I would say a lesser
18 man would not have been on speaking terms with them because
19 they had once owned the Western Hemisphere in terms of juris-
20 diction and it was with some reluctance, so to speak, that they
21 transferred it to CIA. So he was highly regarded by the FBI
22 people. That was by force of his own personality.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. The Mexico City Station had a major role?

24 Mr. Angleton. Yes.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. I take it one reason is because Oswald

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1 had visited Mexico City?

2 Mr. Angleton. That is right.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you review the cable traffic that
4 flowed when the Mexico City station and headquarters after the
5 assassination?

6 Mr. Angleton. I saw a lot of jumbled messages. I saw an
7 awful lot of meassages that always seemed to be contentious
8 and that is the only way I can describe them.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Contentious in what way?

10 Mr. Angleton. In the sense of headquarters saying cer-
11 tain things to Mexico and coming back and overlapping. I
12 never was able to sort out, I don't know that I saw all the
13 cables but there seemed to have been a lot of confusion.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Let me see if I can summarize that
15 accurately. You saw a lot of cables. You did not see all
16 of them, is that correct?

17 Mr. Angleton. I don't know if I saw all of them. There
18 was no reason why I should see all of them because I think on
19 some occasions Win would telephone directly or the station
20 would telephone him directly.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Would Mr. Rocca have reviewed all the
22 cable and dispatch traffic between the Mexico City station and
23 headquarters?

24 Mr. Angleton. If they sent it to him, yes, if we were
25 on the dissemination.

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1 Mr. Goldsmith. I take it after Mr. Helms' order that the
2 CI Staff would have been on the dissemination.

3 Mr. Angleton. We probably would have been. You see,
4 every station chief had the privilege of what is called "eyes
5 on cable" in different categories of dissemination that cable
6 people only follow what the code word is. They don't know
7 about Mr. Helms' order in that sense.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. You indicated that the cables were
9 contentious. Was there any conflict apparent in those cables
10 between Mexico City station and headquarters?

11 Mr. Angleton. When I use the word contentious it may be
12 overdoing it but I can remember somebody saying, "have you
13 done this or that?" Or demanding that you send it up here
14 or something. I can't give you details. All I meant is that
15 Win was usually the tidiest of men. In other words, he always
16 had a big fat In box but he never left, regardless of an
17 appointment or anybody else, until he finished his day's work.
18 He was a prodigious worker.

19 So, what I am trying to say is that having been down there
20 and seeing him function at one time when there was some pro-
21 blem with the Bureau and all that, I had the highest regard
22 for the way he ran his outfit.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. How common was it for Scott or anyone else
24 in the Mexico City station during the aftermath of the assassi-
25 nation to communicate with headquarters personnel

1 telephonically?

2 Mr. Angleton. It was very rare.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever communicate with them tele-
4 phonically relative to the assassination?

5 Mr. Angleton. I don't think so, no. I mean, I wouldn't
6 have the right to.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Mexico City station have any
8 surveillance operations in effect in 1963 against Soviet and
9 Cuban Embassies and Consulates?

10 Mr. Angleton. Yes.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Was information regarding Oswald obtained
12 as a result of these operations?

13 Mr. Angleton. Yes.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what information was obtained?

15 Mr. Angleton. Unless I saw the cables I could not tell
16 you precisely what was obtained. I know that there was infor-
17 mation about his going into the Soviet Embassy. In other
18 words, there was both telephonic and other surveillance of some
19 sort.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Photographic?

21 Mr. Angleton. Photographic surveillance.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether this information was
23 given to the Warren Commission?

24 Mr. Angleton. I think the substance of everything was
25 given to the Warren Commission.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the Warren Commission was told about the specific surveillance operation?

Mr. Angleton. I don't really know whether they were in the end. The reason I say that is because I can remember a question about whether to black out the background behind the face or something so that it could not be identified in terms of location.

Mr. Goldsmith. Your answer is that you do not know whether or not the Warren Commission was told specifically about the surveillance operation?

Mr. Angleton. No. My feeling is that they must have been told in the sense -- I mean, it stands to reason that they would be pressuring, the attorneys would be pressuring, to know more and more about the coverage and all that.

Mr. Goldsmith. We have made reference now to a photograph. Why don't we start examining some of the cable traffic that is available to me. I am going to be making reference to documents by their numbers. The numbers have been assigned to the documents by the Agency. Essentially the Agency has assigned the numbers for security purposes so that every document that is given to the Committee can be accounted for. For convenience purposes I have taken those security numbers and I use the for reference purposes in this deposition.

At this time we are going to refer to CIA document number 177, which is a cable dated 9 October 1963. The 177 appears

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1 at the bottom right. I would ask you to read that particular
2 cable.

3 Now, the second paragraph of that cable makes reference
4 to photograph and it gives as description of someone. The
5 description, however, does not correspond to Lee Harvey Oswald.
6 Do you have any information concerning the discrepancy between
7 Oswald and the description given of him in that second para-
8 graph?

9 Mr. Angleton. No, it does not mean anything to me.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Agency ever able to learn the
11 identity of the individual to whom reference is made in the
12 second paragraph?

13 Mr. Angleton. I don't know.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know when the Warren Commission was
15 told about these photographs to which reference is made in
16 the the second paragraph?

17 Mr. Angleton. No. I mean, I don't know when.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think that they were told about
19 the picture but you don't know when?

20 Mr. Angleton. I heard much about the picture but I still
21 don't have a coherent picture of the picture.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Let me show you CIA Number 2139. This
23 is a memo dated 5 March 1964 for the attention of Richard
24 Helms. Raymond Rocca is the author of the memo.

25 Mr. Angleton. Who gave it this title?

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Pardon me?

2 Mr. Angleton. Who gave it this title?

3 Mr. Goldsmith. I don't know who gave it the title. That
4 is a xerox copy of the document in the form that we found it
5 to be in the Oswald file.

6 Mr. Angleton. Where is the reference to --

7 Mr. Goldsmith. I am sorry.

8 Mr. Angleton. Where is the reference? Where is Rankin's
9 letter which has been referred to?

10 Mr. Goldsmith. I will make that letter available to you.

11 Mr. Angleton. I can't get it in the context.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. Let me ask you this question which I do
13 not feel requires reference to that letter.

14 The second paragraph clearly makes reference to those
15 photographs?

16 Mr. Angleton. Let me finish this because I only got this
17 far.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. I am only going to ask you a question
19 about the second paragraph.

20 Mr. Angleton. It starts off here, paragraph two of the
21 letter, this says "this is in response to paragraph three of
22 this letter."

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. We will make the letter available
24 if you feel you have a need to see it.

25 Mr. Angleton. Yes sir.

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1 Mr. Goldsmith. Now, the second paragraph of that memo
 2 makes reference to the photographs that were the subject of
 3 the controversy. According to the second paragraph there was
 4 apparently an inclination on your part to "wait out the
 5 Commission" with regard to its request for these photographs.

6 Mr. Angleton. Does it say that?

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Let me read the relevant sentence to you.

8 Mr. Angleton. I don't read it that way. I don't see what
 9 it means, wait out what? I have to see what Rankin --

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Otherwise it refers to "Jim would prefer
 11 to wait out the matter covered in paragraph two of that letter.

12 Mr. Angleton. Which I don't know anything about.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that. I will show you the
 14 letter. Later on in the same paragraph it says "We have either
 15 passed in substance to the Commission in response earlier
 16 levies for the items referred to, reported leads. For example
 17 the famous six photographs which were not of Oswald."

18 I am asking you, in reference to these six photographs
 19 which were not of Oswald, was there any inclination on your
 20 part not to provide those materials to the Warren Commission?

21 Mr. Angleton. I really can't answer you until I see what
 22 paragraph two means. I don't even know whether paragraph two
 23 refers to the photographs because here it says "We have either
 24 passed material in substance to the Commission", which I assume
 25 is what I am referring to, in other words. what I am saying

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1 is that whatever I am objecting to seems to have already been
2 passed in substance.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. I won't quarrel with that. I won't
4 quarrel with you at all. It does say that it was passed in
5 substance. Perhaps the best thing to do would be to get the
6 Rankin letter for you to review and then we will come back
7 to this point later on.

8 Mr. Angleton. All right.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. At the time of Oswald's contact with the
10 Embassies in Mexico City, was that contact considered to be
11 significant and important in any way by the Mexico City
12 station?

13 Mr. Angleton. I think all contacts were.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. All contacts with whom?

15 Mr. Angleton. Americans.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever talk to Win Scott about
17 Oswald's trip to Mexico City?

18 Mr. Angleton. No, not to my knowledge.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Please review CIA number 179 which is a
20 cable dated 10 October 1963. It is three pages. Now, this
21 cable contains a correct description of Oswald in the first
22 paragraph. Do you know what the source of that correct
23 description would have been?

24 Mr. Angleton. It looks like it might have been Navy or
25 the Bureau.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Would that information have been obtained
2 from his 201 file, do you think?

3 Mr. Angleton. I would assume so. Wait just one minute.
4 Let me see what the dissemination was on this. This wasn't
5 to Egeter. She worked for me. CIA liaison Roman in draft.
6 Does that mean that she was acting as Liaison? So they had
7 a role?

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Would they have had access to the 201
9 file?

10 Mr. Angleton. Yes, but they would have access to the
11 201 file but the originator here is a fellow from WH Division,
12 Bustov.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Charlotte Bustoff?

14 Mr. Angleton. Charlotte.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you know her?

16 Mr. Angleton. No.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. The first paragraph also makes reference
18 to Oswald by the name "Lee Henry Oswald" That has become
19 somewhat subject of controversy by the Warren Commission
20 critics. Do you know how the Agency ever started to refer to
21 Oswald by an incorrect middle name?

22 Mr. Angleton. I would like to -- when I look at this,
23 this is obviously a -- the memo starts getting down here to
24 birth date and all that. It looks like passport information.
25 Therefore, I assume that is either State or Navy. I mean,

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1 somebody who had a record on him.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. The next paragraph makes reference to
3 background information concerning Oswald's defection. Would
4 that have escalated the significance of his contacts with the
5 Soviets in Mexico City, in your opinion?

6 Mr. Angleton. Let me see that again. I think that would
7 be a solid trace. In other words, it would be from Scott's
8 point of view a matter of considerable interest.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Why is that?

10 Mr. Angleton. Because it does not read like a lot of
11 third hand information. It looks like it is pretty solid
12 information. It is not a lot of allegations and so on.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Why would Scott be concerned about the
14 fact that Oswald was a defector? I guess I am asking you to
15 state the obvious.

16 Mr. Angleton. He had been in counterintelligence all his
17 life and he had handled an awful lot of Soviet cases.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. The last sentence of paragraph five indi-
19 cates "Please keep headquarters advised of any further
20 contacts or positive identification of Oswald."

21 Assuming that the Mexico City station, prior to the
22 assassination, knew that Oswald had also contacted the Cuban
23 Embassy, should that information have been communicated to
24 headquarters and by using the words or the phrase "assuming
25 that Mexico City station knew", I mean actual knowledge, they

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1 had linked the contact of an individual with the Cuban
2 Embassy, specifically Oswald, should that information have
3 been communicated to headquarters?

4 Mr. Angleton. You mean if they thought the same indi-
5 vidual hwere had been in touch with the Cubans?

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

7 Mr. Angleton. Sure.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. I note at the bottom left hand corner
9 of the document that Thomas Karamessines was the releasing
10 officer. Why would someone as high up in DDO as Karamessines
11 have been the releasing officer for a cable of this kind?

12 Mr. Angleton. I think that the reason for that would be
13 that when you have more than one division involved plus a
14 staff and all that, he probably wanted to have his finger on
15 it.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. What other division besides DDO was
17 involved here?

18 Mr. Angleton. SR Division. Since the fellow was from
19 Russia and all that Russian background it would be involved.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. We have Western Hemisphere units con-
21 cerned and also Soviet Russian units concerned?

22 Mr. Angleton. That is right.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the Mexico City sta-
24 tion ever obtained a tape recording of Oswald's voice?

25 Mr. Angleton. I would assume so but I don't know. I

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assume they did when they talked about that previous information you showed me. Wait a minute. Let me recapitulate:

"According to so and so American spoke broken Russian and said his name was so and so." It was obviously a tape.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know if there were any tape recordings of Oswald's voice in existence at the time of the assassination?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to show you a letter dated November 23, 1963 which I regret is not in very good form, in other words, a poor xerox. The letter is from Mr. Hoover to the head of the Secret Service. I am only going to ask you to read one paragraph in it starting at the bottom of page four, going on to page five. If you have difficulty reading this, I will be glad to read it to you.

Mr. Angleton. This is from whom to whom?

Mr. Goldsmith. This is from Mr. Hoover to Mr. Rowley of the Secret Service.

Mr. Angleton. I can't read it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me read it then and I apologize for the poor form.

"The Central Intelligence Agency advised that on October 1, 1963, an extremely sensitive source has reported that an individual identified himself as Lee Oswald contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City."

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1 Then it is sanitized. The next relevant sections are
2 as follows: Special agents of this Bureau who have conversed
3 with us from Dallas, Texas, have observed photographs of the
4 individual referred to above and have listened to a recording
5 of his voice. These special agents are of the opinion that
6 the above referred to individual was not Lee Harvey Oswald."

7 In other words, the substance of this paragraph suggests
8 that there was a tape recording that was listened to after the
9 assassination by FBI agents. The recording purported to
10 contain Oswald's voice but the agents were of the opinion that
11 it was not Oswald's voice. Do you have any information con-
12 cerning this issue?

13 Mr. Angleton. No. Does that indicate whose tape it is?

14 Mr. Goldsmith. It does not. The inference is that it is
15 a CIA tape. Frankly, this is a sanitized document.

16 Mr. Angleton. I wondered if the Bureau had a tape.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. The inference here is that at the time
18 the Bureau was in possession of the tape.

19 Did the CIA's Mexico City station ever obtain a photograph
20 of Oswald as a result of its photo-surveillance operation
21 against the Soviet and Cuban Consulates?

22 Mr. Angleton. I don't know.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think that they should have
24 obtained a photograph of Oswald in light of the scope of the
25 coverage?

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1 Mr. Angleton. I don't know how good the coverage was.
2 In other words, I don't know -- in those days cameras were not
3 what they are today, I mean in germs of automated or the type
4 that takes one ver minute. I don't know what it was set
5 to.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, you have no pe-sonal know-
7 ledge of this?

8 Mr. Angleton. No. I don't know whether this is a movie
9 or still.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. You made reference earlier to Win Scott
11 whom I take it you regarded as an extremely competent indi-
12 viduai?

13 Mr. Angleton. Yes.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Was Win Scott well known for maintaining
15 an extremely thorough record system?

16 Mr. Angleton. He was. He was always fighting the
17 administration part of the Agency, who always wanted to reduce
18 the files or burn stuff and so on.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. The administration people wanted to burn
20 files and he was inclined to keep them?

21 Mr. Angleton. Yes.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know where his files are stored?

23 Mr. Angleton. He had a big office.

24 Mr. Goldmith. In Mexico City?

25 Mr. Angleton. Yes.

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1 Mr. Goldsmith. Did Win Scott also maintain materials in
2 a personal safe?

3 Mr. Angleton. I am certain that he did.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know where that safe was?

5 Mr. Angleton. I don't know but I know it would certainly
6 be under his eye and it would be in his office, I would assume.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. After Win Scott's death did you ever visit
8 Mexico City for the purpose of removing materials from Win
9 Scott's safe?

10 Mr. Angleton. Yes, I visited there but not for the pur-
11 pose of removing stuff from the safe.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. What was the general purpose of the visit?

13 Mr. Angleton. Well, number one, I was appointed as an
14 official by Dick to go down there to the funeral. Number two,
15 Win was going to write a book, a manuscript. My purpose was
16 to go down and get all copies of the manuscript.

17 Since I was a close friend of his and I knew his wife and
18 all that, I combined both things and talked to her and
19 explained our position on it.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Were you able to obtain this manuscript?

21 Mr. Angleton. Yes.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you have occasion to review it at
23 all?

24 Mr. Angleton. I looked through it. He made more than
25 one draft.

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1 Mr. Goldsmith. What was the general purpose of the manu-
2 script, to give an account of his experience with the Agency?

3 Mr. Angleton. Well, it was sort of a last will and
4 testament of an operator in which a lot of it was camouflaged
5 and romanticized into a story. It had a plot and all that.
6 Win had written under a pseudonym some seven stories of his
7 youth in Alabama which were sort of Mark Twainish. He had
8 it privately printed.

9 It was an extremely good book. I think that he was try-
10 ing to write a mystery novel but at the same time he was mak-
11 ing a lot of observations about the world of espionage and
12 me in particular.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Was this particular manuscript ever
14 published?

15 Mr. Angleton. Not to my knowledge.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Was it intended to be a fictional or
17 nonfictional account?

18 Mr. Angleton. Both. I mean, it was fictional but it
19 was recognizable. I mean, anyone who was in the business would
20 have recognized a great deal in it.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. How did the Agency know that Scott was
22 writing that manuscript?

23 Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I know that his wife, as
24 I recall, his wife didn't know he was writing. I don't know
25 precisely how we found out, whether he told us or how it came

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1 to us. I knew at one time but it slips my mind precisely
2 how we knew.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you obtain any materials other than
4 this manuscript?

5 Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I can't remember. I know
6 I got an awful lot of material which I turned over to the
7 Chief of Mission down there to dispatch back through the
8 pouch.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall how long the manuscript
10 was? How many pages?

11 Mr. Angleton. It was sort of thickish, about that thick.
12 (Indicating). I can't tell how many drafts there were.
13 Apparently it was far from being finished. It was well on --

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Did he ever discuss it with you?

15 Mr. Angleton. No.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Why don't we take a brief recess now or
17 perhaps Miss Brady will resume questions. I will review some
18 materials that have been provided to me by the Agency. I might
19 add that so far as I am concerned, we are in pretty good shape
20 in terms of time.

21 Miss Brady. Did you have any contact with Bernard
22 Barker, Howard Hunt or Eugenio Martinez during your CIA career?

23 Mr. Angleton. Who was the first one?

24 Miss Brady. Benard Barker.

25 Mr. Angleton. None of them.

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Miss Brady. At any time?

Mr. Angleton. No. I want to explain the Hunt business. One of the things that this Joe Trento, the reporter, gave out that he learned from this Committee, he put it that he learned from the Committee that they had a memorandum between myself and Dick Helms to the effect that I wrote a memo to Dick saying that Howard Hunt was in Dallas at the time of the assassination and I was suggesting or proposing a cover-up.

Miss Brady. To whom?

Mr. Angleton. To Helms. Now, when I was called before the Watergate Committee I was challenged about soom such and such in the Executive Office Building. I didn't even know what they were talking about. I determined that that is where all the Watergate people were hanging about, Hunt.

I kept getting all these threatening telephone calls from Seymour Hirsch of the New York Times and all of that. I couldn't honestly understand what they were talking about until the whole Hunt thing hit the fan and they arrested Hunt and so on.

Then a journalist came to me and tole me that there was in inspector Bast, he called himself Inspector Bast, who is supposed to be a well to do man, a lawyer of some sort, a private investigator in McLean, and he had invited Colson to his swimming pool and that he had a hidden microphone in the shrubbery and that Colson told him that Angleton had recruited

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Hunt and was running Hunt in the White House as his agent and that Hunt reported to Angleton daily.

Bast was reported to have this tape recording which he made known to this journalist. The journalist was going to print all of this.

Miss Brady. When was this? During the Watergate period?

Mr. Angleton. Sometime maybe a little after or during.

So I laughed at this fellow and told him, I said "That is just about as crazy as anything I have ever heard." I said, "If you pursue that", I told him, "YOU will be exposed on this. I never met Howard Hunt in my life."

He was arrested on a Friday or Saturday. The first working day I asked the Office of Security to supply me with eight by ten photos of his security badges. In our organization you go to hundreds of meetings without knowing all the people. It is part of the compartmentation, if you would like. Therefore, I had to be doubly sure because the newspaper picture of Hunt was about this big and you couldn't get any features out of it.

So, when they showed me the photographs, I had never seen Hunt in my life.

The curious thing here, and I never explained it to the press or anybody, is the fact that my Deputy's name is Jim Hunt and I just let them go along, since they started the myth, let them live with it. But Jim Hunt being retired and playing

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1 golf, I saw no reason to give an explanation and ruin the 19th
2 hole so to speak.

3 So, when Trento called me at the Army-navy Club, one of
4 the things he also said to me at that time was, "Has Hunt
5 been in touch with you?" Again he is on that same Colson-Bast,
6 et cetera, route as the others.

7 Miss Brady. So it is fair to say, apart from whatever
8 was made known publicly about the Watergate incident, you had
9 no independent knowledge of Hunt's activities with the Agency?

10 Mr. Angleton. No. Later when he was picked up, yes, I
11 called for his file and read his file. I might also add that
12 I feel quite honestly that the man has suffered a great deal,
13 I mean a very great deal, the death of his wife and all the
14 things he went through and tragedies and trying to put his
15 life back to gether again with all these character assassins
16 still running after him. He paid his price. So I am a little
17 sympathetic with the fellow without even knowing him.

18 Miss Brady. Was there ever really any Agency document
19 about Hunt's whereabouts on November 22, 1963?

20 Mr. Angleton. I don't remember any such thing. As I
21 said, Hunt didn't mean a thing to me until after the Watergate.

22 Miss Brady. Do you have any knowledge of the pre-Bay of
23 Pigs operation called "Operation 40?"

24 Mr. Angleton. By that name? What is it about?

25 Miss Brady. Another one of the anti-Castro groups

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involving some of the anti-Castro groups down in the Miami area.

Mr. Angleton. No.

Miss Brady. Targets and operations against Cuba, you had no knowledge of that?

Mr. Angleton. I may have at some time or another but you have to keep in mind that the Counterintelligence Staff was not involved, that the Special Group on Cuba had its own liaison with the FBI and their own counterintelligence. In other words, I loaned them or gave them one man in particular whom I know who was fluent in Spanish, and he ceased to be a member of my, I mean, he was taken off my rolls and transferred to them.

He was one of the principal counterintelligence people. Then later on, when Harvey was running it, he had another one of my men, but they were severed from the CI Staff and integrated within that.

In other words, they allegedly had their own counterintelligence capability built into the Task Force.

Miss Brady. What is the extent, if we can call it, of domestic counterintelligence in Miami and New Orleans during the early sixties?

Mr. Angleton. Domestic counterintelligence in New Orleans and Miami? Are you talking about the Domestic Branch? We had what is called Domestic Operations which was on the overt

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1 side of the house.

2 Miss Brady. I am asking more in particular if there were
3 any covert activities that you were aware of?

4 Mr. Angleton. No. The only people who had that capa-
5 bility would be the Office of Security which had I think people
6 under cover.

7 Miss Brady. So if there were domestic operations you
8 are saying the Office of Security would have been in charge of
9 them?

10 Mr. Angleton. They would not have run operations there.
11 They had people under cover for investigative purposes,
12 personnel and security checks. I mean applicants, field
13 security checking.

14 Miss Brady. Was either Counterintelligence or the Office
15 of Security aware of Castro G-2 operatives in the Miami area?
16 Have they been identified?

17 Mr. Angleton. What period are we talking about?

18 Miss Brady. The early sixties again.

19 Mr. Angleton. That would have been the jurisdiction of
20 the code name J.M. WAVE outfit who had direct liaison with
21 the Miami field office of the FBI.

22 Miss Brady. Was J. M. WAVE a separate component or was
23 it run out of another office?

24 Mr. Angleton. I think J. M. WAVE was the code name on
25 communications for that entire task force based in Miami.

1 Miss Brady. Did you at any time have any knowledge of
 2 any contact by Oswald with the Cuban G-2 in either New
 3 Orleans or Miami?

4 Mr. Angleton. None.

5 Miss Brady. Now you mentioned a Domestic Intelligence
 6 Office, is that how you phrased it?

7 Mr. Angleton. Yes. It had different names. It was once
 8 called "OO". I can't remember what that means. Anyway, it
 9 was a collection part of the Directorate of Intelligence,
 10 which means that it was not a part of the Clandestine Services
 11 but of the Deputy for Intelligence.

12 It was a domestic so that it did not work clandestinely.
 13 Its offices were in the telephone directory of the major
 14 cities where they were located and its basic thing was to
 15 interview Americans who had been behind the Curtain. It was
 16 a vacuum cleaner so to speak of every kind of human being they
 17 had the manpower to interview, and they did some very good
 18 work.

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 James Angleton

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Mr. Goldsmith. We were discussing the manuscript that you
 obtained from Winn Scott's residence in Mexico City shortly
 after his death. Do you recall whether Winn Scott's pen
 name was Ian Maxwell?

Mr. Angleton. How do you spell the first name?

Mr. Goldsmith. I-a-n.

Mr. Angleton. I think it was, at least from the books
 that he published.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you read through that manuscript
 in its entirety?

Mr. Angleton. I read it in its entirety but my problem
 is that there was more than one draft, but I read it pretty
 thoroughly at one stage.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall if it contained a chapter
 which discussed Lee Harvey Oswald's visit to Mexico City?

Mr. Angleton. No, I don't recall that. In fact I didn't
 know there was a chapter on it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me show you what we have obtained
 from the Agency by virtue of a committee request for materials
 that were obtained from Mr. Scott's safe or residence after
 his death. This is a chapter from a manuscript.

It is fairly long.

Mr. Angleton. Is it a part of the book?

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, I only have one chapter here. It
 says Chapter 24 from a draft manuscript of "The Foul Foe," a

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book which purports to be an account of the writer's career in intelligence. I have no way of knowing one way or another whether this was included in the material that you actually read. But I would like to ask you to review those materials now. For the record the CIA number starts with 11112364 and it ends at 11112371. Please take five or ten minutes to read through that.

Mr. Angleton. This as far as I know I have never seen. I don't recall seeing this.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it possible that this was among the materials that you obtained but simply that you did not review it at that time?

Mr. Angleton. You see, the copies that I saw were before the Xerox. They were what you call thermofaxes. Has this been retyped from something?

Mr. Goldsmith. This is not the original or anything. Maybe Mr. Berk can shed some light.

Mr. Berk. It was contained in the files. There were other copies of this manuscript in somewhat edited versions. This seems to be the final form.

Mr. Angleton. Were the documents in the files thermofaxed?

Mr. Berk. I am not versed in the distinction between thermofax and Xerox.

Mr. Angleton. Thermofax is a special kind of paper, very dark.

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1 Mr. Berk. No, it was not thermofax.

2 Mr. Angleton. It is a heat treatment thing so that
3 unless you are using the original you have a very poor copy and
4 it is very hard to make a thermofax from a thermofax.

5 Mr. Berk. The paper itself is dark?

6 Mr. Angleton. Yes. I mean it is dark by having gone
7 through the heat process, you don't get a sharp black and white.

8 Mr. Berk. It did not seem to be that type.

9 Mr. Angleton. I picked up an awful lot of materials there.
10 The thing comes back to me that I also arranged for the Chief
11 of Mission to be able to see Mrs. Scott after-ards and she said
12 she would cooperate a 100 hundred percent.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. This particular chapter I asked you to read
14 discusses Oswald's Mexico City trip; is that correct?

15 Mr. Angleton. This is not the style of the manuscript.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. The manuscript you reviewed?

17 Mr. Angleton. It is not in his style because he was
18 writing a more novel type of style.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that and I really don't
20 intend to dwell upon that manuscript since that is different
21 from what I have apparently shown you today.

22 Mr. Angleton. Although the title there must be the same
23 one that he had on the manuscript. Would you read that title
24 again?

25 Mr. Duncan. "The Foul Foe."

4

1 Mr. Angleton. that rings a bell as being the title of
2 the book.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Let me tell you that the committee has
4 every intention of reviewing this in more detail. This was
5 just made available to us very recently. In any event the chap
6 that you just read discusses Oswald's trip to Mexico City, is
7 that correct?

8 Mr. Angleton. Yes.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Does it appear to you, based upon your
10 knowledge of the case, to be an accurate reflection of the
11 events that took place in Mexico City when Oswald visited there
12 in 1963?

13 Mr. Angleton. I can't say that I necessarily have the same
14 picture from reading all that. My memory of headquarters, it
15 reads very much like Scott in terms of the actions that he
16 took and his feelings.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. This then does not strike you as a fictiona
18 account?

19 Mr. Angleton. No.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. When Mrs. Scott gave these materials to
21 you to bring back to the Agency or for you to arrange for
22 the material to be sent back to the Agency did she in effect
23 make those materials a gift to the Agency? Was she giving
24 them all to the Agency?
25

Mr. Angleton. As I remember it there was no dispute.

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When I went down there, one, I did not know her modd. In other words, Win had retired and he was working I think for some international investigative agency which had originally been set up by a former employee named Al Ulmer who lived in London and now lives in Geneva. I think Win, who was a very powerful man in Mexico, got a number of his Mexican friends to invest in it and I think it failed, went bankrupt. So I didn't know what the state of mind of the wife was going to be in terms of certain bitterness that Win did feel.

I went down there very open-minded as to what might happen. I was disturbed because, as I recall, we only had Xeroxes or these thermofaxes and there was the whole question of being able to get all the copies and all that type of thing and whether he had sent them out to publishers and so on. So, I was a little apprehensive about her greeting. When I went to see her, her first words were "Why did it take so long? So to speak. When I took her in the side room and said "I had an unpleasant task" -- I put it very clearly -- "there are some papers. If these are published this violates Win's oath. We want to recover all of them," there was absolutely no opposition. She said, "You can have everything." Whoever was the Chief of Mission was with me and so it was arranged that he would followup and pick up all the stuff.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was [] at that time a man named John Horton?

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1 Mr. Angleton. That is correct.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you familiar with the cryptonym

3 A.M.MUG?

4 Mr. Angleton. No, I mean not with that -- A.M.?

5 Mr. Goldsmith. MUG, a Cuban defector.

6 Mr. Angleton. It does not mean anything in that way.

7 The "M" as I recall was Cuban, "A.M." or Cuban operations.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you remember a Cuban defector in 1964
9 providing information to the Agency about Oswald's contacts with
10 CBI, Cuban Intelligence?

11 Mr. Angleton. No.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. Let us go back to this particular document
13 at this point. I call your attention to paragraph two of this
14 letter.

15 Mr. Angleton. I am trying to get the date.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. This is 5 March 1964 and that is 12 Feb-
17 ruary 1964.

18 Mr. Angleton. Tom Karamessines' address was Acting Director
19 which meant that Dick Helms was away.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. To Odum of the Federal Bureau of Inves-
21 tigation.

22 "In order to complete the records of the Commission
23 regarding this matter the Commission would like to be informed
24 of the circumstances surrounding the obtaining of this picture
25 by your Agency and the identify of the individual shown if

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this information is currently available. Thank you for your assistance."

Mr. Angleton. Read that once more.

Mr. Goldsmith. "In order to complete the record of the Commission regarding this matter the Commission would like to be informed of the circumstances surrounding the obtaining of this picture by your Agency and the identify of the individual shown if this information is currently available."

Now I would refer to the second paragraph of Document Number 2139 where you indicate that the Commission has received the substance of their request but in effect I think you are suggesting that the Agency wait out giving the Commission the specifics.

Mr. Angleton. My only concern would have been the elaboration of surveillance and telephonic surveillance, letting that be known.

I want to make one observation. People say, well, the Soviets always know that you photograph them or they always know that their lines are tapped. There have been too many times in history that an unknown, either an American Army officer or somebody else that doesn't know, that makes the slip. Those are all provable cases of where even though the Soviets know -- I can remember one case, an emergency situation with one of our agents in Paris on the run, getting to Rome and telephoning the embassy that he is in trouble, et cetera --

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even though they know they try to shut him up but it is too late. That type of thing.

Therefore with all the past experience the idea that even though they knew that, this thing would get further, would have complicated things for the Mexican Government because Win's relationships with the Mexican Government were at the top, with the President. Therefore the repercussions would have been far more than just simply losing the operation.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you familiar with the name Louisa Calderon?

Mr. Angleton. I have heard but I can't place it?

Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to a completely different area at this time, on what basis would the CIA staff has occasion to open a 201 file on an individual? I am referring now to the time period 1959 to 1960.

Mr. Angleton. We opened up many files.

Mr. Goldsmith. In other words, what would the criteria have been for opening a 201 file? I am speaking now with reference specifically to the CIA staff?

Mr. Angleton. It would be anyone who was suspect or who had contacts with the Soviets, I mean with the bloc or with an espionage net, regardless of how remote.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me show you CIA document Number 796. This is a Department of State telegram dated October 31, 1959. Let me read it to you.

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Miss Brady. But ran no operations apart from these contac
Mr. Angleton. No. The rule was that if they had likely
prospects of somebody going from any American company that
they might contact him to pick up something but they didn't hav
a budget for payment. Dhey didn't have the rites of security
oaths, all of that. In other words, if it was to become oper-
ational or sensitive in any way then they would have to pass it
through the Clandestine Services who might or probably wouldn't
even consider it seriously.

Miss Brady. Returning again to the Soviet, do you know wh
investigation w-s done to test Mosenko's allegations about
Oswald?

Mr. Angleton. I think it was simply a question of interro-
gation and reinterrogation and how many files did he read and
trying to press him on detail, detail, detail, detail. I know
there were some conflicts because at one stage when the Warren
Commission was going to ask the Soviet Government for, I mean
to request the Soviet Government for information regarding
Oswald hen he stayed there, that we composed a very detailed
questionnaire that the State Department turned down on diplo-
matic ground that it would disturb the water.

Miss Brady. A questionnaire for the Soviet Government?

Mr. Angleton. Yes. Then I know that we had question-
naires that we prepared for the Office of Security to use in
their polygraphing, which they did not use. In other words,

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1 there were a lot of things that in our view were testings and
2 that type of thing which were not employed.

3 Miss Brady. Did the CIA examine the documents turned over
4 by the Soviet Government about Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union?

5 Mr. Angleton. I am certain of that. I know I saw them.

6 Miss Brady. Do you know whether any assessment was drawn
7 as to whether or not they were authentic?

8 Mr. Angleton. I am just remembering my own reaction was
9 that it was a lot of puffery. It was just filling space with
10 stuff of no consequence.

11 Miss Brady. Were any of the people in the Agency who work
12 in the area of foreign documents or Russian language asked to
13 make any intensive analysis of those documents?

14 Mr. Angleton. I am certain that that was done.

15 Miss Brady. Do you believe that reports exist on that
16 kind of thing from those evaluations?

17 Mr. Angleton. There should be. Whether they went to the
18 Agency on that or whether the recipients, the Warren Com-
19 mission -- how they handled that I don't know. All I can say
20 is that if we had the originals it would be almost automatic for
21 that to go to what we call our "TSD" and have them examine
22 everything from the point of view of the typewriters and so
23 on, if there was on the surface something to be gained by it, if
24 there were stamps or certifications or whatever. Also, just
25 from a technical point of view they would be interested in the

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1 quality of paper because one of their jobs was to make paper lo
2 like Russian paper.

3 Miss Brady. I know that many of the documents contain
4 names of Russian officials who either had occasion to see
5 Oswald or work with him. Would there have been traces or
6 followups on those individuals?

7 Mr. Angleton. I am certain of that. That would be the
8 normal job for the Office of Security -- I am sorry, I will
9 correct that -- for the Soviet Division.

10 Miss Brady. Did the CIA have any independent knowledge of
11 the Minsk radio factory where Oswald worked?

12 Mr. Angleton. I don't know.

13 Miss Brady. Was it normal for some type of evaluation
14 of installations like that in the Soviet bloc countries to be
15 maintained?

16 Mr. Angleton. I think that in those days any information
17 on any Soviet factory regardless would be maintained. that woul
18 be again where the "OO" or the Domestic Intelligence people
19 produce volumes of material on that because they would inter-
20 rogate so many American businessmen who had different kinds
21 of jobs and so on. It was really a very productive inexpensive
22 operation.

23 Miss Brady. What investigation to your knowledge was
24 conducted about Marina Oswald?

25 Mr. Angleton. I think she was checked out against all the

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files and records and relatives or whatever she gave on her application. All that type of thing would be automatic.

Miss Brady. Did we have some way of verifying or checking if, for example, she gave the name of the uncle she lived with? Did we have resources to do that?

Mr. Angleton. No. All I would say is that if somebody found in the OO or in the computers that some traveller had lived in Minsk or had this or that, it is conceivable that there might have been a request levied on OO to see their contact.

Miss Brady. Given the lack of resources to go into those kinds of areas about Marine Oswald, do you have any opinion about how thorough that part of the Warren Commission's investigation was or are there still remaining questions as far as you are concerned about Marina Oswald?

Mr. Angleton. My only concern I think is the concern of everybody. It is the facility with which she was able to leave the Soviet Union. I have known one case where a man, an American was recruited by the Soviet intelligence in order to get his wife out, a prominent man. He lived and died before we discovered that he was a Soviet agent.

Miss Brady. He did return to the United States with his bride?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know -- I think he got her out as a result of making a deal.

Miss Brady. How close was that in time to Oswald's

stay in the Soviet Union?

Mr. Angleton. It was a long time ago. In other words, this is the whole history of Soviet espionage making use of hostages, people in the immediate family as a way of control and as a leverage over agents. In other words, agents who were ideologically opposed to them, yet they operated very effectively for them by virtue of hostages in the family, and even some famous agents who did high grade work for KGB did it only by virtue of the hostage situation.

Miss Brady. Returning now to Golitzen, did you have any knowledge during the initial briefing of Golitzen about a story or allegation about him that the KGB had a plot in existence prior to the 1960 election to assassinate Nixon if he were elected?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I heard this before. I don't think that is the way, to my memory, the way he put it. That is again the trouble I find with the Hart testimony, the inaccuracies of making those kinds of statements, whether he said this as a positive fact. What he did say was that through the reorientation of the KGB as a part of the de-Stalinization of the KGB, of bringing it in as an integral part of the government, because under Stalin the KGB had deteriorated to an instrument of personal terror to preserve Stalin's cult of personality, in other words, to advance Stalin but not necessarily to advance the Soviet or the Communist

Government as such across the board, that is the reason he had chiefs and executed them, chiefs and executed them, and so on; so part of the de-Stalinization was to raise the KGB -- and it took several years, six years, before this was culminated -- to where it was restored to the same role it had under Lenin, namely as a integral part of Soviet policy and as a part of a full-fledged member of the Voviet community, which by implication would mean that every action would have a political objective and would therefore advance the cause of Communist strategy.

In describing all of that it got into the fact that even foreign leaders who stood in the way would be executed. In other words, Department 13's role was in effect to remove obstacles in the West.

Miss Brady. So, your recollection of the story of the allegation is that it was that general and not specifically related to Nixon?

Mr. Angleton. All I am syaing is that having talked thousands and thousands of hours with him I don't remember his saying that to me about Nixon. All I am trying to say is that that would have rung a lot of bells. Maybe he did say it. If he did I don't think he ver said it to me because you had to keep in mind that when he first came to the United States he was in the hands of the Soviet Division. Then there were a lot of misunderstandings, and fauling out between the Divison and Golitzen.

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1 Then he left the country and went abroad with his family
 2 and broke the ties with the Soviet Division and then eventually
 3 there were negotiations by the foreign country he was in and
 4 it was finally negotiated that he would be prepared to come
 5 back as long as the Counterintelligence took him over from
 6 the Soviet Division. So he had tremendous numbers of sessions
 7 with the Soviet Division before finally they deteriorated
 8 totally.

9 In other words, there was a tremendous amount of material
 10 which had accumulated, transcripts and all of that.

11 Miss Brady. So, the initial debriefings were conducted
 12 by the Soviet Division?

13 Mr. Angleton. That is right, and also with the partici-
 14 pation at times by my men, namely Burch O'Neill and I think
 15 a man called Jean Evans. In other words, these two men would
 16 get into see him on special questions of a counterintelligence
 17 nature, compartmented on certain agent cases and so on.

18 Miss Brady. Why was a decision made ultimately to turn the
 19 Nosenko case over to the Office of Security and roughly when was
 20 that decision made?

21 Mr. Angleton. The Office of Security had a right to
 22 defectors in terms of their own needs as being primarily respon-
 23 sible for the personal security and physical security of instal-
 24 lations. So they had maintained with the Soviet Division very
 25 close relationships in terms of daily visits back and forth on

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1 Nosenko. It became then a question that the person handling
2 that in the Soviet Division, Bruce Solie, gradually took the
3 position that Nosenko was bona fide.

4 Miss Brady. Is it correct that that was after an early
5 assessment that he was not bona fide?

6 Mr. Angleton. That is right. I think the polygraphic
7 test showed that he wasn't and so on. So that when the Soviet
8 Division failed in breaking him through hostile interrogation,
9 and obviously his relationship with all those people had evaporated,
10 it was not illogical to let -- I mean if you are
11 going to have sugar-vinegar -- the Office of Security pick it
12 up from there and sweeten the situation, particularly because
13 they believed in him. Then they had a keen interest in arriving
14 at all the information he could volunteer and being able to present
15 cases to him and handle him.

16 So that is what took place. I didn't give you a date
17 because I don't recall the date but it was in Hart's testimony.
18 I don't know whether that date is accurate.

19 Miss Brady. Is it fair to say at that point that the
20 Counterintelligence staff was of a mind that he was not bona fide?

21 Mr. Angleton. I will put it this way. To my knowledge I
22 never have ever stated, in other words, I never took the
23 position in extremis, a flat statement. If I had had to give
24 it without any further -- I mean if I just had to stand still
25 and look at everything, I would have had to say that he was

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a dispatch agent. But again since I have a different philosophy of modus operandi, which is to give rope and never inform Nosenko that I doubted him, I would have continued to milk him and milk him. I would never have hired him as a consultant to the Agency or FBI, giving counterintelligence lessons and seeing people and personnel and having freedom of movement and that type of thing. You see, under the National Security Act of 1974 you have the implementing directives of NSCIDs, National Security Council Intelligence Directives which control and govern the interagency relationships.

Under that there is a NSCID specifically on defectors. For example, it advocates that you must preserve the climate of defection and so on. It goes on down and charges the Central Intelligence Agency with the rehabilitation of defectors. Therefore, I would have rehabilitated him but without, one, giving him any information, I would work him out of his own material; not give him anything new, I mean anything that wasn't worked out of his own material. I would continue to test question him and financially look after him and all of that, but with nothing to be gained by learning anything about the Agency.

Now in that same directive there are provisions made for an inter-agency defector committee so that all components in the government have a right to use that asset for their own purposes. But the rehabilitation is strictly on the shoulders of the

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Director who also is empowered to do certain things with the Attorney General in terms of the status, citizenship, and bills in Congress and so on.

I will put it this way, the FBI was disseminating his reports. I have to backtrack on this. It is very difficult to explain it. When McCone was before the hearings of the Church Committee he made the statement in an interview with Daniel Schorr that the material had not gone to the Warren Commission, or words to that effect, because there were doubts as to the bona fides of Nosenko. But that since then he had been assured by the Agency or had been told by the Agency that the bona fides had been established. When I heard this on television I immediately called the Agency and raised a serious question on how they could make a statement that his bona fides had been established.

There was a lot of waffling on this. They said that had been accepted when Security took over, or words to that effect. So I called Tom Karamessines. I said, "What is your understanding of the status of the man Nosenko?" He said the man's bona fides had not been established. So even in the FBI report information disseminated by him was sourced as information from a KGB, or whoever they might put down there, whose bona fides had not been established.

So that this was a determination hurried up by Colby and company because they had another embarrassment on their hands.

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1 They had one journalist, TV commentator in Moscow, who had
 2 been named Sam Jaffee whose uncle was the famous Hollywood actor
 3 he was a great character actor. Nosenko had accused him, had
 4 made the statement that he was a Soviet agent while he was a TV
 5 man in Moscow, and named his case officer. Jaffee got on
 6 this business and couldn't get jobs and therefore challenged the
 7 Agency as to whether he was bona fide or not. So, Colby sent
 8 him a letter stating that he wasn't a Russian agent, et
 9 cetera.

10 But the Bureau refused to give him such a letter. He is
 11 still running around. He has been on the Tomorrow Show and a
 12 lot of other things. So he is still in the woodwork.

13 Miss Brady. The next area I would go into would be the whole
 14 initiation of the Hart report. I think at this point I am
 15 going to defer again to Micky and then we can arrange our own
 16 time.

17 Mr. Angleton. Fine. Would you make a note there, that last
 18 questionnaire, to go back again, because I want to make it more
 19 cogent than it remains at this moment.

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file is

1 Miss Brady. What was the general purpose of the CI/SIG
2 unit within the CI Staff?

3 Mr. Angleton. The purpose of it basically was that the
4 Office of Security has jurisdiction, the Director of Security
5 has jurisdiction over the physical installations of the Agency
6 and has sole possession of security files and is responsible
7 for the security clearance of personnel. That is an exclusive
8 jurisdiction.

9 In any intelligence organization the most sensitive thing
10 is the security file, particularly the CIA. It is a very
11 thorough thing from birth plus everything that every hostile
12 neighbor might have to say about somebody.

13 Now, I set it up in 1954 for the purpose of, one, that
14 no one in the Counterintelligence, which is part of Clendes-
15 tine Services, would ever have access to anybody's security
16 file. I chose an individual who had been ex-FBI and who had
17 worked in the Office of Security as the man to run that com-
18 ponent. So that I never had access to the security files nor
19 did anybody else.

20 But in the event that there was an allegation about an
21 employee, he could review with the Security Officer the entire
22 file. But all that he would give to me or to any of my sub-
23 ordinates would be purely any relevant extract from that file
24 which pertained to the lead as a way of sanitizing, I mean of
25 keeping inviolable the security file. Now, that was one of

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their functions.

Second, prior to this there was no place in the government where you could find a list of defectors from the United States. Normally that should have fallen on the FBI to keep a list of all defectors and so on. So when I took over the Counterintelligence, my whole thing first was to build up a data base and all those gaps in government that one could find where you should have counterintelligence coverage and that was, for example, among other things, all the German captured documents.

Miss Brady. Have you finished with your answer?

Mr. Angleton. No, I am just saying -- you were asking for the functions of the SIG and I was trying to explain what they are.

Miss Brady. Yes, I asked for the functions in general terms and your answer was responsive.

Mr. Angleton. It is not responsive because it had many duties that had to do with other categories of sensitive cases involving Americans and other things which were not being handled by anybody else or just falling between stools and so on.

Miss Brady. Would the organizational charter of the CI/SIG make reference to these various organizational functions?

Mr. Angleton. It would probably in fairly camouflaged

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1 terms, yes. It was not a unit, however, whose duties were in
2 other words, explained to people. I mean, in training school
3 and so on it was very much fuzzed over if anyone was laying
4 out the CI Staff.

5 Miss Brady. Can you state with certainty that one of
6 the essential functions of the CI/SIG unit was to maintain
7 a current list of American defectors to other countries?

8 Mr. Angleton. It would fall within that but there was
9 never, it was only until after the assassination that the
10 major effort was done to try to get all this. It was also
11 to do all the defectors from the Soviet Bloc which had never
12 been done.

13 Miss Brady. Prior to the assassination this was not one
14 of the general purposes of the CI/SIG unit?

15 Mr. Angleton. I can't say that for a certainty. I can't
16 say it for a certainty because it had so many duties. This
17 time you are referring to -- to come back to reality, the
18 heaviest burden on them was Mr. "X", Golitzin, because there
19 were bodies of sensitive intelligence that as far as I know
20 have never been disclosed running into thousands of pages of
21 hard documents relating to Soviet intelligence, and they were
22 also primarily responsible for that.

23 Miss Brady. Let me show you a number 706. This is an
24 opening request form. Byt that I mean it is a form to request
25 the opening of a 201 file. I ask you to review that particular

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1 form.

2 Mr. Angleton. Yes.

3 Miss Brady. First, I would like to ask you the following
4 question. According to this document the file was opened
5 in December of 1960. Earlier I showed you a State Department
6 telegram reporting Oswald's intention to provide the Soviets
7 with military intelligence. That document was dated October
8 31, 1959. It has been alleged by critics of the Warren
9 Commission that there is something unusual about the delayed
10 opening of the 201 file.

11 In your opinion, is there anything unusual about the
12 delayed opening of the 201 file?

13 Mr. Angleton. That date again is what?

14 Mr. Goldsmith. October 31, 1959.

15 Mr. Angleton. What time was it received by Egeter?

16 Mr. Goldsmith. The earlier telegram is dated October 31,
17 1959. This is dated December 1960, more than a year later.
18 Is there anything unusual about that apparent delay in the
19 opening of the 201 file?

20 Mr. Angleton. Was she the only recipient of that tele-
21 gram?

22 Mr. Goldsmith. The telegram does not indicate who was the
23 recipient. In fact, I think it went to the Security Office.

24 Mr. Angleton. Normally there is a cover sheet, a
25 registry. When that telegram comes in -- let me see that

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telegram again.

In other words, the procedure, when that telegram came in from Moscow that would go to the Soviet Division who should have the action on that telegram. It would have probably gone to the Office of Security simply because of the relationship between the Security Office --

Mr. Goldsmith In fact, this document was obtained from the Security Office.

Mr. Angleton. I am trying to reconstruct what the internal dissemination was. It might well have gone to liaison of some sort. We had a lot of liaison. But the action on that telegram would have been the Soviet Division to open a 201 file.

Mr. Goldsmith. Again, my question is why would it have taken more than a year to open the file on Oswald. Is there anything unusual in your view?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know the circumstances. I don't understand why it would take that long. In my view that should have hit the Soviet Division pretty hard.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why would CI?SIG have responsibility for opening the 201 file on Oswald at this time?

Mr. Angleton. That is what confuses me a bit, and I am confused here because if there was anyone more meticulous that I ever ran across it was Miss Egeter.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me give you some background information.

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1 According to the record, in late October of late 1960 the
2 Agency received from the Department of State a list of
3 defectors. I am referring now to CIA number A-21 and A-22.
4 A-22 has Oswald's name on it. You might want to read this
5 letter, A-21, skim it.

6 Mr. Angleton. I see that.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Now, this information was all routed to
8 CI/SIG apparently but until today --

9 Mr. Angleton. Is there a routing slip?

10 Mr. Goldsmith. I am sorry, Mr. Angleton. For that document
11 you are looking at right now, we don't have a routing slip.
12 I guess you will have to take my word for the record.

13 Mr. Angleton. All I am saying is that we had so many
14 difficulties with Bissell as Deputy Director of Plans that I
15 am amazed it actually came to us.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. According to the Agency's records, these
17 letters were routed to your office in 1960, late October
18 1960. Approximately a month later the file was opened.
19 However, until you testified earlier, no one had really
20 indicated to us that one of the purposes of the CI/SIG was
21 to monitor defectors.

22 Mr. Angleton. It was to build up the most sensitive
23 cases on Americans. I have to explain two things here which
24 I don't think are clear and are the most sensitive of all
25 things. Number one, are the transcripts of thousands of pages.

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1 of the Golitzin interrogations which included the interroga-
 2 tions by five to seven other services, Foreign Services, the
 3 condition of their having access to him was that they give us
 4 copies of all of their own interrogations. So we are running
 5 into thousands of pages with only a few personnel, very few
 6 personnel.

7 In addition to that, there were several thousand of the
 8 most sensitive kinds of documents of Russian origin with
 9 cryptonyms of agents in which part of their task with another
 10 person was to try to make identifications of these people who
 11 were Soviet agents both here and in Western Europe.

12 So that this was totally unknown, let us put it that
 13 way, unless the people had special clearances. But the action
 14 of anyone, whether he is a defector or not, goes with the
 15 geographic area. In other words, the person who is supposed
 16 to open up a 201 file is supposed to be the person whose
 17 geographic area it pertains to.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. SR, for example?

19 Mr. Angleton. Yes, the persons in Moscow. They are the
 20 ones who have assets. They have people in the Embassy. Our
 21 rode piggyback on everything else that everybody else was
 22 doing. Also, if we had an intercept -- can I go off the
 23 record here --

24 Mr. Goldsmith. Sure. Off the record.

25 (Off the record discussion)

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Mr. Goldsmith. On the record.

By opening Oswald's 201 file and marking it restricted, would that normally mean that if someone else in the Agency requested access to the file, Miss Egeter or someone else in the CI/SIG unit would be notified?

Mr. Angleton. It is not a question of marking it restricted so much. It is a question that if she entered, without knowing any of the circumstances, if she opened up a 201 file with her name and her extension and all of that, it would be there so that anyone in registry could call to her attention the fact that the Uganda Desk did or whatnot was asking for the file or had submitted something.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would that be done as a matter of routine or only if she marked the file as restricted?

Mr. Angleton. I can't really answer that question. There is a book about that thick on registry procedures. Sometimes there is a notice in there, a piece of paper which says any inquiry on this should be reported to so and so on extension so and so. So the case officer can then call that person and say "What is your interest in that case?" That is the only means of making sure that somebody who is sitting way up in this section immediately is notified of some new information that the case has been working on that no one was believed to know about, that something has hit registry.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would a 201 file always indicate the fact

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of an Agency relationship between an individual and the CIA if in fact there was such a relationship?

Mr. Angleton. It could and many of them do. The general rule is that the hard file, the file kept by the case officer, would be the file that would show any relationship to the Agency.

Mr. Goldsmith. That is the soft file, is it not?

Mr. Angleton. No, the soft one is the 201, unless I am getting my terminology confused.

Mr. Goldsmith. The hard copy would be the official Agency copy whereas the soft copy would be the one maintained by the case officer?

Mr. Angleton. Right. In other words, I kept thinking of soft in terms of not as important. In any event, I always thought the soft file was the one with a lot of material missing. That is what I am trying to get.

Mr. Goldsmith. We need not spend much time on the distinction between soft and hard.

Let us talk in terms of the one that the case officer maintained and the one that is maintained in registry. The one that is maintained in registry, I take it, does not have all the materials, is that correct?

Mr. Angleton. Not where there is a special interest in that person, I mean where it is still an active case or where somebody has a particular interest.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. That information would be in the file main-
2 tained by the case officer?

3 Mr. Angleton. That is right.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. How would someone actually get access to
5 the file maintained by the case officer?

6 Mr. Angleton. By registry telling him that "If you want
7 to know anything more you have to call so and so on extension
8 so and so," and there may be a legitimate interest and he
9 would permit him to read it. It might be a superior interest
10 and the file gets transferred to the next fellow.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Let me show you CIA 943. This is a xeroxed
12 copy of some index cards that were found in Oswald's 201 file.
13 I would like to refer you to the card on the top of the page
14 which is marked "Secret Eyes Only" and has Oswald's name on
15 it also. It makes reference to CI project/RE. The date is
16 9 November 1959. Do you know what that would be referring to?

17 Mr. Angleton. These were in what?

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Oswald's 201 file. The Committee is speci-
19 fically interested in whether Oswald was the subject of any
20 CI project. By that, was he actually a participant or was he
21 under surveillance by any CI project?

22 Mr. Angleton. I would have to go back into all the symbols
23 that they used down there to understand "RE" unless it had
24 something to do with defectors.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Was there a special project group in the

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1 CI Staff?

2 Mr. Angleton. I think that was another name for SIG at
3 one time.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. To your knowledge, was Oswald ever the
5 subject of any CIA project?

6 Mr. Angleton. No.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know R[] E[] J?

8 Mr. Angleton. Yes.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what responsibilities he had?

10 Mr. Angleton. Yes, mail intercept.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Now, this card has the initials "RE" on it.
12 Is it possible that it is making reference to that individual?

13 Mr. Goldsmith.. It could be, it is probably a mail inter-
14 cept.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. H. T. Lingual program?

16 Mr. Angleton. Yes. That explains a lot because he
17 probably passed that to Egeter.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the Agency ever had had
19 experience with case officers setting up fictitious 201's,
20 fake 201 files?

21 Mr. Angleton. When you say fake what do you mean?

22 Mr. Goldsmith. For example, in the case of a project file
23 you might set up a project file indicating that the project
24 was intended to serve one purpose when it was actually
25 intended to serve another, by way of example?

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Mr. Angleton. That is possible.

Mr. Goldsmith. Can you think of any projects where that was done?

Mr. Angleton. I can't off hand think of them but I know there might be cases where the sensitivity of the case was so that you either would not open up a 201 file because the very existence of the name of the person in the file would disclose -- say there was an illegal that had been identified, the very fact that you have a file with an illegal's name has destroyed your case.

Mr. Goldsmith. So it was, I take it, then, accepted Agency practice under certain circumstances to either not open a file at all or if you were to open one, open it under somewhat misleading circumstances?

Mr. Angleton. I think so.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were you familiar at all with ZP FIFLE program?

Mr. Angleton. Only from listening to testimony on the radio.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever have any active involvement with Mr. William Harvey in regard to that program?

Mr. Angleton. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you know [] ?

Mr. Angleton. I know who he is, [] .

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you consider him to be a reliable

individual?

Mr. Angleton. He was down in the Argentine. I think he may have been ex-FBI. I am not certain. He was a great friend of Harvey's and well regarded. I never had any real business with him.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you know Ann Goodpastor?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. What were her responsibilities in the Mexico City station?

Mr. Angleton. She was very close to Win Scott, as I recall, and to Bill Harvey. I mean, she knew a lot of the old timers. I can't tell you exactly, but there was bound to be someone very sensitive.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know if she in fact was Win Scott's right hand person in Mexico City?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I know that she is, I personally have had very little dealings with her but my men had had a lot of dealings with her. She was always in on very sensitive cases.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know David Phillips?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

What is your opinion of his reliability?

Mr. Angleton. I have always regarded him as a little bit of a romantic. I think he is a very honest, straightforward fellow who is not really much of a professional. I

think he is a very decent, upright, forthright person. But I don't think any subtleties of the business ever penetrated.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know an individual named Maurice Bishop?

Mr. Angleton. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you ever heard reference to the term "Black Tape 201 File?"

Mr. Angleton. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you know Paul Harman?

Mr. Angleton. Very well.

Mr. Goldsmith. Will you give us your opinion as to his reliability?

Mr. Angleton. Very high. Paul is a person who fell on bad times when he was running operations in the German Division or something when I salvaged him.

Mr. Goldsmith. How many years did he work on your staff?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. It seemed like eternally but it wasn't. It was many years. I regard him as a very unique individual.

Of course, Paul was trained by Rocca to begin with and that is very important because he learned everything from Rocca. He is the only man I ever knew in the Clendestine Service who never failed you on tracking down something or finding it, whether it is a system in the Library of Congress; in other words, he made discoveries which had been there had

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1 the Agency ever known it was there for anyone if they had the
2 imagination, the drive, the total dedication that he had.
3 Therefore, he made tremendous breakthroughs of bringing us
4 the efforts and labors of other people in government at no
5 cost.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Did he have a good memory?

7 Mr. Angleton. A tremendous memory.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Was he a record retrieval expert?

9 Mr. Angleton. He was. He was a bird dog.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Angleton, that just about exhausts my
11 questions. I would like to thank you very much for your
12 assistance today.

13 Mr. Angleton. Thank you.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. I also would like to add that normally when
15 the Committee takes a statement from a witness at a hearing,
16 at the conclusion of the hearing, the witness is given an
17 opportunity to make a statement. This is not a formal hearing
18 and the same procedure does not automatically apply. However,
19 if you would like to take advantage of the opportunity to make
20 a five minute statement for the record, please feel free to
21 do so.

22 Also he is coming back another day to finish my questions.

23 Mr. Angleton. I simply want to recapitulate this would
24 have been the end of my session had it not been for the
25 surprise witness, John Hart. I don't think I can let 31 years

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1 of my life go down the drain listening to Hart. So that I
2 will be back when I have annotated what I regard to be one
3 of the worst torpedoes that the Director has launched into
4 the depths and has missed the target and it may make a U turn.
5 I use nautical terms because he has been launching a lot of
6 torpedoes in a very brief career.

7 So I will go on record with all my observations regarding
8 that and I want to point out first, so that you will under-
9 stand the depths of my feeling, that I was not notified by
10 the Committee and I was not notified by the Agency that Mr.
11 Hart was going to appear and therefore I had a great deal of
12 personal troubles that came about as a result of that surprise
13 testimony which I had not heard. It involves the reputations
14 of a great number of men.

15 Number one, the CI Staff did not have any jurisdiction
16 over Nosenko. The CI Staff was never involved in any of the
17 administrative details, payments or whatever. Contrary to
18 Hart's statement, I never saw the installation or visited the
19 installation with the Chief of the Soviet Division, which he
20 states as a categorical fact in his testimony.

21 I never was consulted regarding hostile interrogation,
22 to which I am very much opposed. I don't mean by that torture
23 or anything else. I mean alerting Nosenko that there are
24 suspicions regarding his testimony. That is totally contrary
25 to my philosophy of counterintelligence. So that it was a

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frolic of others. But I do not stand aside from those others because all those decisions went up through the channels of command and were made and therefore I stand by what the ultimate decisions were.

But he coalesced this into an accusation against the Counterintelligence that has no foundation whatsoever. He was permitted to give that testimony in public and in that way he has hurt a great number of people. I won't go into the big impact it had on my personal family and friends. Therefore, I want to be responsive to that.

My hope had always been with the Church Committee that these matters would be pursued as they said they would be pursued when they turned the files over to the Senate Intelligence Committee. It was to be a continuity of these matters that would be followed up. There has never been.

I might also add if the Admiral had any judgment in my view, he would have called together people who were familiar with these cases, with Hart present, and he would have had a normal discussion or conference with them and I don't think he would have put Hart up there for testimony. Because I question, one, Hart's qualifications, his first job having been as a very junior subordinate under me [] I know his career. I have been on all the senior promotion boards from the very beginning and therefore, his file has crossed my path many, many a time.

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1 He was a Colby man when he was put in. He was put in
2 by Colby's successors. He was brought in a case for which he
3 did not have the slightest qualifications or knowledge.

4 Therefore, those are my feelings about it. I never have
5 brought attorneys to this meeting or consulted about attorneys
6 in terms of my original meeting with Miss Brady until all
7 these doors were opened. Now, it is a question of who is
8 going to close those doors because there is also Mr. "X" who
9 resides in this country who listened to the stuff about his
10 psychiatric conditions and whatnot, his paranoid condition.

11 I think the Bureau showed great wisdom when they refused
12 to send somebody because these are all continuing cases. Just
13 because there is no directory, no chief counterintelligence
14 has changed, it has changed none of the basic counterintelli-
15 gence functions and the counterintelligence challenges that
16 exist today.

17 They didn't show me the Colby manuscript but they showed
18 it to everybody else before they cleared it. Had I seen it
19 I would have given them information which Colby omitted from
20 his book and they would have seen that they could not clear
21 his book because it was a distortion of classified information.

22 So there is a whole series of things which I may find
23 necessary to take up with the President's Oversight Committee
24 before this is all over.

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1 I don't want to end by throwing an apple of discord but
 2 I really do say that the judgment factors that have been
 3 involved here are open to very serious question.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you very much for your statement.
 5 I am sure that Miss Brady will give you an opportunity to
 6 communicate on the record your opinion on this matter.

7 Mr. Angleton. Thank you very much.

8 Whereupon, at 5L45 p.m., the taking of the deposition
 9 was recessed, to be resumed at a time mutually agreed upon
 10 between counsel.)

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Handwritten initials/signature

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CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

1 I, Albert Joseph LaFeance, the officer before whom the
 2 foregoing deposition was taken, do hereby certify that the
 3 witness whose testimony appears in the foregoing deposition
 4 was duly sworn by me; that the testimony of said witness was
 5 taken by me in shorthand to the best of my ability and there-
 6 after reduced to typewriting under my direction, that said
 7 deposition is a true record of the testimony give by said
 8 witness; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor
 9 employed by any of the parties to the action in which this
 10 depositions was taken; and further that I am not a relative
 11 or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties
 12 thereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the out-
 13 come of the action.

 Notary Public in and for the
 District of Columbia

My Commission expires November 14, 1980

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have read the foregoing pages
 1 through 155, inclusive, which
 contain a correct transcript
 of the answers made by me to the
 questions therein recorded.
 Signature is subject to
 corrections.

 (Deponent's signature)

I, Albert Joseph LaFrance, Notary Public in and for the
 District of Columbia, do hereby certify that I am notarizing
 and witnessing the signature for the deposition of James
 Angleton on this _____ day of _____.

 Notary Public in and for the
 District of Columbia

My Commission expires

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